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 1  Introduction 
This book integrates two basic ideas that, at first glance, might seem incom-
patible: the concept of economic competition and the relation between so-
cial and private rental housing1. The concept of economic competition basi-
cally holds that two or more parties strive for something that not all can ob-
tain. This can either be two or more suppliers that strive for the provision of a 
product to a customer, or two or more customers that strive for the consump-
tion of a good. One might argue that the purposes of social and private rent-
al housing are very diverse. In other words, social housing and private rent-
al suppliers do not strive for the provision of rental housing to the same cus-
tomers, while social and private renters do not compete for the consumption 
of the same rental service. 
However, this division between the two rental tenures appears to be less 
sharp if two recent developments in contemporary rental housing are taken 
into consideration. On the one hand, many countries have seen the privati-
zation of public housing companies through stock transfers to private non-
profit housing associations, tenant cooperatives, or profit-oriented landlords. 
Furthermore, policy makers have required social housing suppliers to oper-
ate in a more market orientated way and increasingly use private finance for 
developing and managing social housing dwellings. Here, public policy inter-
ventions have allegedly promoted competition between social housing organ-
izations and introduced commercial management tenets in order to increase 
the efficiency of the sector. In political practice this has been accompanied by 
a shift from object subsidies to means-tested demand-side subsidies in social 
housing finance. On the other hand, public authorities in some countries 
have tried to strengthen the role of private landlords in the provision of rental 
housing for vulnerable households, including low-income renters in general 
and homeless people in particular. This development has been facilitated by a 
relative increase of means-tested demand subsidies for private renters. 
Against this background, this thesis puts forward the argument that the 
once clear demarcation between the activities of social and private land-
lords appears to be shifting, which has possibly led to more mixed rental mar-
kets2, in which social and private landlords competitively coexist. With this in 
1 As will be shown in Section 1.1, social rental housing here is understood as rental housing that is allocated 
based on social criteria, while private rental housing is defined as rental housing that is allocated based on mar-
ket principles. Commercial and market rental housing have been used as alternative terms in the housing litera-
ture to describe this form of rental housing. This thesis regards them as synonyms, yet it follows the more Anglo-
Saxon perspective and thus tries to consistently use the term private rental housing or private renting. 
2 Originally, the term ‘mixed markets’ has been used by studies on nonprofit organizations (e.g. Brown & Slivin-
ski, 2006) to describe the relation between nonprofit and profit-oriented firms in market settings. Although, social 
landlords and nonprofits, as well as for-profits and private landlords are not necessarily congruent in housing 
market realities, I consider the terminology ‘mixed rental markets’ as an apt and concise way of characterizing 
the research subject of this study, i.e. the idea of competition between social and private landlords. Conversely, 
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mind, it can be said that a study of competition in mixed rental markets is rel-
evant in the sense that it helps to better grasp the functioning of rental mar-
kets in which social and private renting become increasingly intertwined. Even 
though this thesis should certainly not be read as a blueprint for designing 
such competitive mixed rental systems, it might thus inform the policy debate 
on how to introduce efficiency-oriented rental housing policy innovations.
This is not to say, however, that increasing competitive pressures have 
become a universal trend across national rental housing markets, and that 
such debates take place in all countries. After all, there are still large differ-
ences between countries with regard to whom social and private rental ser-
vices are provided for and which government policies and expectations are 
attached to them. Here, it has been pointed out that social housing from a 
consumers’ viewpoint has become more residualized in some countries, 
whereas it continuously serves a wider socio-economic stratum of the popu-
lation in other countries. Similarly, private renting has been characterized by 
its diversity with regard to its tenants, potentially serving all kinds of socio-
economic and demographic client groups. Nonetheless, which private rental 
segment – and with it, which type of private landlord – prevails, is again a 
question of which country we are looking at. Accordingly, a first observation 
is that the potential of inter-tenure competition in rental housing markets 
differs strongly between countries. Secondly and related to this is that social 
and private rental services are not traded along the same principles. The fact 
that, in contrast to private rental housing, the very reason for the existence of 
social rental housing is the prioritisation of people in housing need, means 
that if competition between the two tenures exists at all, it arguably takes 
place under different premises and has a different meaning than economic 
theory has taught us. That being said, it is possible to formulate two themati-
cally interwoven research aims that guide this PhD study.
1. The first research aim is to develop a new theoretical framework that can unfold the 
complex and shifting relationship between social and private rental housing from a 
competition perspective.
2. The second research aim is to better understand social and private landlords’ com-
petitive interactions, under which conditions they are likely to develop, and what 
the effects of these interactions are by applying the new framework in an internati-
onally comparative context.
To be able to fulfil these aims, the study is designed as a comparative re-
search project, using the mixed rental housing market in the cities of Coven-
the terms ‘rental housing’ and ‘rental housing markets’ merely acknowledges the existence of social and private 
rental sectors in the wider housing market, without carrying the notion of competition. 
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try in England and Breda in the Netherlands as empirical examples. The da-
ta collection was conducted between 2008 and 2011, which means that the re-
search findings mostly apply to this period of rental housing in the two coun-
tries and case studies. The two cases are arguably two very different local 
rental markets and also national housing systems with regard to the roles of 
social and private renting, who provides rental housing services and how gov-
ernments intervene into the production and delivery of these. 
The remainder of this introductory chapter basically sets out the concep-
tual framework for analysing competition in mixed rental markets. To do so, 
there is a first discussion of what is understood as private and social rent-
ing3 in the context of this study. Hereafter, the introduction will elaborate on 
the arguments on the possibility of competition between rental tenures that 
were mentioned in the beginning of this short overview. Based on a review 
of the concepts of competition in the economics literature, the theoretical 
model will be introduced, and consequently, the key research questions and 
research approach will be presented. The final section of this chapter briefly 
describes the content of this thesis. 
 1.1  The definitions of social and private renting
Researchers have constantly pointed out that a cross-national comparison of 
housing tenures is difficult, because the meanings that are attached to the 
terms social housing, owner-occupation, private renting, cooperative housing, 
etc. are different in most countries (Barlow & Duncan, 1988; Ruonavaara, 1993; 
Hulse, 2008). Of course, this does not mean that one cannot compare housing 
tenures and their relationships in two or more countries; however, due to the 
fact that tenure forms are most often culturally and historically contingent 
(Doling, 1997), it is essential to provide precise definitions of what one means 
when using these tenure labels. This thesis is not an exception here. 
Haffner et al. (2009a) note that most studies and official statistical sources 
typically base the definition of private renting on ownership status. Accord-
ingly, private renting is often equated with the provision of rental housing by 
private individuals or companies. However, this definition can be problemat-
ic. On the one hand, it may include private renting that is linked to employ-
ment or family relationships, and is thus not traded on an open market but 
is constrained to accommodate specific tenants who fulfil a certain eligibili-
ty criterion (being a family member or an employee of the firm). On the other 
hand, an ownership-based definition might include landlords providing hous-
ing services, which are linked to social allocation criteria when the landlord 
3 In this study, the terms renting and rental housing are used interchangeably.
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receives a subsidy or a tax concession for the provision of a dwelling. 
Similarly, social housing is often defined in terms of who owns the prop-
erty and the way the rent is set. It follows that social housing is often equat-
ed with the provision of housing by public companies and nonprofit housing 
associations (see Rhodes & Mullins, 2009). What this definition of social hous-
ing misses is that such organizations do not necessarily only provide dwell-
ings at a submarket rent to specified tenant groups but might trade parts of 
their housing stock on the open market. 
It follows that ownership status is not a sufficient criterion to define the 
two sectors and clarify the distinction between them. In line with Haffner et 
al. (2009a) and Ruonavaara (1993), this study argues that the key distinction 
between the two rental sectors is how private and social rental services are allo-
cated in the rental market. In theory, private rental housing is allocated by sup-
ply and demand. The rent has the function of signalling shortages or oversup-
plies of rental services. Theoretically, rents can be adjusted so that the private 
rental sector (PRS) is brought into a near-equilibrium state (Oxley, 2000). The 
vast majority of private landlords operate along a profit-maximizing premise. 
Consumer demand is governed by the willingness and ability to pay for a cer-
tain housing service. Tenants who are not willing or able to pay can be excluded 
from the consumption of a private rental service (O’Sullivan & Gibb, 2003). 
Social housing, on the other hand, is primarily not allocated by financial 
considerations of market actors (Oxley, 2000). Supply is not primarily based 
on profit-making decisions as in private rental markets; rather, it can be 
assumed that non-pecuniary goals prevail and that social housing providers 
are to a large extent driven by their public tasks (Maclennan & More, 1997; 
Scanlon & Whitehead, 2007). Concurrently, demand for social housing ser-
vices is not steered by tenants’ ability or willingness to pay the rent, but by 
a politically and socially defined and interpreted form of need (Oxley, 2000). 
Rents in social housing are mainly determined by administrative decisions. 
They tend to be kept at below market levels and clearly have a different pur-
pose than the signalling function of market rents. This implies that adjust-
ment in social housing to new market circumstances remains publicly con-
trolled and thus reflects political objectives rather than decisions of inde-
pendent providers and consumers of housing services (Whitehead, 2003). 
Table 1.1 provides an overview of what kind of rental housing this study con-
siders as private renting and what as social housing. In brief, social housing 
is understood as rental housing that is allocated along social and administra-
tive criteria, while private renting subsumes rental housing that is distributed 
through market forces. Accordingly, tenancies that are linked to employment 
or are provided by family and friends are not understood as private renting 
(and neither as social housing) and are therefore not considered in this study. It 
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follows that private renting and market renting are used interchangeably.4
The market/non-market definition approach is certainly not without prob-
lems. Firstly, how should we comprehend demand-side support in the PRS? 
Is this a form of social housing? The argument here is that although housing 
allowances have a strong impact on housing affordability, they do not change 
the market allocation process directly. Furthermore, since parts of this study 
rely on official data sources, it is not always possible to retain the ideal defini-
tions of private and social renting, since these sources tend to use ownership 
as the defining criterion, most likely due to a simpler data compilation pro-
cess. Thirdly, the conceptions of a researcher do not always match those of the 
actors in a market – in this case, landlords, letting agents, and tenants. It will 
become obvious throughout the text that these people use terms (e.g. commer-
cial renting) that might not necessarily reflect the dichotomy presented here. 
A final point that needs to be made is the use of the term nonprofit 
throughout the study. When describing the relation between different rent-
al tenures, Kemeny (1995) in his famous study on dual and unitary rent-
al markets speaks of competition between nonprofit and for-profit land-
lords, rather than of competition between social and private landlords. As will 
become apparent in the next sections, this study also relies on the distinc-
tion between nonprofit landlords, which are simply said organizations with 
a social mission which are not allowed to distribute profits to sharehold-
ers (Hansmann, 1987), and for-profit landlords and uses this terminology to 
describe the business models of social and private landlords. Nonetheless, 
this classification is not always accurate, since profit-oriented landlords can 
and do provide social rental services in some housing markets, while non-
profit landlords often do not only provide social rental services, but also mar-
ket-based rental accommodation. 
Arguably, this incongruity makes the research more complex and requires 
a clear and visible distinction of the terms social renting and social landlords, 
as well as private renting and private landlords. Yet, as will become obvious 
throughout this research, an unambiguous use of the corresponding termi-
nology is not always easy. To name but two problems, official sources do not 
4 Both terms have been used in the housing literature (e.g. Maclennan & More, 1997); however, it seems that in 
recent years ‘private renting’ and ‘private rental housing’ have become accepted as the standard expressions. In 
line with this dominant paradigm, the latter term is used throughout the study.
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necessarily follow the distinction between landlords themselves and the dif-
ferent allocation mechanism they apply, and neither is it evident in what way 
the market-based activities of social landlords follow their primary social 
mission. Accordingly, the conclusions of this thesis will reflect on the com-
plexities of staying true to the given definitions. 
 1.2   Competition and rental housing markets in
   the housing literature
Before answering the question of whether competition between the two rent-
al tenures is possible at all, it seems worthwhile to take a broader look at the 
notion of competition on rental housing markets. First, one might ask: Com-
petition for what? This question relates to the specific characteristic of the 
good housing in that it has both investment and consumption attributes. 
The rental dwelling can be considered as an investment good, which produc-
es income for landlords; yet, it can also be seen as a housing service for ten-
ants, which takes into account the physical quality of the dwelling, any lo-
cational condition and the legal quality of the rental housing consumption 
(Barr, 2004). Breaking up the product rented housing into these two categories 
means that before the actual provision of a housing service takes place, land-
lords might compete for rental housing assets, building sites, government 
contracts or even resources for the construction of new housing. 
The second question then is: Competition between whom? In principle, 
competition between the providers in rental housing markets could take 
place within the social housing industry, within the private rental sector, and/
or between social and private landlords. Indeed, the introduction of more 
market orientated policies in Western countries primarily aimed to introduce 
competitive elements into the social housing industry (Walker, 2000; Scanlon 
& Whitehead, 2008). 
The focus of this thesis is on competition between social and private land-
lords in the provisions of housing services for tenants. Nevertheless, it will 
not be neglected that competitive forces within social and private renting, as 
well as competition between different types of landlords at earlier production 
stages can have an impact on how the two landlords groups might compete 
for the provision of rental housing services. 
The theoretical impossibility of rental tenure competition
It is useful to keep in mind that rental housing is exposed to various mar-
ket imperfections (see O’Sullivan & Gibb, 2003). Quigley (2003) notes that land-
lords tend to have a better knowledge about the quality of their dwelling than 
tenants. This leads to substantial information asymmetries, under which it 
is difficult for tenants to estimate the asked rental price of a dwelling cor-
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responds with its actual market value. A second particularity of the product 
housing is its long durability (Priemus, 1998), which means that new dwell-
ings play an inferior role in the total housing supply and prices are mainly de-
termined by the existing stock. This leads to strong price rigidity in the rental 
(and also owner-occupied) market. Adding to this that rental housing services 
are highly heterogeneous – location and dwelling features are almost unique 
for every dwelling –, preferences of tenants are idiosyncratic, and transaction 
costs when moving to a new dwelling are extremely high, economists note 
that landlords are often able to set rents above market levels (Mac-lennan, 
1982). In other words, due to imperfect information, the durability of dwell-
ings, and the and intrinsic market power of landlords, the nature of the good 
private renting can be seen as an inherent limitation of competitive forces. 
Even more importantly, the definitions of social and private renting giv-
en above showed that the two sectors operate along different allocation and 
price adjustment mechanisms, which are grounded in the different purposes 
of the two rental sectors. Maclennan and More (1997) argue that the compet-
itive market outcome produces only an insufficient amount of decent rent-
al housing. In other words, the market will not provide for a socially defined 
form of need, if that requires higher quality or lower rents than given by 
the market outcome. Nonetheless, society might want all households to live 
under acceptable housing conditions. “There is, then, a gap […] between soci-
etally desired and effectively demanded housing output. This gap is often 
labelled housing requirements or housing needs” (p. 535). Hence, if social 
housing provides shelter only for those in housing need, and therefore to 
groups that lack the financial ability to pay for accommodation in the private 
sector, it could be argued that inter-landlords competition is impossible. Here, 
the different price adjustment mechanisms could be mentioned as well. In 
private markets one way of being successful in attracting new customers is to 
lower prices (Ricketts, 2002). Price setting in the social housing sector follows 
administrative decisions instead. Consequently, social housing suppliers can-
not react to price changes in the PRS, as it would be the case in fully commer-
cial markets. In other words, direct price competition between the two rental 
sectors is impossible. 
Housing market realities 
Indeed, in most countries it holds true that the objectives of the two rental 
tenures and how the two sectors function are different. Nonetheless, the defi-
nitions of social and private rental housing are theoretical in nature and only 
provide narrow descriptions of how the two industries5 operate and thus are 
5 The term industry is used in the industrial economics literature to describe the entirety of suppliers of a certain 
product. In this study a distinction is being made between social housing industry and private rental industry.
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related in real housing markets. 
The various market imperfections of housing services (see Section 1.1) have 
led to different government responses in many countries. Certain regulations 
and operating rules with regard to rents, quality, and property rights of ten-
ants are in place in most Continental European countries (Arnott, 1995). For 
instance, in Germany rent increases are regulated by the system of local ref-
erence rents, which are based on comparable quality characteristics for build-
ings and dwellings and the neighbourhoods they are located in (Haffner et al., 
2009a). Almost every country, including those where rent and quality regula-
tions are almost absent and property rights for private tenants are generally 
weak (e.g. the United States, Australia the UK), some form of housing allow-
ance for tenants exists and new rental housing provision tends to be struc-
tured through planning regulations (Pawson, 2006; Retsinas & Belsky, 2008). It 
follows that private rental housing is not affiliated with a powerful position 
of landlords per se, but under certain conditions it can resemble social hous-
ing in the way the relative power positions of tenants and landlords are con-
trolled by public authorities. Similarly, such housing policies mean that the 
PRS is not fully market-based, but that there are restrictive regulatory meas-
ures, particularly at the lower end of the market. 
Additionally, it is not helpful to consider the PRS as one coherent sector. 
On the contrary, it can have quite a fractured structure of provision, since in 
reality it tends to consist of different groups of landlords – divided by, i.a., 
organization structures and financial goals – and different groups of cus-
tomers. In this context, Rugg and Rhodes (2008, p. 15) rightly note that pri-
vate renting is characterized by the existence of distinctive submarkets, in 
which “tenants tend to carry certain expectations, and landlords will frame 
their management practices and purchase property types to fit the needs 
of their target tenant group. These submarkets may be spatially concentrat-
ed or widely dispersed, depending on the demand group and on the supply 
of particular property types in a given area”. From this it follows that private 
renting does have different purposes within and between various countries. 
For instance, private renting in the UK seems to carry the label as a tempo-
rary first step towards owner-occupation on the housing ladder, whereas in 
Germany’s housing system it conveys a tenure-for-life idea (Kemp & Kofner, 
2010). Nonetheless, even these two extremes share the paradigm that private 
rental accommodation is inhabited by all kinds of household. 
This directly relates to a more recent phenomenon. Governments in many 
countries, such as Ireland, the UK, Belgium, and Germany, have sought to 
increasingly involve private landlords in the provision of housing for low-
income households (Scanlon & Kochan, 2011). Gray and Mcanulty (2008) for 
Northern Ireland and Kemp (2011) for England provide some evidence that the 
share of ‘residual users’ has grown significantly in the PRS in the last two dec-
ades; a development which has been facilitated by generous demand subsidies, 
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enabling private landlords to gain substantial returns in a normally low-reve-
nue market segment. Moreover, in many European countries but also in the US, 
governments have come to experiment with projects on the provision of pri-
vate rental accommodation for homeless people (see O’Sullivan & De Decker, 
2006; Retsinas & Belsky, 2008). Arguably, this is not a form of free market rent-
ing, since access to those dwellings is defined by social criteria. Nonetheless, 
these developments in various Western housing markets show that many ten-
ants who would have traditionally found accommodation in the social housing 
sector, now form a new and growing group of potential private renters.
Furthermore, the theoretical statements about social housing do not nec-
essarily cope with how it actually works in political, social and business prac-
tice. Housing policies may assign a broader role to social housing than just 
satisfying housing need. For instance, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands 
are well known for their social housing sectors which offer housing services 
to those households that given their income would be able to pay for housing 
services at market levels (Whitehead, 2003; Scanlon & Whitehead, 2008). Here, 
social housing is expected to perform as a socially integrating force, prevent-
ing the stigmatisation of low-income households (Haffner et al., 2009a). This 
links to planning practice in for instance the UK, the Netherlands and Ireland 
(Scanlon & Whitehead, 2008; Redmond & Norris, 2007), where public housing 
companies or nonprofit housing associations are required to cooperate with 
private developers and (non-housing) social institutions on building socially 
mixed neighbourhoods. 
There are also good grounds to relax the assumption that pecuniary con-
siderations do not play a role in social housing. With the introduction of 
more market orientated social housing policies the objective functions of 
social landlords have become much more diverse. As a first step in this devel-
opment, governments have sought to transfer the ownership and provision 
to other suppliers than public authorities. In the UK this has involved stock 
transfers from council suppliers to privately managed Large-Scale Voluntary 
Transfer associations (Malpass, 2001). In the Netherlands municipal stock has 
been primarily transferred to existing housing associations, while in Sweden 
significant parts of the municipal stock have been transferred to tenant coop-
eratives. In business practice the transfer of public stock to private organisa-
tions was accompanied by the introduction of private financing schemes and 
a concurrent reduction of public subsidies in most Western European coun-
tries. As a result, social housing organisations are increasingly expected to 
work along commercial and social guidelines. 
Based on these rental market ‘realities’ one could argue that from the con-
sumers’ viewpoint, social housing and at least parts of the market rental sec-
tor are thus not necessarily ‘worlds apart’, since the two rental services might 
have similar prices, qualities, and locations; or the other way round, provid-
ers of private renting and social housing might have similar customer bases. 
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The contention of this study thus is that the relation between social and pri-
vate renting has become more blurred in some countries – certainly not in all 
countries –, potentially leading to increasing competitive pressures on both 
landlord groups.
A testimony of this blurring relationship is that it has come to the attention 
of the European Union’s competition authorities which has started an inquiry 
into the question of whether the relation between social and private renting 
the Netherlands is in accordance with the EU’s competition rules,; in other 
words, whether there is a level playing field for all suppliers of rental hous-
ing (Priemus & Gruis, 2011; Gruis & Priemus, 2008; Elsinga et al., 2008). The two 
main outcomes of this inquiry is that housing associations must allocate 90 
per cent of their new lets to the target group of social housing – i.e. house-
holds with a taxable income of less than approx. €33,600 – and they must 
split their organisation into a commercial and social entity (Priemus & Gruis, 
2011). Similarly, in Sweden there were also concerns about how social hous-
ing tenancy laws and rent regulation practices create an unlevel playing field 
between municipal and private landlords. However, negotiations between 
the Swedish government and the EU Commission were not required, since 
the dispute between social landlords and private rental organizations could 
be solved beforehand (Elsinga & Lind, 2012). Consequently it can be said that 
competition between the two rental tenures is not only possible in business 
practice, but has become a direct subject of political decision-making within 
countries as well as on a supranational level. 
To conclude, the assumption still holds that competition cannot be based 
on simple price cuts, since administrative allocation mechanisms prevail in 
the social housing industry. Yet, non-price competition between social and 
private landlords for tenants or a mix of tenants on the basis of, for instance, 
rent/quality relations, property rights, location, or a combination of those 
might very well be possible.
Existing conceptual frameworks
The described development towards a potentially more competitive relation-
ship between the two rental tenures in many countries has been acknowl-
edged by an increasing number of housing researchers (e.g. Kemp, 2011; Scan-
lon & Kochan, 2011; Hulse et al., 2010; Rhodes & Mullins 2009; Murie, 2009; 
Kemp & Keoghan, 2001; Walker, 1998; Giffinger, 1998) However, there have on-
ly been a few attempts to devise conceptual frameworks that can unfold the 
basic principles of what competition between the two landlord groups means 
and what the processes of competition are. Arguably, the most influential ex-
ception has been Kemeny’s (1995) seminal work on unitary and dualist rent-
al markets (see also Kemeny et al., 2005). In brief, dualist rental systems are 
characterized by two polarized rental tenures. Public authorities closely con-
[ 13 ]
trol nonprofit6 social landlords through their integration in the command 
economy public rental sector. Furthermore, access to nonprofit renting is 
based on strict means testing, leading to a strong residualization of the sec-
tor. Profit renting in the PRS is largely unregulated and is effectively shielded 
from any competitive pressures of the nonprofit sector. In unitary rental mar-
kets, a social market approach to rental housing provision encourages non-
profit landlords to compete with the profit-oriented private sector. Since reg-
ulatory barriers to competition do not exist, lower rents (or higher quality/se-
curity of tenure) in the nonprofit sector lead to high competitive pressures on 
profit landlords, forcing them to lower their rents (increase quality/security 
of tenure) as well. Kemeny further contends that in order for competition to 
take place, certain requirements need to be fulfilled: Nonprofit housing needs 
to be of a sufficient overall size and must provide a wide range of services 
with regard to dwelling age, size, type, and standards. 
One of Kemeny’s basic assumptions on the effect of competition between 
social nonprofit and private profit rental landlords is tested by Atterhög and 
Lind (Atterhög & Lind, 2004; Atterhög, 2005) in the context of the Swedish uni-
tary rental market. The authors analyse whether competition between munic-
ipal housing companies and private landlords leads “to lower prices, reduced 
costs, more innovation and generally a stronger position for the consum-
er” (ibid, 2004, p. 108). In research practice this means that they test the rela-
tion between supply concentration and rental prices in all local authorities in 
Sweden, where they use the market shares of municipal providers as a proxy 
for supply concentration in both rental sectors.7 Being clearly preoccupied 
with the effects of competition between the two rental tenures, the authors’ 
research presents an interesting and useful way of quantifying this relation-
ship. 
Most recently, Haffner et al. (Haffner et al., 2009a; 2009b; Oxley et al., 2010b; 
Elsinga et al., 2009) have presented the competitive gap between social and 
private renting as a new way of thinking about the relationship between the 
two rental tenures. On the one hand, the competitiveness gap is based on the 
degree of substitutability between rental housing services, which includes 
a comparison of absolute rent and quality levels, as well as the regulatory 
6 As stated above, rather than using the terms social and private rental housing, Kemeny uses the terms profit 
and nonprofit renting. There are however no indications that he understands them differently.
7 Interestingly enough, the results of their regression analysis show that there is indeed a relationship between 
the market share of the municipal housing company and the rent level; yet the findings are in the opposite direc-
tion of what they had assumed: The lower the market share of the municipal provider, the higher the rent level 
(where the effect is small and has a low level of significance). Furthermore, Atterhög and Lind show that in their 
model, competition from the owner-occupied sector – which they call a good substitute for renting – is much 
more important for rental prices than competition within the rental sector.
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frameworks on who can provide and consume which rental service. On the 
other hand, the gap is defined by the degree of rivalry between the suppliers 
of rental housing, which in their work equals the concentration of supply, as 
measured by the market share of individual landlords. 
In short, these three conceptual frameworks provide some useful starting 
points. Kemeny’s argument that political decisions are central in circumscrib-
ing the likelihood of competitive pressures in mixed rental markets, and the 
consideration of product-related aspects (substitutability) and market struc-
tural aspects (the degree of rivalry) as proposed by Haffner et al. are guiding 
thoughts in this thesis. However, the contention here is that since these frame-
works merely focus on structural and political aspects of competition (and in 
Atterhög’s case the effects of competition), give less attention to functional-
ities of private renting than to those of social renting (see Hulse et al., 2010), 
and lack empirical testing, particularly in the case of Kemeny (for an excep-
tion see Hoekstra, 2009), they are not able to fully unfold the behavioural inter-
actions in mixed rental markets and how these relate to structural and politi-
cal aspects, and what the outcomes of such interactions are. Hence, in order to 
devise a more holistic conceptual framework for analysing inter-tenurial com-
petition on rental housing markets, the next sections will take a step back and 
discuss existing concepts of competition in broader economics terms.8
 1.3  The traditional structure-conduct-perfor-
mance paradigm
The traditional neoclassical framework for the analysis of competition be-
tween providers in fully commercial markets is the structure-conduct-perfor-
mance (SCP) paradigm. It has been claimed that the SCP can shed light on the 
competitive conditions of a market in which firms operate, how those condi-
tions affect their behaviour, and what the economic effects of both individual 
and collective behaviour are (see Motta, 2004; Shy, 1995). 
Market structure consists of three aspects (see Clarkson & LeRoy Miller, 
1983): Supply concentration measures the number and market shares of sup-
pliers in a market. Product differentiation measures the homogeneity of the 
products that are being traded. Barriers to entry and exit assess how likely 
new suppliers enter and exit a market and thus how stable the supply struc-
ture in a market is. Firm conduct is defined as the individual firm’s policies 
towards its product markets and towards the moves made by rival firms. The 
main questions are how firms set prices – collusively, tacitly or independently 
8 Here, the study also relies on related work on the different meanings of competition in the economics literature 
(see Lennartz et al., 2009).
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–, and which strategies they pursue to discourage entrants (Jacquemin, 2000). 
Performance evaluates whether the firms’ interactions lead to socially and 
economically desired outcomes. Here, the economics literature distinguishes 
between allocative efficiency (are resources allocated in the best way possi-
ble), dynamic efficiency (do firms invest a proper amount of their resources in 
R&D), and productive efficiency (is the output of production maximized given 
the prescribed input), as well as equitable and consumer-satisfying outcomes 
in the market (Motta, 2004).
The underlying hypothesis of the SCP paradigm is that a stable causal rela-
tionship between the three elements exists (see Figure 1.1). The structure of a 
market is exogenous, while conduct and performance are structurally deter-
mined variables. Under the assumption that all actors have complete infor-
mation and products are perfectly divisible, a perfectly competitive market 
is defined as a market in which the number of sellers is high, products are 
homogeneous and entry and exit barriers do not exist. In such a market envi-
ronment, all firms are price takers, which means that they have to set prices 
independently to the marginal costs of production, which according to eco-
nomic theory leads to an efficient market; that is the performance of the mar-
ket is welfare optimal (Tirole, 1988). In all other market forms, from monopo-
listic competition, where suppliers compete on differentiated products, to a 
monopoly, where only one provider exists, suppliers can exert market pow-
er and set prices above marginal costs without losing customers and becom-
ing less profitable. From a behavioural viewpoint profit-maximising strategies 
exist in all market forms. However, the main difference between perfectly and 
imperfectly competitive markets is that firms in the latter can improve their 
position (gain higher profits) through optimal pricing and output strategies, 
where profitable pricing is facilitated by the possibility to engage in price fix-
ings when the number of firms is low (Caves, 1986). As a result of such ineffi-
cient aggregate behaviour welfare losses occur (Martin, 2010). 
Shortcomings of the SCP framework and the neoclassical idea of competition
The problems with this basic assumption are manifold: Firstly, the static, uni-
directional relationship between structure and performance, and with it the 
neoclassical assumption that a large number of sellers necessarily lead to a 
more efficient market outcome, was challenged by mainly non-mainstream 
studies (Jacquemin, 2000). In contrast to the SCP, the ‘efficient structure hy-
pothesis’ (ESH) assumes that market structure is not an exogenously giv-
en factor, but depends on the strategic decisions and efficiency of individu-
al firms (Schmalensee, 1989). More decisively, the ESH argues that in a state of 
perfect competition there would be no competition at all, because there is no 
incentive to behave slightly different and thereby outperform a rivalling firm, 
which is however what competition originally is about – the strive for some-
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thing that not every competitor can obtain. Accordingly, Clarkson and LeRoy 
Miller (1983) note that the lack of conscious rivalry contradicts the neoclassi-
cal model, since in order for the market to come into equilibrium state, a dy-
namic process must take place that “works through rivalry among economic 
transactors” (p. 110). 
Secondly, for the described relation between the elements of the SCP to be 
possible, the traditional SCP – and with it the entirety of the mainstream eco-
nomics literature – presumes that all firms are rational profit-maximizers. In 
a perfectly competitive market, suppliers who do not act rationally and devi-
ate from the profit-maximizing equilibrium face increased risks to be driv-
en out of the market. However, a large corpus of the economic literature on 
the nature of the nonprofit firm shows that the profit maximization is but 
one strategy that a supplier in a market can use. More precisely, Hansmann 
(1987) states that nonprofit activities are a response to goods that are under-
provided, most often because the provision does not guarantee a satisfying 
return, but serve a public purpose. By fulfilling this public need, nonprofit 
firms might best be described as rational optimizers pursuing their non-mon-
etary objectives (see Ritchie & Weinberg, 2000). Pursuing social rather than 
only monetary objectives has some important implications for the pricing 
behaviour of nonprofit firms, since they might use other devices than fees, for 
instance waiting lists or price discrimination (Malani & David, 2004), which in 
turn means that pricing decisions are not necessarily at the core of how firms 
interact with each other in a competitive market setting, be it in a highly con-
centrated or a highly deconcentrated market.
Finally, the traditional SCP neglects that there are institutional constraints 
on what individuals and organizations are able to do in a market (North, 
1990). Literally every market has an institutional framework that can be 
described as the rules of the game, limiting the choices that firms can make 
and structuring the interactions between them. However each organization 
and manager within each organization might decipher these rules different-
ly, which in turn might lead to different perceptions of how competitive the 
market environment is and who their competitors are. Accordingly, in such 
highly regulated markets one can often observe firm behaviour, which can 
deviate significantly from the market specific equilibrium (Simon, 1986).
The framework’s limitations do, however, not mean that the mainstream 
SCP paradigm is of no use as a competition analysis tool. Nonetheless, a sim-
ple application of the traditional SCP framework to rental housing markets is 
not a meaningful exercise. Accordingly, based on the described weaknesses 
of the original framework and guided by the special conditions of how rental 
housing markets function, it seems to be possible to modify the SCP in a way 
that it becomes a more eclectic paradigm for competition analysis in mixed 
rental markets.
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 1.4  The structure-conduct-performance of  
  rental housing 
Generally, rental housing is not utilized to test the logic of the SCP or to make 
some inter-industry comparisons; instead, the opposite is true. The SCP is ap-
plied to rental housing in order to create a framework that can be used to pro-
vide valuable insights on the competitive relation between social and private 
rental housing. For this purpose some considerable modifications to the origi-
nal framework are proposed (for an overview see Table 1.2). 
Firstly, since the traditional SCP inadequately addresses explanations of 
firm behaviour, it follows that when applying the SCP to rental housing it 
should be utilized as an organizing framework, including a more explicit for-
malization of strategic firm conduct. In other words, adapting the SCP to rent-
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al housing markets is based on a clear separation of the three elements struc-
ture, conduct, and performance. This means that the SCP model is used as 
an ordering framework that acknowledges both the structural and the behav-
ioural concept of competition and assesses the links between them empiri-
cally. Secondly, the SCP of rental housing will give considerable weight to the 
rules and regulations on rental markets. As said, (neo-)institutional econo-
mists have clearly pointed out the importance of regulatory frameworks for 
firm behaviour. Hence, this framework is in line with approaches that dem-
onstrate how new rules and regulations can facilitate the analysis of chang-
ing social housing systems (e.g. Gibb & Trebeck, 2009); however, by consider-
ing the regulation of the PRS as well, this idea will be expanded to the whole 
rental market. Thirdly, instead of analysing competition between firms which 
all operate along the same principles and pursue the same goals in the mar-
ket, the diverging objective functions and business models in social and pri-
vate renting are made explicit in the whole thesis, particularly when investi-
gating rent setting and investment strategies of different landlords. The non-
profit/for-profit cleavage will thus be used as one guiding topic in this thesis. 
Finally, it has been pointed out before that housing policy approaches and 
social rental structures differ between countries. As a result and in contrast 
to the original SCP, where measuring substitutability is exogenous and pri-
marily relies on the calculation of the cross-price elasticity of demand (Mot-
ta, 2004), substitutability of private and social housing services needs to be 
made explicit in this framework. Modifying the traditional SCP refers to the 
fact that it is a strictly supply side analytical tool of measuring competition 
in a market. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the consumption 
decisions of tenants in national rental markets should not be seen as giv-
en, since the ability and willingness to substitute the two rental services dif-
fers between countries and customer groups. Therefore, the contention here 
is that the ability to substitute needs to be made explicit within the SCP of 
rental housing framework – i.e. the question of whether a specific tenant does 
have access to both social and private rental services –, while the willingness 
to substitute the two rental services is not directly included in the theoretical 
model, but should be analysed on a meta-level. 
Market structure
The previous section suggests that market structure in the SCP of rent-
al housing should comprise five rather than only three items that define the 
competitiveness of the mixed rental housing markets. 
In line with the traditional framework, the first key aspect is the concen-
tration of supply in a rental market. Arguably, there are two levels of supply 
concentration: on the one hand, the market shares of landlords within each 
rental sector, and on the other hand, the position of individual landlords in 
the whole rental market, particularly the one of social landlords who tend to 
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be relatively large organizations. Nevertheless, supply concentration does not 
only deal with the number of landlords and their respective market shares 
but also with where they offer their services in local housing markets. The 
rationale to include spatial concentration aspects into the model is grounded 
in the condition that (rental) housing is spatially fixed. Dwellings are where 
they are, and even if the supply in both social and private rental housing was 
highly deconcentrated, the two industries might operate in very different are-
as, thus having a smaller market overlap. In other words, the SCP of rental 
housing controls for spatial monopolies of private renting and particularly 
social housing suppliers to see if supply concentration on a city-level actually 
conforms with where the two rental services are provided, which influences 
the question of whom they are provided for. 
The concept of barriers to entry supply in this study is a different one than 
in the traditional SCP paradigm. It can be argued that conventional entry and 
exit barriers, such as absolute cost advantages of incumbents and brand loy-
alty, are relatively low in rental housing markets. Many people who want to 
provide rental housing do have or can acquire the resources to do so (Arnott, 
1995). However, entry and exit barriers can be high when they are understood 
as the bureaucratic burdens for landlords to operate in both rental segments. 
This refers to the possibilities for private individuals and companies to enter 
the social housing industry and, conversely, the possibilities for social land-
lords to operate in the private rental sector. Under the assumption that social 
and private rental services might be provided to a completely different set 
of customers, the fourth market structural item is the existence of barriers 
to access social and private rental housing. The question here is, who might 
actually consume private and social housing services: Is there free choice 
for tenants between the two rental services, or do regulatory and landlord-
induced impediments to consume either service exist?
Product differentiation refers to the degree of homogeneity of social and 
private rental services. In contrast to the traditional SCP, which measures 
product differentiation in terms of cross price elasticity of demand (Shy, 
1995), this study follows the definition of substitutability that has been pro-
posed by Haffner et al. (2009a). They argue that the substitutability, or the 
degree of product similarity, relates to two subjects. On the one hand, the 
similarity of rent levels and rent regulation policies should be taken into 
account. This should be complemented by an analysis of actual rent expen-
ditures, which should investigate whether housing allowance are available 
to both social and private renters and how generous they are. On the other 
hand, product differentiation is about the similarity of service quality. This 
comprises both the quality of the dwelling and the quality of location. Addi-
tionally, the existence of quality regulations in the two sectors is an impor-
tant point, which includes observations on how the security of tenure is reg-
ulated in each sector. Ideally, one would consider the rent/quality relation 
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of social and private rental services conjointly. After all, prospective tenants 
might, for instance, consider a low rent/low quality private rental service 
housing and a middle rent/middle quality social housing service as good sub-
stitutes. Here, it can be assumed that the ability and willingness to substitute 
generally is a question of the purposes of social and private renting. Where 
the purpose of social housing is to accommodate a broader clientele than just 
those in need, the two sectors are more likely to cover similar market seg-
ments and should thus be considered as better substitutes by the consumers 
(see also Oxley et al., 2010b).
Landlord conduct 
It was shown in the previous section that the traditional SCP paradigm and 
neoclassical economics in general see the behaviour of the firm as a proper-
ty of market structure, in which each market form (perfect competition, mo-
nopolistic competition, oligopoly) has its own equilibrium to which firms will 
adapt in the long run if they seek to maximise profits. Under the assump-
tion that a more diverse set of objective functions exist in mixed rental mar-
kets and that managerial intentions can be diverse and are not necessarily ra-
tional, conduct in the SCP of rental housing is generally understood as a pro-
cess of conscious rivalry. In other words, the basic condition for a competi-
tive relationship between firms is that they perceive each other as rivals for 
the patronage of customers and take certain risks to outperform their con-
testers (Shepherd, 1984; Baumol, 1982). In line with our framework, compet-
itive behaviour would thus mean that social landlords see private landlords 
as rivals and vie for their customer base, and vice versa. This in turn implies 
that the existence of a rival social (private) industry might have an impact on 
strategic behaviour in the private (social) industry. If such competitive percep-
tions exist, consequent strategic behaviour could be recognized in the follow-
ing aspects: the investment strategies of landlords with regard to the quali-
ty of their housing stock; their pricing strategies as a way to make their offers 
more attractive to customers; their investment strategies with regard to the 
quantity of supply, where landlords might seek to increase their market share 
through the construction or acquisition of new dwellings; the risk diversifying 
strategies that landlords pursue. One might imagine that private landlords in-
creasingly engage in submarkets that are very different from social housing 
in order to avoid its competitive pressures. Social landlord behaviour, on the 
other hand, could comprise a risk diversification strategy in which the provi-
sion of housing services is spread across different local markets; and finally, 
the way decisions are made in business practice. Do private and particularly 
social landlords make their decisions as individual landlords, or are decisions 
made as one coherent sector, or are they stipulated by administrative specifi-
cations?
To guarantee a detailed understanding of conduct there should be a dis-
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tinction between the strategic decisions of for-profit and nonprofit providers. 
It holds true that in mixed rental markets the diversity of business models 
implies that social landlords are more inclined to behave cooperatively than 
for-profit private landlords. Actually, they are often encouraged to do so by 
legislated, socially sanctioned incentives. The literature on the economics of 
the nonprofit firm has highlighted that where such divergences in business 
paradigms exist the notion of inter-firm rivalry is altered, since there is lim-
ited scope for competitive behaviour to take place (Young et al., 2010; Ritch-
ie and Weinberg, 2004; Hansmann, 1987). On the other hand, a distinction 
should be made between business models within each sector. After all, small-
scale individual landlords and corporate investors within the private rental 
sectors, as well as public and private not-for profit providers within the social 
housing sector can have very different business approaches and goals in the 
respective rental sectors (see also Scanlon & Kochan, 2011). Here, it is also 
suggestive to make a distinction between ownership and management. In 
both sectors there might be an organisational division between owners of the 
dwelling and those who manage it on a day-to-day basis. In the private rental 
sector, corporate investors might own dwellings, but the management could 
be in the hands of professional letting agents. Conversely, in the social hous-
ing industry, public authorities might own the stock, but management servic-
es are outsourced to an independent private organisation.
Market performance
Following the traditional SCP, performance evaluates the effects of competi-
tion between the two groups of suppliers in mixed rental markets. Here, firm-
level and market-level (or societal) effects can be distinguished. From an 
economic viewpoint the first aspect is mainly about the question of wheth-
er competitive interactions between the two landlord groups leads to a more 
productive use of resources in the delivery of rental housing services. Neo-
classical theory tells us that increasing competitive pressures provoke man-
agers of firms to find ways of providing their products at lower costs since the 
profitability of the whole industry decreases with an increasing number of 
competitors. The analysis of firm-level performance should examine whether 
such mechanism exist in mixed rental market realties. Additionally, the firm-
level performance should consider the effects of competition on the social 
mission of social landlords in the rental housing market. Here, a broader dis-
cussion on the effects of an ever-commercialising social rental sector should 
take place. The other way round it could be asked whether competitive pres-
sures lead to an exit of private landlords, since they are not able to compete 
with social landlords on equal terms and thus become unprofitable. 
From a broader perspective, performance is about the impact of competi-
tion in mixed rental markets on the consumers. In other words, performance 
deals with the societal desirability of competition between social and private 
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rental landlords. A competitive rental housing market, in which the two sec-
tors offer housing units that are good substitutes, means that tenants have 
more choice. If tenants have more choice and if they make use of the choice 
in their housing consumption decisions, one can assume that the outcome 
of rental housing allocation satisfies tenants’ housing preferences. Nonethe-
less, again it needs to be acknowledged that competition might have negative 
side-effects: If competition with commercial suppliers induces social housing 
landlords to focus on more profitable market segments and try to cater for 
more affluent households in order to secure their own financial stability, this 
would imply a less equitable rental market, in which social housing suppliers 
lose sight of their public and social responsibility. On the other hand, com-
petition can have positive effects as well. If competitive pressures in mixed 
rental markets induce landlords to lower their prices or increase the quali-
ty of their products as a strategy to survive in the market and if tenants can 
choose between all kinds of products effectively, allocative efficiency as well 
as consumer satisfaction might increase. From a government’s viewpoint this 
has important implications of how and when they should intervene in the 
market. If the desirable effects of competition surpass the negative effects, 
one might argue that public authorities might want to regulate rental mar-
kets in a way that increases competitive interaction between social and pri-
vate landlords. 
Consumer behaviour in mixed rental markets
In contrast to the traditional SCP, conduct in the rental market framework al-
so gives significant weight to the role and behaviour of the tenants. In this 
line of reasoning, market structure sets the general conditions for competi-
tion between social and private renting. It can be argued that the degree of 
product similarity and the question of whether the same tenants can access 
both social and private rental services thus circumscribe the potential degree 
of substitutability of private and social rental services. This structural view on 
the relation between the two rental products and under which conditions they 
can be consumed is surely important. However, the observable factors of the 
two products, such as absolute rent levels or security of tenure, do not neces-
sarily match with how they are perceived by tenants. Moreover, it says nothing 
about tenants’ willingness to actually substitute the two rental services. 
Accordingly, the SCP of rental housing should include an investigation of 
the attitudes towards and perceptions of social and private rental servic-
es and consequently whether tenants intend to move between the two rent-
al sectors voluntarily. It has been pointed out by ample social research, most 
prominently through the Reasoned Action Approach by Fishbein and Ajzen 
(1975; 2010), that there is a direct link between perceptions and attitudes on 
the one hand, and behavioural intentions and behaviour on the other hand. 
In research practice the psychological concepts of attitudes, perceptions, 
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intentions, and actual behaviour, as well as the relations between them, can 
be used to make the relative abstract concept of substitutability – or more 
precisely, the willingness to substitute – more graspable and understandable. 
 1.5  Research approach and key questions
The theoretical exercise in the previous section has primarily focused on the 
various conceptual meanings of competition in mixed rental markets; howev-
er, less attention was given to the relations between the three elements mar-
ket structure, landlord conduct, and performance. It was said before that the 
traditional SCP assumes a unidirectional causal relationship going from the 
exogenous market structure directly to performance. It is thus unsurpris-
ing that the traditional framework has been applied in a way that has direct-
ly measured aspects of market structure and runs those in a regression anal-
ysis against some commonly acknowledged performance measures. Again, 
this study will follow a different approach, as competitive conduct, where it 
comes from, and what it leads to is at the centre of the theoretical model and 
the empirical investigation. 
Figure 1.2 should be understood in a way that the links between the ele-
ments are not presumed as is done in the traditional SCP paradigm. This does 
not mean that the SCP of rental housing is not interested in the impact of 
market structure on landlord behaviour, of behaviour on performance, and 
additionally of performance on structural settings in the long run. Rather the 
opposite is true, as is indicated by the arrows in the conceptual model. How-
ever, the difference is that this thesis acknowledges a more complex relation-
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ship between the three elements than a one-way causal explanation, which 
is why the approach chosen here is to empirically analyse the various aspects 
of competition in mixed markets separately and deduce the links between 
them from the empirical evidence. In other words, the interrelations between 
the three elements of the SCP are a process of discovery within the empirical 
investigation, making this thesis more of an exploratory than an explanatory 
study. In line with this is the meta level examination of tenants’ consumption 
decision in mixed rental markets. Since, such an analysis is not part of the 
traditional SCP approach, the links with the other three elements are not pre-
sumed, but will be the subject of an empirical discovery process. 
Research questions 
Based on the theoretical epitome of the SCP of rental housing it is possible to 
formulate the research questions that will guide the further analysis of this 
thesis. Generally, the research questions structure the empirical examina-
tions into four parts, and equally four chapters. The first set of questions con-
cerns the competitiveness of the two local rental markets in Coventry (Eng-
land) and Breda (the Netherlands) and thus gives a thorough account of the 
market environment, including the rules and regulations of provision, under 
which both landlord groups operate. The second set of questions deals with 
the concept of conscious rivalry in mixed rental markets and how rivalrous 
interactions relate to the rental market environment. The third group is about 
the effects of a more or less competitive mixed rental market and more or 
less competitive interactions between landlords. Finally, the research ques-
tions on tenant behaviour in mixed rental markets seeks the basis for giving 
a more precise account of how the role of the consumer of the two rental ser-
vices influences the competitive relationship as such. 
The competitiveness of the rental market structures (Chapter 3)
1. What is a competitive structure of mixed rental housing markets? 
2. How competitive are the mixed rental markets in Coventry and Breda?
Rivalry between social and private landlords (Chapter 4)
1. What is competitive conduct of social and private landlords in mixed rental mar-
kets?
2. What are the perceptions of social and private landlords of their competitive rela-
tionship? Do they perceive each other as rivals in the rental market? How do these 
perceptions affect their strategic behaviour in the market?
3. What are possible drivers of and accordingly barriers to the rivalrous interactions 
between the two landlord groups? 
The outcomes of competition in mixed rental markets (Chapter 5)
1.What is the meaning of performance in mixed rental housing markets?
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2.What are the possible effects of competition between social and private landlords on 
the performance of mixed rental markets?
The willingness of tenants to substitute social and private rental services (Chap-
ter 6)
1. What are tenants’ perceptions of social and private renting? How can these percep-
tions be explained?
2. How do these perceptions, as well as structural conditions and personal circum-
stances influence tenants’ willingness to consume social and/or private rental ser-
vices? 
 1.6  Methodological approach and data 
The attentive reader will notice the centrality of comparative housing re-
search (Doling, 1997) in the formulation of the research goals and approach. 
Making this book explicitly comparative transcends the idea that the condi-
tions, processes, and effects of competition between the two landlord groups 
are expected to be different across housing systems. Rather, by examining a 
small number of empirical cases holistically, we seek to better understand 
the causal processes and conditions that can lead to similarities and differ-
ences between the tenurial relationships in these countries (see Pickvance, 
2001; Oxley, 2001; Oxley, 1991). In simpler terms, an application of the inter-
nationally comparative methodology aims to build explanations of why the 
relationship between social and private renting in country A might be classi-
fied as competitive, but not in country B. 
In research practice the framework will be tested in the context of rental 
housing in England9 and the Netherlands. The two countries have been cho-
sen from theoretical, policy-orientation and pragmatic perspectives. First 
of all, the two countries have a significant market share of both rental ten-
ures. This makes any kind of relation – not to mention a competitive relation 
– more likely than in countries where either one of the sectors is extreme-
ly marginalized. Furthermore, in Kemeny’s terminology, the two countries are 
two of the most extreme cases with regard to the functionality of dualist (Eng-
land) and unitary rental markets (the Netherlands) (see Kemeny, 1995; Keme-
ny et al., 2005). In line with this is that the Netherlands – but not England – 
has been said by the EU to endorse unfair competition between social and pri-
9 Although the policy goals and instruments of housing are comparable between the constituent parts of the 
United Kingdom, there are nonetheless some significant differences between their housing systems with regard 
to administrative and governance responsibilities. Due to efficiency and pragmatic reasons the study will thus use 
England as a case study rather than the whole of the UK.
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vate rented housing because of the lack of a level playing field caused by sub-
sidies to the social sector leaking into their commercial activities (Gruis & 
Priemus, 2008; Elsinga et al., 2008). Part of this discussion shows that the idea 
of inter-tenurial competition exists in the housing political discourse in the 
Netherlands; however, it also signifies that in the Dutch housing market reali-
ty, true competition between the two sectors might be undermined, as it takes 
place on an unlevel playing field. 
From a theoretical but also a more pragmatic point of view, this study fol-
lows the work of the Housing Systems Department at the OTB Research Insti-
tute for the Built Environment, TU Delft. The housing researchers Michael 
Oxley, Marietta Haffner, Marja Elsinga, Joris Hoekstra, and Harry van der Heij-
den have conducted extensive research on the competitive relation between 
social housing and private renting as well as competition within the social 
housing sector. Many of their conclusions are grounded in a comparison of 
the Netherlands and England (Elsinga et al., 2009), showing that rental hous-
ing seems to be more competitive in the former than in the latter country. 
Part of their research approach and also results can guide and complement 
the empirical research of this study. 
The thesis further contends that it is meaningful to conduct a compari-
son of two local rental markets as case study cities within the country com-
parison. First of all, rental markets are primarily local markets, meaning that 
indicators of competition and how it is expressed in reality can best be exam-
ined on local levels as well. Ideally, an analysis of competition between social 
and private housing in local markets would rely on the concept of housing 
market areas (HMA) (Jones, 2002). The reason is that HMA are seen as “con-
tinuous areas comprizing a settlement or group of settlements with a high 
degree of housing market self-containment and where in-migration […] is of 
only minor significance” (Jones, p. 557). However, for this study the approach 
is not feasible. As we will rely significantly on secondary data and official doc-
uments in this analysis, it seems to be more meaningful to stick with local 
authority boundaries, since it is the unit to which published data on (rental) 
housing most often applies. 
Based on a literature review and an interpretation of secondary data, the 
local authority of Breda has been chosen as a typical city for the Netherlands, 
while the local authority of Coventry has been chosen for England. The selec-
tion criteria for the two cases were as follows:
 ▪ The overall size of the population and the housing stock should indicate at 
least a mid-sized city, in the sense of having a mixed social structure in 
which all kinds of classes and incomes are sufficiently represented. 
 ▪ The local authority should have a relatively solitary location; i.e. it is not in 
an agglomeration area, where housing markets of several local authorities 
strongly interact with each other. 
 ▪ The share of both rental tenures should reflect tenure shares in the country.
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 ▪ The types of suppliers should be representative for the overall country. 
However, for England it was decided to exclude cities where a council land-
lord is active, mainly because traditional as well as stock transfer housing 
associations (see Pawson, 2006) have become the dominant providers of 
social housing. 
 ▪ The pressure in the local housing market (demand/supply relation) in both 
rental sectors should signify what researchers have observed for the whole 
country. In the PRS, vacancy rates were used as a measure for market pres-
sure, and in social housing the average waiting time on the social housing 
waiting list. This criterion precluded extremely tight housing markets such 
as London in England and Amsterdam or Utrecht in the Netherlands. 
Data 
The competitiveness of the rental markets
The analysis of the of the five competitiveness benchmarks in Chapter 3 pri-
marily relies on secondary data published by local and national statistical of-
fices, as well as a study of national and local policy documents. To get a better 
understanding of regulation issues (such as rent regulation, security of ten-
ure, or accessibility criteria) in the two countries, the study further reviews 
the housing literature on rental housing markets and policies in England and 
the Netherlands. It also collects primary data to calculate rent levels, as well 
as the number and market shares of social and private landlords in the two 
case study cities, and makes use of a series of in-depth-interviews with local 
housing experts, including housing officers from the local authorities. 
The perceptions and behaviour of landlords10
To explore the key questions on landlord conduct, a qualitative approach was 
chosen. Rather than using a large-n quantitative survey, the empirical exam-
ination explores the views and perceptions (research question 1) of 30 social 
and private landlords in 36 semi-structured in-depth interviews. In all inter-
views a topic guide was used, which comprised similar questions for all kinds 
of landlords, while at the same time it allowed for country or city-specific is-
sues. The themes revolved around the main activities of landlords, their prod-
ucts and the tenants they cater for, their views on the rental market in gen-
eral, their perceptions of the other rental sector and its landlords, notions of 
competition, as well as views on rental policy and regulation on a national 
and municipal level.
To allow for an exhaustive exploration of the range of possible views of 
landlords, the sampling approach for the interviews was as follows: In the 
10 A more precise account of the data collection process for both the qualitative in-depth interviews with land-
lords and the quantitative survey among tenants in Breda and Coventry is given in Appendix B.
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social housing sectors, interviews were conducted with managers and other 
responsible persons in different departments of housing associations (e.g. let-
tings, project development, business strategy, and commercial operations). To 
cater for different market segments and business models in the PRS, the sam-
pling targeted small-scale landlords, letting agents, and (where existing) cor-
porate investors. In both case study cities, the sampling targeted managers 
rather than owners, which led to a relatively high share of letting agents in 
the 16 interviews in the PRS (37.5 per cent).
For the actual analysis of the interviews a mix of description, interpretation 
and grounded theory techniques (see Ritchie & Lewis, 2003) were applied. 
The outcomes of competition in mixed rental markets 
Assuming that the single case study approach in each country restricts the 
research to specific market circumstances, which means that the conditions 
and processes of competition might differ in other local rental markets, the 
research approach in Chapter 5 on the effects of competition is both theoreti-
cal and empirical – which is being signified by the term possible effects in the 
research question. Consequently, the analysis primarily relies on a meticu-
lous review on the meaning of performance in the economics and the hous-
ing literature, as well as on market outcomes in England and the Netherlands 
as presented in previous studies. This is complemented by the evidence from 
the in-depth interviews and official performance reports to assess whether 
competition between the two groups of providers leads to a more productive 
and efficient use of resources and evaluate whether a higher degree of direct 
competition has a negative impact on the delivery of social housing services 
and the overall provision of private rental services.
The perceptions and intended behaviour of tenants11
To investigate the views of tenants on social and private renting and their 
willingness to substitute the two rental services, Chapter 6 is designed as a 
quantitative survey study. The empirical data for this chapter were collected 
through a postal/internet survey among social and private renters in the Dutch 
case study city of Breda and a postal survey among social tenants in Coventry. 
In Breda, 5,000 social tenants were approached by email and were invited 
to fill in the questionnaire between October 2011 and December 2011. Invi-
tations for participation were sent to all social renters who provided their 
email address to their landlords, meaning that there was no pre-sampling of 
respondents. Because email addresses of private tenants were not obtaina-
ble, 2,500 invitations were sent to a random sample of private renters by post-
11  A more precise account of the data collection process of the quantitative survey among tenants in Breda and 
Coventry is given in Appendix C.
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al mail. 825 out of the 7,500 invited households returned a usable question-
naire, of which social tenants filled in 529 and private renters 296 question-
naires. This equalled an overall response rate of 11 per cent (10.6 per cent in 
the social rented sector and 11.8 per cent in the private rented sector). 
In Coventry, only social housing tenants of one housing association were 
invited for participation. Primarily due to time- and resource constraints, tar-
geting private rental households was not feasible in the English case.12
On behalf of this thesis one housing association sent the questionnaire to 
each of its 2,000 social housing addresses in Coventry by postal mail. No pre-
sampling of respondents took place. In total, 168 usable questionnaires were 
returned, which amounted to a response rate of 8.4 per cent. 
Similar questionnaires were used in both cities.13 They contained 61 ques-
tions and were divided into five main parts: (1) current housing situation, (2) 
the respondent’s housing career, (3) moving plans and housing preferenc-
es, (4) perceptions of social and private renting, (5) personal information. The 
questionnaire design largely followed the aim to cover all relevant aspects 
of the Reasoned Action Approach model. Sections 6.1 – 6.3 and 6.5 aimed to 
learn more about households’ resources and restrictions and actual control to 
rent socially or privately, as well as their intentions to do so. Section 6.4 of the 
questionnaire probed for tenants tenure-specific beliefs, attitudes towards 
and perceptions of renting socially and privately.
 1.7  Outline of the thesis
Having introduced the conceptual and methodological approach of the re-
search in this introductory chapter, the remainder of the book looks as fol-
lows: Chapter 2 on rental housing in England and the Netherlands should be 
seen as an intermediate piece, which seeks to provide background informa-
tion on the development of social and private renting in the two countries, 
the position of the various landlord groups on a national scale and who the 
consumers of the two rental services are. As such the chapter remains on a 
purely descriptive level and can be used by the reader to get a deeper under-
standing of the rental systems and practices in the two countries and the two 
case studies.
Chapter 3 will elaborate on the meaning of a competitive market structure 
in mixed rental housing markets. The application of the conceptual mod-
el in the second part will unfold the market environment in which landlords 
12 For an explanation, see Appendix C.
13 There were minor differences between the questions the current housing situation, because in Coventry the 
survey only included social rental households.
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have to operate and in which tenants consume either social or private rent-
al services. It will elucidate the characteristics of the two rental products and 
examine the organization and regulation of either rental sector. The analyt-
ical basis of this chapter is a comparison of rental housing in the two case 
study cities Coventry and Breda. 
Chapter 4 will first spell out what the concept of conscious rivalry between 
social and private landlords means and what it entails in business practice. 
The proposed taxonomy of rivalry will then be used for the analysis of the 
interviews with local landlords and letting agents. Do they see each other as 
rivals? What is such a rivalrous relationship based on? In a third step, a link is 
being made to the findings on the structural environments in which landlords 
operate. The analysis thus seeks to give a precise account of how structur-
al conditions in the market can circumscribe, or better to say drive or inhibit, 
perceptions of rivalry and consequent competitive interactions. 
Chapter 5 on the effects of competitive interactions between landlords on 
the performance of the rental market takes up two tasks. Firstly, it will give 
a more precise account of what performance in mixed rental markets means 
and how it can be measured. Here the chapter will engage in a discussion of 
the mainstream economics, nonprofit, and housing literatures. Secondly, the 
deduced concept of performance in mixed rental markets will be applied to 
the real housing market situations in Coventry and Breda, as well as to the 
national rental systems in England and the Netherlands. Choosing this ‘effects 
of competition’ approach will highlight the theoretical and empirical links 
between structure and performance, as well as conduct and performance. 
Chapter 6 on consumer behaviour in mixed rental markets surpasses the 
original approach of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm, as it will 
focus on the demand side aspects of competition in mixed rental markets 
by applying a more comprehensive meaning to the term substitutability. It 
will, on the one hand, engage in a discussion on how the Reasoned Action 
Approach by Ajzen and Fishbein (2010) can be used as an innovative research 
approach to measure the willingness and ability to substitute social and pri-
vate rental services. On the other hand, based on the survey among social 
and private renters in Breda, as well as social renters in Coventry, the chapter 
will statistically examine under which circumstances tenants are inclined to 
move between the two rental sectors. 
The conclusion of the thesis in Chapter 7 will present a summary of the 
research findings, including a recapitulation of the individual chapters but 
more importantly a final discussion on the links between market structure, 
landlord conduct, market performance, and consumer behaviour. Further-
more, it will present a critical reflection of the research approach; it will pro-
vide some recommendations for future related research; and finally, it will 
discuss the policy implications of the research project. 
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 2  Rental housing systems 
in England and the 
  Netherlands
The previous chapter briefly outlined the rationale for selecting England and 
the Netherlands as the two countries for the empirical testing of the theoret-
ical framework. To repeat, Kemeny (1995) classified England as a dual rent-
al market, whereas the Netherlands is characterized by a unitary system. Fur-
thermore, various papers by Haffner, Hoekstra, Elsinga, van der Heijden and 
Oxley claim that competition between the two sectors is stronger in the Neth-
erlands than in England. Finally, based on various selection criteria, the study 
presented the cities of Coventry and Breda as ‘typical’ case studies for the na-
tional housing systems. 
This intermediary chapter elaborates on these issues. On the one hand, 
it aims to provide a better understanding of the roles and functionality of 
social and private rental housing in the two countries. This means that we 
take a closer look at the landlords and the tenants in each country, as well 
as at housing policy and regulatory arrangements in the period 2008 to 2011 
– which is the period of the data collection for this study. On the other hand, 
this chapter will throw more light on the two case study cities. So far, the 
study only presented the criteria, which led to the selection of Coventry and 
Breda as typical case studies. Yet, in order to be able to draw conclusions from 
the case study on the whole national rental system it seems to be inevita-
ble to outline the main differences between the local rental market and the 
national rental housing system. The description of the local housing market 
will be kept relatively brief, since a thorough analysis of rented housing in the 
two cities follows in Chapter 3.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2.1 will start out with a short his-
torical sketch of the tenure structure in England. Section 2.1.1 takes a clos-
er look at the landlords in both rental sectors, while Section 2.1.2 character-
izes social and private rental tenants more thoroughly. Section 2.2 will use an 
identical approach for rental housing in the Netherlands. In Section 2.3 the 
two case study cities will be introduced. The conclusions (Section 2.4) will dis-
cuss and summarize the differences of the roles of social and private renting 
in the two countries and will show how the two case study cities comply with 
the national system. 
 2.1  Rental housing in England 
In a long-term historical perspective, the most important tenure in the Eng-
lish housing market was private renting. In the period of industrialization 
and urbanization private renting expanded drastically, adding up to more 
than half of the entire housing stock. During that period poor housing condi-
tions, high levels of overcrowding, and the emergence of slums in urban areas 
characterized housing markets. As a consequence, two major housing politi-
cal reforms were introduced in the early 20th century, introducing a rent con-
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trol system in the private rental sector and exchequer subsidies in the social 
housing sector, which led to a long period of council housing growth and pri-
vate renting decline, particularly in the first two decades after World War II. 
To quote Mullins and Murie (2006, p. 37), “for a considerable period – from be-
fore 1919 to the 1970s – it was possible to support the growth of home owner-
ship without restricting the growth of council housing, and both expanded at 
the expense of private rented accommodation.” 
By the end of the 1970s the reputation of social housing worsened, particu-
larly the high-rise apartment blocks and terraced housing estates built in 
the 1960s and 1970s received negative connotations (ibid, 2006). It was par-
tially this development in the social sector and partially ideology that led 
to a radical change in housing policy under the Conservative government. 
In an almost 20 year long period between 1979 and 1997, housing policies 
were mostly designed as a commitment to an increased provision of hous-
ing through the market. Owner occupation was highly subsidized, and pri-
vate renting was almost completely deregulated. Social housing, on the oth-
er hand, experienced a large decline of its tenure share and an erosion of the 
monopoly of council suppliers (Mullins & Murie, 2006). The outcomes of this 
are highlighted in Figure 2.1.
It is debatable whether the housing policy of New Labour from 1997 to 2010 
was a continuation of the previous government’s housing policy, or wheth-
er changes are more apparent. The general policy guidelines did not change 
in the private sector, since owner-occupation remains the preferred tenure 
and the deregulation of private renting has not been revoked (Haffner et al., 
2009a). The social housing sector, however, was targeted by various new hous-
ing policy programs: Amongst other things, the government has created the 
possibility for local authorities to run their housing stock through an Arms-
[ 33 ]
Length Management Organisation, a social rent restructuring policy has been 
implemented, the housing allowance system was reformed, and most impor-
tantly, choice has become the keyword in the provision of social housing.1
 2.1.1  The landlords 
Social landlords 
Until after the 1980s, social housing provision in England was very much as-
sociated with public council housing suppliers. The radical reform of housing 
policy under the Conservatives aimed to change this monopolistic structure – 
in 1981, local authorities provided 92 per cent of all social housing – and facil-
itated the growth of the nonprofit housing association sector, which has led 
to a relatively balanced dual supply structure of social housing on a nation-
al level (see Table 2.1). Two specific policies played a key role in this devel-
opment. Firstly, the decrease of the council sector can primarily be ascribed 
to the Right to Buy program. Introduced through the Housing Act in 1980, it 
enabled tenants to buy their social dwelling at a substantially discounted 
price. Up until now, the program has led to a sale of about 1.8 million, having 
its prime in the 1980s. Secondly, the Conservatives shifted bricks and mor-
tar subsidies for new social housing, as well as subsidies for maintenance in-
vestments from local authorities to housing associations. As a consequence, 
housing production by local authorities practically came to a halt in the be-
ginning of the early 1990s, while the production of housing associations has 
substantially grown in the last two decades. A further result of the new sub-
sidy scheme was the execution of large-scale voluntary transfers (LSVTs) of 
council housing stock to newly established private stock transfer associations 
or existing ‘traditional’ housing associations (Pawson, 2006), a practice which, 
according to Malpass (2001) has contributed to a process of demunicipaliza-
tion in England.
So, what are the differences between public council suppliers and the hous-
ing association sector? Council housing organizations can vary significant-
ly in size and kind of stock. Some authorities, most evidently in the bigger 
cities, own more than 50,000 dwellings, where others only supply a relative-
ly small number of dwellings. It is self-evident that local authorities primar-
1 These issues will be discussed in more detail throughout the chapter.
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ily own housing stock within their own boundaries (Cave, 2007). Councils can 
manage their housing stock either directly or through an Arms-Length Man-
agement Organisation (ALMO), which are semi-autonomous companies run-
ning the day-today management and business policy, while the local council 
itself still owns the stock and controls the allocation policy within the munic-
ipality (Audit Commission, 2009). 
The main reason for setting up ALMOs is the current finance system in the 
council housing sector, which is based on a revenue subsidy scheme. Cen-
tral government funding covers the difference between rental incomes and 
the housing costs of local authorities. These subsidies are designed to keep 
council housing rents below market levels. Separate bricks and mortar subsi-
dies, on the other hand, supported investments into existing and new hous-
ing stock. The abolition of those funds (see above) has led to a chronic under-
investment in council housing and finally resulted in relatively poor condi-
tions of its dwellings. Under the housing policy of New Labour, government 
funds were made available to increase the standard and performance of local 
authority housing. However, it was stipulated that funding for maintenance 
investments and subsidies for the construction of new social housing is only 
available to local authorities that run their stock through an ALMO (Pawson, 
2006; Whitehead, 2007).
Generally, all housing associations are nonprofit associations, meaning 
that all operating profits must be reinvested into the housing business. They 
are responsible for managing their own finances and for guaranteeing their 
long-term financial viability. From a legal viewpoint all associations are pri-
vate entities and are neither owned nor directly controlled by the central or 
local government. Most importantly, to obtain various rights and privileges 
housing associations must be registered as a Registered Social Landlord2 (RSL) 
with the Homes and Communities Agency (HCA)3, the national regulator of 
the housing association sector. Social housing finance is more complex in the 
association sector than in council housing. The Housing Act 1988 introduced 
a large-scale mixed funding regime for HAs, stipulating that public capital 
grants are limited to 75 per cent of the initial project costs, where the rest is 
to be covered through loans on the capital market. The risks of the develop-
ment project and lending private money are carried by the housing associa-
2 Since the term housing association has no decisive meaning from a legal point of view, throughout this study 
the term housing association is equated with the term Registered Social Landlord. Housing Associations that are 
registered as charitable organizations instead of being registered as RSLs are addressed as these.
3 When the research project was started, social housing regulation and registration was the responsibility of the 
Tenant Services Authority. However, the current Conservative-Liberal government has decided to abolish the TSA 




In order to be able to meet the increased costs of social housing provision, 
it was further stipulated that the rent levels of the new dwellings should ena-
ble associations to reach a break even in their investment. As a result, hous-
ing association rents have increased rapidly in the last twenty years, leading 
to relatively high rent differential between public providers and housing asso-
ciations (see CLG, 2011a). With the intention to balance all rents in the social 
housing industry, the New Labour Government (1997-2010) introduced a new 
rent-restructuring regime in 2002. It says that, by 2012, all social dwellings 
have to apply a rent formula that reflects local manual worker earnings, as 
well as the size, locality and condition of the dwelling. Part of this process is 
the adjustment of rents for existing dwellings. This means that rent increases 
are coupled with the general retail price index, can however be increased by 
a further 0.5 per cent of the yearly rent and £2 per week. Rent decreases are 
also possible in the adjustment period and are subject to the same rule (Tang, 
2008).4
The introduction of the mixed funding regime was complemented by a 
new regulation structure. Since 2009, the HCA is responsible for the distri-
bution of the central government’s capital grants. Based on the guidelines of 
the National Affordable Housing Programme (NAHP), the HCA decides which 
housing associations – or ALMOs and private developers – are eligible for 
funding for the development of new social housing in a certain local author-
ity. These decisions are guided by performance assessments of individual 
associations through the Audit Commission.5
Notwithstanding all housing associations operate under the same financing 
and regulation premises, the governance models of the housing association 
sector have become more diverse since the late 1980s. In general, two distinct 
types can be identified: traditional housing associations and stock transfer 
associations. The mixed funding regime has enticed traditional housing asso-
ciations to become more commercialized, to grow substantially in size, and to 
expand to new localities (Mullins, 2010). Malpass (2,000) points out that even 
though some mainly larger associations have renounced their voluntary busi-
4 Since 2012, housing associations have an additional rent setting option, the so-called ‘Affordable Rent’ setting 
scheme. It enables housing associations to offer fixed term tenancies at a rent level that is higher than the aver-
age social, which means that the initial rent is set to 80 per cent of local market rents.
5 In its decision on which housing associations are eligible for funding, the HCA also cooperates with the Na-
tional Housing and Planning Advice Unit (NHPAU). The NHPAU is an independent body, which does not have 
any regulatory powers itself; however, it advises local and regional planning bodies on where and how much new 
affordable housing needs to be built. Hence, the decision on which housing associations receive grants of the 
HCA is not only based on the HAs’ individual performance, but also on where the highest demand for new social 
housing construction exists.
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ness model and have become more risk-seeking in their business operations, 
the new supervision and governance structures have resulted in the tradi-
tional housing associations becoming “more obviously and deeply entrenched 
within the structure of the state apparatus for meeting social needs” (ibid, 
p. 240). Pawson (2006) notes that although they might be of equal size, stock 
transfer associations differ from traditional housing associations on vari-
ous aspects: First of all, LSVT associations inherited a relatively poor housing 
stock and a tenant mix that was very much dominated by the lowest income 
stratum of the local population. Secondly, they are formed from within the 
public sector, thus they do not share the traditional association’s history as 
voluntary charitable organizations. Thirdly, they are bound to local bounda-
ries and tend to retain their close ties with local authorities, at least in the 
first years after the stock transfer. 
The question remains how stable these observable differences between tra-
ditional and stock transfer associations are? In the last ten years, the entire 
housing association sector was affected by a rapidly increasing number of 
inter-landlord collaborations into higher administrative units and allianc-
es. These agglomerations were achieved either through the establishment of 
new group structures6 or through mergers between existing housing associ-
ations, leading to a mixing of the business models of the two housing asso-
ciation groups (van Bortel et al., 2010; Pawson & Sosenko, 2008). The forma-
tion of these group structures of housing associations all over the country can 
have some essential implications for supply structure on a local level. After 
all, it is not uncommon that two or more housing associations operating in 
the same local market belong to the same parent group. In some local author-
ities (e.g. Liverpool, Newcastle, and Sunderland) the council transferred the 
social stock to a number of newly formed associations, which are part of the 
same group, however, operating in different parts of the city. Therefore, the 
question remains whether those groups should be considered as one supplier 
or several suppliers.
Private rental landlords
Figure 2.1 shows that there has been a strong growth of private rental hous-
ing since 2003. One might argue that the deregulation policy of the Conserva-
tives as described above had a key role in this development. Here, the Govern-
ment’s main projects were the abolishment of all sorts of rent regulation for 
tenancies that were started after 1989, and the introduction of assured short-
hold tenancies, which gave landlords the possibility to regain possession of 
their dwelling after a six months period of a secured tenure, without the ne-
6 This involves the creation of a formal association of separate organizations, where one association functions 
as a group parent, while the others are subsidiaries.
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cessity to justify their decision. 
Looking at the growth of the sector in the last two decades, one might argue 
that the private rental deregulation policy has directly led to the rejuvena-
tion of the sector. Of course, the deregulation of rents has given landlords bet-
ter profit prospects; yet, housing researchers (e.g. Hughes & Lowe, 2007; Rho-
des, 2006; Haffner et al., 2008; Kemp, 2004) tend to agree that it is debatable 
to which extent the deregulation of the PRS has contributed to this develop-
ment. It has been pointed out that besides the favourable conditions for pri-
vate housing growth – e.g. increasing house prices made the rental business 
an attractive investment opportunity – and the improvement of the pub-
lic opinion on private renting, particularly the introduction of Buy-to-Let 
mortgages as a new finance mechanism has made an essential contribution 
(Kemp, 2011). The original Buy-to-Let was launched by the Association of Res-
idential Letting Agents as a new type of mortgage product; thus it was not 
a government project, but originated in the capital market and PRS itself. 
Buy to Let mortgages can be described as mortgage-style loans, specifically 
designed for the purchase of a residential property, where the rent income is 
used to finance the mortgage costs (Rhodes, 2006). Since its introduction in 
1996, a large influx into the PRS of ‘Buy to Let landlords’ could be observed. 
Estimates by the Council of Mortgage Lenders indicate that there were rough-
ly 750,000 outstanding Buy to Let mortgages in 2006 – however, the number 
should be considered carefully (Rugg & Rhodes, 2008). Interestingly, the suc-
cess of the Buy-to-Let has strengthened the small-scale supply structure of 
the private rental industry. 
Most experts on private renting in the UK, including Peter Kemp, Julie 
Rugg, Stuart Lowe, Steve Wilcox, and David Rhodes, have argued that the sec-
tor should not be seen as one homogeneous mass, but it needs to be consid-
ered that there are very distinct types of private landlords. “Private landlords 
do not form a homogeneous group. On the contrary ‘The term private land-
lord encompasses a wide range of types of individuals and organizations and 
includes some who would not recognize that term as a description of them-
selves’” (Crook & Kemp as cited in Kemp, 2004, p. 94).
First of all, it must be clarified that not all PRS dwellings are traded on the 
open market. Employers, relatives/friends and other landlords provide about 
20 per cent of all private renting accommodation only to specified households 
(Rhodes, 2006). The Private Landlord Survey 2010 (CLG, 2011b) provides data 
on the market shares of different groups of landlords in England (see Table 
2.2). It shows that almost three-quarters of all landlords in England are indi-
viduals and couples. Private companies make up 15 per cent of all landlords. 
The rest of the landlords are other organizations, including a large share of 
employer landlords. Furthermore, we can see that the share of full-time 
investors is much lower among individuals and couples than among compa-
nies and other organizations. This corresponds with the relatively low share 
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of individuals and couples who receive more than 75 per cent of their income 
from rent collections. Finally, a large majority of individuals and couples do 
not own more than 9 dwellings, where more than half of them own just a sin-
gle dwelling (53 per cent).
It goes without saying that this classification is rather crude and does take 
the differences within each landlord group only insufficiently into account. 
Kemp (2004) uses a more precise classification, which includes landlords’ 
motivations and business models. Beside stewardship landlords, employer 
landlords, institutional investors and property slump landlords, three types 
of landlords should be mentioned in particular. Firstly, informal landlords are 
landlords who see their property as a part-time investment. Many of them 
are not strictly commercial and are not necessarily profit driven. They rather 
engage as landlords to be able to repay their mortgage on the property. Infor-
mal landlords are mostly couples or individuals, who provide a very small 
number of dwellings in areas where they live themselves. Secondly, investor 
landlords are a wide range of individual landlords and companies, many of 
which are Buy-to-Let landlords. They are characterized by a good knowledge 
of the local housing market conditions, often provide housing in several loca-
tions, are more commercially oriented, and their portfolios can range from a 
couple of dwellings to several hundred properties. Many of them depend on 
the rental stream as their main source of income (Rhodes, 2006). Interestingly 
enough, many investor landlords started out as informal landlords and might 
have come into the business by chance, or without the intention to make a 
business out of their rental activities. Yet, with the availability of cheap Buy-
to-Let mortgages, many informal landlords have become keen investor land-
lords (Hughes & Lowe, 2007). Thirdly, commercial landlords are a smaller 
group of landlords that comprises large private and public residential proper-
ty companies or commercial property companies with large residential prop-
erty portfolios. They tend to own several thousands of dwellings throughout 
the country, while they operate on a strictly profit-driven business model. 
Large-scale student housing suppliers belong to this category (Rugg & Rho-
des, 2008). 
Rhodes (2006) points out that both informal and investor landlords have 
increasingly made use of letting agents in the last years. Surveys show that 
60 per cent of all private rented dwellings were entirely managed by their 
landlords in 1993, whereas in 2001, already 50 per cent of all landlords have 
assigned management tasks to a letting agent. These tasks can be divid-
ed into lettings only services, in which a letting agent, i.a., find and vet pro-
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spective tenants, and full management services, which allow agents to per-
form tasks such as the setting and collection of rents, or the organization of 
maintenance investments. The motives of part-time and business landlords 
to use a letting agent tend to be diverse. Where business investors primar-
ily make use of an agent due to the fact that their dwellings are often not 
in the same locality as their place of residence, part-time investors predomi-
nantly assign tasks to agents due to the fact that they have a limited amount 
of time to pursue their obligations as a landlord (ibid, 2007). In general, the 
increased use of letting agents might have two important implications. First-
ly, in those localities where the usage of letting agents is common, the pro-
vision structure in the PRS might change significantly. It still holds true that 
the ownership of the private renting stock in such a situation is dominat-
ed by a very high number of small-scale individual landlords, but the provi-
sion of the housing service, nonetheless, could be significantly influenced by 
the structure of the local letting agent market. Secondly, the increased use 
of agents might have an impact on tenant/landlord relationship. If full man-
agement responsibilities are given to a letting agent, it can be assumed that 
rather than the actual owner of the dwelling, tenants might consider letting 
agents as their landlord.
 2.1.2  The tenants
On average, private renters and social tenants are very dissimilar with regard 
to their socio-economic and demographic dispositions (see Table 2.3). Consid-
ering the age structure of household reference persons (HRP)7, except for a 
large proportion of older persons (> 65 years) the age structure in social hous-
ing is in line with the age structure of all HRPs. Furthermore, with regard to 
household composition it can be observed that lone parents with dependent 
children tend to live in social dwellings, while couples with or without chil-
dren are to a much lesser extent be found in the social sector. Within the so-
cial sector the group of one-person households dominates; more than 40 per 
cent of all social renters do not share their dwelling with another person. Ac-
cordingly, with 2.2 persons per household, compared to 2.3 overall, the house-
hold size in social housing is the smallest across all tenures (CLG, 2011a). 
Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) groups are overrepresented in the social sec-
tor, particularly blacks and Bangladeshi. 
In contrast to the demographic structure in the social housing sector, a par-
7 “The household reference person (HRP), otherwise known as the “highest income householder”, must be a 
householder (i.e. a person in whose name the accommodation is owned or rented). Where there are joint house-
holders, the person with the highest income is selected. If two or more householders have exactly the same in-
come the oldest is selected.” (CLG, 2012)
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ticularly young customer base marks the PRS. More than half of all private 
renting tenants are younger than 35 years, whereas HRPs older than 65 years 
are fairly underrepresented. This is partly the result of the strong growth of 
the student population in England and also their growing importance as one 
of the main target groups of private renting. With regard to household com-
position no precise picture evolves. Couples with and without children are 
underrepresented; however, other multi-person households are overrepre-
sented in the PRS. Single households are, on the other hand, in line with the 
average of all households. Black and Ethnic Minorities are clearly overrepre-
sented in the PRS. More than 18 per cent of all private renters belong to an 
ethnic minority; hence their share is even higher than in the social housing 
sector. Similar to social housing, BMEs are not a homogenous group in private 
renting. The sector seems to be popular among Indian and Chinese residents, 
whereas Black and Bangladeshi are less often found in private rentals.
More than anything else, social sector tenants can be depicted by their eco-
nomic status. Not only is the share of unemployed persons well above aver-
age – almost 10 per cent in the social sector compared with 3.4 per cent over-
all – but even more striking is the extremely low labour market participa-
tion rate. Only a third of all social housing tenants either work full- or part-
time, where particularly the share of full-time employed tenants is dispro-
portionately low, leaving two-thirds of all social households with an econom-
ically inactive reference person. This disadvantaged economic status is also 
reflected in the income situation of social housing tenants. In 2010, more 
than half of all social housing households had a gross annual income of less 
than £15,000 (25.6 per cent for all tenures). The mean gross annual income of 
social renters was roughly £17,400, compared with about £35,000 overall (CLG, 
2011a). Since a diverse group of households rent privately, it is not possible to 
simply categorize them with regard to income and work status. The largest 
majority of private renting tenants (HRPs) belong to the working population 
in England. About 70 per cent are in employment, with 60 per cent being full-
time employed, which can to a certain extent be explained by the low share 
of pensioners in the sector. The high share of working persons is well reflect-
[ 41 ]
ed in the gross income of about £29,000 per annum. Generally, private ten-
ants are relatively well distributed among income classes. There is a substan-
tial group (26 per cent) with comparably low gross annual incomes of under 
£15,000 per year. Another large group of HRPs and partners earns between 
£20,000 and £30,000 per year (24 per cent). Finally, there is also a relatively 
large income cohort with a gross yearly income of more than £40,000 (20 per 
cent). It can thus be said that social renters are on average more residualized, 
while private renters are more polarised. 
In the context of income levels, it is interesting to take a closer look at the 
rent expenditures of each group. In 2008, the average weekly rent paid by 
social tenants was £79, with large differences between council tenants (£74) 
and housing association tenants (£84). For a large share of social housing ten-
ants (63 per cent in 2010) the weekly rents are partially or fully covered by 
Housing Benefit payments. For those social tenants that received Housing 
Benefit8 the mean rent was reduced to £8 per week, which means that rent 
costs were almost fully covered by government subsidies (CLG, 2011a). When 
private tenants are depicted by their rent expenditures, which also touch-
es on the question of affordability in private renting, it should be considered 
that different tenancy types in the sector exist. Generally, rents that are still 
regulated and rents of those dwellings that are not traded on the open mar-
ket are on average much lower than those of assured and assured shorthold 
tenancies9. In 2010, private tenants had to pay an average of £160 per week 
(all tenancies combined). To give an idea of rent differentials according to ten-
ancy type within the PRS, 2008 data from the Survey of English Housing (CLG, 
2009) shows that tenants with an assured tenancy had to pay £126 per week, 
those with an assured shorthold £136. Regulated tenancies cost about a week-
ly mean rent of £85, while tenants of a not openly traded dwelling had to pay 
8 Housing Benefit in the social housing sector applies on a national level to make certain that tenants with 
comparable living and income conditions receive similar benefits. The three defining factors of the amount of 
the HB are the net household income – stating that HB is means tested –, household composition, and the rent 
level (Stephens, 2005). The current HB rules are designed to ensure households that their post-rent incomes 
do not fall below the social assistance benefit rate. Therefore, all tenants that receive social assistance or have a 
post-rent income below that level are eligible to receive a HB that covers 100 per cent of their rent expenditures. 
Tenants whose income is higher than the social assistance level are entitled to receive a HB that equals their rent 
discounted by 65 per cent of the difference between their net income and the social assistance rate. Local author-
ity tenants receive their HB in the form of a rent rebate, which is directly paid into their rent account. In contrast, 
housing associations tenant get a rent allowance that may be paid to them or, on request, to their landlord, which 
is largely used in practice (Kemp, 2007).
9 Most assured shortholds guarantee a regulated tenancy for the first six months of a rental contract (a court 
order is necessary for an eviction), yet as soon as the fixed term ends, landlords can repossess the dwelling any 
time they seek to do so, given that they write the so-called S21 eviction notice two months in advance of the expi-
ration date.
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£107. The amount of rent a household has to pay is, of course, also a ques-
tion of where the person lives. While median rents in London are on aver-
age high above £200 per calendar month, they are only half as high in the 
North of the country. Another point is that for 21 per cent of all private ten-
ants rent expenditures were at least partially covered by Local Housing Allow-
ance (LHA)10. If LHA is taken into account, mean rents per week decrease to 
£53 per week. However, considering that in contrast to the social sector only a 
quarter of all private rental households receive housing benefit, it holds true 
that most of them do not have such low housing costs. This is generally in 
line with the much higher rent expenditures as a share of weekly household 
income in the PRS. When HB benefits are included private renters spend on 
average 43 per cent of their income on housing (incl. service charges) while 
‘only’ 28.5 per cent of social renters do so. Benefits excluded the expendi-
ture to income ratio for private renters increases to more than 50 per cent, 
whereas the one of social renters is about 39 per cent. Surely, these figures 
do not say anything about how much income is left after housing is paid for, 
and given the more residualized income situation of social renters one might 
assume that they face affordability issues that are nowhere near a more for-
tunate situation than the one of private renters.
Finally, social and private tenants can be described by their intra- and 
inter-tenurial mobility. In contrast to the PRS, a considerably longer length 
of tenancies can be observed in social housing. A large share of social ten-
ants has occupied the current dwelling for more than ten years (43 per cent). 
The median length of residency in the social sector was about 12 years, com-
pared to 14 years for all tenures. In this regard social tenants compare bet-
ter with owner-occupiers than with private tenants. If we look at movement 
between tenures in 2009-2010, new entrants into the social sector were pri-
marily newly formed households or previous private tenants. Regarding the 
previous tenure by current tenure in 2009, more than 60 per cent11 had their 
previous accommodation in the social sector (CLG, 2011a). Out of the house-
10 Since 2008, Housing Benefit in the PRS is called Local Housing Allowance (see Haffner & Boelhouwer, 2006; 
Stephens, 2005). It is calculated on the basis of a local reference rent, instead of the actual rent level, and the 
household size. Keeping the idea of rent ceilings of an earlier reform, where tenants have to cover any excesses, 
the main innovation was that tenants who are able to find a dwelling with a rent below the LHA are allowed 
to keep a difference of up to £15 per week (Haffner et al., 2009a). The current Conservative-Liberal Democrats 
Government wants to change the LHA system once again. In the Emergency Budget in June 2010 the coalition an-
nounced that from April 2011 on properties of more than four bedrooms are not subsidized, the £15 excess that 
some tenants could keep will be removed, it is not the average local rent that is used for the calculation but the 
30th per centile of the local rents. In addition the government introduces absolute caps – £250 for a one bedroom 
property, £290 for two, £340 for three, and £400 for four bedrooms. Yet, at the time of writing the old LHA scheme 
was still in place.
11 This only includes reference persons with a residency for less than one year.
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holds who move to another tenure, more than 80 per cent chose the PRS as a 
destination. Here it should be said that this might be temporary trend, since 
in the period 2005-2008 a majority moved to the owner-occupied sector (60 
per cent). Apparently, the current house price crisis has changed moving pat-
terns considerably. Considering the movement behaviour of private renters, 
they are generally much more mobile than social tenants and owner-occu-
pants. In 2009-2010, 54 per cent of all market renters occupied their dwelling 
for less than two year. Consequently, the mean length of stay in the PRS is, at 
about four years, by far the lowest of all tenures. Furthermore, moving from a 
private renting dwelling to another one is most common. Indeed, three quar-
ters of all private tenants who had moved between 2009 and 2010 had their 
previous accommodation in the PRS as well. Finally, tenants who leave the 
private rented sector are about two times more likely to move to owner occu-
pation than to the social sector (ibid, 2011a).
 2.2  Rental housing in the Netherlands 
Similar to the situation in England, the PRS in the Netherlands grew along-
side the increasing (urban) population in the late 19th and early 20th centu-
ry (van der Schaar, 1987). In the post-World War II era, the ever-existing prob-
lem of housing shortages in the Netherlands was aggravated by strong pop-
ulation growth. Accordingly, the central government’s housing policy at that 
time aimed primarily at building new dwellings as fast as possible. In this pe-
riod different subsidies and housing political instruments were introduced. 
Particularly the extensive bricks and mortar subsidies, which were availa-
ble to all housing associations and also private landlords, resulted in a rap-
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id growth of the social housing sector (Haffner, 2011) (see Figure 2.2). One rea-
son for the social sector growth was its ability to carry out the construction 
of a high number of dwellings in a short period. Another reason was the gov-
ernment’s aim to establish social housing rents as an instrument of economic 
and social policy. Below market rents were seen as the basis of modest claims 
for wage increases, thus being “an instrument of anti-cyclical economic poli-
cies in periods of economic downturn” (Dieleman, 1996, p. 276). 
In the 1970s, the central government aimed to increase choice for house-
holds in their decisions on buying and renting and it aimed to increase the 
quality of the existing and new housing stock, which resulted in a mixed sys-
tem of object and subject subsidies. By the end of the 1970s, however, the gov-
ernment decided to gradually decrease the subsidies for the rental sector, 
while promoting a substantial increase of the owner-occupied sector (Haffner 
et al., 2009a). Due to a crisis on the housing market between 1978 and 1982, 
the government plan was, however, curtailed or at least delayed until the 
mid-1980s. Hence, bricks-and-mortar subsidies for the developers of afforda-
ble rental housing were kept on a temporary basis. This again increased budg-
etary constraints, and with these an even greater need to economize on sub-
sidies became apparent (van der Heijden, 2002).
A new stage in housing policy was reached when the former Secretary of 
State, E. Heerma, published the policy memorandum Housing in the Nineties 
in the late 1980s (Heerma, 1989). With this document the government pro-
claimed a constant retreat from the housing market, particularly from the 
social rental sector (Kempen & Priemus, 2002). The new policy aimed at six 
major subjects: decentralization, deregulation, independent housing associa-
tions, a stronger reliance on means-tested housing allowances, privatization 
of municipal housing companies, and the promotion of owner occupation 
(Dieleman, 1996; Boelhouwer & van der Heijden, 1992). 
Two items of ‘Housing in the Nineties’ directly targeted social housing: the 
privatization of municipal housing companies and the financial independ-
ence of housing associations. With regard to the first aim, the policy was very 
successful. Even though sales of the stock had taken place already before the 
1990s, most large-scale transfers took place in the course of the new policies. 
In 1990, there were still 213 active municipal housing companies with a hous-
ing stock of about 315,000 dwellings. Only ten years later, the stock owned by 
Dutch municipalities was negligibly low (14,000 dwellings), making housing 
associations the sole providers of social housing in the Netherlands (Priemus, 
2003a). 
The financial independence of housing associations was achieved in two 
consequent steps. Firstly, the Social Housing Management Order (BBSH) stip-
ulated that the social housing sector should function as a revolving fund, 
where social housing activities have to be financed by the associations’ own 
means (Boelhouwer, 2003). The second major step was the grossing-and-bal-
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ancing operation of the 1990s. Up until 1995, housing associations received 
subsidies to equalize deficits in the operation of their rented housing stock, 
enabling associations to invest in the construction of new social housing. 
With the grossing-and-balancing all subsidies concerning the renovation of 
the stock, exploitation, and the construction of new stock were eliminated, 
and housing associations had to pay back all outstanding government loans. 
For this, the associations received a lump sum equal to the discounted value 
of all future state-approved property subsidies, covering a period of 50 years 
and based on long-term estimations of rent levels, as well as interest and 
inflations rates (van der Heijden, 2002)
One might argue that the deregulation aspect of the ‘Nota Heerma’ docu-
ment should have had a direct influence on the structure of private renting. 
However, except for the discontinuation of object subsidies, proposals on how 
to change the sector have never exceeded the stage of discussions between 
politicians and housing market experts. Amongst other things it was debat-
ed whether a reform of the rent regulation system should take place, where 
private rental lobbying groups have advocated for a higher share of deregu-
lated rents or sometimes even for a full deregulation of the whole PRS. These 
groups – particularly the umbrella organization of institutional investors – 
have argued that, due to overregulation and the position of the housing asso-
ciations in the country, private renting has become a relatively unattractive 
investment.
A state of housing political inaction has, however, affected all tenures in 
the 2000s. Similar to private renting, social housing has experienced a long 
phase of no major reforms. The reason is surely not that the sector is consid-
ered to work perfectly; indeed, there were several cases of fraud and manage-
ment malpractice in the housing association sector since the major reforms 
in the early 1990s (see van Bortel et al., 2010). As a result, the structure and 
independence of the social housing sector has been discussed controversial-
ly. For one thing, the independence of housing associations has led to funda-
mental discussions on how to supervise the sector and how to define their 
fields of activities, in order to guarantee a stable balance between associa-
tions’ social and commercial activities. On another point there have been con-
tinuous debates on the rent regulation in the social sector. Some commenta-
tors (e.g. IVBN, 2011) point out that the quality and size of a large number of 
their dwellings would allow associations to increase rent levels considerably. 
Most importantly, discussions about social housing in the Netherlands have 
also taken place on a European Union level. In short, the Commission of the 
EU has expressed serious concerns about the size of the social sector and how 
the setup of the sector allegedly inhibits fair competition in the commercial 
rental market segment. The result of this discussion is that from 01 January 
2010 on, housing associations have to allocate 90 per cent of their dwellings 
to households with a disposable income of less than €33,614 (Priemus & Gruis, 
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2011). Arguably, this new rule has some major consequences on how associa-
tions run their stock and to whom they will and can offer their dwellings. With 
this we might expect a significant change of the relation between social and 
private renting. This issue will be picked up once again in the analysis of mar-
ket structure (see Chapter 4).
 2.2.1  The landlords 
Social landlords
Housing associations were established as not-for-profit organizations in the 
mid-19th century, with the aim to create decent housing conditions for the 
industrial workforce in urban areas. They were given the status of approved 
institutions through the Housing Act in 1901; however, until after 1945 they 
played a minor role in the Dutch housing market (Priemus, 2003a). The sector 
grew significantly between 1945 and 1990; however, their heyday took place in 
the course of the changing housing policies of the 1990s. Nowadays, about 418 
housing associations own 2.4 million social dwellings in the Netherlands, a 
number that has been fairly stable over the last 20 years (VROM, 2011).
From a legal perspective all associations are private nonprofit organizations 
that are neither owned nor directly controlled by public authorities (van Bor-
tel et al., 2010). There is however a regulatory framework that stipulates how 
the money of housing associations has to be used. The Social Housing Man-
agement Decree (BBSH) constitutes six major tasks of the housing associa-
tions. Firstly, housing associations are obliged to give priority to the official 
target group of social housing. This target group is defined as those house-
holds that are eligible to receive a housing allowance and is based on the age 
and compositions of the household. For instance, a single household refer-
ence person younger than 65 years belongs to the target group if his or her 
gross income does not exceed €20,975 per year. A multi-person household, 
on the other hand, can have a gross income of up to €27,075. The standard 
rates for households above 65 years are slightly lower (VROM, 2009c).12 This 
implies that associations have to keep rents at an affordable (below-market) 
level. Secondly, housing association managers need to consult with their ten-
ants. Thirdly, housing associations are obliged to maintain a decent quali-
ty of their housing stock. Fourthly, all housing associations must guarantee 
their financial continuity on their own behalf. Fifthly, housing associations 
12 As stated above the definition of the target group of social housing has changed in the course of the new 
social housing allocations system that has been agreed upon between the Dutch Government and the European 
Commission. The core target group still is defined by the eligibility to housing allowance payments, yet the hous-
ing associations’ target group is circumscribed by the new allocation model in which 90 per cent of all available 
dwellings must be allocated to households with a taxable income of less than €33,000 per year.
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are expected to invest in the residential environment and the liveability of 
neighbourhoods. Sixthly, with respect to the growing importance of housing 
for older people, associations should provide joint housing-and-care opportu-
nities (Elsinga & Wassenberg, 2007). Housing associations that are registered 
as an approved institution are committed to these tasks and responsibilities. 
To guarantee these main activities a supervision system has been established 
in which housing associations are supposed to enter voluntary performance 
agreements with local authorities about the use of their financial assets and 
in which their actual service performance is evaluated by the central gov-
ernment and their financial performance by the Central Fund for Housing, 
which is an independent government agency that reports the financial state 
of the entire social housing sector and individual associations to the minister 
responsible for housing (Conijn, 2005).
As said, with the abolition of continuous supply side subsidies13 housing 
associations operate as revolving funds. If they want to invest in their cur-
rent housing stock or the construction of new dwellings they have to use pri-
vate finance. There are however indirect subsidies for the construction of 
new social dwellings. Firstly, housing associations often receive a discount 
when acquiring developing sites from local authorities.14 The second indi-
rect subsidy is the state guarantee for social housing investment borrowings 
by the Guarantee Fund for Social Housing (WSW). Due to the public guaran-
tees, housing associations can borrow against lower interest rates, by which 
they have an estimated benefit of €300 million per year. Thirdly, the Central 
Housing Fund (CFV) supports housing associations with insufficient financial 
means in specific investment projects or those associations that are in finan-
cial troubles. The indirect subsidy here is that the CFV was set up with the 
financial backing of the state. Finally, housing associations have the right to 
borrow from the Dutch Municipality Bank, which is a special purpose bank 
with a very high credit rating (Priemus & Gruis, 2011). These four indirect 
subsidies, but particularly the first two subjects, have provoked commercial 
developers and providers of private housing to proceed against the unlevel 
playing field on the commercial rental market in the Netherlands that was 
mentioned above. 
Notwithstanding the existence of these implicit subsidies, the introduction 
of the revolving fund scheme has arguably been a trigger of the sector’s com-
13 Continuous because the lump sum that has been paid by the government in 1995 can be seen as a subsidy 
which still has an effect on associations’ current expenditures.
14 For each site a taxation of the market value has to be done by an independent agent. The subsidy can thus be 
defined as the difference between the market value and the actual price an association has to pay. However, if an 
association was overcompensated in relation to the social and economic value of the development, they might be 
forced to pay back a certain amount of the subsidy (van Middenkoop, 2010).
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mercialization and financial self-reliance with regard to rent levels, project 
development and the utilization of their stock. In the Netherlands a rent reg-
ulation system exists in which all rents below a certain threshold – in 2011 
this level was €652 net rent per calendar month – are regulated, meaning 
that a quality valuation system stipulates maximum rent levels and govern-
ments stipulate rent increases. Dwellings with a rent level above the deregu-
lation limit are based on free market allocation principles, as are rent increas-
es, which can however be implemented only once per year. The quality cal-
culation comprises different aspects: Amongst others, quantifiable aspects 
such as the size of the dwelling, the type of heating system, how the dwelling 
is insulated, the type of dwelling, and the availability of a garden area. Fur-
thermore, the quality of the living environment is expressed in points as well, 
where rent committees evaluate factors like the proximity to shops and the 
quality of schools in the neighbourhood (VROM, 2009a). In the context of rent 
setting and the regulation scheme the commercialization process has been 
characterized by several developments: On the one hand, associations have 
sought to develop social housing dwellings with a maximum rent level that 
comes close to the deregulation limit. On the other hand, housing associa-
tions have increased their activities in the development and management of 
free market dwellings. Other associations have pursued the path of develop-
ing owner-occupied dwellings, which they could sell with considerable profits. 
Finally, many housing associations opted for the sale of parts of their hous-
ing stock to sitting tenants. All of these activities are considered to be essen-
tial for the functioning of the revolving fund principle of the social housing 
finance model (Haffner et al., 2009a). 
Although they are all subject to the same regulation and have similar 
financing methods, there are important organizational differences between 
associations. First of all, similar to the situation in England, housing associa-
tions in the Netherlands differ significantly in the number of dwellings they 
own and manage. Table 2.4 shows that a majority of associations is relative-
ly small, since their stock does not exceed three thousand units (55 per cent). 
Yet there are also some very large associations with more than 25,000 dwell-
ings in their portfolio (VROM, 2009a). 
It should not go unnoticed that in the last ten years the average size of 
housing associations has grown significantly, increasing from 3,400 dwellings 
per association in 1997 to more than 5,000 in 2008, and the number of associ-
ations has decreased substantially – minus 300 associations in the same peri-
od (van Bortel et al., 2010). The reasons for the vigorous merger activities are 
manifold. Priemus (2003a) points out that from a business economics view-
point it is a legitimate strategy to withstand increased financial pressures. 
Furthermore, numerous housing associations have exchanged their manage-
ment and have tried to work as financially independent organizations but did 
not succeed to do so. As a result, passed off as mergers those associations 
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were de facto taken over by financially sound associations. Finally, housing 
associations used the mergers to grow beyond their original area of opera-
tion. Accordingly, there are a larger number of housing associations that have 
become regionally and some even nationally operating actors in the social 
housing sector. 
Data from the Central Fund for Housing (CFV, 2010) shows that besides the 
size of their stock and the area of operation, the sector is very heterogeneous 
with regard to the main focus of individual associations. Although most asso-
ciations can be characterized as generalists, engaging in all kinds of social 
housing activities, a considerable share of the association sector tends to spe-
cialize in specific customer groups, such as students and elderly. 
Private rental landlords 
Generally, the depth and breadth of information and research on the provid-
ers of private rental dwellings in the Netherlands is, to say the least, mea-
gre. There are, for instance, no detailed surveys on the average number of 
dwellings per landlord or within landlord groups. Nonetheless, it is possible 
to sketch a picture of who the providers of private rental accommodation are, 
their motivations and how they operate. 
Unlike the very small-scale supply structure of private renting in England, 
there are generally two main private landlord groups in the Netherlands. 
On the one hand, similar to the UK a large number of small-scale individual 
landlords exist. On the other hand, there is a class of professional corporate 
investors (Priemus, 1998). However, these are not fixed categories, because 
there are differences between landlords within each category with regard to 
their aims, business models, what they own, and which tenants they cater for. 
Yet, it seems to be meaningful to stick to the two-fold categories in the first 
place, and look at differences within each group in more detail when it is nec-
essary.15  
National surveys show that in 2008 about 52 per cent of the private rental 
stock is owned by private individuals, about 41 per cent by large-scale com-
panies, and the rest by other landlord groups (including employer- and fam-
ily-related provision). Out of the 40 per cent market share corporate inves-
15 It is however not always easy to maintain these two categories because different sources, e.g. statistical year-
books and policy documents tend to define each group differently.
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tors within the PRS, institutional investors own 22 per cent of the stock, own-
ing about 134,000 dwellings throughout the country (IVBN, 2008)16. This land-
lord group comprises a number of subclasses, such as pension funds, insur-
ance companies, banks, and real estate funds. Notwithstanding their declin-
ing market share, institutional investors are an important landlord group in 
the country and need some clarification. Many of those that are still exist-
ing today entered the housing market in the 1950s and 1960s when subsidies 
for the construction of new dwellings where available to all types of develop-
ers (van der Schaar, 1987). At that time they were building all kinds of dwell-
ings, but mostly in larger housing estates in peripheral areas of larger cit-
ies throughout the Netherlands. This included low- to high-priced dwellings. 
With the abolition of these subsidies, the building activities of institutional 
investors decreased rapidly. Paradoxically, compared to housing associations 
and developers of owner-occupied dwellings, the building activities of insti-
tutional investors had picked up between 2006 and 2007, just before the crisis 
on the Dutch housing market began. 
However, recent developments in the institutional investor segment are dif-
ferent to their original developments in the 1950s and 1960s. Under the cur-
rent market conditions they primarily seek to develop high-end accommo-
dation with rent levels that exceed the liberalization threshold significantly. 
Currently, about 48 per cent of their tenancies are still regulated, while 52 per 
cent – mostly their newer dwellings – fall under the free market regime (IVBN, 
2011). Institutional investors, but also corporate investors in general, are high-
ly commercialized investment companies, most of which seek a maximum 
return on investment. Almost all of them are large-scale providers with port-
folios of at least several hundred dwellings. They tend to operate in various 
local markets, thus having only weak local connections. Furthermore, many 
of them are active in other real estate segments than just housing; for some 
of them the real estate market – and particularly private renting – is just one 
investment opportunity. Almost all institutional investors are members of the 
umbrella organization IVBN (Association of Institutional Property Investors), 
which functions as an interest group constantly campaigning for the liberali-
zation of the rental housing market (Elsinga et al., 2007).
With about 400,000 dwellings private individuals own about 14 per cent of 
all rental dwellings (2008). Private individual landlords in the Netherlands 
tend to have similar motives for providing private rental accommodation as 
those in England. It also holds true that they are not really a homogeneous 
group. Some of them have become landlords by chance (for instance, through 
inheritance of a dwelling); others have started a small-scale renting busi-
16  Institutional investors are here understood as a specific subcategory of corporate investors. The business 
principles are the same, in that they are profit-oriented investment trusts operating.
[ 51 ]
ness, which may provide a large share of their total income. Although there 
is no hard data on exact market shares, it seems sensible to make a differ-
ence between part-time landlords and investor landlords in the Netherlands 
as well. Part-time investors in the Netherlands tend to own a very small num-
ber of dwellings. They often do not manage the dwelling themselves and are 
active in a single location. Many of them see their activities as an additional 
investment for their pension. Investor landlords tend to own tens of dwellings 
in various locations in a city, operating on a strictly commercial basis and 
often seek high or maximum returns on their investments (Priemus, 1998; 
Elsinga et al., 2007). Many of these private persons and small businesses are 
united in the umbrella organization Vastgoedbelang. The aims of this organi-
zation are similar to the ones of the IVBN, namely a liberalization of the rent-
al market and a higher profitability of investments (including maintenance 
investments). The call for deregulation policies needs to be seen in the light 
of the low rent levels of the dwellings of small-scale individuals. More than 95 
per cent of their dwellings have a rent level that falls below the deregulation 
threshold (Vastgoedbelang, 2010).
 2.2.2  The tenants
To recapitulate, private tenants in England were characterized as an incoher-
ent group of households (see Section 3.1.2). In the Netherlands it is possible 
and also seems to be useful to distinguish between private tenants that rent 
with an individual person and those that rent with a corporate investor. All 
data in this section comes from the National Survey on Housing 2009 (WoON) 
published by the Ministry of the Interior. The main finding here is that social 
and private tenants in the Netherlands are more alike than renters and own-
er-occupiers. 
More specifically, considering the demographics of social tenants, the age 
structure of people who live in social housing is considerably old. Almost 60 
per cent of all tenants are between 35 and 65 years old. Additionally, retired 
households are strongly overrepresented, while younger reference persons 
(< 35 years) are underrepresented (see Table 2.5). The household composition 
depicts single parent families as fairly overrepresented; yet, by far the largest 
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group is single-person households with a share of around 50 per cent. Accord-
ingly, and similar to what we have observed for England, the average house-
hold size in the social sector is lower than the overall size. Arguably the most 
striking demographic characteristic of social tenants is the high share of eth-
nic minorities. More than every fourth household in the social sector has an 
ethnic background, where the overall share is less than 20 per cent. 
The age structure in the whole private rental sector is relatively well repre-
sented among all age categories; yet, similar to the English case, particularly 
young people under 35 tend to live in the PRS. This pattern is much more vis-
ible in the small-scale individual landlord segment, indicating the existence 
of a large student population. Conversely, elderly people are slightly overrep-
resented in the corporate investor market segment. Furthermore, the compo-
sition of households differs between private rental segments as well. In the 
institutional investor segment about half of all households are single persons; 
couples without children are the second biggest group. The general distribu-
tion of household types is sustained within the private person sector; howev-
er, the share of single-person households is substantially higher than in the 
institutional investor segment (+ 8 percentage points). Again this indicates 
the large number of students living in this segment. 
With regard to their movement behaviour, social tenants are characterized by 
a relatively low mobility, expressed in comparably long mean lengths of resi-
dences. In 2009, social tenants had occupied their current dwelling for an aver-
age of 13.6 years, compared to 13.9 years overall. Moving social tenants most 
often go to other social dwellings (59 per cent). About a third became owner-
occupiers in the same period, which includes households that gained the pos-
sibility to buy their current social rental dwelling.17 Interestingly enough and in 
contrast to the English example, the social housing sector was the main desti-
nation for newly formed households. Conversely, it seems that private tenants 
are less affected by ‘tenure immobility’. Quite surprisingly, the lowest share 
of tenants stayed within the PRS (28 per cent) in 2009, whereas the majority 
moved to the owner-occupied sector. Furthermore, private renters seem to con-
sider their accommodation not only as a short-term solution. Looking at mean 
length of stay in the private sector, we can see that particularly institutional 
investor tenants have occupied their dwelling for a relatively long period. This 
indicates that many tenants regard private renting as tenure of choice rather 
than as an interim solution – as it seems to be the case in England.
Social housing households are distinctly structured with respect to their 
socio-economic status. Less than half of all reference persons are eco-
17 This can be seen as a first indication of the fact that the rental housing sector is not a closed system but has 
strong ties with the owner-occupied market. Although this is not the subject of research in this thesis, the idea of 
competition between owner-occupation and rental housing is thus important and valid as well.
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nomically active. Additionally, the rate of retired persons in the social sec-
tor is above average as well (34.5 per cent compared to 23.6 per cent over-
all). This economic status is clearly reflected in social tenants’ income situ-
ations. The mean disposable income of social sector households was about 
€23,000 in 2008. This is significantly lower than overall disposable incomes 
(approx. €37,000). Expressed in income classes, more than 40 per cent of all 
social tenants had a disposable income of less than €18,500 per year, while 
15 per cent had even less than €12,000. Nonetheless, there is also a relative-
ly high share of people – about 35 per cent – with a relatively high disposable 
income (> €25,000). With regard to social tenants’ rent expenditures, the aver-
age monthly net rent of social sector households was €363 in 2009. The share 
of tenants whose rent expenditure was partially or fully covered by housing 
allowances added up to 40 per cent in the same period.
In the PRS, about 55 per cent of all tenants get their income from either 
full-time or part-time employment. Less than a third is retired, and about 3.5 
per cent of all PRS households have their main income from unemployment 
benefits. There are differences between the two segments, however. Among 
those households renting with a corporate investor about 40 per cent get 
their income through pension scheme, while this is only the case for about 
20 per cent in the private individual sector. Regarding their incomes, one can 
observe relatively evenly distributed income classes. About 23 per cent has a 
disposable income of less than €12,000. Middle-income households are well 
represented; however, the biggest income class is those households with a 
disposable yearly income of more than €25,000 (about 44 per cent). Again the 
differences between households renting with a private institution and those 
renting with a private person are substantial. The former are overrepresent-
ed in the higher income class, which is expressed by a yearly mean disposa-
ble income of approximately €28,750 per year. Tenants renting in the private 
person segment, on the other hand, are significantly overrepresented in the 
lower income classes, shown by the much lower mean disposable income of 
€23,200. With regard to rent payments in the private sector, one can generally 
observe a much higher mean monthly net rent than in the social housing sec-
tor. With €548 per calendar months, the net rent expenditures of private ten-
ants are 1.5 times higher than the ones of social tenants. Yet, we can also see 
that the difference is lower among tenants who rent with a private individu-
al landlord and have net rent costs of €520 per month, whereas average net 
rents of €577 can be observed in the institutional investor segment. In both 
PRS segments the share of housing allowance recipients is significantly lower 
than in the social rental sector (about 14 per cent in total). This is in line with 
the fact that absolute housing allowances are on average only half as high in 
the PRS as in the social rental sector. 
In the context of rent expenditures and public assistance through housing 
allowances it is worthwhile to take a closer look at the way housing allow-
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ances are designed in both sectors. In the previous section it was said that 
one should distinguish between the regulated and the deregulated rental sec-
tor in the Netherlands. We have seen that all dwellings with a rent level of 
more than €652 are allocated through free market processes. This deregula-
tion limit also performs as the maximum rent limit for which tenants can 
receive housing allowances (see also Haffner et al., 2008; Priemus & Elsinga, 
2007). For all rents, including social housing as well as private rental units, 
below the deregulation limit, housing allowances are designed as follows. A 
basic rent has to be paid by every tenant in the Netherlands. The level of the 
basic rent is, depending on the age and composition of the household, about 
€205. The basic rent is supplemented by a quality discount limit of €357, 
which says that the rent that lies between this level and the basic rent is ful-
ly covered the housing allowance. The quality discount limit is also the max-
imum rent limit for households with a reference person who is younger than 
23 years. Rents that exceed the quality control limit are subsidized on the 
basis of household age and composition. This means that for one and two-
person households the rent between €357 and €511 (capping limit) is subsi-
dized with 75 per cent of the actual rent level. This capping limit is slightly 
higher for multi-person households (> two persons per household), with €548. 
These two capping limits are the maximum subsidized rents for non-single 
households with a reference person of less than 65 years. All single and older 
(> 65 years) households can also receive a 50 per cent housing allowance on 
their rent between the according capping limit and the liberalization limit of 
€652 (VROM, 2009b). 
It is also worth mentioning that the rent tenants have to pay determine 
the property rights they get. Security of tenure is defined in the Dutch civ-
il code. It delineates that both in the social and private sector tenancy agree-
ments exists for an indefinite period of time, and the landlord is not allowed 
to cancel such an agreement without the approval of the tenant. In the PRS it 
is common practice that temporary contracts are agreed for a period of one 
year; after this ‘introductory’ period the contract is indefinitely valid. None-
theless, this security of tenure system only applies to tenancy agreements 
that fall under the regulated rent system. Rents that are above the liberaliza-
tion limit are not affected (there is however a system of some basic rights in 
place; see VROM, 2009a).
 2.3  The case study cities Coventry and Breda
The previous sections aimed to provide information on how the two rental 
sectors operate on a national level. This section now turns to the case study 
cities Coventry (England) and Breda (Netherlands). The goal here is, however, 
not to describe the functionality of rental housing in the two municipalities 
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and to go into detail with regard to the relationship between the two sectors. 
As part of the analysis on market structure, this will be covered in the follow-
ing comparative chapter. Instead, this section aims to provide some informa-
tion on the housing markets as such and to show whether the two ‘typical’ 
cases deviate from what we have described for the national level on who pro-
vides rental housing and to whom is it provided for. As such, the description 
of the two cases will be kept very brief. 
 2.3.1   Coventry in context
The local authority of Coventry is a metropolitan borough in the West Mid-
lands Region. With a population of about 306,700 (2007), Coventry is the 11th 
largest city in England and the second biggest city in the Midlands. The city is 
administratively subdivided into 18 wards (see Figure 2.3). Although the major 
city in the West Midlands is Birmingham, Coventry performs the role of the 
leading city – due to its population size, as well as economic and socio-cul-
tural dominance – in a sub-regional context of Coventry, Solihull and the re-
maining local authorities in the county of Warwickshire (North Warwickshire, 
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Warwick, Nuneaton & Bedworth, Stratford-on-Avon and Rugby) (CCC, 2006a). 
Until the 1980s, Coventry was one of the major manufacturing areas in the 
UK, probably best known for car manufacturing and engineering. However, 
with the demise of these industries, the city experienced a long-term period 
of declining employment levels and a significant decrease of deprivation lev-
els, which rose well above the national average. This economic decline went 
hand in hand with a decline of the total population number. In the late 1990s 
and 2000s the city experienced a substantial economic recovery, at least until 
the national economic crisis at the end of the decade. The recovery was based 
on a strong growth of research oriented job growth in engineering industries. 
This went together with an increasing number of students and employees at 
the two local universities, Coventry University and the University of Warwick-
shire. Accordingly, the city has grown once again in the last ten years, par-
ticularly among younger age cohorts. Besides the growth of the younger pop-
ulation, the city has also undergone a strong increase of its BME population 
– 20 per cent of all inhabitants are non-white, where the Indian population is 
most strongly represented (8.3 per cent). Hence, considering the demographic 
profile of the city, Coventry seems to be in line with a typical mid-size urban 
area, including a high share of students and BME citizens.
Considering the socio-economic profile of the resident population, we can 
see that the average unemployment rate was 9.5 per cent in 2009, compared 
to 8.0 per cent in England. Accordingly the share of economically inactive 
people is slightly higher as well (25.5 per cent to 23.4 per cent) (ONS, 2010). 
The mean household income in Coventry was £30,225 in 2006 (CCC, 2006a), 
which means that households in Coventry are on average the poorest in the 
sub-region Coventry/Warwickshire. Nonetheless, incomes in Coventry com-
pare with the national average, as the mean household income tends to be 
significantly lower than incomes in local authorities such as Milton Keynes 
and Oxford, but significantly higher than in the cities in the North of England.
The housing market
Current data shows that there are about 130,000 households in Coventry, 
leading to an average household size of approx. 2.4 persons per household. 
Out of these 130,000 households a large majority lives in owner occupied 
dwellings (70 per cent). The social rental sector has a tenure share of 18.3 per 
cent, while households renting a private dwelling add up to an estimated 13 
per cent of all households18 (see Table 2.6). 
18 For the private housing sector the most recent published data is for 2006. Interviews with local experts sug-
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Historically, the development of housing tenures has been different from 
the national picture. Local housing expert Dr Tim Brown, lecturer at the 
DeMontfort University Leicester, noted that the owner occupation rate in the 
city has increased much faster in the post-war period than in other English 
cities. This is a reflection of the city’s past as a major engineering area. The 
economic surge in the 1950s led to extremely high wage levels in the Coven-
try region, which in turn enabled ordinary workers to buy houses rather than 
– what was the usual state at that time – renting them. The large share of the 
owner occupied sector led to a relatively fast decline of private renting; social 
housing, on the other hand, grew rapidly.
In the last twenty years and in line with the national development, the rel-
ative share of the owner occupied stock and the relative and absolute num-
ber of the social housing stock decreased, while the stock of private rent-
ed housing grew significantly. The decrease of the social housing stock was 
mainly due to the demolition of difficult-to-let estates and the sale of social 
dwellings to sitting tenants through the Right-to-Buy program – about 2,500 
units in the last decennia. A major change in the supply structure of social 
housing was the transfer of 20,196 council housing dwellings to the White-
friars Housing Group in 2001. Accordingly, there is no council housing sup-
plier any longer and all social housing is supplied by nonprofit housing asso-
ciations (CCC, 2006a; Outside, 2009). Currently, 15 housing associations own 
housing stock in Coventry, most of which are traditional associations. By far 
the biggest social provider however is the stock transfer association White-
friars. Two traditional housing associations can be considered as major sup-
pliers of social housing as well; these are Midland Heart and Orbit Heart of 
England.19 In line with the social housing structure in the whole country, sub-
stantial differences between the activities of the stock transfer and tradition-
al housing associations in Coventry exist. First of all, they differ with regard to 
geographical scope: Where all of Whitefriar’s housing stock is located within 
the boundaries of the municipality, the traditional housing associations oper-
ate in various locations in the Midlands. Secondly, the two association groups 
diverge with regard to their tenants and their portfolios. The stock portfolio of 
Whitefriars is considerably older than that of the traditional housing associ-
ations and the share of houses and bungalows is much lower. Data provided 
by the TSA (2010) shows that the tenant profiles of the three associations are 
comparable overall; yet, Whitefriars tends to provide relatively more units for 
tenants receiving Housing Benefit and lower-income households in strongly 
deprived neighbourhoods. 
gest that the share of the private rental sector has, however, increased significantly in the last four years and is 
estimated. Based on growth rates on a national level, the current PRS share is estimated to be about 13 per cent 
nowadays, which is still slightly below the national average.
19 This will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.
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The robust growth of the private rental sector in the last two decades, par-
ticularly in the last four years, has three main reasons. Firstly, in line with 
the development of the sector, the market environment, such as low inter-
est rates, relatively stable house prices (also in the property slump years), 
and surging rents – presented a favourable investment climate for aspiring 
new landlords and those who wanted to increase their portfolio size. Sec-
ondly, Coventry has experienced a strong growth of its student population in 
the last twenty years. As described before, this is one of the main custom-
er groups for private landlords. Thirdly, the influx of asylum seekers and 
migrant labourers has created a new and large customer group for landlords 
as well (CCC, 2006b). This connects to the highly diverse supply structure of 
the PRS in the city, in which private landlords operate in all kinds of submar-
kets. Most landlords see the student housing business as their major field of 
activity, but a considerable number of landlords focus on (young) profession-
als and the middle to higher rent market segment. Seemingly, a substantial 
share of the private landlord class in the city operates in the Housing Ben-
efit market, offer temporary accommodation, and provide housing for asy-
lum seekers. Furthermore, data from the city council (ibid, 2006) and person-
al interviews with local housing market experts suggest that, in line with the 
national PRS supply structure, small-scale individual persons dominate the 
market. However, in recent years a number of large-scale nationally operating 
suppliers of student accommodation have sought to enter the housing mar-
ket in Coventry. 
To conclude, as difficult as it is to call a city a typical case study for rent-
al housing in England, this brief description of the city’s housing market has 
at least shown that we are not dealing with a distinct case such as London 
or the cities in the North of the country would be. Therefore we can argue 
that the case study city conforms to the selection criteria as presented in 
the introductory Chapter. Firstly, the fact that the council housing stock was 
transferred to a LSVT housing association (Whitefriars) allows for an exami-
nation of competition between housing associations, as the ‘modern’ provid-
ers of social housing, and private landlords. Secondly, the housing market in 
Coventry seems to show no structural trait that would be completely excep-
tional to what one can observe in the country. Rather, the share of social and 
private renting, the effort of the city council to create more mixed communi-
ties (CCC, 2007), the location of the municipality, the social structure of the 
population, and the development of the PRS in the last years that competition 
compares with what one might call a national average situation.
 2.3.2  Breda in context
The city of Breda is a municipality in the province of North Brabant, the Neth-
erlands. With a population of 172,085 inhabitants (O&I Breda, 2012), Breda is 
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the 8th biggest city in the Netherlands and the third biggest city in North Bra-
bant. Breda functions as both a regional centre in the Province and as an im-
portant link between the Netherlands and Belgium, particularly between the 
cities of Rotterdam and Antwerp (Gemeente Breda, 2009).
In the post-World War II period the city experienced a rapid growth of its 
population, partially through the annexation of adjacent municipalities such 
as Teteringen and Bavel (see Figure 2.4), and partially through demographic 
changes (in-migration and excess of births). In 1940, the population added up 
to about 50,000 inhabitants, while it grew to about 160,000 until the end of 
the last century. In the last ten years the population has grown by another 
10,000 inhabitants (CBS, 2009). The demographic growth of the city has been 
facilitated by a positive economic development in the last twenty years. Breda 
has become one of the strongest local economies of the service sector in the 
country, which was accompanied by the influx of highly educated young peo-
ple in the same period. 
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Breda has a relatively balanced age structure of its population, which is in 
line with the situation in the whole Netherlands; one might note that older 
people are slightly overrepresented, and that a significant (polytechnic) stu-
dent population exists. With respect to the ethnic population, recent figures 
show that 79.7 per cent of the population has a non-migration background. 
The biggest ethnic minority are Moroccan people with 2.9 per cent of the local 
population, while Turks are the second biggest group with 1.7 per cent (O&I 
Breda, 2012). In 2009, there were 73,500 households, leading to a household 
size of 2.3 persons per dwelling. Compared to national figures, single-person 
households are fairly overrepresented in Breda, while couples with children 
are significantly underrepresented. This, however, compares with the situa-
tion in other bigger Dutch cities (CBS, 2009). 
Regarding income levels in the city, the average disposable yearly house-
hold income was €31,200 in 2006. More precisely, single-person households 
had a disposable income of €18,600, while the average income of couples with 
children was €44,200. Here, the situation in Breda compares with the national 
and the regional average. Most households receive their income through job-
related salaries or self-employment; there is however a significant group of 
social benefit recipients. Again, this compares with the national average.
The housing market
The housing stock in the city of Breda grew rapidly after World War II. New 
housing and mixed-use areas were developed, some adjacent villages were 
annexed – with them large development sites and a relatively high number of 
single-family houses –, whereas older housing estates were gradually demol-
ished after the 1980s. Currently, there are about 75,100 dwellings in the city 
(O&I Breda, 2012).
About 60 per cent of all dwellings are owner-occupied, while 40 per cent are 
rental dwellings. The majority of rental dwellings are social housing units (31 
per cent), while private renting is a relatively small sector in the city (9 per 
cent) (see Table 2.7). In the last two decades a substantial shift from renting to 
owner-occupation has taken place in the city. On the one hand, many private 
landlords have left the market, particularly corporate investors. In numbers 
they sold more than 1,100 dwellings between 2001 and 2009. More recently, 
the decline of the sector has come to a halt however. Local experts (Interviews 
Breda, 2010) stated that there has been a strong influx of property slump 
landlords, which is reflected in a temporary surge of PRS dwellings owned by 
private individuals from 4.6 per cent in 2010 to 8.0 per cent in 2011. On the 
other hand, social housing has been fairly stable; yet a significant number of 
dwellings were demolished in the last years, particularly in the major urban 
renewal areas in the Northern and Western part of Breda (Geeren and Heuvel) 
(Gemeente Breda, 2009). Social housing in the city is provided by three hous-
ing associations, which have a similar share of the market.
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Increasing demand for owner occupied dwellings has led to escalating 
house prices in Breda up until 2009. With an increase of the median transac-
tion price from about €175,000 in 2001 to more than €240,000 in 2007, house 
price increases in the municipality have outpaced the countrywide mean 
price. Accordingly, Breda has become one of the most expensive municipal-
ities with regard to mean house prices (Gemeente Breda, 2007). In turn this 
has also led to rapidly rising rent levels in the private rental sector. In the 
social housing sector, excess demand has led to growing waiting lists and 
individual waiting time in the last years (Gemeente Breda, 2009). It should be 
added, however, that demand pressure is strong in all tenures; yet, this is only 
typical for a mid-sized city in the Western part of the Netherlands. 
Considering the supply structure three housing associations – Lauren-
tius Wonen, Singelveste AlleeWonen, and WonenBreburg – provide all social 
housing dwellings in Breda. Even though these associations are so-called 
approved institutions, there are some major differences between them. Lau-
rentius housing association has its roots in the suburban areas of the city, 
owning a housing stock that is much more spread across the city than that of 
the other associations. Singelveste AlleeWonen is a regionally operating, mid-
sized housing association with a majority of its housing stock in Breda. Its 
stock tends to be of better quality and higher rents than that of WonenBre-
burg, but of lower quality and rent levels than that of Laurentius. WonenBre-
burg is also a mid-sized regional housing association with its main area of 
operation in the municipality of Tilburg. In the 1990s it took over the munic-
ipal housing stock in Breda, which still has an impact on its main activities 
today. Due to the fact that they have the lowest tenant profile, the worst stock 
and the highest concentrations in more problematic neighbourhoods of all 
social housing providers, their main business is investments into their cur-
rent stock. Similar to Singelveste, WonenBreburg has become one of the main 
student housing suppliers in Breda (Interviews Breda, 2010). 
The supply structure in the city equally follows what has been described 
for the national level, in which the PRS is split up between private individu-
als and institutional investors/large-scale private companies. While PRS land-
lords in Breda had an almost equal share of the housing stock (5.3 and 5.1 
per cent of the total housing stock) in the market in 2001, the share of private 
individuals (4.6 per cent/3,500 dwellings) is higher than the share of institu-
tional investors (3.6 per cent/2,700 dwellings) in 2010 (O&I Breda, 2012). Small-
scale individual landlords tend to be active in specific market segments. Most 
importantly, alongside with student complexes owned by housing associ-
ations, they are the main providers of student housing in the city. Another 
important customer group is younger couples and families who seek to live 
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in more upscale accommodation in the city centre. Conversely, institutional 
investors tend to own larger estates and provide accommodation for older as 
well middle-aged multi-person households. Part of their stock, primarily less 
expensive dwellings, is often rented to younger starters. Institutional inves-
tors are predominantly nationally operating organizations, often being repre-
sented by letting agents in the local housing market.
To conclude, similar to Coventry in England, Breda can be seen as a ‘typical’ 
mid-sized city in the Netherlands: tenure shares are comparable, the hous-
ing market is tight, social housing and private renting have been declining 
in the last twenty years – at least up until 2010 –, the supply of social hous-
ing is dominated by large scale housing associations, while private renting is 
supplied by both private individual and corporate investors. The particular-
ly high prices in the private sector might be seen as a particularity; howev-
er, most urban areas in the Netherlands have house and rental prices that are 
well above the average.
 2.4  Conclusions
This intermediate chapter sought to provide information on rental hous-
ing in England and the Netherlands and gave a brief introduction to the re-
spective case study cities. To summarize, based on the high share of poor and 
low-income households and the long median length of stay it might be as-
sumed that social housing in England primarily performs the role of a perma-
nent tenure with a welfare safety net function. People who become social ten-
ants are likely to stay so permanently. We have, however, seen that there are 
important differences between the council housing and housing association 
segments in general, and between traditional associations and stock trans-
fer associations in particular. Hence it seems that the emerging structure and 
more commercialized modes of operation within the housing association sec-
tor, as well as changes in social housing policy have introduced some traits of 
a choice-based tenure, rather than acting as a safety net only.20 
The description of the tenants and the landlords in the private rental sec-
tor imply that there are no simply identified sources of demand and sup-
ply. What seems to be a crucial aspect of private renting is the tenants’ high 
mobility, indicating the easy access role of the sector in the English housing 
market. However, the sector houses tenants from the whole social stratum, 
who might either see private renting as their tenure of choice or as a tempo-
rary solution before moving to an owner-occupied or social housing dwelling. 
The discussion on rental housing in the Netherlands has proposed that the 
20 For a good discussion on this issue, see Fitzpatrick and Pawson (2007).
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primacy of the social rental sector is, similar to the English case, the satisfac-
tion of housing need of disadvantaged households. Yet, considering the socio-
economic and demographic profile of its renters, the social sector provides 
accommodation for a broad stratum of households. The private rental sector, 
on the other hand, is difficult to interpret and it seems that there is not a 
singular clear role, neither in policy making nor in housing market realities. 
This argument is based on the admittedly simplistic view of a strong polariza-
tion between the provision and demand structures in the corporate investor 
segment and the private individual landlord segment. The first seems to per-
form the role of tenure of choice for older and more affluent households who 
tend to stay in their dwelling for a long period. Conversely, private individu-
al landlords, comprising both informal and investor landlords, tend to provide 
dwellings that are more often inhabited by younger, less affluent households 
(including the student population) who see their accommodation as a tempo-
rary solution.
To conclude, the descriptive analysis suggests that social and private rent-
ing in the Netherlands are indeed closer than in England with regard to the 
tenants’ profiles, or in the terms of Elsinga et al. (2009) and Haffner et al. 
(2009b) a higher degree of competition between social housing and private 
renting might exist in the Netherlands than in England. Using the typical case 
study cities of Coventry and Breda the next chapters will approach the rela-
tion between the two sectors more analytically, using the SCP of rental hous-
ing as a guiding paradigm. How does the allegedly more competitive rental 
system in the Netherlands play out in a local market context? How do provid-
ers of social and private renting see their relationship? And if social housing 
is more competitive in the Netherlands, why are there relatively few moves 
of tenants between the two rental sectors in both countries, particularly from 
social housing to the private rental sector? These are some of the questions 




 3  Market structure 
  The competitiveness of mixed 
rental markets 
The first chapter of this thesis introduced the conceptual framework for the 
analysis of competition between social and private landlords in rental hous-
ing markets, presenting the idea that competition analysis relates to the com-
petitiveness of the market environment in which both landlord groups oper-
ate, the rivalrous interactions between social and private landlords, and the 
outcomes of competition in the rental market. It was further argued that the 
SCP paradigm itself seeks to unfold the links between these three competi-
tion elements. This chapter addresses the first element of the SCP of rental 
housing, the competiveness of the rental housing market in which landlords 
in Coventry and Breda operate. Two research questions guide the following 
analysis: (1) What is a competitive market structure in mixed rental housing mar-
kets?; (2) How competitive are the mixed rental markets in Coventry and Breda? 
The first key question is theoretical in nature. The argument in the intro-
duction was that in order to make the concept of ‘market structure’ workable 
for this research, the narrow neoclassical meaning as used by the traditional 
SCP approach should be complemented by some basic insights of institution-
al economics and the general functionality of rental housing markets, in par-
ticular of the social housing sector. As a result, the definition of market struc-
ture in this study focuses on the relation between two different industries 
in one market. Five elements of market structured were devised as crucial 
in this respect: Supply concentration in both rental tenures, the spatial con-
centration of this supply, barriers to enter the social and private rental hous-
ing industry, barriers to access the consumption of social and private renting, 
and rent and quality aspects of product differentiation between social and 
private rental services. So far, only the meanings of these competitiveness 
items were introduced; however, it has been left implicit under which circum-
stances a mixed rental market can be classified as competitive or uncompet-
itive. This gap will be addressed in the first part of this chapter, in which we 
elaborate on the question of how mainstream theories of market structure, 
particularly the idea of perfect competition, can be translated to rental hous-
ing markets. Subsequently, this model is applied to the two case study cities 
Coventry and Breda, which means that each item of market structure will be 
examined through a comparative approach. To make the differences in mixed 
market competitiveness visible, a simple five-point scale (from very low to 
very high) of competitiveness will be used. This comparative scale should be 
seen as a pragmatic approach, where modest subjective estimation is inte-
grated with objective empirical data. 
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 3.1  An analytical framework of perfect competi-
tion in mixed rental markets
As it was argued in Chapter 1, five items circumscribe the competitiveness of 
a mixed rental market: Firstly, there is a strong impetus for analysing supply 
concentration for the two rental sectors separately, the reason being the ex-
istence of two industries, which might or might not operate in the same mar-
ket. The assumption here is that a deconcentrated supply structure is more 
competitive than for instance a situation in which both industries are char-
acterized by a monopolistic supply structure – which seems to be very unlike-
ly in the PRS with its naturally atomistic supply structure. As a second step it 
seems to be meaningful to assess the position of social landlords in the whole 
rental market. Are they dominating the market, or are there private landlords 
with similar market shares? If social landlords are quasi-monopolists in the 
rental market (as measured by their market share), one might assume that 
they dictate market outcomes and individual decisions by private landlords 
are very much circumscribed by the strategies of social landlords. In practice, 
the measurement of supply concentration might not always be straightfor-
ward, since a cleavage between ownership and management can exist. After 
all, if a small number of letting agents managed the entire stock of a large 
number of owners, serious concerns about the validity of supply concentra-
tion measures based on ownership would prevail.
Secondly, spatial concentration connects to the idea of monopolies with-
in the two rental sectors and in the rental market as a whole by controlling 
for a strong spatial concentration of tenure-related rental housing supply (see 
Maclennan & More, 1997). It can be assumed that if social housing was sup-
plied in completely different locations than private renting, the whole rental 
market would surely be less competitive than an environment in which social 
and private landlords provided housing in the same neighbourhoods. Ideal-
ly, one would look at the stock location of every individual provider. However, 
the spatial distribution of the entire social housing and private renting stocks 
can be seen as a good proxy for this. 
Thirdly, it was argued before that strong entry and exit barriers can exist 
if they are defined as the requirements and preconditions providers have to 
meet when they aim to offer market or social housing services. The underly-
ing supposition is that when bureaucratic burdens are low for a landlord to 
operate in both sectors, or to switch from one sector to the other, the market 
environment is more competitive than a situation where providers are bound 
to strict regulation of the types of housing services they may offer. This con-
nects to the idea of a contestable market (see Baumol, 1982), where entry to 
all kinds of provision is costless and there is no distinction between exist-
ing and potential competitors. One entry barrier might be the access of land-
lords to subsidies in the provision of social housing due to specific require-
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ments for an organization to become a social landlord. A contestable market 
means that all types of incumbent social landlords as well as other types of 
landlords are allowed to contest for the provision of new social housing and 
associated subsidies. Similarly, a contestable rental market means that there 
are no restrictions for social housing providers to engage in the market rent-
al business, i.e. they should be able to offer housing that is allocated by mar-
ket forces in addition to their social housing activities without any regulatory 
barriers. A conscious choice of social housing providers against the provision 
of market renting, on the other hand, should not be seen as a barrier to entry. 
Contestability in the provision of social housing further means that pub-
lic subsidies, if available, should be assigned to the bidder with the most effi-
cient and socially desired proposal, irrespective their organizational status. In 
order to guarantee a level playing field in the market rental sector, rules and 
regulation should prohibit the use of social housing funds for an engagement 
in the market rental sector. The latter should take place along strictly com-
mercial lines. As the outcomes of operating in the social and particularly the 
market sector were uncertain, the risk of failure and bankruptcy would then 
be genuine. Contestability also relates to the question of where social land-
lords are able to offer their housing services. Do they have a prescribed area 
of operation, or are they allowed to operate on a regional or national scale? 
This touches on the existence of spatial barriers to entry. If spatial barriers to 
entry existed and local housing markets were closed entities, rental markets 
would be less contestable and thus less competitive.
Fourthly, it was argued that the degree of competitiveness is strongly influ-
enced by the question of who might actually be able to consume both private 
and social housing services. Access barriers to consumption here is defined 
as the free choice for tenants between the two rental services, or whether reg-
ulatory or landlord-induced impediments to act on their demand preferenc-
es exist? In practice, one barrier to access the social housing sector might be 
explicit income limits, stipulating that households with an income above a 
certain threshold are excluded. Conversely, such barriers might also be pre-
sent in the commercial sector, if private landlords set up minimum income 
barriers, thereby excluding lower-income households from the consumption 
of their housing services per se. From a regulatory viewpoint the application 
of waiting lists for prospective tenants is a clear barrier to access the sector. 
On the other hand, high demand pressures might stifle access to private rent-
al housing. More specifically, private renting is a private good, which means 
that in principle tenants are rivals and can be excluded from the consump-
tion of the good. The extent of consumer rivalry and excludability are how-
ever a question of whether there is an excess or shortage of supply. Hence, 
a tight private rental market might be seen as a barrier to entry for starters 
and people who are willing to move to the sector. The assumption behind the 
opportunity to consume a social or private rental service is the following: The 
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scarcer the social housing resource (long waiting lists), the higher the proba-
bility that potential social housing customers move to a private rental accom-
modation. Yet, the higher the pressure on private renting the higher the prob-
ability that people cannot find appropriate accommodation. 
Fifthly, product differentiation refers to the idea of substitutability of pri-
vate and social housing; i.e. whether the two services are homogeneous or 
heterogeneous services with regard to their rent/quality bundles. The rent 
item comprises three different aspects: the differences between absolute rent 
levels, the regulation of initial rents and rent increases, and the availability 
and generosity of housing allowance payments. The assumption here is that 
if all of these three aspects are similar in both rental sectors, the rental mar-
ket is more competitive because the willingness and ability to substitute both 
services is increased. Equally, this homogeneity approach also applies to the 
quality of the two rental services. If low-standard social dwellings – includ-
ing both technical and comfort aspects – were only offered in deprived neigh-
bourhoods, while high-end market dwellings were mainly located in popu-
lar areas, the products would barely be seen as substitutes. Additionally, the 
existence of quality regulations in the two sectors is an important point. This 
includes observations of how the security of tenure for tenants and further 
property rights are organized and regulated in both sectors: If social tenants 
savour a high degree of security in their rental agreements and market ten-
ants can be evicted easily, social housing has a competitive advantage. Fur-
thermore, if there are similar quality regulations in place, tenants might con-
sider the two products as better substitutes. 
What is a competitive market structure?
To repeat, neoclassical economics states that a perfectly competitive market 
needs to fulfil five conditions – homogenous goods, high number of suppliers, 
no barriers to entry and exit, perfect information for all market participants, 
and divisibility of goods. If all these conditions are fulfilled, suppliers can on-
ly behave competitively, leading to a welfare-optimal outcome of the market. 
This notion might help to answer the question on what a competitive market 
structure in mixed rental housing is. Although the present theoretical model 
abstracts from information aspects and the divisibility of a good, the previous 
remarks have shown what competitiveness means in the context of the indi-
vidual items: A competitive supply concentration means that there is a high 
number and small market shares of landlords in both rental industries. Fur-
thermore, a competitive supply structure also implies that there are no spa-
tial monopolies of either social or private landlords. Competitiveness in the 
context of barriers to entry is a situation in which all kinds of organizations 
can provide social as well as private rental housing without facing any regula-
tory barriers. This relates to the idea of a contestable rental market (Baumol, 
1982). Moreover, a competitive market structure is circumscribed by a situa-
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tion in which potential private and social renters can easily access both sec-
tors, not facing any regulator- or landlord-related impediments to consump-
tion. Finally, competitive rental markets are dependent on the homogeneity 
between the two rental services, including market-related as well as regulato-
ry product characteristics. 
If we look at the five factors conjointly, one might argue that there is a state 
of ‘perfect competition’ between social and market renting. This would be ful-
filled if each aspect were fully competitive in itself: a large number of suppli-
ers with small individual market shares, high spatial proximity; no barriers to 
entry in supply; no barriers to access consumption; identical product charac-
teristics. It should be obvious that similar to its neoclassical antecedent, that 
the state of ‘perfect competition’ does not exist in reality, since social rental 
housing will never be fully congruent with the private rental sector. However, 
it is possible to use the model of a perfectly competitive market as a yardstick 
to classify real local rental markets, which are Coventry in England and Breda 
in the Netherlands in the case of this research. 
 3.2  Supply and spatial concentration 
Supply concentration 
Two measures of supply concentration are widely used in economic studies, 
the n-firm concentration ratio, which is based on the market share of a cer-
tain number of largest suppliers in the market, and the Herfindahl Index (HI)1. 
Both measures are used in this study. The oligopolistic structure of social 
housing, which was described in Chapter 2, can be found in the local authori-
ty of Coventry as well. Data from the Tenant Services Authority (2010) reveals 
that 21.042 social housing units (general needs dwellings only) are offered by 
15 housing associations throughout the city. These dwellings are, however, not 
equally distributed among suppliers. Table 3.1 shows that the three largest 
housing associations own about 90 per cent of the social housing stock in the 
city. Even more revealing is the position of Whitefriars housing association, 
owning three out of four social dwellings in the city. A calculation of the Her-
findahl Index (0.57) suggests an almost monopolistic supply structure. 
There are no perfectly representative figures on supply concentration in the 
PRS in Coventry. Yet the calculation for different supply concentration indi-
1 The HI is defined as the sum of squares of the market shares – which are expressed as fractions – of a given 
number of firms in the market. Antitrust agencies consider a HI of more than 0.18 as a highly concentrated indus-
try. Values between 0.1 and 0.18 are regarded as moderately concentrated, while values below 0.1 are regarded as 
deconcentrated and competitive (Kelly, 1981). The HI is supposed to be less arbitrary than the n-firm concentra-
tion index as it takes both the number of suppliers and each individual market share into account.
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ces of accredited landlords2 shows that on average each landlord provides 
four dwellings. The 3-firm (32.5 per cent) and 10-firm (50 per cent) supply con-
centration suggest that there are a few larger providers of accredited proper-
ties; however, the Herfindahl Index, including all accredited landlords, is very 
low with a value of 0.04. More precisely, the few large-scale providers tend 
to be active in the student market only. For instance, the largest accredited 
landlords in the city are Warwick University (215 units), and a private student 
housing developer (133). Accordingly, it can be assumed that private renting 
apart from student housing is even more deconcentrated than the already 
low HI Index suggests.
In Breda, social housing has an oligopolistic supply structure with only 
three major providers. Data provided by the three housing associations shows 
that their market shares are of comparable size, where the smallest associa-
tion owns 6,736 general needs dwellings and the largest 8,439 dwellings.3 Not-
withstanding the comparable market shares, the calculation of the Herfind-
ahl Index shows that social housing in the city is a very concentrated indus-
try when compared with other industries or the private rental sector. Since 
there is no mandatory registration scheme for private landlords, the calcula-
tion of supply concentration in the private sector cannot be as accurate as in 
the social sector. However, the municipality collects data on landlords with a 
housing stock of more than ten dwellings. The analysis of this data leads to 
two interesting findings. Firstly, as expected, supply concentration as meas-
ured by the Herfindahl Index (0.03) in the private rental sector is rather low. 
2 The Coventry Accredited Property Scheme (CAPS) is a local voluntary system of private landlord accreditation. 
The idea behind this is to recognise and publicise which landlords provide accommodation that is of good physi-
cal standards, comprising amongst other things general fitness for habitation, security and fire precautions, as 
well as energy efficiency issues, and that is well managed. In 2010, the CAPS included about a third of all PRS 
dwellings in the city.
3 There are further approved institutions in Breda. Yet, these other institutions are excluded from the calculation 
since they provide accommodation in joint housing and care facilities and nursery homes for elderly people only.
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It can be assumed that the degree of concentration of the entire PRS indus-
try is strongly overestimated, since small-scale landlords are largely excluded 
in the sample; indeed, only eight individual persons own a stock of more than 
ten dwellings in the city. Conversely, there is some concentration in the cor-
porate investor market segment. Five corporate investors own more than 200 
hundred dwellings in the city, which is reflected in relatively high three-firm 
and particularly ten-firm concentration indices. 
It was mentioned before that the use of letting agent services among pri-
vate landlords in England as well as the Netherlands has been growing rap-
idly in the last years. As a result of this development, the provision structure 
in the PRS is not as clear as the number of dwellings per landlord and related 
concentration measures might suggest. If in business practice letting agents 
manage the dwelling and the tenancy, which could include decisions on rent 
levels, investments into the building, and the selection of tenants, they might 
be perceived by tenants as the landlord of the dwelling. In Coventry, with its 
41 letting agents, it seems that management services are far more concen-
trated than ownership of the dwellings. It is not possible to calculate agent-
based supply concentration, but evidence from interviews with local letting 
agents suggests that the average letting agent in Coventry manages about 80 
dwellings, which would add up to a total of about 3,000 to 3,500 dwellings. If 
this number was correct, one could indeed assume that due to the manage-
ment/ownership cleavage the statements about a highly deconcentrated pri-
vate rented sector in the city should at least be treated with caution. 
Equally, there is no hard evidence on the position of letting agents in Bre-
da. Yet, a review of the two most important rental property websites in the 
Netherlands4 and evidence from the interviews with landlords and agents in 
Breda propose that a large proportion of the private rented stock is offered 
via letting agents. Furthermore, local letting agents stated that they often pro-
vide management tasks as well. Interestingly enough, there seems to be no 
difference between institutional investors and small-scale individuals, since 
both landlord groups largely rely on their services. A brief examination of the 
letting agent market in the city shows that there are about 20 companies. 
The two biggest letting agencies, both being specialized in the institutional 
investors market, manage up to 1,000 dwellings (Interviews Breda, 2010). As a 
result, there are indeed some signs of a concentrated private renting industry 
in Breda, maybe even more so than in Coventry. 
Spatial concentration 
In a national context, Hills (2007) points out that particularly between the 
1960s and 1980s social housing in England was predominantly built by local 
4 Funda.nl and pararius.nl. 
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authorities in urban and urban fringe housing estates. Conversely, accord-
ing to Rugg and Rhodes (2008) it is a common phenomenon in England that 
some submarkets of private renting are located in specific areas as well. The 
local authority of Coventry is an enlightening example of tenure-segregat-
ed local housing markets. Table 3.2 shows that social renting, as measured by 
an above average tenure share per ward, is strongly present in certain wards 
but not in others. Here, it should be noted that wards are made up of histori-
cally shaped and grown neighbourhoods and are purely administrative units 
that do not take into account the structure of the housing market; there-
fore, they are, to say the least, a relatively imprecise spatial unit for measur-
ing the concentration of supply. Indeed, within many wards there are classical 
social housing neighbourhoods, where it is de facto impossible to find a bal-
anced tenure mix. Areas like Wood End, Henley Green, Manor Farm (all Hen-
ley Ward), Willenhall (Binley and Willenhall ward), Stoke Aldermore (Lower 
Stoke ward), Canley (Westwood), and Tile Hill (Woodlands) have a social hous-
ing share of more than 80 or even 90 per cent. 
Spatial concentration can also be found in the private rental sector. Large 
concentrations can be found in the city centre (St. Michaels ward), as well as 
in the wards Foleshill, Radford, Earlsdon, in Stoke, Cheylesmore and Whober-
ley. Interestingly enough, the demand structures vary between these wards. 
The centre seems to be appealing to various tenant groups, while Foleshill 
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shows a high concentration of tenants with a BME background. Lower Stoke, 
Earlsdon, Cheylesmore, and Whoberley are due to their proximity to either 
Warwick or Coventry University very popular among students, leading to 
a high share of private HMO5 accommodation in these areas. Periodically, 
before the start of a study year, some neighbourhoods in these wards expe-
rience a very high turnover of tenants. This is well reflected in the num-
ber properties that were advertised in August 2010 (Rightmove.co.uk, 2010). 
As one can see in Table 3.2, the two largest private renting wards are clear-
ly underrepresented, while popular student areas, particularly Earlsdon and 
Cheylesmore, are overrepresented. Finally, Radford and Holbrook are private 
rental markets with a higher profile, meaning that they show a larger share of 
professionals among private tenants.
As a result of this tenure-concentrated spatial structure in Coventry, there 
are indeed only few wards where both rental sectors have tenure shares that 
are above their respective local authority averages. Among these are Foleshill, 
Longford, Lower Stoke and Radford. From the viewpoint of spatial proximity 
between the two sectors the central ward St. Michaels stands out. It should be 
noted that because the measurement of social housing concentration com-
prises only the two largest providers and because private renting has grown 
significantly in the last four years, their actual vicinity might be underesti-
mated here. 
Social housing in Breda seems to have a relatively low degree of spatial seg-
regation. Except for very few cases, social housing is widely present in all of 
Breda’s housing areas6 (see Table 3.3). Nonetheless, there are some periph-
eral neighbourhoods – peripheral to the city centre – where social housing 
strongly dominates the housing market. Particular concentrations exist in the 
housing estates of Hoge Vucht, Princenhage/Heuvel, Brabantpark/Heusden-
hout, and Tuinzigt/Westerpark, all of which have been developed in the 1960s. 
An assessment of spatial concentration of private renting shows two things. 
On the one hand, institutional investors and private individuals tend to oper-
ate in different areas within the city. Where large-scale landlords tend to have 
their stock in peripheral areas with large housing estates, private individu-
als are mainly active in and around the city centre. On the other hand, we can 
see that private renting generally plays a minor role in suburban areas. 
5 Housing in Multiple Occupation.
6 This is a classification provided by the research and statistics department of the municipality of Breda. Differ-
ent neighbourhoods are clustered into those ‘housing areas’ (woongebieden). According to the statistics depart-
ment, clustering was done in a very pragmatic way, therefore not being based on empirical methods of clustering 
as done in a housing market area approach (see Jones, 2002). As a result, housing areas in Breda are a more or 
less arbitrary classification. However, it serves our purposes quite well, because their size, measured in the total 
number of dwellings is comparable to the ward classification in Coventry.
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With regard to spatial competition between the two rental tenures we can 
make the following preliminary conclusions: The total number of social hous-
ing dwellings in every market area of Breda is higher than the total number 
of private rentals. There are few areas in the city where we can find a concen-
tration of all landlord groups: Belcrum/Doornbosline, Princehage/Heuvel and 
particularly the centre of Breda are exceptional in this respect. However, if the 
two private rental segments are considered as one, the picture is slightly dif-
ferent since then almost all of the central and peripheral – yet not the subur-
ban areas – have significant shares of social and private renting. 
 3.3  Barriers to entry provision and access con-
sumption
Barriers to entry the provision of rental housing 
As a general rule, all types of landlords can supply social housing in England. 
As explained in the previous chapter, housing associations that want to be el-
igible for public funding need to become Registered Social Landlords with the 
responsible regulatory body, the Homes and Communities Agency. Profit-ori-
ented private companies or individuals can register with the regulatory body 
as well. If they do so they are eligible for funding for the construction of new 
social housing as well. Grants for the construction of new dwellings are in-
tended to be given to the most efficient organizations no matter what their 
legal status is – where efficiency is based on a nationwide monitoring system. 
There are thus genuine risks to fail as a supplier of social housing. A system 
of social housing supply where all sorts of providers can provide social hous-
ing and those landlords with the best performance actually provides new so-
cial housing shows a high degree of contestability (compare Gibb & Maclen-
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nan, 2006). If we further take into account that housing associations are al-
lowed to operate in the market rental sector, and that those activities are 
solely financed through private loans, there seem to be few potential supply-
side barriers to a competitive mixed rental in England. 
However, this seems to be an overtly theoretical reasoning since in local 
practice the provision of social housing in Coventry is exclusively in the 
hands of housing associations – indeed, there has not been a single case of 
social housing development by a commercial party. Interviews with local 
experts (Coventry, 2010) suggest that this might not only be due the reluc-
tance of private developers to engage in social housing, but also because of 
the way the social housing production is organised by the local authority: The 
council has the responsibility to identify the need for social housing, as well 
as where and under what circumstances it should be built. In practice, they 
thus decide on which developer actually receives funding for a new social 
housing project. The Coventry council takes a rather pragmatic approach in 
this decision, as it is highly influenced by its relationship with the locally 
operating housing associations and the experiences from the past (see also 
Mullins & Walker, 2009). Hence, even if there were private companies willing 
to engage in social housing, they probably would find it very difficult to get 
access to government funding.7 The other way round, housing associations in 
Coventry engage in the provision of market housing only on a negligible scale. 
To say the least, their commercial renting activities are manageable, to say 
the least. Indeed, the biggest housing association does not provide any mar-
ket or intermediate8 market rental accommodation. The two largest tradition-
al housing associations in the city do provide commercial units; yet these are 
primarily shared-ownership dwellings, which are intended to be sold in the 
long run.
National rules on the supply of social housing in the Netherlands stipu-
late that it is the exclusive task of approved institutions. Private organizations 
that wish to provide social housing would therefore have to become such an 
institution. The status as an approved housing association is, however, asso-
ciated with certain responsibilities (see Chapter 2), which inhibit that, for 
instance, institutional investors engage in social housing as a supplementa-
ry activity. This means that even if private landlords aimed to supply social 
housing, maybe because they wanted to make use of the existing implic-
7 Similarly, this practice might form a severe barrier to entry new local markets for social housing providers. 
In other words, even though all types of landlords and developers are eligible to provide housing in various loca-
tions, the close ties between local authorities and housing associations already operating in Coventry, seem to 
impede the emergence of new social housing providers.
8 Intermediate rental housing is a form of tenancy that is seen to close the gap between social and market rents. 
Intermediate rents are set to a level, which equals 80 per cent of the rent of a market dwelling of similar quality.
[ 76 ]
it subsidies for social housing (below-market level loans, below-market level 
land prices), there would be high barriers to enter the social housing industry. 
On the other hand, housing associations can and do engage in the provision 
of market rental housing. As long as they have the financial means to do so, 
there are no barriers to enter except for the capital costs. In Breda the three 
housing associations engage in market rental provision on various scales. If 
we define market renting9 as rental accommodation above the liberalization 
threshold, we can see that the smallest housing association in the city has by 
far the most significant share of dwellings in the deregulated market segment 
(see Table 3.4). However, the question remains whether these activities com-
ply with the idea of a contestable market. It was pointed out that the indirect 
subsidies for the provision of social housing might leak into such commercial 
activities. The local market of Breda is no exception here, since social and pri-
vate rental accommodation is often developed within the same estates. Fur-
thermore, the notion of contestability is undermined by restrictions on where 
approved institutions are able to operate. Generally, each housing associa-
tion has a defined area, mostly a region, where they can develop social hous-
ing estates. If an association aspired to provide social housing outside that 
area, they would either have to gain a special permit by the Ministry which 
is responsible for housing, or they would have to either cooperate, or more 
radically, merge with a local association. Translated to the social housing sec-
tor in Breda this means that the risks for the three housing associations – 
and possibly private developers – of new entrants in the market through new 
developments are relatively small. 
 
Barriers to access social and private rental consumption 
In both cities, social housing is allocated though a Choice-Based Letting (CBL) 
scheme.10 However, the CBL systems operate quite differently in the two lo-
calities. In the so-called Coventry Homefinder anybody who is older than 16 
years, is not an asylum seeker or a student, and has not been evicted from a 
previous tenancy can register with the system. There are however explicit en-
try barriers in the actual allocation of dwellings. Firstly, different properties 
are reserved for households of a corresponding size. The general rule is that 
9 Dwellings of housing associations with a rent level of below the threshold is by definition social housing and 
cannot be market renting. Provision in the deregulated sector is offered on the free market and not allocated 
through waiting lists.
10 The main idea of a CBL scheme is that all available social dwellings in a locality are offered via the same chan-
nel (mostly internet pages), where tenants can place bids for dwellings and have the right to turn offers down 
(see Brown & King, 2005).
[ 77 ]
the number of bedrooms is one less than the household size (CCC, 2010b). 
Secondly, there is a priority banding system, which is based on an applicant’s 
housing need (see Table 3.5). 75 per cent of all bids are allocated based on 
banding priority and the length of registration time, the other 25 per cent is 
allocated on the basis of waiting time only. Income is not directly considered 
in the allocation of housing; yet, housing need is by definition higher among 
low-income households, which means that there is at least an indirect barrier 
for more affluent households. Finally, the existence of a long waiting list se-
verely restricts access to social housing. In May 2010, 13,509 people were reg-
istered for social housing, most of which (~ 90 per cent) were classified as not 
having any housing need (see Table 3.5). If this number is compared to the 
2,500 available dwellings in 2010, it should be obvious that the chance to get 
into the sector for people with low housing need is marginal. 
In Breda, anybody who is older than 18 years can register with the CBL 
scheme. Exceptions are made for students (they are treated as a separate 
group of applicants, since they are only eligible for housing in student hous-
ing complexes) and adolescent households in urgent housing need (most-
ly people who are affected by redevelopments). Registrations are made in two 
ways: People can either state that they are actively looking for social housing 
accommodation, or they can register as passive applicants in order to accu-
mulate waiting list time. Active applicants, but not passive ones, will receive 
offers with available properties that match their individual criteria (e.g. a giv-
en number of bedrooms, neighbourhood). A smaller part of the stock for active 
applicants is allocated through a lottery drawing. Housing need plays a minor 
role in social housing allocation; nonetheless, barriers to access exist, where 
the most profound is the existence of long waiting lists. Each dwelling has an 
individual waiting time, which is based on property type, size, and location. If 
an applicant wanted to rent an apartment with an elevator in a high-demand 
neighbourhood, for instance the city centre, an accumulated waiting time of 
about 52 months would be necessary. For a single-family house the average 
waiting time is as long as 70 months (Gemeente Breda, 2009). The structure 
and age of the applicant household determines the necessary waiting time 
as well. Generally, it is the case that the older the applicant, the higher their 
acquired waiting time needs to be before they get an offer by one of the three 
housing associations. Similarly, larger households have to wait longer before 
they receive offers. The average waiting time in Breda adds up to 4.5 years. If 
we further take into consideration that there are more than 8,500 active appli-
cants on the waiting list and another 20,000 passive applicants the barriers to 
enter the social sector extremely high (see Table 3.6). 
A second significant barrier to access social housing is the introduction of 
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explicit income limits. Since January 2011, it is stipulated that 90 per cent of 
all new allocations in the social sector (< €650) must be appointed to tenants 
with an income of less than €33,614. The access of middle and higher-income 
households to social housing thus has become more restricted. 
Conversely, barriers to access the private sector exist in Coventry and Bre-
da as well. Interviews with private landlords in Coventry suggest that a com-
mon practice in the allocation of accommodation is the application of mini-
mum income requirements. Tenants might be required to show some proof 
of a steady and sufficient income to cover the monthly rent for, particularly, 
more expensive dwellings. Furthermore, there are high transaction costs for 
new private tenants, since they have to make a deposit and, most often, pay 
a letting agent fee of about 20-40 per cent of a monthly rent. Though no fig-
ures are available on the scale of discrimination, many advertisements for pri-
vate rental properties specify that the landlord will not accept tenants who 
receive housing allowances or other social benefits. The interviews with sev-
eral private landlords confirm that stigmatization is an important driver of the 
tenant selection process. Finally, continuously high demand for certain proper-
ties, particularly two-bedroom properties and bedsits in popular areas, has led 
to a limited availability of and thus accessibility to PRS dwellings. Indeed, even 
though they might be affected by temporary fluctuations in the student hous-
ing market, landlords draw a picture in which they have no structural problems 
of finding new tenants for their vacant dwellings (Interviews Coventry, 2010).
Similar patterns of discrimination and housing market pressures can be 
observed in Breda as well. Firstly, it is common practice by private landlords, 
in particular by institutional investors to apply minimum income require-
ments. Advertisements and statements from letting agents in Breda suggest 
that most often gross incomes need to exceed the asked rent level four times. 
Furthermore, access to private renting is constrained by the very high trans-
action costs of moving to such accommodation. In reality tenants do not only 
have to pay the first month rent before they move into a flat, but they have to 
make a deposit (most often a one-month rent) as well. Moreover, if they want 
to access dwellings of small-scale individual landlords11, tenants have to pay 
a letting agent fee, which equals a one-month rent as well. Another barrier 
11 Most small-scale individual landlords in the city use letting agents when looking for new tenants. Institutional 
investors abstain from such practices, paying the letting agent fees themselves rather than passing them on to 
the new tenant. 
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to access is that institutional investors use waiting lists for the allocation of 
their dwellings in the regulated market segment. However, this does not real-
ly compare to the CBL allocation scheme in the social housing sector, because 
this is not a mandatory allocation system, but mainly a self-imposed system 
for the management of new lets. Finally, even if tenants were able to fulfil 
the mentioned requirements, access to the private rental sector is severely 
restricted by the shortage of supply. Similar to most other urban areas in the 
Netherlands, the supply of private rental housing is relatively tight, particu-
larly the supply of affordable dwellings with a rent below the liberalization 
threshold (< €652). In Breda, particularly the supply of private rental accom-
modation in central and peripheral areas is a scarce good, since it is popular 
among a diverse set of customer groups, such as students, young single-per-
son households and more affluent multi-person households (Interviews Bre-
da, 2010). 
 3.4  Product differentiation
Rent levels and regulation
Most publications (e.g. Scanlon & Whitehead, 2007) that compare the mean 
rent levels in both sectors do not refer to the size and quality of dwell-
ings. This is however a crucial aspect since higher rents in the private sec-
tor might, i.a., just be based on larger and better dwellings across the whole 
stock. Since data on private sector rents is limited, it is not possible to pre-
sent rent levels for specific quality levels in both cities. However, it is possible 
to calculate social and private rents for different property sizes, here meas-
ured by the number of bedrooms in both cities and additionally by total floor 
size in Breda. 
Table 3.7 shows that that there is generally a large gap between private sec-
tor and social housing rents in Coventry. The average rent of a private rental 
dwelling is almost twice as high as the one of a social dwelling. It also shows 
that the gap in rent levels increases with the number of bedrooms in a prop-
erty. While rents of bedsit and one-bedroom apartments are about 1.5 times 
higher in private renting, two and three bedroom apartments are almost 
twice as expensive. The huge gap between a four-bedroom social and a four 
bedroom private dwelling is probably due to the high number of student 
houses. Here, the rule is that the sum of rents charged for single bedrooms 
is significantly higher – which holds true for all HMO forms – than if the rent 
was charged to one household only. 
Although not visible in Table 3.7, there are, of course, differences between 
the social and private sector rent differentials across various localities in 
Coventry. Data provided by the three housing associations show that in the 
social housing sector rents do not differ substantially between the 18 wards. 
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For instance, for a two-bedroom dwelling in Cheylesmore (the most expensive 
ward) tenants have to pay £316 net rent per calendar month (pcm)12, where-
as tenants in Radford have to pay £294 pcm for the same type of accommo-
dation. The opposite is true in the PRS, where rent differentials of £100-£200, 
depending on the type and size of the dwelling, between the various neigh-
bourhoods can exist. To give but one example, for a two-bedroom flat in Earls-
don the average monthly rent is £580, while it amounts to ‘only’ £475 for the 
same dwelling type in Binley & Willenhall, which is a social housing dominat-
ed area in the city. 
Abstracting from such measurement issues and the differences between 
city areas, the basic contention is that part of this large gap between social 
and market rents can be explained by the different systems of rent regula-
tion. Chapter 2 laid out the different systems of rent settings and pointed out 
that where the private sector is almost completely deregulated, social hous-
ing rents are determined through an administrative rent setting mechanism 
– the rent-restructuring regime. These differences comprise initial rents as 
well as rent increases. If we translate this into the comparison of rent levels 
in Coventry, we can assume that prospective private renters in the city do not 
only have to pay higher prices for similar dwellings, but future rent payments 
will increase more rapidly in the PRS than in the social sector. Arguably, this 
has a negative impact on the substitutability of the two rental services. 
12 Net rent is the rent excluding service charges and utility costs and excludes any personal subsidies for the 
tenant.
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Furthermore, the actual rent level should be seen in the context of what a 
tenant has to pay by himself and which share of his rent might be covered 
by demand subsidies. This touches on the question on how LHA allowances 
compare to Housing Benefit payments in Coventry. It was shown (see Chap-
ter 2) that in principle housing allowances are available to both social and pri-
vate rental households; yet there are important differences in how the two 
systems are operated, where Housing Benefit is calculated in a way that post-
rent incomes do not fall below the social assistance eligibility level. LHA, on 
the other hand, is based on local reference rents and is thus not connected to 
actual rent levels. The local reference rents for different property sizes in Cov-
entry are shown in Table 3.8. If we now compare this with the existing rent 
levels in Table 3.7, one can observe that for most households the largest share 
of their rent tends to be covered by LHA (September 2010) calculations.13 From 
this point of view there thus appears to be little differences between social 
and private renting.14
Table 3.7 also illustrates the existence of high rent differentials in Breda. 
Absolute average net rents in Breda are about 2.5 times higher in the private 
rental sector than in the social housing sector. Similar to the situation in Cov-
entry, it can also be observed that rent differentials grow with the number of 
bedrooms. However, the rent gap in Breda might be significantly overestimat-
ed. On the one hand, the calculation of average rents should consider actual 
floor sizes as well, since private rental dwellings with an identical number of 
bedrooms tend to be larger than social rentals – a finding that does not hold 
in Coventry, since dwelling types are similar across rental sectors. Indeed, if 
we look at actual property sizes in Breda, average rents in the private sec-
tor are less than two times as high; yet, rent differentials are substantial. On 
the other hand, there are only a relatively low number of cases in the private 
rental sector, where the existence of high quality dwellings in upmarket are-
as seems to be overestimated significantly. Letting agents (Interviews Breda, 
13 Surely the household size needs to be considered, where the local authority allows one bedroom for every 
adult couple (married or unmarried), one for any other adult aged 16 or older, one for any two children of the 
same sex aged under 16, one for any two children aged under 10, and one for any other child (under 16).
14 The LHA caps introduced by the current Conservative-Liberal coalition government will supposedly change 
this significantly, since market renting becomes more unaffordable, if average rents are significantly higher for 
each property type than the level of the LHA cap. As a result, Housing Benefit and thus the social sector in Coven-
try might become more appealing to low-income household since the largest share of their rent is covered by the 
allowance, while they can expect additional housing costs in the private rented sector.
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2010) stated that he lower and middle rent segments have been growing sig-
nificantly in the last years. One agency states that they mediate about 30-40 
dwellings with a rent level below the deregulation limit (see Chapter 2) every 
month, where bedsits for students play a crucial role. Indeed, most of the 380 
advertised properties were located in expensive inner-city locations or new-
ly constructed estates. Hence, besides the lack of student accommodation in 
the calculation, there is also an absence of less expensive, older dwellings of 
institutional investors in the city. Data provided by one letting agency, which 
manages rental accommodation owned by corporate investors, shows that 
there are indeed several hundred dwellings with a middle rent level, some of 
which fall below the deregulation limit. Furthermore, similar to the situation 
in Coventry, rent differentials can be smaller in some neighbourhoods than 
in others. The data from property website used for the rent level calculations 
shows that city centre locations and specifically private rental accommoda-
tion in peripheral areas to the South of the City Centre (Zandberg and Gin-
neken) have much higher rents than similar (with regard to size and dwell-
ing type) private rentals in the North of the city. It is thus unsurprising to find 
that specifically in those neighbourhoods where social landlords and corpo-
rate investors have above average market shares (e.g. Hoge Vucht and Heuvel) 
the rent differentials tend to be the lowest. 
Similar to the situation in Coventry, rent regulation arguably plays a sig-
nificant role for the rent gap in Breda. As implicated in the previous state-
ments, it is important to note the difference between landlord types on the 
one hand, but also between regulated and unregulated rents on the other 
hand. Except for the relatively inexpensive student market and the regulated 
institutional investor housing stock – which does not have the potential to be 
offered in the free market sector – landlords in Breda seem to have a strong 
incentive to provide housing that is not only above the liberalization thresh-
old, but exceeds it significantly. On the one hand this guarantees them high-
er revenues, since here is no administratively determined maximum rent. On 
the other hand, there is less supply in this segment, since housing associa-
tions primarily operate in the regulated market sector. Arguably, this limits 
competitive pressures, which might lead to a higher profitability. 
A final point here is that housing allowances are available on a similar basis 
for social and private renters in the regulated market segment. One could 
argue that given this similarity the substitutability between the two rental 
services is relatively high. However, in the light of actual rent levels in Breda, 
there might be serious concerns about how substitutability is affected in real-
ity. Again, the largest share of private rental accommodation is to be found in 
the deregulated sector. At least from a theoretical viewpoint this means that 
a tenant who receives a housing allowances but who considers moving to the 
private sector would most probably lose their entitlement. This then links 
back to the concerns about barriers to enter the private rental market.
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Product differentiation – quality levels 
In order to assess the quality of dwellings in the private rental sector, pub-
lic authorities in Coventry conducted a House Condition Survey in 2006. As 
measured by the Decent Homes Standard15 (DHS) approximately 40 per cent 
of the private rental stock is classified as non-decent, whereas the decen-
cy rate in the social housing sector is much higher (about 90 per cent) (CCC, 
2006a). This quality gap is probably based on the age profile of the PRS stock, 
where the largest share of private rental dwellings was built before 1919 (ca. 
32 per cent), and another 20 per cent was built before the end of World War 
II. In contrast, social housing was mainly constructed in the post-war peri-
od until 1964 (almost 50 per cent) (see Figure 3.1). Although not being a direct 
measure of a dwelling’s quality, from the viewpoint of similarity between so-
cial and private rental dwellings it seems to be meaningful to mention the 
prevailing dwelling types in the two sectors. Generally, both tenures are com-
parable in what they offer to tenants, meaning that three-bedroom houses, as 
well as two-bedroom houses and flats are most often provided by social and 
private landlords. A marked difference, however, is the higher share of bedsits 
and smaller flats in the property structure of social housing.
A lack of comprehensive data means that this study cannot assess the 
quality of location for single properties, but uses a more mediate approach: 
Based on the English indices of deprivation16 (CLG, 2007) the quality of social 
15 In the Housing Green Paper 2000 the government stipulated that all rental houses in England should meet 
the current statutory minimum standard for housing, which was redefined in 2006 with the Housing Health and 
Safety Rating System (HHSRS); all dwellings should be in a reasonable state of affair and have reasonably mod-
ern facilities. Furthermore, all dwellings must have a sufficient degree of thermal comfort, best achieved through 
effective isolation and efficient heating.
16 This relies on measuring seven factors of deprivation for small-scale neighbourhoods of about 3,000 - 5,000 
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and private rented housing locations is associated with the quality of small-
scale neighbourhoods. In Coventry, 33 out of 197 areas belong to the 10 per 
cent most deprived areas in the whole country (CCC, 2008). Figure 3.2 indi-
cates that most of these localities can be found in neighbourhoods where 
social housing is the dominant tenure (e.g. Wood End and Manor Farm in the 
ward of Henley). Interestingly, the two wards with the highest share of pri-
vate renting show some of the highest deprivation levels in the city as well 
(Foleshill and St. Michaels). However, other private rental areas in the city are 
associated with low levels of deprivation (e.g. Earlsdon and Woberley). This 
finding reflects the great diversity between private rental submarkets, indi-
cating that part of the private rental stock compares to social housing with 
regard to quality of location and quality of dwellings, while other submarkets 
are very different from social housing. 
A further aspect of quality is if there are regulations that protect tenants 
from the deterioration of their dwellings. It was mentioned that social hous-
ing standards are monitored by the Audit Commission and the HCA and stip-
ulated by the Decent Homes Standard. Conversely, in the PRS applies, the 
local authority has sought to apply its role as enforcer of decent living con-
ditions through different measures, including the introduction of its volun-
tary accreditation scheme (see footnote 2 in Chapter 1). Therefore, it might 
be argued that tenants have a comparable degree of security of what their 
inhabitants: income deprivation, employment deprivation, health deprivation and disability, education, skills and 
training deprivation, barriers to housing and services, living environment deprivation, and crime.
Figure 3.2 Overall index of multiple deprivation (IMD) in Coventry, national percentages, 
2007
Source: CCC, 2008 
Overall IMD 2007
LSOA falls in the...
Lowest 10% 33 LSOAs (34)
10 to 20% 27 LSOAs (32)
20 to 30% 26 LSOAs (25)
30 to 40% 28 LSOAs (22)
40 to 50% 18 LSOAs (24)
50 to 60% 21 LSOAs (20)
60 to 70% 20 LSOAs (17)
70 to 80% 10 LSOAs (11)
80 to 90% 10 LSOAs (9)
90 to 100% 4 LSOAs (3)
most deprived LSOAs in England
(2004 IMD count)
0% = most deprived
100% = least deprived
LSOA = Lower layer Super 
               Output Area
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accommodation should provide from a minimum quality aspect; however, the 
threats for landlords of being punished when providing bad quality housing 
are arguably more genuine in the social housing sector. 
Finally, from the tenants’ viewpoint the quality of a rental service certain-
ly comprises more aspects than measurable location and dwelling features. 
It was argued before that the property rights of social and private renting 
will have an impact on the substitutability of social housing as well. Chapter 
2 described that alongside the systematic differences in rent regulation, pri-
vate rental tenants savour much less security of tenure in England; however, 
it seems that with the rise of assured shorthold tenancies in the association 
sector, security of tenure is converging.
Similar to the situation in Coventry direct measures of the quality of the 
dwellings are not available in Breda. Hence, this study will turn to a more 
indirect quality indicator, the value of dwellings. The average value of a pri-
vate rental dwelling is significantly higher than the one in the social sector 
(€163,491), where dwellings of private individual landlords are the most val-
uable (€206,333) (see Table 3.9). One reason for this is that with 65 sqm social 
rental dwellings are on average significantly smaller than their private sector 
counterparts (100 sqm on average). Furthermore, dwellings owned by insti-
tutional investors tend to be of younger age than social housing dwellings, 
which were to a large extent constructed in the 1970s and 1980s. In contrast, 
most of the small-scale individuals’ stock is considerably older. Yet, it seems 
that good maintenance of these dwellings makes up for the older age of the 
stock (O&I Breda, 2012).
Additionally, higher values in the private rental market reflect that they are 
more often associated with neighbourhoods of high demand and quality. A 
recent publication (VROM, 2010) on the liveability of neighbourhoods17 shows 
that levels of deprivation are generally low throughout Breda (see Figure 3.3). 
Yet, there are some differences between neighbourhoods. The lowest scores 
on liveability in Breda are to be found in peripheral areas in the Northeast 
and the Southwest around the city centre. Unsurprisingly, these happen to be 
areas where a high concentration of social housing, and to a smaller extent 
the older, more inexpensive institutional investor stock can be found. 
In the theoretical part of this chapter it was argued that a comparison of 
the quality of social and private renting should look at property rights for ten-
17 The liveability index is based on six benchmarks: security, social inclusion, population structure, quality and 
availability of public facilities, public spaces, and the quality of housing stock itself, which are however not re-
ally quality measures but use data on dwelling types, the age of the housing stock, and the share of social rental 
dwellings.
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ants and quality regulation aspects as well. With regard to the latter, Gov-
ernments in the Netherlands did not introduce a national quality regulation 
scheme in the past. However, one could argue that the rent regulation sys-
tem functions as an inbuilt quality filter. As said, the quality valuation sys-
tem stipulates the maximum rent level for each dwelling. This means that if 
landlords want to operate above the deregulation threshold, the quality and 
the size of the dwelling needs to be high per se, which in reality has led to 
an overtly high quality and large private rental sector. With regard to tenants’ 
property rights it was explained already that the differentiation is once again 
not between social and private renting, but between regulated and unregu-
lated rent levels, where security of tenure, understood as both the protection 
from direct eviction or indirect eviction through extremely high rent increas-
es, is considerably higher in the regulated market segment. Consequently, it 
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can be argued once again that social and private tenants seem to be on par 
with each other; yet in the context of actual rent levels in the local rental 
market, tenants who intend to move from a social to a market rental dwell-
ing, will most often lose out with regard to property rights. Most likely, this 
has a negative impact on the degree of substitutability between the two rent-
al services.
 3.5  Perfect competition and the mixed rental 
markets in Coventry and Breda 
So far, the analysis compared rental housing in the two cities without mak-
ing a reference to the question of how competitive they are in relation to the 
model of perfectly competitive mixed rental markets. Based on a five-point 
competitiveness scale, Table 3.10 classifies the two rental markets and shows 
that they are quite diverse on various aspects. More precisely, the competive-
ness scale ranges from very low, indicated by a double minus score, though 
neither competitive nor uncompetitive (0 score), to very competitive, indicat-
ed by a double plus score. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, 
this approach should not be considered as using hard facts and numbers, but 
introduces a moderate subjective element into the classification of the two 
rental markets, which seeks to visualize how they compare to the model of 
perfect mixed rental market competition. 
There are similar patterns of supply concentration in both cities. Social 
housing is highly concentrated – even more so in Coventry due to the position 
of the very large stock transfer association. Private renting seems to be rela-
tively competitive in both cases. However, one should keep in mind the cleav-
age between ownership and management. The expert interviews suggest that 
landlords in both cities have increasingly made use of letting agent services 
for managing their housing stock. Considering that agents can have a decisive 
influence on rent setting, investment decisions, and tenant selection, the low 
concentration in the two private rental sectors might at least be questioned. 
A final observation is that if considered as a whole, both rental markets are 
strongly dominated by housing associations. One of the main distinctions 
between the two rental markets is the high geographical proximity and thus 
high competitiveness of social and private renting in Breda. In contrast, there 
are relatively few neighbourhoods/wards in Coventry with an above average 
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size of both private renting and social housing. Spatial monopolies of social 
housing and the low geographical proximity of the two sectors suggest a low 
degree of competitiveness in the English case.
Barriers to entry supply is the only aspect where Coventry scores high-
er than rental housing in Breda, because at least in theory rental housing is 
a relatively open market. All kinds of providers can apply for social housing 
grants, where access to funding is based on contestability principles. How-
ever, we have seen that local practice and landlords’ business strategies foil 
the nationally legitimized free entry principles. In Breda, the social housing 
industry is an insular system, in which high barriers to entry effectively pro-
tect housing associations from potential competition from private landlords. 
Yet, housing associations in Breda seem to be more entrepreneurial and com-
mercial, as they have penetrated the PRS more strongly than their English 
counterparts. From the viewpoint of the theory of contestability, the identi-
fication of barriers to entry supply in both cities suggests that the given sup-
ply concentration calculations are relevant for the classification of compet-
itiveness, since they appear to be relatively stable in a long-term perspec-
tive. Considering the barriers to access consumption aspect of competitive-
ness, the prioritization of housing need in social housing allocation as well as 
the strong stigmatization of low-income households by private landlords pro-
pose that barriers to access are higher in the English case study city. The esti-
mation of a higher level of competitiveness in Breda is based on the finding 
that even though income limits have been introduced in social housing allo-
cation in Breda, middle-income households can still access the social hous-
ing sector if they acquire enough waiting time; after all notwithstanding the 
approx. €33,000 income criterion, more than 40 per cent of all households in 
the Netherlands are in theory still eligible for a social rental dwelling (VROM, 
2011). Equally, the fact that in Breda both social and private landlords provide 
accommodation for the student population, suggests a high degree of com-
petitiveness at least in this market segment. 
If we look at rent and quality aspects of product differentiation conjointly, 
the two rental markets can be similarly classified, however, due to different 
reasons. In Coventry, a low-rent/low-quality market segment exists in rental 
housing, while it is relatively marginal (yet growing) in Breda. From the view-
point of the low-income demand group, there thus seem to be more options 
to rent a social or a private dwelling in the English city, suggesting a high-
er degree of competitiveness. On the other hand, when rent regulation and 
housing allowances are taken into account, the picture is quite converse. 
Below the liberalization threshold the consumption of a private or social rent-
al service takes place under identical conditions in Breda. In other words, tak-
ing into account that private tenants often have to pay more for similar quali-
ties, lose out property rights, and face higher insecurities about rent increas-
es the suggestion that there is a higher degree of substitutability in Coven-
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try becomes at least questionable. If tenants in Breda rent a private dwelling 
rather than a social dwelling, they most likely have to pay a lot more; yet for 
the additional rent they get a dwelling of higher quality and larger size. Here, 
substitutability becomes a question of willingness to pay for a better product. 
Overall, it can be tentatively concluded that from a rent perspective substitut-
ability seems to be relatively low, while the quality aspect of product differ-
entiation suggests neither highly competitive nor completely uncompetitive 
rental markets. As a result, the potential for a larger overlap between the two 
sectors seems to be higher in Breda, while the two sectors are actually more 
alike in Coventry. 
A final remark is that in comparison to the state of perfect competition 
between social and private renting, both rental markets are relatively uncom-
petitive. Although Breda is slightly more competitive than Coventry, it seems 
to be surprising that the Dutch case study city does not score higher over-
all in relation to the model of a perfectly competitive mixed rental market. 
After all, the Netherlands has been described as a more competitive rental 
market than England (see previous chapters). Certainly, the approach of using 
case study cities for the empirical research can play a substantial role in this 
outcome, since even typical local markets never reflect the national situation 
perfectly. However, the contention here is that the market structure frame-
work is just able to give a more precise account of how competitive rental 
markets are with regard to the relation of social and private renting. This is 
because previous studies have often remained on an abstract level, where the 
assessment of competitiveness was based on less empirical material as used 
in the present approach. 
 3.6  Conclusion 
The aim of this first empirical chapter was twofold: To present discuss the 
question of what a competitive mixed rental market is and to analyse the de-
gree of competitiveness between social and private renting in the two local 
rental markets of Coventry and Breda. The two underlying research questions 
were combined in that the two real local rental markets were compared with 
each other on the grounds of the model of the perfectly competitive mixed 
rental markets. The discussion in the first section of this chapter showed that 
such a market can be defined as a rental environment in which social and 
private rental supply is deconcentrated, the two services are offered in the 
same locations, both rental services can be provided by all types of landlords, 
they can be consumed by similar tenant groups, and social and private rent-
al services are highly similar with regard to their price/quality relations, in-
cluding actual rent and quality levels as well as regulatory principles. It was 
further argued that ‘perfect competition’ between social housing and private 
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renting cannot exist in reality. Rather, it should be considered as a tool to em-
pirically determine to what extent local rental housing deviates from this 
‘ideal’ state of competition. 
It was thus unsurprising to find that both rental markets do not conform to 
this paradigm, but show several signs of an uncompetitive market structure. 
The approach has shown that it is not always without difficulties to exact-
ly classify rental housing in the two case study cities, mainly due to a lack 
of comprehensive and comparable data. Nevertheless, the analysis of prima-
ry and secondary empirical data has led to the conclusion that there seems to 
be a slightly higher degree of competitiveness in Breda. Interestingly enough, 
this corresponds with the descriptions of the roles of social and private rent-
ing in the national rental systems (see Chapter 2); however, based on these 
descriptions of the national rental housing systems one would have expected 
a much wider gap between the two local markets. 
For the next chapters these findings are meaningful in the following way. If 
we follow the assumption of the traditional structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm that the competitiveness of market structure has important impli-
cations for the strategic behaviour of landlords, and consequently on the per-
formance of the whole rental markets, then there should indeed be some 
signs of more conscious rivalry between landlord and stronger strategic inter-
actions between the two landlord groups in the rental market of Breda. 
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 4  Landlord conduct
  Perceptions of rivalry and 
  rivalrous behaviour 
The previous chapter examined the competitiveness of the local rental hous-
ing markets in Coventry and Breda in the light of the model of perfect com-
petition between social and private renting. Analysing the market environ-
ment in which landlords provide and tenants consume rental services aimed 
to shed light on, i.a., regulatory, structural, and spatial aspects of competition 
in mixed rental markets. In this chapter, the focus is shifted towards the ac-
tors themselves. Through this it is acknowledged that in reality competition 
is a dynamic process, and not a structural concept, as it takes place between 
the different suppliers in the market. As such, this chapter aims to explore 
and build explanations for the competitive relation between, and competitive 
conduct of, social and private landlords in mixed rental markets. Within the 
SCP of rental housing, the analysis of competition between social and private 
renting has two main components. On the one hand, this chapter is interest-
ed in the actual processes of competitive conduct. This relates to the first two 
sets of research questions: (1) What is competitive conduct of social and private 
landlords in mixed rental markets? and (2) What are the perceptions of social and 
private landlords of their competitive relationship? Do they perceive each other as ri-
vals in the rental market? How do these perceptions affect their strategic behaviour in 
the market? The first question is a theoretical one and is discussed in the fol-
lowing section. The second set of questions is about the application of this 
analytical framework in the context of mixed rental housing in Coventry and 
Breda (Section 4.2)
On the other hand, since competitive conduct is not a necessity – we have 
seen that both case study cities, show various signs of uncompetitive rent-
al markets with regard to inter-tenurial relations – the chapter will discuss 
possible drivers of and barriers to competitive behaviour. In other words, this 
chapter also broaches the issue of how the structure of the two rental mar-
kets in Coventry and Breda influences the rivalrous behaviour of social and 
private landlords in mixed rental markets. The third key question thus is: (3) 
What are possible drivers of and accordingly barriers to the rivalrous interactions 
between the two landlord groups?
As the aim of this chapter is to give a precise account of the concept of con-
scious rivalry in mixed rental markets and which factors might lead to such 
views, a qualitative research approach of interviewing landlords directly 
was chosen (see Appendix B). As such, the empirical investigation primarily 
remains exploratory; yet, using the comparative approach adds a substantial 
and significant explanatory element to the study. Yet, before the results of the 
empirical research on perceptions of rivalry and rivalrous conduct are pre-
sented, the next section discusses the concept of conscious interfirm rival-
ry in more detail and it provides a rationale for why this theoretical approach 
is considered as more fitting for this study than a more formalized, model-
building economics approach to studying competitive behaviour. 
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 4.1   An analytical framework of conscious rivalry 
in mixed rental markets
In the introductory chapter (Section 1.3) of this thesis it was pointed out that 
from the perspective of neoclassical economics, and certainly within the tra-
ditional SCP framework, the behaviour of the firm is a property of market 
structure, which means that each market form (perfect competition, monop-
olistic competition, oligopoly) has its own equilibrium to which firms need to 
adapt if they want to avoid the risk of being driven out of the market. Accord-
ingly, a theory of firm conduct becomes only interesting if a market is im-
perfectly competitive, because under the conditions of perfect competition a 
firm has no incentives to advertise, to react to the decisions of rivals, or to try 
to discourage entry.1 In imperfect markets it is the case that individual com-
petitive strategies can lead to a better position of single firms; however, com-
petition models of new institutional economics and game theory show that 
for each market, optimal profit-maximizing output, pricing and investment 
strategies prevail. Hence, if managers intend to maximize profits, their choic-
es seem to be very limited, irrespective of which market form prevails (Mar-
tin, 2010). 
In the context of the SCP of rental housing there are two main issues with 
the neoclassical notion of firm conduct: First of all, the whole traditional 
and also modern industrial economics strand is based on the assumption of 
rational, profit maximizing suppliers. The outcomes of the conventional mod-
els of competition analysis, e.g. Bertrand competition in a duopoly, stand and 
fall with profit-maximizing equilibrium pricing or output strategies (Martin, 
2010). Yet, in mixed rental housing markets social and private landlords do 
not necessarily share the profit-driven business paradigm, which particular-
ly applies to the social housing industry, where nonprofit organizations share 
a more diverse set of objective functions and have a business primacy of a 
social mission. As a result, the nonprofit economics highlights that the exist-
ence of different objective functions among firms in the same markets has 
important implications for our understanding of how firms compete. 
Equally important, in neoclassical economics managers are seen as anony-
mous actors who have to operate along prescribed structural settings. Actual 
behaviour, including the processes and intentions that lead to strategic deci-
sions on pricing and investments, thus tends to be neglected by the analysis, 
or is at least only implicitly mentioned. As a result, if we want to understand 
competitive behaviour of individual landlords in rental housing markets a dif-
ferent path might be more useful. This thesis argues that although it is not 
1 From this point of view it could be argued that the analysis of conduct is always interesting, because, in reality, 
truly perfectly competitive markets do not exist.
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directly related to the SCP concept itself, the business economics and man-
agement literature on interfirm rivalry provides a more promising approach.
In short, the main argument here is that given the inherent differenc-
es between social and private landlords, and more generally social and private 
renting, using the neoclassical notion of conduct would only be inadequate-
ly able to highlight the various facets and conditions of such a competitive rela-
tionship.2 In this study, the focus thus indeed lies on landlords’ interactions 
and perceptions, which might be classified as an interpretive and explorato-
ry approach to conduct in the SCP of rental housing, since the prediction of 
actual behaviour plays a subordinate role. 
Competition as a process of interfirm rivalry
The essence of rivalry is that there are at least two firms striving for incom-
patible positions in the market (Baum & Korn, 1996). To quote Porter (1980), 
“firms feel the effects of each other’s moves and are prone to respond to 
them.” This definition of rivalry has four major aspects. Firstly, rivalry is re-
lational as it is based on the actions and reactions of competing firms. It is 
thus a dynamic process, which is shaped by the conscious choices of manag-
ers and other responsible persons in an organization (Kilduff et al., 2010). 
Secondly, it takes place between firms directly, which means that a firm’s 
competitive actions are consciously targeted at their competitors; there are 
moves and countermoves. Rivalrous strategies, such as comparative advertis-
ing or predatory pricing, are intended to gain a competitive advantage above 
other firms (Chen, 1996; Chen et al., 2007). 
Thirdly, managers have incomplete and biased knowledge and information 
about markets and competitors, and they have differing cognitive capacities 
to understand these. As a result, rivalry tends to be highly subjective (Nair & 
Selover, 2011). This in turn has two main effects: On the one hand, subjective 
psychological stakes can trigger individual managers to depart from ration-
al economic behaviour. On the other hand, there might be a cleavage between 
objective (as measured by structural criteria such as supply concentration) 
and perceived levels of competition (Paton & Wilson 2001; Porac et al., 1995). 
Here, competition research has shown that in real markets perceptions of 
rivalry can be stronger in concentrated than in highly competitive markets3 
2 This is not to say that more sophisticated, modern game theoretical models could not provide further valu-
able insights; for instance, they might help to shed light on the questions of which strategies social and private 
landlords are likely to use in a competitive setting, and which price and output equilibriums are likely to develop. 
Hence, if one dealt with the prediction and estimation of behaviour, particularly in settings of repeated interac-
tions, game theory might be a superior guiding principle. However, this is a higher level of theoretical abstraction 
and would require a more formal economics approach.
3 This paradoxical situation is the core of the conflict between the concepts of conscious rivalry and perfect com-
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(Baum & Korn, 1996). Due to the fact that firms do not have to advertise or 
pursue any competitive strategy they will remain anonymous players in the 
market and will not be perceived as rivals. In contrast, perceptions of rivalry 
and rivalrous behaviour are often the strongest in highly concentrated mar-
kets, where firms can observe and react to every single move of their compet-
itor (Chen, 1996). 
Fourthly, the subjective nature of rivalry means that it is not necessarily a 
reciprocal perception. In reality, one firm might see another firm in the mar-
ket as a close competitor, while the other might not see any competitive rela-
tionship at all. This can lead to rivalrous behaviour of one firm, which does 
however not necessarily induce a rivalrous reaction of another firm (Chen et 
al., 2007). 
The drivers of rivalrous interactions 
Besides identifying the main traits of a rivalrous relationship between firms, 
the business literature has sought to analyse the conditions under which 
strong perceptions of rivalry and rivalrous behaviour can prevail (e.g. Kilduff 
et al., 2010; Baum & Korn, 1996). Although these studies tend to make no di-
rect connection to the industrial economics literature on market structure, 
one can observe some implicit analytical approaches to unfold how the struc-
ture of a market influences interfirm rivalry. Nair and Selover (2011), for in-
stance, highlight that perceptions of rivalry and rivalrous strategic behav-
iour are positively related to product similarity and similarly large firm size. 
Equally, Baum and Korn (1996) provide some evidence that rivalry is pos-
itively influenced by the market domain overlap of competing firms, which 
means that if firms operate in various identical market segments, the poten-
tial for multi-market contact increases, which in turn increases the chance 
that firms identify each other as rivals and direct their competitive actions 
against them. 
Furthermore, the literature also provides evidence that the drivers of rival-
ry are not necessarily related to structural issues. To give but two examples, 
Paton et al. (2000) show that perceptions of rivalry tend to become stronger 
among firms who have operated in the same market for longer periods. There 
thus seems to be a time component of interfirm-rivalry, meaning that the 
longer two firms have competed the stronger their rivalry will be. Chen et al. 
(2007), on the other hand, show that the capacity of a firm to act and react 
competitively, including financial and cognitive resources, can be a major 
driver of rivalry. Other psychological drivers have been identified in Chen’s 
work (1996, 2007). He finds evidence for three interrelated drivers of competi-
tive behaviour: The awareness of a competitive relationship among managers, 
petition, as mentioned in the introduction to this thesis.
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their motivation to act, and their capability to do so. Particularly the last point 
is noteworthy, since it emphasizes that managers’ intentions to behave com-
petitively are worthless without sufficient financial resources.
Conduct in the SCP of rental housing
Similar to the model of a perfectly competitive mixed rental market in Chap-
ter 3, the concept of conscious interfirm rivalry will be used as a yardstick to 
analyse the competitive relationship between social and private landlords. 
This means that competition here is understood as a process in which social 
landlords feel the competitive pressures from private landlords, (and vice ver-
sa), and are prone to respond to these through their strategic behaviour. Ac-
cordingly, it will be investigated whether there is a (I) relational, (II) direct, (III) 
subjective and (IV) reciprocal form of competition in the two rental markets 
of Coventry and Breda. Examining these four aspects relates to the first two 
research questions, which means that both perceptions of rivalry and rival-
rous strategic behaviour are at the centre of the research. 
Moreover, addressing the third research question, the chapter will in a sec-
ond part engage in a discussion on the drivers of and barriers to a competi-
tive relationship and rivalrous behaviour in mixed rental markets. This touch-
es on the question of how structural and political conditions in rental mar-
kets are generally tied in with competitive behaviour, and more specifical-
ly it will be discussed whether the impression of a slightly more competitive 
rental market in Breda than in Coventry endures when investigating landlord 
conduct, and if not why that might be so. In other words, the empirical inves-
tigation of this chapter uses the hypothesis that perceptions of rivalry and 
rivalrous interactions are likely to be stronger in the Dutch case study city 
than in the local rental market of Coventry.
One general caveat here is that notwithstanding the theoretical concept 
provides a compass in researching the inter-tenurial relationship between 
landlords, the findings need to be interpreted carefully. Social and private 
landlords primarily serve different market segments and operate with dif-
fering business models, where the existence of different objective functions 
might complicate the analysis of competitive interactions. After all, nonprof-
it and for-profit organizations are not necessarily vying for the favour of the 
customer in the market if the business goals are not identical. This seems to 
be not different when utilizing the concept of conscious rivalry instead of fol-
lowing the neoclassical notion of conduct. Amongst others, Ritchie and Wein-
berg (2004) point out that nonprofit organizations are not only more inclined 
to behave more cooperatively than fully commercial firms, they are actually 
encouraged to do so by legislated, socially-sanctioned incentives. We can thus 
assume that rivalrous behaviour will be by definition relatively weak in rent-
al housing markets, since nonprofit housing associations often have a dom-
inant position. Equally, when nonprofits and for-profit firms have to predict 
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the behaviour and intentions of other nonprofit organizations in the mar-
ket, they face the complication of having to ascertain what their rivals’ objec-
tives actually are. In the context of the rental market this could mean that 
the existence of different objective functions is an in-built barrier to percep-
tions of rivalry. Hence, to guarantee a detailed understanding of conduct, the 
distinction of for-profit and nonprofit providers is an important item when 
exploring and explaining processes of rivalry between landlords.
 4.2  Landlords’ perceptions of rivalry and their 
competitive strategies 
Social landlords in Coventry
The general view of housing association managers in Coventry is that the 
PRS consists of three diverse market segments. The student lettings market is 
seen as private landlords’ major field of activity, which concentrates around 
the vicinity of university facilities. The market for professional households is 
perceived as a high turnover market that serves customers who are more af-
fluent but are nevertheless not (yet) seeking to buy their own property. The 
quality of the dwellings in this niche market is regarded as superior to the 
products of the social housing sector, which corresponds with the view that 
rent levels are also much higher. From the viewpoint of location and the qual-
ity of the dwellings the market for professionals is regarded to be fairly sim-
ilar to the owner-occupier market, which adds to the notion that it serves a 
similar stratum of the local population. Finally, the bottom end of the mar-
ket is considered to serve low-income households who often receive housing 
allowance payments. A recurring theme here is that at the lower end of the 
market the type of dwellings and the tenants that private landlords cater for 
are similar to social housing; this can be interpreted as a more or less sub-
stantial overlap between the two rental sectors from a product similarity – i.e. 
similar rent levels and quality levels – viewpoint. However, most interviewees 
also state that the property rights of tenants and the maintenance services 
provided by landlords are better in the social housing sector. 
“I suppose the PRS is characterized by two ends. The high end where you live in good 
properties, professional people who have got a transient life and are thus a bit reluctant 
to buy. And you got the unscrupulous private renting, which is for lower-income people. 
Private landlords here own a few units, which are quite poor and are heavily overcrowd-
ed. Our homes might be quite poor as well, but we are heavily regulated. We thus have to 
keep to certain standards, act in an ethical way. The PRS has two ends and we are proba-
bly quite close to the lower end.” (Coventry, social landlord)
These views on market segmentation and product similarity are generally 
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in line with social landlords’ prevailing perceptions of rivalry. Housing asso-
ciation managers agree that there is no competitive relation with landlords 
of student housing and professional housing in the city. On the other hand, 
perceptions of rivalry with private landlords who operate in the low-income 
rental4 segment do exist; yet, not among all interviewees. A common pattern 
here is that participants who are responsible for the day-to-day tenancy man-
agement tend to see private landlords in the lower market segment as direct 
competitors, while general association managers and managers in the strate-
gy departments do not observe such a relation.5 This provides some evidence 
for the subjective nature of perceptions of rivalry, where the cognitive capac-
ities of the provider can determine the strength of these perceptions. Where 
perceptions of competition exist they are largely based on continuous experi-
ences with social tenants leaving the housing association for better and, even 
more so, bigger dwellings in the PRS. Furthermore, if rivalrous perceptions ex-
ist, they do not really conform to a competitive market theorem. Social land-
lords do not see the risk to be driven out of the rental market by private land-
lords – after all, with such a high number of social housing applicants on the 
waiting list, a lack of customers does not exist. It is rather the additional costs 
of losing tenants to the PRS (e.g. search, repair and vacancy costs) that is seen 
as the major issue. 
“We are seeing increasing competition from the private rented market, particularly over 
the last five years where there has been a shift to a lot of individuals buying properties 
and then let privately. Also, we can see that our rents have gone up, while their rents have 
come down, so we are closer together these days.” (Coventry, social landlord)
In general, social landlords show a lack of understanding of the described 
competitive processes. Firstly, they seemingly do not fully comprehend why 
their tenants would leave to a private rental accommodation after all. This 
might be interpreted as a general difficulty to recognize competitive advan-
tages of either landlord group in the rental market. Secondly, social land-
lords in Coventry do not present a mutual view on what competition might be 
based on. Although they tend to agree that competition does not take place 
on price and location, there are different accounts of competition on waiting 
time, availably of dwellings, quality, repair services, or service charges. Again 
4 This is a term most landlords used themselves. When being asked what they actually mean with this, the re-
sponses included such ideas as private landlords who provide housing for benefit recipients, private tenants who 
could potentially be social tenants, or it was connected to specific neighbourhoods. An absolute rent level that 
would circumscribe this market segment is not mentioned, but it seems reasonable to understand it as the rental 
market segment for lower income households, irrespective of whether they are social or private renters.
5 Rather than using the term rival, interviewees deliberately used the term competitor.
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this signifies how different cognitive capacities lead to diverging ways of de-
ciphering the competitive environment. Thirdly, social landlords only have a 
vague picture of whom they are competing against. Private landlords are re-
garded as anonymous market actors, making it difficult for them to describe 
the core of the competitive relationship and identify their rivals in the private 
rental market. 
“You almost don’t see it as competition. Two landlords don’t have a banner above their 
properties. You also don’t see private landlords except for what you see in the windows of 
estate agents. So you can’t see what you are competing against.” (Coventry, social land-
lord)
Considering social landlords’ strategies to react to competitive pressures 
from private landlords in the low-income sector, the interviewees state that 
the most obvious approach would be to offer better or bigger dwellings to ten-
ants who express a moving desire. However, this is not a marketable strate-
gy given the constriction of the allocation system (see next section) and the 
tight budgets of housing associations in general. Hence, rather than pursuing 
an extensive investment strategy to be able to directly react to the threat of 
losing tenants to the PRS, associations rather employ a strategy of better in-
formation in order to convince tenants that they endeavour a more sustain-
able tenancy – mainly through the pronunciation of stronger property rights– 
when renting with a social landlord. This could be interpreted as the require-
ment for better marketing and more explicit tenancy management approach-
es in competitive mixed market environments.
A final major point in the interviews was the activities of social landlords 
in the private rental sector, which would be student lettings and in particular 
the more expensive market for professionals. Although in reality these activ-
ities take place on a marginal scale, housing association managers state that 
they would see themselves in direct competition with private landlords. Fur-
thermore they agree that with increasing numbers of intermediate market 
rentals6 in recent years, there is more scope for competition in the commer-
cial market segment. Where social landlords already operate in the commer-
cial rental sector, they tend to use market-led pricing strategies. Hence for the 
actual rent calculation, their own social housing stock, even if it was in the 
same areas does not play a role.
6 Intermediate rentals mean that the tenant pays 80 per cent of the dwelling’s market rent. As stated before 
(Chapter 2), the current Conservative/Liberal Coalition Government seeks to expand this social housing subsec-
tor significantly, since the need for social housing grants could arguably decline when rents do not only cover 
costs.
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“We would compare our products to other products by using Rightmove [the leading 
property website], would type in the number of bedrooms and the type of dwelling and 
see what the market rent is. Also, we talk to letting agents and ask for their opinion. Then 
we’d compare that to what we assumed it to achieve at the start of the year. And from 
that we would then set the rent. The intermediate rent is the same calculation, but we use 
80 per cent of the market rent.” (Coventry, social landlord)
 
Private landlords in Coventry
Private landlords’ perceptions of social housing in Coventry are mainly 
steered by negative stereotypes and stigmatization of both social landlords 
and tenants. Particularly landlords in the student and professionals mar-
kets state that social landlords do not take care of their dwellings, have very 
poor repair services, and are highly ineffective in using public resources for 
the provision of social housing. The views on social tenants, or low-income 
households in broader terms, are equally negative as there is a general suspi-
cion of antisocial behaviour and non-payment attitudes. It seems that some 
private landlords try to define themselves by being as far away from social 
housing as possible, both with regard to locations and tenants they cater for. 
Most revealing was the statement of a letting agent who suggested that so-
cial housing is still provided by the council, although in reality the council’s 
stock had been sold to Whitefriars housing association in 2001. According-
ly, the interviews with private landlords for student and professionals hous-
ing do not provide any evidence for perceptions of rivalry. Asked about their 
feelings about the provision of market and intermediate rentals of housing 
associations, private landlords stated that they are not aware of these hous-
ing association activities. Hypothetically, it would however not be an issue for 
them, since the interviewed landlords who operate in the market for profes-
sionals are relatively confident that an increase in supply does not lead to 
higher risks for them to be driven out of the rental market. They claim that 
the high quality of their dwellings guarantees them strong demand.
The views of landlords who operate in the low-income housing sector are 
more informed through personal experiences in dealing with social landlords 
and former social tenants. This is not to say, however, that their perceptions 
are more positive; rather, they also state that dwelling and location mainte-
nance by social landlords is poor and repair services are inefficient. Accord-
ingly, their view is that they offer superior products and services in the low-
income rental sector. Similar to landlords in the professionals and students 
segments, these landlords do not see social landlords, as direct rivals in the 
rental market. In general, this provides evidence for non-reciprocal percep-
tions of rivalry, since private landlords do not share the perceptions of social 
landlords. More precisely, these landlords are aware that they provide hous-
ing in similar locations for similar types of households, leading to a higher 
likelihood of inter-tenure moves of their own tenants. However, a common 
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theme is that they picture low-income households to prefer a social dwelling 
to their own accommodation if it was available, mainly because rents are low-
er – at least for those whose rent payments are not fully covered by housing 
allowances – and security of tenure is stronger. 
Interviewer: You just described that there is a competitive relationship with other private 
landlords. Do you see a similar relationship with social landlords in the city?
Landlord: No, no, they can get as many tenants as they want. My tenants would go to 
Whitefriars [the largest social landlord] if they could get a place that is similar to what 
they have got now.
I: Is that a problem for you, people leaving to the social housing sector?
L: It hasn’t been when it happened. People move on. It is an accepted problem. If they 
pay 500 for my dwelling and can have a Whitefriars’ dwelling for 250, it is a no brainer.
[…]
I: What about the costs when people leave?
L: Oh, don’t get me wrong. I do not like high tenancy changes, but I am not able to com-
pete with Whitefriars on rents and keep those tenants. It’s a problem, but it’s not some-
thing I can address, it is just not solvable.
The weak perceptions of rivalry with social landlords are well reflected in the 
market strategies of private landlords operating in the low-income rental sec-
tor. In their study on private landlord behaviour in the UK, Rhodes and Bev-
an (2010) found that two general rent-setting mechanisms exist, on the one 
hand market-led rent setting and on the other hand LHA-led (Local Housing 
Allowance) rent setting. The interviews that were conducted for this thesis 
suggest the same pricing patterns among private rental housing in Coventry. 
It suffices to say that market-led pricing, which dominates in the students’ 
and professionals’ market segments, does not have a strong connection to so-
cial housing rent levels and rent setting principles, except for the fact that a 
large presence of social rental dwellings in a certain area provides a basic in-
dication for the types of demanded PRS dwellings. In other words, there is no 
direct influence of social housing rent setting on market rents, but a more 
oblique effect can exist where the social housing stock dominates the tenure 
structure of the market. 
“If there is a lot of social housing I try to find out what their rents are because the exist-
ence of social housing rents can lower my tenants’ willingness to pay. So there is no use 
in going into a £400 market with an £800 project. We just have to look at it [social hous-
ing] if we want to understand our market place.” (Coventry, private landlord)
More interestingly is the question of whether LHA-led pricing has any con-
nection with social housing prices, simply because it is the prevailing pric-
ing strategy used by landlords in the low-income sector. Private landlords see 
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the LHA-led rent setting as a simple, secure and transparent way of getting a 
satisfactory rental return. They might not have any possibilities to ask for a 
rent level that is slightly above or below the market rent, yet the way that the 
LHA is calculated guarantees that the LHA rent is relatively close to what they 
could ask on the open market.7
Interestingly enough, these landlords state that LHA pricing also guides 
their rent setting for tenants who do not receive housing allowance. Since 
they know what they could get when housing an LHA tenant, they communi-
cate this maximum rent to applicants, and let them decide on whether they 
want to pay this rent or not. The other way round, one landlord describes 
his rent setting practice as looking for a market rent that is not too far away 
from the maximum LHA rate, irrespective of the area in which he is operat-
ing. The reason is that if a tenant gets into a financial hardship and starts to 
receive LHA, the chances to sustain the tenancy are higher. Since the going 
LHA rate is calculated on the basis of the market rent, there is no direct con-
nection between social landlord and private landlord pricing behaviour. Rath-
er, for LHA-led pricing the rent levels are even more rigid than under market-
led pricing, which means that landlords in this segment are seemingly not 
able to use their rents as a tool of rivalrous behaviour. However, given that a 
large presence of social rental dwellings in a certain area can have an indirect 
effect on maximum market rents, LHA rent setting is not entirely uncoupled 
from social housing rent setting. 
In line with the prevailing perception that they cannot compete with social 
landlords in the sense that they could offer a similar product quality for the 
same rent, private landlords seek to guarantee constant demand for their 
dwellings by cooperating with the local authority in the so-called accom-
modation for homeless and other vulnerable people. Here, they get referrals 
of potential social housing tenants, which have an urgent need and require 
accommodation on short notice. The risks for private landlords who accom-
modate tenants through this scheme are lower than if they looked for low-
income households through other means, since the council acts as a guar-
antor and pays a bond as well as they guarantee landlords an income stream 
of one year. After this period, landlords tend to extend contracts with ‘good’ 
tenants on a private basis. Interestingly, if there is this agreement with the 
local authority, private landlords seem to set all negative perceptions of low-
income households aside, since their tenancy is financially secure. One might 
thus say that they operate along rather opportunistic guiding principles then. 
7 LHA levels are calculated on the basis of the open market rent for different dwelling sizes. LHA is calculated 
for Broad Rental Market Areas, which means that the rate is similar for all areas in Coventry. This in turn implies 
that in some neighbourhoods actual market rents reflect the LHA rate rather well, while in more expensive or very 
cheap areas a large gap between the market rate and the LHA rate can exist.
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It needs to be pointed out that the interviews for this research had been 
conducted before the rent caps for Local Housing Allowance was introduced 
(see Chapter 2). This means that LHA-led rent setting might become a rela-
tively unattractive way of pricing. If maximum LHA rates decrease significant-
ly, landlords might lose their ability to achieve satisfactory returns. This in 
turn implies that they are likely to change their rent setting behaviour, ask-
ing for a market rent and thus not accepting LHA tenants any longer. In this 
context two interviewees note that they are very flexible with regard to which 
kind of customers they provide housing for. If they experienced decreasing 
returns in the still relatively profitable low-income PRS, they would probably 
not only change their pricing strategy, but would most likely invest into their 
stock making the dwelling suitable for student housing. However, how realis-
tic this scenario of changing strategies business is – indeed, dwellings which 
are provided to LHA recipients are often in less desirable areas – and what the 
full implications of rent allowance caps on the low-income PRS are remains 
to be seen.
Social landlords in Breda
Similar to the situation in Coventry, social landlords in Breda do not see pri-
vate renting as one coherent sector but as a set of different market segments, 
which are served by different types of private landlords. Yet, their categori-
zation of market segments in the PRS is more precise than the one of social 
landlords in Coventry, since they use the official distinction between regu-
lated and deregulated dwellings to distinguish between the lower-rent seg-
ment and the (middle and) higher segments. It seems that besides its practi-
cal function in the rental market, the deregulation threshold forms a psycho-
logical barrier, which helps landlords to classify the rental stock in the city. 
Indeed, interview participants did seldom use the terms low-income hous-
ing or high-rent segment, but stuck to the terminology regulated and dereg-
ulated market. The prevailing perception here is that the largest share of all 
private renting is to be found in the deregulated, high rent market segment, 
whereas the provision of housing in the regulated, more affordable sector is 
considered to be marginal. Here, different opinions exist: some interviewees 
claim that there is no offer at all, while others at least acknowledge a strong 
role for private landlords in the student lettings market. Most importantly, al-
most all social landlords ignore the provision of regulated dwellings by insti-
tutional investors, which (as shown in Chapter 3) in reality amounts to sever-
al hundred dwellings in the city and is with regard to product characteristics 
very similar to social rentals. This is rather revealing for the self-perception 
of social landlords as the sole provider of housing for lower-income house-
holds. Where the existence of private landlords in the regulated segment is 
acknowledged the views of housing association managers tend to be negative 
and seem to be ill-informed: Although there is little evidence for such behav-
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iour, these landlords are mostly characterized as slumlords. 
“There are 7,000 dwellings in the private rental sector. You can expect that about all of 
these dwellings cost more than €647 [the liberalization threshold]. But the deregulat-
ed sector has never really picked up, because if you can afford their rent, you better buy 
your own property. That is why the private sector is more of a transition market, a market 
where people stay temporarily. No wonder it is so small, because low-income households 
rent with us and richer people tend to buy.” (Breda, social landlord)
Consequently, all interview participants do not see any competitive relation-
ship with private landlords for low-income and other vulnerable households. 
On the contrary, one association in Breda goes as far as cooperating with pri-
vate landlords in a way that it refers potential social tenants – i.e. people who 
are on the social housing waiting list – to certain private landlords. Hence, 
in practice this housing association functions as a letting agent for private 
landlords. This service covers both the regulated and deregulated market seg-
ments and clearly reveals how this specific association sees the private sector 
in the entire rental market, namely as complementary to its own provision. 
This behaviour might be considered as the opposite of a relational form of ri-
valry, since the relation of social and private landlords in the regulated sector 
is not based on actions and corresponding reactions, but on a tacit form of co-
operation. 
“We have nothing to fear from them. They have their stock, we have ours. The thing is 
that with 8,000 people on the social housing waiting list, competitive pressures are very 
low. […] As long as there are so many people on the waiting list and there is no structur-
al problem with vacant dwellings, we have no problem with tenants moving to the private 
rental sector. But this hardly happens anyway.” (Breda, social landlord) 
On the other hand, there are strong perceptions of rivalry with private land-
lords in other market segments. On the one hand, private landlords who pro-
vide student housing are seen as direct competitors8. The interviewees state 
that they do only have periodical problems with vacancies in their student 
halls. Nonetheless, they see themselves in a weak competitive position, since 
private landlords tend to provide more desirable products – i.e. rooms in 
shared houses in attractive city-centre locations – and are therefore consid-
ered to be better prepared to deal with decreasing demand. What this means 
is that there is little scope for housing associations to react to the actions of 
private landlords, since there are only limited possibilities to change the price 
of the product – rent levels for students are at the lower end already – and 
8 The interview participants used the Dutch term ‘concurrent’, which is best translated as competitor.
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certainly no possibilities to change the product itself. To overcome this inher-
ent unfavourable competitive position in the student housing market, Bre-
da’s housing associations have pursued a different strategy. In their alloca-
tion management they directly cooperate with the polytechnics in the city, 
where the latter refer students, particularly foreign students, to social land-
lords. These claim that this has guaranteed them high demand throughout 
the study terms in the past years. 
Similarly, perceptions of rivalry in the commercial market segment exist 
where housing associations operate in this segment on a substantial scale. 
Two of the three housing associations in Breda have grown and plan to fur-
ther grow in the deregulated sector. Their managers share the perception 
that private landlords are their direct competitors. An interesting trait here is 
that social landlords exclusively mention large-scale institutional investors, 
although evidence from property websites and other sources show that indi-
vidual landlords are fairly active in this market as well, particularly through 
the provision of inner-city apartments for younger, high-income house-
holds. According to the interviewees, competing on the turf of private land-
lords takes place on building sites for new developments as well as on rent 
and quality levels. With the ultimate aim to minimize vacancy levels, housing 
associations pursue a strategy of aggressive price competition that is direct-
ly targeted at corporate investors. This pricing policy can be seen as a result 
of their nonprofit business models, allowing them to aim for stable incomes 
in the long run, rather than pursuing relatively higher profit margins in the 
short run. For instance, this nonprofit related strategy has found its expres-
sion in moderate inflation-related rent increases even in the deregulated 
market segment. This rent setting strategy is supplemented by a quality-ori-
ented strategy that can give housing associations a competitive edge above 
private landlords. Accordingly in the past, they have sought to offer dwellings 
with comparably larger outside areas, to give first-time occupants the possi-
bility to influence the interior design, and to apply the same dwelling mainte-
nance practices that were successful in lowering costs in their social housing 
activities as well. 
“Letting agents and corporate investors have never taken us seriously, because it has 
been a small segment for us so far. But our deregulated supply grows substantially; so all 
associations together will have 1,500 deregulated dwellings in the near future. I think that 
we are going to be a major factor for them.” (Breda, social landlord)
“We could say that we want a rent increase of 5 or 7 per cent for our expensive dwellings. 
However, with the economic development of the last two years in mind, I think there is 
the risk that our tenants would leave. They already pay a lot, so I guess it would be too 
much for them to bear at the moment.” (Breda, social landlord)
[ 105 ]
A final theme in the interviews with social landlords in Breda – which was 
however also a common perception among housing association managers in 
Coventry – was that when asked about their competitors in the rental market, 
interviewees mentioned that there are some elements of a competitive rela-
tionship within the social housing sector. Particularly with regard to the de-
velopment of new social housing and access to development sides – and in 
the case of Coventry also for government grants, all participants agreed that 
they vie for a leading position. On the other hand, the same landlords stated 
that within the fields of tenancy management and community development 
patterns of cooperative behaviour would prevail. Accordingly, it can be said 
that the housing association sector is no exception to other nonprofit mar-
kets in that cooperative behaviour is common business strategy (see Section 
4.1); after all, landlords try to strike a balance between mutual social goals 
and their desire to grow as an organization. In the business literature this 
has been described as ‘coopetition’ between firms (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000), 
a term which has been used by social landlords in Breda in a modified form, 
since they described themselves as ‘collegial competitors’. 
Private landlords in Breda
In contrast to private landlords in the English case it seems that private land-
lords in Breda have good knowledge of the structure of social housing. They 
distinguish between the three housing associations, know where they are lo-
cated and are well informed about their recent development activities. The 
perceptions of the performance of social landlords in this segment is predom-
inantly positive, emphasizing the relatively high quality of social dwellings, 
while they also expose less stigmatization of social tenants than their English 
counterparts. Surprisingly, even though they are aware of the very dominant 
position of HAs (housing associations) in the deregulated market segment, 
they see a lack of provision in the sector and they seem to regard an increas-
ing supply of social landlords rather than of private landlords in the deregu-
lated sector as a positive thing – maybe this links to the view of one individ-
ual landlord that housing associations are better prepared to deal with ‘more 
problematic tenants’. The perceptions of private landlords on the commercial 
activities of housing associations, i.e. the provision of private renting in the 
deregulated sector and the development of apartments for sale, are more ar-
bitrary. The interviewees tend to see these activities as necessary to guaran-
tee the financial continuity of housing associations and thus do not seem to 
have general resentments against commercial operations. However, most in-
dividual landlords, institutional landlords and letting agents, express the con-
cern that housing associations seem to have lost their balance between so-
cial and market (rental) activities. They claim that commercial activities have 
prevailed in the recent past, while social goals, particularly the provision of 
housing for the official target group, have taken a back seat. 
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“The target-means discussion in social housing is often turned upside down. The target 
is social housing, and the means is the sale and renting of market dwellings, helping to 
realize social housing. But sometimes you get the feeling that it is exactly the opposite. 
They see the development of expensive rentals and units for sale as the target itself. But 
that is not what they are about, they exist for the provision of social housing and that’s 
it.” (Breda, institutional investor)
Although private landlords who operate in the regulated rental sector see 
housing associations in a dominant position, they do not regard them as 
competitors. Similar to the views of social landlords, all types of private land-
lords express the idea that the demand for rental dwellings in the lower in-
come segment is so large that they do not have any problem with finding ten-
ants for their properties at all. Hence, rather than having rivalrous percep-
tions of social landlords, the prevailing notion is that their provision comple-
ments the associations‘ social housing activities. The excess demand also cir-
cumscribes the rent setting strategies in the regulated segment. Generally, 
private landlords ask the maximum rent that is stipulated by the quality val-
uation system. They claim that demand for these dwellings is so high that it 
would not make sense for them to offer them cheaper. An interesting excep-
tion can be the provision of older dwellings owned by institutional investors. 
Dwellings that were built in the 1960s and 1970s with government subsidies 
are sometimes priced according to a satisficing return, meaning that corpo-
rate investors have a certain return on investment in mind and as long as this 
is achieved rent levels are not changed. In practice this can lead to rents that 
are lower than the maximum asking rent. Accordingly, both rent setting strat-
egies in the regulated segment are thus not a response to social housing rents 
but follow administrative and internal principles. Here, it is worth mention-
ing that a cleavage between the strategies of private landlords and the letting 
agents who manage the stock can exist. It has been reported in the interviews 
in Breda – and also in Coventry – that the perceptions of the two groups of-
ten differ on the subject of maximum rents. Simply said, private landlords of-
ten approach the market from the viewpoint of what they want to earn, while 
letting agents primarily look at what the market offers. It is thus unsurprising 
that the more self-centred approach of the owner of the dwelling coincides 
with a lower awareness of demand aspects and the activities of other land-
lords, including housing associations than it is the case among letting agents. 
“I do not necessarily look at the expectations of my landlords, because I know that they 
have a different way of thinking about the rent level. There are always some tensions, 
since they look at their investment and what they want to have, and that is the price. But 
they completely leave the tenants and what they want to pay out of the picture. I always 
try to look at the demand side. But it is their property, so they have the last word in the 
end.” (Breda, letting agent for small-scale individual landlords)
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Perceptions of rivalry certainly exist in the student and the deregulated mar-
ket segments, but they tend to differ among landlords, which is again a sign 
of the subjective nature of perceptions of rivalry. Similar to the impression 
of social landlords in the city, most landlords and letting agents of student 
housing see themselves in a favourable competitive position with regard to 
the products they offer; nonetheless, considering the vivid building activities 
of social landlords, they predict a more difficult market environment in which 
enduring vacancies might occur. The interviews suggest that private land-
lords might react to changing market conditions by being flexible in their rent 
setting behaviour – given that student rentals owned by private landlords are 
relatively expensive, there seems to be some room for lower rent levels in-
deed – and by using their ties with sitting tenants to find new tenants in the 
student population for vacant dwellings on short notice. 
The commercial rental activities of social landlords are widely regarded as 
a new form of competition in the deregulated sector. They see it as a problem 
that housing associations have entered the market with numerous relative-
ly cheap dwellings. Housing associations are considered to deliver a strong 
product with modern facilities that might make corporate investors’ units 
from the 1970s and 1980s relatively undesirable. These activities are seen as 
unfair competition. Interestingly, it is however not the use of indirect subsi-
dies that is mentioned as the root of the problem, but the nonprofit business 
model of housing associations in general. In contrast to corporate investors 
they are not bound to specified return targets, which enables them to keep 
rents comparably low, thereby putting pressure on private landlords’ rent set-
ting. It should not be neglected, however, that not all agents and landlords 
share this view. One letting agent who operates in the high end market seg-
ment for individual persons expresses the perception that housing associa-
tions are not operating in this segment, and if they are it must be on a very 
small scale. This again exemplifies the subjective and not necessarily recip-
rocal nature of rivalry in mixed rental markets. From a strategic viewpoint, 
corporate landlords have reacted to increased competitive pressures in the 
following way. On the one hand, they have identified the risk that their old-
er stock might be affected by enduring vacancies. This in turn has induced 
some corporate investors to opt for an exit strategy in the €700 to €9009 rent 
segment by disposing of their older, less-desired dwellings. On the other 
hand, many corporate investors have sought to develop high-end accommo-
dation for specifically older households, who have decided to sell their cur-
rent dwelling and move to newer rental accommodation; rent levels for such 
accommodation often exceeds €1,000 rent per month. 
9 Between 2001 and 2011 the stock of corporate investors in Breda has decreased form 3,600 dwellings to 2,750.
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“Just assume that we want to buy a dwelling in a location where we have this [more 
expensive] association stock. When we make a taxation of the rent that we can ask, their 
provision becomes a major factor. Let’s say I think our dwelling could make 900 Euro and 
the association asks 750 for their dwelling, we have a serious problem as an investor. […] 
Yes, their thinking that they want to accommodate people without exhausting the maxi-
mum market rent is a problem.” (Breda, institutional investor)
 4.3  Forms of rivalry in the mixed rental markets 
of Coventry and Breda 
Table 4.1 summarizes the findings on landlords’ perception of rivalry and 
which competitive strategies they use to thrive in such a market. The find-
ings in the two local rental markets are also related to the taxonomy of inter-
firm rivalry as a subjective, relational, direct, and reciprocal process of com-
petition. It can be concluded that there are some significant differences be-
tween Coventry and Breda. In line with the theoretical framework, the inter-
views with social and private landlords in the low-income segment in Coven-
try suggest a subjective and non-reciprocal form of rivalry where views dif-
fer within and between each landlord group. On the other hand, the relation-
ship cannot be described as a direct and relational form of rivalry since stra-
tegic choices are primarily not directed at landlords of the other sector but 
play out mainly in an implicit fashion. For instance, it was shown that private 
landlords could thrive on the scarcity of social rental dwellings and cooper-
ate with local authorities to make tenancy management in his arguably more 
difficult market segment work. In the Dutch case the distinction between the 
regulated (lower-income) and deregulated (commercial more expensive) seg-
ments is the leitmotif of the interviews. In the lower-income sector all types 
of landlords agree that interfirm rivalry does not exist in any form; the rela-
tionship can better be labelled as a form of tacit cooperation or at least mu-
tual acceptance of one’s activities without retaliation. In the deregulated seg-
ment, however, the interviews suggest a direct and relational, but also sub-
jective form of interfirm rivalry. Nonprofit housing associations have entered 
this segment on an increasingly large scale with aggressive pricing strategies. 
This has provoked private landlords, however mainly corporate investors, to 
change their strategic behaviour in the market. 
Two things are important here. Firstly the general impression that percep-
tions of rivalry of and rivalrous interactions between social and private land-
lords are relatively weak, conforms with the finding of the relatively uncom-
petitive market structures – as measured against the model of a perfect-
ly competitive mixed rental market – in Coventry and Breda in the previous 
chapter. Hence, one might state that there is indeed a strong link between 
market structure and landlord conduct in the SCP of rental housing. On the 
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other hand, the findings partially contradict the main hypothesis of the 
research, which stated that perceptions of rivalry and rivalrous behaviour 
of social and private landlords should be slightly stronger in the Dutch case 
study, if we take the competitiveness of the rental market environment into 
account. However, the previous remarks have shown that this only holds true 
for the commercial market segment, in which social landlords and private 
landlords operate on market principles. In the lower-income segment, which 
is arguably the pure form of competition between social and private renting – 
here, the allocation of dwellings owned by social landlords is based on social-
ly defined criteria, while private landlords allocate their dwellings on market 
principles –, rivalrous perceptions and processes seem to be stronger in Cov-
entry. The following section takes a closer look at the structural and political 
barriers to agile rivalrous interactions and thus explores why the actual find-
ings do not correspond with the stated expectations. 
 4.4  The drivers of and barriers to rivalry 
  between social and private landlords
The previous two sections unfolded the questions of how social and pri-
vate landlords perceive each other and how these perceptions are reflected 
in their decision-making on rents and investments. From a theoretical view-
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point these two questions primarily deal with competitive conduct itself. 
Equally important in the SCP of rental housing is the link between competi-
tive conduct of landlords and the structure of the rental market. The theoret-
ical statements in Section 4.1 have shown that the strategy literature on in-
terfirm rivalry does not establish a direct link with the industrial economics 
literature on market structure, most likely due to the different assumptions 
about the role of firm behaviour in a market. This is not to say that an im-
plicit connection between structural conditions and the extent of interfirm ri-
valry will be absent; indeed, product similarity, spatial proximity and simi-
lar (large) firm size were found to have a positive influence on the compet-
itive relationship between firms in this literature. Accordingly, this section 
aims to make the relationship between market structure and rivalry between 
landlords explicit, as it will integrate the findings on the structures of the two 
rental markets in Coventry and Breda in Chapter 3 and the findings on per-
ceptions of rivalry and rivalrous conduct in the previous two sections of this 
chapter. 
By and large, exploring the theoretical link between market structure and 
landlord conduct again relies on the interpretation of the in-depth interviews 
with landlords. On the one hand, the statements of the interview participants 
often related directly to the idea of what limits or drives competitive percep-
tions and actions of both landlord groups – for instance, the question of what 
governments could do to increase competition between the two sectors has 
proven to be particularly useful in this respect. On the other hand, the com-
puter-assisted, interpretative analysis of the interviews was very useful for 
finding further explanations for competitive behaviour. Through this, less 
apparent connection between families of codes (themes), such as the land-
lord’s business model and pricing decisions, could be highlighted and framed 
in a wider context. 
The interpretation of the interviews suggests that the barriers to and driv-
ers of rivalry can be subdivided into rivalry in the low-income rental sector, 
where a distinction between social and market led allocation needs to be 
made, and rivalry in the commercial rental market, in which nonprofit hous-
ing associations compete with private landlords under fully market-driven 
allocation models. Within this distinction it will be made explicit where (Cov-
entry and/or Breda) such barriers have been identified. 
Barriers to rivalry between social and private landlords in the low-income 
segment
The interviews in both case study cities propose that high demand for social 
housing with correspondingly long waiting lists is the single most influen-
tial barrier to rivalry between the two landlord groups in low-income renting. 
With 10,000 (Coventry) and 8,000 (Breda) actively searching applicants for so-
cial housing there is no need to gain a competitive edge over other landlords 
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and vie for each other’s customers. Based on the inability of social landlords 
to accommodate all its potential customers, private landlords have seemingly 
found a niche market in which they can apply a viable and profitable business 
model of providing dwellings for potential social tenants, at least as long as 
it takes for them to get into social housing. The other way round, this means 
that the situation might look differently in a weak local rental market (see 
Bramley, 1999), in which the demand for social rental dwellings and inexpen-
sive private rentals is low. 
The demand barrier to a rivalrous relationship directly ties in with the rent/
quality relation of social and private rental services. In reality, there are rela-
tively large rent differentials for similar dwellings in both cities (see Chapter 
3). Landlords are convinced that the higher the difference between social and 
private rents, the higher the propensity that tenants stay in a social dwelling, 
even if they had the desire to move to another dwelling. This might seem rel-
atively obvious; yet in reality it plays out differently in the two housing mar-
kets, since actual rent levels have to be analysed in the context of the inter-
play between rent regulation and housing allowance rules. Generally, with no 
influence on their actual rent levels, social landlords in Coventry have no pos-
sibility to react to competitive pressures from the private rental sector by low-
ering rent levels for low-quality dwellings in areas of low demand. Additional-
ly, from the tenants’ viewpoint this relates to the question of who in fact pays 
the rent bill. In a situation where large rent differentials are fully covered 
by housing allowance payments10, tenants have a strong incentive to move 
to better private rental accommodation. If, however, rent excesses were not 
covered by benefit payments, private landlords would have to become more 
aggressive (e.g. through lower prices) in their effort to convince these people 
of renting accommodation with them. 
“If you are paying £70 with us but can get a £110 house in a better area, […] why wouldn’t 
you go? If this becomes more difficult because of lower benefits and they can only leave 
to cheaper areas that might not be better, they might not leave us.” (Coventry, social land-
lord) 
“To stimulate competition even further is to deregulate how associations work, particular-
ly the rent restructuring regime and the control over the amount of rent we set. To some 
extent you would hope they [the Government] want to do that, given their drive to reduce 
public expenditure. So they could start increasing competition by allowing us to use dif-
ferential rents; here we have a high demand property and charge more rent for that than 
for a dwelling in a converted pre-war house in an area where few people want to live.” 
(Coventry, social landlord)
10 Which was the case at the time the interviews took place.
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In Breda, rent regulation seems to impede competitive interactions between 
landlords as well; yet, in a different way than in Coventry. The dual system of 
rent regulation with a highly regulated sector below €652 of rent per months 
and an almost completely deregulated sector provides various incentives 
for landlords to operate in different market segments, which severely limits 
the scope for competitive behaviour. In line with their social mission, social 
landlords often keep rents artificially low,11 whereas private landlords have a 
strong motive to operate in the high-end market segment, particularly when 
investing in new dwellings, since this guarantees higher profits and lower bu-
reaucratic burdens. 
There are also some general accounts of how differences in the qualities 
of social housing and private renting locations and dwellings impede a rival-
rous relation in the regulated low-income segment in Breda. Firstly, both 
social and private landlords in Breda emphasize that the relatively high qual-
ity of existing social housing impedes investments of private landlords in the 
deregulated sector. Even if the latter decided to invest in new dwellings in the 
deregulated market, they would have to build relatively expensive dwellings 
that could match the dwelling standards of social landlords. In the context of 
the quality-led rent regulation system (see Chapter 2), the strategy of building 
dwellings in the lowest rent sphere is also not an option, since extremely high 
land prices generally thwart profitable investments in the regulated sector. 
Social landlords in Coventry experience the reverse problem. They claim that 
due to the subsidy system they can only deliver highly standardized, minimal-
ly equipped houses when developing social housing. Accordingly, the impetus 
to keep investments as cheap as possible often leads to a mismatch between 
social dwellings and the products of private landlords, at least the newly 
developed ones. The possibility to offer modern facilities and furnished dwell-
ings is seen to give private landlords an inherent competitive edge. Likewise, 
the competitive behaviour of social landlords in Coventry is highly constrained 
by their existing stock portfolio. The poor quality of a substantial share of 
social dwellings, as well as a large proportion of relatively undesired dwell-
ing types, such as bedsits and one-bedroom apartments, is seen as a possible 
motive for tenants to prefer a private rental dwelling. However, there are also 
various statements conveying the importance of property rights for tenants as 
an important factor of a competitive relationship between social and private 
renting. Housing association managers in Coventry claim that higher secu-
rity of tenure for social tenants gives them an inherent competitive advan-
tage over private landlords. It does not directly restrict landlords in behaving 
as rivals, but for tenants who are considering a trade-off between higher rents 
11 In business reality, many dwellings that given their quality could be provided in the deregulated segment are 
provided in the private rental sector (IVBN, 2010).
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and less security of tenure for a more desirable dwelling, the excess of proper-
ty rights in the social housing sector gives tenants an incentive to stay.
Another category of barriers to rivalry directly relates to the supply struc-
ture of rental housing. In neoclassical economics deconcentrated supply is a 
sign of a competitive market. However, from a rivalry viewpoint it seems that 
the small-scale is a limiting factor. Firstly, in both rental markets all types of 
landlords claim that it is difficult for individual landlords to operate in the 
low-income sector, as they are more vulnerable to dealing with problematic 
customers. They might not have the expertise to deal with anti-social behav-
iour and most likely they are struck harder by rent arrears. As a result, small-
scale landlords often refrain from becoming active in the low-income seg-
ment. Secondly and in relation to this, the limited supply of low-income rent-
als by private landlords in Coventry is also based on prevailing negative views 
on low-income households and in particular social tenants. If the perceptions 
of more private landlords were destigmatized and if they saw the same busi-
ness opportunities as some incumbent private landlords, it might be the case 
that more private landlords would seek to operate in this segment and thus 
further increase the competitive pressures on social landlords. Thirdly, the 
deconcentrated supply structure in the PRS makes it difficult for social hous-
ing landlords to target them as their rivals in the rental market. Unlike in an 
oligopoly, social landlords do not recognize specific providers as their rivals, 
making targeted moves of competitive behaviour inherently difficult. This 
directly relates to the fact that housing association managers in Breda only 
mention corporate investors as their competitors but not small-scale individ-
ual landlords in the deregulated market segment, even though official data 
from the municipality shows that the latter provide a substantial number 
of dwellings in this segment. Finally, it was shown in Chapter 2 that private 
landlords are often part-time landlords, where rental income is only a minor 
source of the total income. Such landlords might simply not find the time to 
expand their rental housing business, irrespective of whether they provide 
housing in the lower-income segment, the student market, or the market for 
professionals. 
“In the past I have provided housing for those who are a bit outside of the mainstream 
society12 but I have to say that this has gone wrong every single time. For me it is real-
ly difficult to make such a tenancy work. I think that this is better handled by the housing 
associations.” (Breda, private landlord)
Another recurring theme in the interviews was the way the allocation sys-
12 Arguably, the interviewee wants to describe a group of tenants which in practice do have problems with main-
taining the tenancy due to various problems, such as mental health issues, financial troubles, etc., 
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tems in the two sectors generally limit a competitive relation between land-
lords. Surely, all types of landlords share the notion that the needs-based al-
location in social housing and the ability-to-pay based allocation in private 
renting generally undermine the idea of competition when looked at from a 
tenants’ choice perspective. However, managers of housing associations in 
Coventry note that the needs-based foundation of the choice-based letting 
scheme (CBL) particularly adds to the limited possibilities of rivalrous behav-
iour. In practice, the CBL in Coventry stipulates that when a sitting household 
expresses the desire to move, housing associations do not have the possibil-
ity to offer them a bigger dwelling in a better location since the letting sys-
tem does not allow them to provide a vacant dwelling for a household with 
no housing need – which would be the case for a sitting tenant. Consequently, 
these households either have to stay or have to move to private accommoda-
tion, which is what they often do in practice.
“For us as a business it [a more flexible letting system] would make it easier, and give us 
the possibility to keep our customers much more happy [sic!]. There is no way we can 
keep it [a vacant dwelling] for the person that we want it to have. We might have a cus-
tomer for ten to twenty years who is really happy with us and with whom we are real-
ly happy. Suppose they get a child and need a bigger property. Circumstances mean that 
they’d have to go back into the system, whereas in the PRS they can look for it them-
selves. We have to let them go.” (Coventry, social landlord)
A final barrier seems to be the policy of local authorities towards the devel-
opment of new dwellings in low-income housing. On the one hand, private 
landlords in Breda identify the problem that the local authority tends to ask 
the maximum market price for building sites. This ties in with their view that 
the absence of direct and indirect subsidies (e.g. cheap land) for private land-
lords to develop low-income housing further limits the chances that they will 
(re-) enter this market segment. On the other hand, the local authority in Cov-
entry is considered to have a policy that favours nonprofit housing associa-
tions as developers of new social housing – which is called a preferred partner 
policy (see Chapter 3). Nonetheless, in both cities local authorities have come 
to implement the policy that at least 30 per cent of all dwellings in each new 
development scheme need to be social housing. Interestingly, this supports 
cooperation between social and private parties in the development process, 
but creates more scope for competition between landlords as spatial proximi-
ty is increased on a general level. 
Types of barriers to competition in the lower-income segment
Figure 4.1 gives an overview of all the themes that have been identified as 
barriers, or understood the other way round as drivers of a rivalrous relation-
ship in the low-income rental sector. What the figure illustrates is that these 
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barriers can be divided into three main categories: Firstly, as pronounced by 
the industrial economics literature, market structural aspects, such as sup-
ply and demand conditions, have a strong impact on how social and private 
landlords see and mediate their competitive relation. Secondly, there are sev-
eral accounts of how regulatory and policy related issues – i.e. institutional 
constraints – drive the extent to which competition and rivalrous behaviour is 
possible. These two aspects generally reflect the findings of the business lit-
erature that product similarity (here including structural as well as regulato-
ry aspects) and similarly large firm size are the main drivers of interfirm ri-
valry. Additionally, there seem to be strong barriers to rivalry that are direct-
ly related to the business strategies and goals of both landlord groups. Here, 
the ‘nonprofit/for-profit cleavage’ plays an essential role. The interviews im-
ply that even if social and private landlords serve similar customers and own 
similar dwellings, the social objectives of housing associations symbolize that 
the two rental sectors must still be seen as dissimilar business areas – sim-
ply said, if not every provider is in it for the money, then desire to outperform 
other landlords is not as strong as in a fully commercial market. 
Barriers to rivalry in commercial rental housing
The discussion on barriers to rivalry in the commercial sector generally has a 
different tenor than the one in low-income renting where two different allo-
cation principles exist. Since the provision of either landlord group is bound 
to identical regulatory conditions in both markets, rivalry becomes more or 
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less a matter of the aims and scope of housing associations in commercial 
rental housing. Barriers to rivalry can therefore be basically equated with the 
idea of barriers for housing associations to enter commercial private rental 
sector. 
In business practice, social landlords in both case study cities see the cur-
rent property slump as a major limitation to increasing their commercial 
renting operations. The development of private rental dwellings strongly 
aims at both continuous rental income streams and capital appreciation. In 
times of unstable or even negative house price developments, social landlords 
regard this market segment as too risky. Social landlords in Coventry add that 
even if they wished to grow in the high- and middle-income market segment, 
they could not do it in current times due to constraints in borrowing private 
capital for such projects. 
Moreover, statements from various social landlords in both cities indicate 
that their social business paradigm forms a barrier to new investment in 
commercial renting. Entering the PRS on a larger scale requires substantial 
capital investments that might be no longer available for their social hous-
ing activities. To put it in the words of one social landlord in Coventry, “com-
mercial renting activities may dry up the cash flow that is necessary for run-
ning and investing in the social housing business”. Since social housing is 
their very reason for existence, many housing associations, particularly those 
in Coventry thus generally abstain from private rental operations. This also 
ties in with the notion that there are conflicting strategies of commercial 
housing operations. The fact that private renting requires long-term capital 
investments is an incentive for some associations to look for other commer-
cial housing opportunities, such as developing houses for sale, since it guar-
antees short-term capital appreciation. On the contrary, commercial renting 
has become a more popular business strategy in the Dutch case. One reason 
might be that it has primarily been a highly profitable business where rental 
incomes alone suffice the targets of social landlords.
Finally, in both cities one can observe differences between traditional hous-
ing associations and those that run the former council stock. In practice, the 
large-scale stock transfer has brought these two associations in a weak posi-
tion, since potential monetary resources for the development of commer-
cial renting are instead bound to paying off long-term debts and to expensive 
maintenance investments into current housing stock. On a long-term basis 
they are thus in a weak competitive position compared to the other housing 
associations in the two markets. 
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 4.5  Conclusion
The main aim of this chapter was to shed light on the competitive relation-
ship between social and private renting from the viewpoint of the landlords 
in each sector. Here, three sets of key questions guided the research. Firstly, 
how competitive conduct of landlords in mixed rental markets can be defined 
and analysed. Secondly, whether social and private landlords perceive each 
other as competitors, and whether we can observe competitive strategies that 
are targeted at landlords from the other sector. Thirdly, how the structure of 
the two rental markets in Coventry and Breda influences the competitive con-
duct. 
Based on a literature review it was argued that a modified concept of inter-
firm rivalry is a useful model for analysing competitive conduct in mixed 
rental markets. More specifically, the review of the business economics and 
management literature led to the definition of conduct as a relational, direct, 
subjective, and non-reciprocal form of conscious interfirm rivalry. 
The analysis of the in-depth interviews with landlords and other practi-
tioners in the rental market showed that although there are some signs of a 
rivalrous relationship between social and private landlords, they are relative-
ly weak when compared against the ‘ideal’ state of interfirm rivalry. Here, the 
analysis shows that there are differences between the two main market seg-
ments, the lower-income rental segment, which is the core business of social 
landlords in both case study cities, and the commercial rental segment, which 
includes lettings for students, professional households and more affluent 
renters in general. 
The first general finding is that perceptions of rivalry and rivalrous interac-
tions are stronger in the commercial market, most likely because the modes 
of operations, strategies and particularly products of both landlord groups are 
more similar than in the low-income segment. Specifically the Dutch case has 
shown that interfirm rivalry in the commercial segment is indeed signified by 
directed and relational competitive actions, which are likely to result in com-
petitive reactions of the other landlord group. In the low-income segment, 
rivalry tends to be generally restricted by the fact that social and private land-
lords do not have the need to drive each other out of the market. Nonethe-
less some interesting differences between the two cases exist. Where manag-
ers of housing associations in the Netherlands see themselves as the exclu-
sive providers of affordable rental housing for households in need – some-
how they have come to a tacit arrangement with private landlords in which 
they can coexist with each other –, a majority of social landlords in Coven-
try experience competitive pressures from private landlords. On the other 
hand, private providers of low-income rental accommodation predominant-
ly regard their products as complementary to the ones of the social housing 
industry. Consequently, the strategic interactions between the two landlord 
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groups are more implicit than direct, and where perceptions of rivalry exist 
they are highly subjective – the interviews showed that managers even within 
the same housing associations did not always hold similar views – and they 
are not necessarily shared by both landlord groups at the same time; accord-
ingly, competitive actions do not necessarily result in competitive reactions 
in mixed rental markets. 
The final topic of this chapter was a discussion of the theoretical and 
empirical links between market structure and conduct in the SCP of rent-
al housing. With the relatively broad definition of market structure in this 
framework, comprising the structure of supply and demand, institutional 
elements, as well as public policy factors, there seems to be indeed a strong 
link going from structure to conduct. Here, the cross-case study comparison 
suggests that all five factors of market structure (product similarity, barri-
ers to access, barriers to entry, supply concentration, spatial concentration) 
are major barriers to competitive conduct; yet, there are strong differences 
between the two cases in which factors are dominant. In the rental market of 
Coventry it seems that dissimilar policy and regulatory approaches (e.g. with 
regard to housing allowance schemes and rent regulation) to the two sectors 
are the main barrier to a stronger rivalrous relationship between social and 
private landlords in the low-income segment, while structural issues (e.g. low 
levels of supply from private actors in the regulated market segment) prevail 
in the Dutch case. Given that perceptions of rivalry and rivalrous actions are 
slightly stronger in the English case, we can conclude that product similar-
ity with regard to absolute rent and quality levels, and with it the degree of 
substitutability from the consumers’ viewpoint, seems to be the primary driv-
er of the existence of rivalrous interactions. In the commercial market seg-
ment, landlords’ different business models rather than structural and politi-
cal aspects largely inhibit the existence of stronger competition between the 
two landlord groups. There are housing associations in both case study cities 
that completely refrain from the provision of market-allocated rental dwell-
ings, primarily because this might disturb the primacy of their social mission 
in the rental housing markets. 
 
[ 119 ]
 5  Market performance
  The possible effects of competi-
tion in mixed rental markets
The central questions in this chapter are the following: (1) What is the meaning 
of performance in mixed rental housing markets? and (2) What are the possible ef-
fects of competition between social and private landlords on the performance of mixed 
rental markets?
In the previous two chapters a conceptual distinction was being made 
between structural elements of competition in mixed rental markets (Chap-
ter 3) and behavioural processes of a competitive relationship (Chapter 4). 
Therefore, an argument could be made that two different forms of competi-
tion exist in rental housing market realities – a more indirect one, in which 
competition is shaped through structural contingencies and political deci-
sions, and a more direct occurrence of competition, which is shaped through 
the perceptions, actions, and reactions of actors in the rental market –, where 
the two forms of competition are, however, empirically and also conceptual-
ly related. In this chapter, the subject is a different one, as it moves away from 
the question of what competition involves in mixed rental market practices, 
but instead focuses on the ends of more or less competition between the two 
rental sectors. Here, two considerations are important: Firstly, the question is 
what the possible effects of competition are with regard to what. Hence, the 
first research question of what the meaning of performance in mixed rental 
housing markets is. This chapter presents a critique of why it is meaningful to 
make a distinction between the effects of competition on the performance of 
social and private landlords themselves and its effects on the performance of 
the wider rental market. The second central concern is with the empirical and 
conceptual relation of the different performance concepts with the competi-
tive conduct of landlords and the structure of the rental market. 
The careful reader will notice that rather than analysing the actual effects 
of competition between social and private landlords, this thesis tries to 
unfold the possible effects or outcomes of more or less competition in mixed 
rental markets. It was noted on several occasions that within the neoclassi-
cal view of the traditional SCP a direct causal link running from market struc-
ture to performance is presumed. From a methodological viewpoint, a pop-
ular and arguably simplistic approach of quantifying the effects of competi-
tion has been to use a measure of industry performance (for instance a meas-
ure of profitability, such as the rate of return on capital or assets) and regress 
this against a measure of market structure (most often the degree of market 
concentration), while controlling for aspects concerning the providers’ inter-
nal operations.1 In contrast to this, the analysis of performance in the ‘SCP of 
rental housing’ does not engage in the practice of actually testing the struc-
ture to performance hypothesis empirically. Instead, it applies a more qualita-
1 For an overview see Nickell (1996). Often these studies are concerned with the question of whether the SCP 
paradigm or the efficiency-structure hypothesis (see Chapter 2) fares better.
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tive approach, in which a meticulous review on the meaning, measurement, 
and determinants of performance in the economics, nonprofit and housing 
literatures is used as a means to discuss the possible outcomes of competi-
tion in mixed rental markets. 
More specifically, the next section of this chapter discusses the mean-
ing of performance in the SCP of rental housing. How has performance been 
defined in the economics, nonprofit and housing literatures, and which 
aspects should be looked at in the context of performance in mixed rental 
markets? Simultaneously, these literatures are reviewed with the question in 
mind of what the findings on the effects of competition are. Here, a distinc-
tion is being made between effects on the providing firms themselves and 
the effects on the wider market, i.e. the question of how beneficial compe-
tition is for consumers. Hereafter, Section 5.2 discusses some findings from 
the empirical analysis in the previous two chapters as well as related research 
results from housing studies in England and the Netherlands to exemplify the 
possible effects of mixed rental market competition. This aims to shed light 
on the relation between market structure and conduct on the one hand, and 
performance on the other hand. Since this will remain on a mainly descrip-
tive and qualitatively analytical level, Section 5.3 seeks to elaborate on what 
kind of data would be necessary and which methodological approach would 
be meaningful, if one wanted to quantify the effects of competition and 
sought to test the main hypothesis of the traditional SCP – a causal link from 
structure to performance – within the SCP of rental housing. The chapter con-
cludes on its main points in Section 5.4. 
 5.1  The concept of performance in the literature 
The aim of this section is to present a concept of performance in the SCP of 
rental housing that can assess the effects of competition in rental markets, 
i.e. the question of what the meaning of performance in mixed rental mar-
kets is. For this a closer look will be taken at the different concepts of perfor-
mance in the economics, nonprofit, and housing literature. Two aspects are 
discussed simultaneously within each of the three perspectives. How is per-
formance being defined and what are the findings of empirical studies on the 
effects of competition on the given performance concepts. We begin with a 
brief review of the industrial organizations literature. This highlights the use 
of the concept of performance in the context of the SCP paradigm. Second-
ly, it was shown in the previous chapter on rivalrous conduct that the exist-
ence of both nonprofit and for-profit business models in a mixed market al-
ters the conditions under which competition takes place. The contention 
here is that where competition follows such differing premises, the concept 
of market performance changes as well. Finally, the meaning and measure-
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ment of performance has received increasing attention in the rental housing 
literature, particularly with respect to the performance of the social housing 
sector. Here, special attention is given to the role of governments in shaping 
market outcomes. In the final subsection, the different approaches to perfor-
mance are integrated to one coherent possible perspective on performance in 
mixed rental markets, and the various findings on the effects of competition 
are summarized.
 5.1.1  Performance as a mainstream economic concept
In the economics literature and specifically in studies of industrial organiza-
tion, performance covers numerous aspects, which is testified by the exist-
ence of such diverging terms as ‘firm performance’, ‘industry performance’, 
and ‘market performance’. Accordingly, the main goal of the structure-con-
duct-performance paradigm, to explain differences in performance based on 
diverging market structures, was often approached in different, yet comple-
mentary ways. Central in defining performance has been the use of various 
concepts of efficiency. 
Here, a firm-centred perspective is the question of the productive efficiency 
of the individual supplier and consequently of the aggregate industry. When 
firms produce a given level of output with the least possible amount of input 
they are technically efficient, or in simpler terms, they are not wasting any 
resources. Equally, if the same firm uses a combination of input factors that 
minimises the cost of producing the given output, it is also cost efficient (Far-
rel, 1957). Other researchers have focused on the social welfare aspects of the 
efficient allocation of resources (Barr, 2004). This is given when firms in an 
industry use the available resources in such a way that they only produce the 
right amount of goods that are most desired by consumers. If this were the 
case, allocative efficiency would be maximised. One important observation is 
that there is no coercive relationship between productive efficiency and the 
best possible resource allocations. After all, an industry could produce a cer-
tain good very efficiently; yet, this good might be of little use to a majority of 
society. 
Again other studies have dealt with the subject of dynamic efficiency. Here, 
one can distinguish between process innovations, which are about produc-
ing the same amount of goods at lower prices through technical produc-
tion advancements, and product innovations, which are about the introduc-
tion of new goods and services or the improvement of existing ones (Stiglitz & 
Walsh, 2006). In a narrow perspective one might argue that the two forms of 
dynamic efficiency are only subtypes of a better productivity (process innova-
tion) and a better allocation of resources (product innovation). Finally, some 
economists have related performance to the question of whether the market 
outcome is socially efficient, taking into account the external costs and bene-
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fits of the distribution of resources. Distributive efficiency occurs when goods 
are allocated to those who are in greatest need and not to those that are able 
to pay the highest price (Motta, 2004; Caves, 1986). 
From a measurement point of view, the various concepts of efficiency are 
primarily theoretical and merely give a technical meaning to the term per-
formance. Consequently, the actual measurement of performance in research 
practice mainly relies on more assessable performance indicators from 
which it can be deduced how market structure can explain efficiency out-
comes in the whole market. Among these are the return on equity (ROE), 
return on assets (ROA), or the ratio of operating expenses to gross income (or 
cost-income ratio) as measures of profitability, which are in turn used as a 
proxy for the measurement of allocative efficiency – after all, abnormal prof-
its are a sign of monopoly power, which in turn signify an inefficient alloca-
tion of resources (Martin, 2010). The measurement of productive efficiency 
and dynamic efficiency equally rely on proxy measures. A popular method in 
measuring productivity has been the use of Total Factor Productivity, which 
is defined as the portion of output not explained by the amount of inputs 
used in production (van Reenen, 2011). Here, output and input measures vary 
between the sectors and industries researchers have been looking at: For 
instance, in health research output might be defined as health gains of indi-
vidual patients (e.g. Hollingworth, 2008), while in manufacturing industries it 
might be the total number of sales (e.g. Nickell, 1996). Similarly, in innovation 
research such various measures as the number of patents and R&D invest-
ments in the manufacturing industries, or investment in management and 
skills training in service industries have been used (Holmes & Schmitz, 2010). 
Considering the effects of competition, it was pointed out before that the 
SCP paradigm predicts that in the state of perfect competition – i.e. products 
are indistinguishable, barriers to entry do not exist, supply is deconcentrat-
ed – the output of the industry is at a feasible maximum, while selling pric-
es are at a feasible minimum, i.e. the price equals the marginal costs of pro-
duction. The result of this is that resources are optimally allocated, producers 
do not waste resources and as a means to stay competitive, producers seek to 
lower their production costs and improve the quality of their products. In oth-
er words, in a state of perfect competition productive, allocative and dynam-
ic efficiency is maximised. The key factor in achieving allocative efficiency 
is the profit that firms can make. If a market in which firms make a normal 
profit experiences an increase in demand, prices will rise, leading to abnor-
mal profits in the short run. If barriers to entry are absent, such high prof-
its will attract new firms bringing more resources into the market where con-
sumer preferences are yet unsatisfied. In the long run, profits will return to 
a normal level which guarantees that production will stay at an output level 
that is regarded by society as optimal (Martin, 2010).
It is unsurprising that much of the industrial organization literature has 
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sought to test these assumptions through measuring performance. To quote 
but few examples, Nickell (1996), points out that the allocative efficiency 
effect of competition as well as the consumer satisfaction aspect have seen 
few opposition in the empirical literature, while it has remained far more 
unclear whether competitive pressures actually lead to higher productive effi-
ciency on the firm level. Although, the empirical work of the author suggests 
that competition also has a positive effect on the production costs of firms, 
mainly through process innovations (Vives, 2008; Holmes & Schmitz, 2010; 
Aghion et al., 2008) and the improvement of management quality by reducing 
slack (van Reenen, 2011), Nickell concedes that “competition [might work] not 
by forcing efficiency on individual firms but by letting many flowers bloom 
and ensuring that only the best survive […]. If there are lots of ways of doing 
things, competition allows many to be tried and then selects the best, some-
thing a monopoly finds hard to replicate.” Such a finding would be in line 
with the notion of Hayek (1948) that competition is a process of discovery to 
determine which way of production leads to the best market outcomes. 
 5.1.2  The nonprofit view on performance
Throughout the thesis it has been argued that the SCP of rental housing does 
not analyse an ordinary commercial market. Primarily in the lower-income 
rental sector the existence of nonprofit and profit-driven business models 
implies that the basic mechanism of low profits as a transmitter of efficient 
resource allocation does not hold. Therefore, it seems helpful to take a clos-
er look at the nonprofit literature and how the firm level and wider market ef-
fects of competition in mixed markets have been described here. 
A general caveat is mentioned by Lakdawalla and Philippson (2006), who 
note that there is ample research on the behavioural aspects of competition 
between different types of providers in mixed markets, meaning that we have 
a relatively good understanding of how a nonprofit firm will react to compet-
itive pressures from its for-profit rivals and vice versa (for an overview see 
Brown & Svilinski, 2006; some of these aspects have been discussed in Chap-
ter 4). However, little seems to be understood about how competition between 
nonprofits and for-profits affects aggregate industry and market performance. 
In brief, research on the effects of competition on performance is still in its 
infancy. There are however some notable exceptions, particularly in studies 
on the health sectors, where nonprofit and for-profit business models have 
competitively coexisted for a long time. These exceptions will be discussed in 
the following. 
Productivity and profits 
Partially, these studies rely on the same theoretical concepts of performance 
as the industrial organization literature in that they seek to unfold the ef-
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fects of competition on the productive, allocative, dynamic efficiency of indi-
vidual providers and the aggregate industry. Firstly, Liu and Weinberg (2004; 
see also Pires, 1985) provide evidence that whereas the production efficien-
cy effect of mixed market competition on for-profit providers is only margin-
al – which means that it largely corresponds to the overall level of competi-
tion in the market it has – there is a productivity increasing impact on non-
profit firms. Particularly when nonprofit providers operate in fully commer-
cial markets without government support, a positive influence on the over-
all efficiency of nonprofit organizations can be observed. The reason is that 
if they want to do well in such markets they need to make optimal use of the 
resources they have. Operating in markets where costs are likely to be higher 
does lead to new insights for nonprofit managers on how to run the mission-
related business more efficiently. Bennett et al. (2003) add to this that in mar-
kets where nonprofits receive government subsidies, they can be punished 
for bad performance through for instance contract terminations. They spec-
ify that in social markets that are dominated by nonprofit providers, govern-
ments tend to have few alternatives, which means that nonprofits might be-
come entrenched in relying on subsidies without having an incentive to per-
form well. However, if such a market sees the strong entry of for-profit pro-
viders, the risks to lose government support becomes more genuine and non-
profits are likely to perform better if they want to continue to be publicly sub-
sidised. 
Cooper et al. (2012) present contrasting findings in their study on the 
effect of private hospital competition on the productive efficiency of pub-
lic nonprofit hospitals in England. They show that although patients’ aver-
age length of stay in public hospitals – which is used as a proxy for produc-
tivity – decreases significantly in more competitive local markets, this can-
not be ascribed to competitive pressures from private hospitals but only to 
more competition within the public hospital sector. Even more significantly, 
they find evidence that the productivity of nonprofit hospitals decreases in 
more mixed markets. Where for-profit firms enter nonprofit dominated mar-
kets they will seek to serve patients with better recovery prospects. This will 
leave nonprofit organizations that want to stay true to their social mission 
with a poorer customer base. Aggregate productivity losses might thus not be 
the result of worse individual performance, but can be influenced by inherent 
competitive disadvantages. 
Addressing the allocative efficiency aspect of competition in mixed market, 
various researchers have chosen a similar approach as mainstream indus-
trial economics studies in that they examine the nonprofits’ and for-profits’ 
profitability levels in mixed markets. Among others, Liu and Weinberg (2004) 
show that from a dominant for-profit provider’s viewpoint being in compe-
tition with a nonprofit can make an otherwise profitable market unprofita-
ble. Using the example of a duopoly with one nonprofit and one for-profit, the 
[ 125 ]
authors show that it is not increasing competition per se that has the big-
gest negative effect on profits, but it is more the organizational status of one’s 
rival. This holds true even in the absence of government support for the non-
profit firm, a situation in which nonprofits lose their inherent cost advantage. 
The authors conclude that regulatory advantages for the nonprofit are nei-
ther decisive nor necessary to induce losses for the for-profit provider. This 
result is supported by an empirical study of Horwitz and Nichols (2009) on the 
effects of competition on the profit margins of nonprofit and for-profit hospi-
tals in the United States. On the other hand, a literature review by Koning et 
al. (2007) finds the reverse effect. They conclude that the most important fac-
tor for profitability levels of the for-profit firm is the structure of the market, 
rather than different organizational statuses. Similarly, Brhlíková (2006) as 
well as Harrison and Lybecker (2005) argue that competition with a nonprofit 
might be advantageous for the profit-oriented firm in comparison to competi-
tion with another fully commercial provider, the reason being that if the non-
profit delivers a significantly different product than the for-profit, sufficient 
manoeuvring space for the for-profit to increase its profits remains present. 
Aggregate prices, quality and quantity
In addition to these more ‘classical’ outcome measures, the nonprofit litera-
ture also focuses on firm behaviour with regard to prices, quality, and output, 
from which aggregate market effects are inferred. Here, a general problem is 
that there seems to be no simple way of deducing the movements of prices, 
quality and output in mixed markets from the processes of competition, since 
more factors are influential. For instance, prices might be prescribed by ad-
ministrative decisions and output might be based on the availability of gov-
ernment funding or the amount of donations that a nonprofit is able to col-
lect. Nonetheless, different scenarios of how aggregate behaviour leads to 
specific outcomes exist. 
To give but few examples, Harrison and Lybecker (2005) present a mod-
el with three possible alternatives of nonprofit behaviour in mixed markets: 
(1) The nonprofit firm maximises a combination of profit and quantity; (2) it 
combines a profit model with an output model that maximises the quanti-
ty of the mission-related service; (3) it opts for strategy that maximises prof-
it and quality. Their empirical research shows that the effect of the first sce-
nario is that the price of the nonprofit provider is lower and overall prices 
will fall, whereas in the second case the prices of the nonprofit are relative-
ly higher, since the maximisation of cross-subsidization – from commercial 
to mission-related activities – is costly. Eventually, the for-profit provider will 
take advantage of the relatively higher prices and will increase prices as well. 
The main outcome of the third scenario is that prices of the nonprofit ser-
vices will increase alongside its quality levels, which is difficult to sustain for 
for-profits as well. Here, the for-profit sector is likely to compete against this 
[ 126 ]
strategy with lower prices and lower quality services. As a result, the aggre-
gate benefits for consumers are relatively high only in the first scenario. 
In addition to this, Brekke et al. (2011) contend that the level of altruism in 
the nonprofit sector determines the wider outcomes of competition in mixed 
markets. If nonprofit firms are sufficiently altruistic they offer higher quali-
ty and lower prices. It is, however, the other way round for nonprofit indus-
tries in which altruism plays an inferior role, which means that the existence 
of nonprofit firms in a market can have positive or negative effects on social 
welfare as a whole, and is not necessarily a guarantor for higher consumer 
satisfaction (see also Malani & David, 2004 and Koning et al., 2007).
Notwithstanding this more sceptical theoretical view on the effects of 
mixed market competition on market outcomes, empirical health care and 
education research tends to show a positive impact of competition on the 
aggregate market. For instance, examining the quality performance of high 
schools in the United States, Dee (1998) shows that there is a positive and sta-
tistically significant impact of the presence of private schools on graduation 
rates among nonprofit public schools, while Agasisti (2011) provides evidence 
for a positive impact of mixed school competition on the test results of pub-
lic school students. In the health care sector recent research (Cooper et al., 
2012; Gaynor & Town, 2011) demonstrates the positive effect of private hospi-
tal competition on the quality of private nonprofit and public hospitals with 
regard to mortality rates. 
The social mission of nonprofits
A third perspective in the nonprofit literature – and arguably the most im-
portant and obvious aspect – is the effect of competition on the social mis-
sion of the providers. Young et al. (2010) specify that private nonprofit busi-
nesses are stronger affected by strong tensions between their social mission 
and their market activities than for-profit firm and governmental organiza-
tions. As a result, in markets in which they compete with solely profit-orient-
ed providers, nonprofits are not only more inclined to behave differently in 
the market, but they should ultimately judge their economic performance in 
terms of fulfilling the social mission rather than only in economic efficiency 
terms. In line with this, James (1998) argues that there are three possible ef-
fects of fully profit-oriented activities on the core social mission. A positive 
utility means that such activities are consistent with the mission, whereas 
negative utility implies the detraction from the main task. Thirdly, commer-
cial activities could just generate net revenue and have no direct impact on 
the provision of the mission-related service. These are generally the markets 
(or market segments) in which nonprofits should seek to maximize profits, 
as this gives them the ability to maximize cross-subsidization and thus im-
prove the overall outcome of their services and products. Services with a neg-
ative utility have the characteristic that there should be a distaste of nonprof-
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it managers to engage in them at all, but particularly in times of tightening 
budgets. Usually, when external funding decreases, nonprofits often have to 
rely on commercial activities to guarantee the survival of their mission-relat-
ed business. However, when these commercial activities have a negative utili-
ty the nonprofit management, would have to decrease the production of such 
services, or stop them entirely, if it aimed to retain its original task, otherwise 
one could label them as ‘for-profits in disguise’.
Examining the strategic options of nonprofit hospices, which face com-
petitive pressures through lower costs of rivalling for-profit providers, Froe-
lich (2012) argues that striving for rapid cost reductions and administrative 
discipline might not be desirable after all. It is argued that while there could 
be no doubt that productive efficiency is important, trying to beat “for-prof-
it business at its own game” (p. 4) through focussing solely on cost reduction 
might urge nonprofits to abandon their unique competitive advantages (e.g. a 
potentially better product quality, better reputation) and, more problematical-
ly, might threaten their very reason for existence in the market. 
Conversely, a study by Hirth (1997) argues, “[if] nonprofits have a compar-
ative advantage in trustworthiness or willingness to provide socially benefi-
cial but unprofitable services, while for-profits have greater incentives for 
efficiency, intersectoral competition can yield better outcomes than a market 
consisting exclusively of one type of firm. Competition from nonprofits may 
exert pressure on for-profits to deliver socially beneficial services. […]” (p. 
433). The mechanism behind this is that poorly informed consumers tend to 
patronise nonprofit providers. As a result, for-profits are inclined to offer bet-
ter quality in the market, in the sense that their services need to better match 
the social preferences of customers in the market. 
 5.1.3  Performance in the housing literature 
There are various approaches to the concept of performance in the housing 
literature. More generally, one can distinguish the housing systems and poli-
cy perspective, which abstracts from questions of tenure and focuses on mar-
ket outcomes in general. Four aspects are commonly acknowledged by gov-
ernments as being important pillars of a well-functioning housing system: 
The price of the housing consumption deals with the question of whether 
housing services are affordable for tenants, while the assessment of the qual-
ity of the services aims to check whether affordability is not only achieved 
through low, socially undesirable rental housing standards. Furthermore, the 
system perspective deals with the availability of housing, i.e. the question of 
whether there are enough dwellings to cover the demand from households 
who cannot gain access to the commercial rental sector (Haffner et al., 2012; 
Kemp, 1995) Another dimension of system outcomes, which arguably touch-
es on price, quality, and quantity aspects, is the level of housing satisfaction 
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(Stephens, 2007). Hence, one can say that the housing literature is in line with 
the idea of the nonprofit literature that aggregate market effects on prices, 
quality, and quantity should be part of an examination of performance. 
In research practice only few housing studies have explicitly, conceptually 
or empirically analysed the effects of competitive relation between social and 
private rental housing on market outcomes. The only exception is the work 
of Kemeny (1995) on dual and integrated rental markets, in which he makes 
the argument that the lower rents of nonprofit landlords in the social rental 
sector should have a dampening effect on market rents in the private sector, 
where the necessary conditions are an excess of supply and a large market 
share of these nonprofit organisations – or in other words, they need to be the 
dominant providers in the market. Kemeny himself does not provide empir-
ical evidence for this claim; however, as stated in Chapter 1, Atterhög and 
Lind (2004) test this hypothesis and show that in the context of the Swed-
ish rental housing market there is indeed a dampening effect on PRS rent lev-
els through the provision of nonprofit social landlords. Similarly, there is little 
empirical research on the performance of the private rental industry. Exist-
ing studies deal with selected aspects of efficiency such as an allegedly inher-
ent lack of the productive inefficiency of small-scale amateur landlords (see 
Scanlon & Kochan, 2011), the lack of dynamic efficiency in connection with 
investments of private landlords for achieving a better energy efficiency in 
their dwellings (Kemp, 2011), or the profitability of the sector in in terms of 
vacancy rates and rent revenues (La Grange & Pretorius 2002). 
On the other hand, ample research exists on the performance of the social 
housing sector. Much of the housing economics literature has focused on the 
economic efficiency of public housing companies – and thus remained close 
to the terminology of the industrial economics literature (for an overview see 
Maclennan & More 1997; Gibb & Maclennan, 2006). Here, different perspec-
tives on performance are discussed. A first issue is the allocative efficien-
cy of public housing provision, where a common assumption is that a lack 
of information and the absence of market signals result in a public housing 
stock that does not match consumer preferences (see also Green & Malpez-
zi, 2003). Secondly, questions are asked about the costs of public housing pro-
vision. The argument is that as a monopoly, or at least dominant supplier of 
low-income rental dwellings, the incentives for public nonprofit landlords to 
reduce the costs of both production and service provision are low. As a result, 
there has been an increasing interest in the commercialization of the non-
profit housing association and the introduction of new regulatory mecha-
nisms through governments as a way to implement external efficiency pres-
sures on the modern social housing sector (Maclennan & More, 1997). Particu-
larly, the role of public authorities in shaping the performance of the (social) 
rental housing is a specific trait of the housing literature and needs some 
more mentioning. 
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Social housing performance and the role of the regulator 
A review of the housing literature suggests that there are two main key mech-
anisms by which governments have sought to increase external efficiency 
pressures: Performance measurement and the implementation of competitive 
pressures. In the following, some examples of these two policy approaches in 
England and the Netherlands highlight how they function in rental market 
practices. 
In general, performance measurement seeks to hold housing associations 
accountable to acquire resources that are necessary for the production of the 
service at the lowest possible costs, to use resources efficiently and to achieve 
the intended objectives effectively (Maclennan & More, 1997; Kemp, 1995). In 
line with the argument of the nonprofit literature, Mullins et al. (2011) argue 
that a measure of social housing performance should aim to give govern-
ments an indication of not only whether public money is spent efficiently, but 
also signal a justification for the existence of the sector to the public. From a 
landlord’s viewpoint, including both identifiable social and economic2 perfor-
mance measures can help to see if the association is on the ‘right path’ as a 
whole. 
The practices of performance measurement have been very diverse in Eng-
land and the Netherlands, which is arguably the result of diverging regula-
tion approaches (van Overmeeren et al., 2010). It might be true that in both 
countries reforms were introduced that aimed to increase the self-reliance 
of the social housing sector, mainly through the means of increasing private 
finance. However, the regulatory framework in the Netherlands is not as pre-
scriptive as in England, resulting in a more decentralized and independent 
manner of business operation, and a higher level of self-regulation in the sec-
tor. Giving Dutch housing associations a more independent status through 
the Social Housing Management Order (see Chapter 2) means that perfor-
mance measurement is primarily related to ensuring the financial stabili-
ty of the associations and the sector as a whole. Accordingly, there are some 
unresolved issues about the measurement of other performance dimensions 
and how these can be used to inform policy-making processes and to guar-
antee the achievement of the social mission of the housing association sec-
tor. In business reality, the desired outcomes are determined at the local lev-
el through voluntary performance agreements between local authorities and 
associations, defining the new output and investments of all housing associa-
tions operating in the municipality for a certain period. Given that these local 
performance agreements are voluntary, their effectiveness, and with it the 
effectiveness of the entire association sector, is questioned (Priemus, 2003b; 
2 Here, Gibb and Nygaard (2006) propose the application of such various productivity measures as rent arrears, 
responsiveness to repair services, vacancy levels and turnover rates.
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Koning & van Leuvensteijn, 2010). Arguably, the only genuine threat is that 
if a housing association gets into serious financial turmoil, the management 
powers will move to the Central Fund for Housing (Elsinga et al., 2009). 
The consequences of the more explicit regulatory framework in England is 
that performance indicators play an important role in shaping the relation 
between public authorities, especially the Homes and Communities Agen-
cy, and individual housing associations. The focus on an efficient use of pub-
lic funds has created a culture in which performance indicators are active-
ly used and promoted by the providers of social housing to position them-
selves in the contest for government funding and public contracts (van Bortel 
et al., 2010). As indicated by regular performance reports of the Central Hous-
ing Fund and the design and implementation of diverse performance indi-
cators3, such benchmarking has become popular in the Netherlands as well. 
Nevertheless, the difference is that, so far, these inter-landlord comparisons 
seem to have no significant consequences for the position of individual hous-
ing associations, other than standing and reputation of its managers in the 
public domain (Priemus, 2003b). 
Secondly, in contrast to the Netherlands, there has been an intensive pub-
lic discourse between scholars and practitioners on the promotion of com-
petition as a mechanism to increase the efficiency of the social housing sec-
tor in England. Arguably the most prominent and discussed document from 
this period is the Cave Review (2007) ‘Every tenant matters: a review of social 
housing regulation’, in which it is argued that the aims of social housing reg-
ulation should be threefold: to enhance consumer power, in the sense that 
tenants should have the ability to exert real choice even in a market that is by 
definition providing a scarce good which ultimately minimizes the existence 
of bad quality services; to guarantee an efficient and effective use of public 
resources; to stimulate the external benefits of social housing, as a reaction 
to the negative externalities of purely privately supplied housing. Generally, 
the Cave review relies on the idea that competition is not a regulatory goal in 
itself, but is a mechanism through which specific outcomes in the social rent-
al market can be achieved. Here, it is made clear that competition is just one 
tool among many, and it should only be used where its purposes are clear and 
the performance of the whole sector can be improved. 
The Cave report refers to competition as a means to achieving regulatory 
goals in several aspects: Firstly, as a mechanism to ensure the continuing pro-
vision of high quality social housing. The argument here is that funding for 
the development of new social dwellings should be granted in a competition 
3 The so-called Raeflex and the KWH visitations are examples for early performance assessment that sought to 
compare housing associations (van Overmeeren et al., 2010), while the Aedex is a measure of the social and eco-
nomic return on investment in the association sector.
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on the basis of an applicant’s performance (see also Maclennan & More, 1997). 
In such a tendering procedure regulators should encourage all types of pro-
viders to participate, since the existence of different business models might 
guarantee that possible applicants optimally combine both financial and 
social aims. Secondly, with this multiplicity of providers, governments should 
seek to disintegrate development, ownership, and management, since this 
would guarantee a greater variety and number of potential competitors for 
public funds (Cave, p. 19). More specifically, making it easier to separate man-
agement from ownership could benefit tenants in the way that owners could 
contract management to other providers, including specialised management 
firms, with a larger local presence and could introduce performance measure-
ment also at the level of management services.
In the Netherlands an explicit discussion on the benefits of competition 
and how governments can intervene in the market to increase competitive 
forces has not taken place yet. Quite conversely, here the public discourse 
has focused on the issues of a level playing field between social and private 
landlords in the rental market. More precisely, the state aid for Dutch housing 
associations comprises state guarantees for borrowings from the Social Hous-
ing Guarantee Fund, support from the Central Housing Fund – which was set 
up and is run by the state to help financially troubled associations –, the sale 
of developing sites by municipalities at prices below the market level, and 
the right to borrow from the Dutch Municipality Bank. These indirect govern-
ment subsidies are available only to registered nonprofit housing associations 
(Priemus & Gruis, 2011). Given the risk that these subsidies can leak into the 
commercial activities of housing associations and the fact that private inves-
tors do not endeavour similar government support, there have been concerns 
about an unlevel playing field between nonprofit and for-profit landlords in 
both the deregulated and regulated market segments. With the introduction 
of the new rules of the social housing allocation system (see Chapter 2) and 
an arguably better monitoring system, the Dutch government in cooperation 
with the European Commission competition authority has equalled the lev-
el playing field in the commercial sector, but decreased the scope for compe-
tition. Arguably, where social landlords are prescribed to operate in a more 
residualized segment, the overlap of customer groups is smaller by definition. 
 5.2  An analytical framework of performance in 
mixed rental markets
The three discussed literatures are meaningful in the following ways. First of 
all, there are mixed, sometimes even contrasting findings in the industrial 
economics and particularly the nonprofit literatures on the possible effects of 
competition on both market outcomes and firm performance. Some studies 
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find a positive effect on the productivity of individual suppliers, while others 
state that the productivity might even decrease. Equally, positive as well as 
negative effects are reported with regard to social outcomes, aggregate quali-
ty, and profitability. Given these inconclusive findings it is not meaningful to 
take specific effects of competition as given and reflect from the finding of 
other studies on the outcomes of competition in mixed rental markets. 
Nevertheless, inconclusive findings or not, the previous remarks can pro-
vide a guideline on how to think about performance and its relation to com-
petition when analysing the relationship between social and private rent-
al housing. Following the economics literature in general and applied stud-
ies of the SCP paradigm in specific, performance in the SCP of rental housing 
is divided into firm-level and market-level (or societal) effects. From an eco-
nomic viewpoint the landlord-level performance effects are primarily about 
the question of whether competitive interactions between the two landlord 
groups leads to a more productive use of resources in the delivery of rental 
housing services. As said, neoclassical theory contends that increasing com-
petitive pressures provoke managers of firms to find innovative ways of pro-
viding their products at lower costs since the profitability of the whole indus-
try decreases with an increasing number of competitors. The analysis of firm-
level performance should examine whether such mechanisms exist in mixed 
rental market realties. Furthermore, performance in the SCP of rental housing 
should examine whether competition between the two landlord groups leads 
to decreasing levels of profitability as is assumed by the SCP paradigm. Profit-
ability could be seen as a proxy measure for an optimal allocation of resourc-
es in the rental market; however, since in mixed markets the logic of profita-
bility appears to be less clear as in fully commercial, profitability in the con-
text of rental housing is mainly seen as having an effect on landlords them-
selves rather than a direct effect on the wider market and consumer satisfac-
tion through better resource allocation. 
From the nonprofit and the housing literature it is taken that firm-lev-
el performance should consider the effects of competition on the social mis-
sion of social landlords in the rental housing market. Again, housing associ-
ations and nonprofit organizations have a mission that is of general public 
interest, which means that in contrast to for-profit providers there is a larger 
multiplicity of stakeholders with different, maybe even opposing aims: gov-
ernments, who might require social landlords to provide affordable hous-
ing; granting agencies, who support the building activities of housing asso-
ciations; the entrepreneurs who run the enterprise; and consumers who are 
often better integrated into decision making processes as they are the sup-
posed beneficiaries of the nonprofit policies. The existence of dominant non-
profit provisional structure, particularly in the low-income rental sector, is 
thus the reason why the definition of firm-level performance should exceed 
the profitability and productivity tenets. 
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Secondly, the definition of market-level effects largely follows the nonprof-
it and housing literatures in that it focuses on aggregate quality, quantity and 
price effects. In other words, market level performance is about the impact 
of competition in mixed rental markets on the consumers. A competitive 
rental housing market, in which the two sectors offer housing units that are 
good substitutes, means that tenants have more choice. If tenants have more 
choice and if they make use of the choice in their housing consumption deci-
sions, one can assume that the outcome of rental housing allocation satisfies 
tenants’ housing preferences. Equally, if competitive pressures in mixed rent-
al markets induce landlords to lower their prices or increase the quality of 
their products as a strategy to thrive in the market and if tenants can choose 
between all kinds of products effectively, allocative efficiency as well as con-
sumer satisfaction might increase. From a government’s viewpoint this has 
important implications of how and when they should intervene in the mar-
ket. If the desirable effects of competition surpass the negative effects, one 
might argue that public authorities might want to regulate rental markets in 
a way that increases competitive interaction between social and private land-
lords. 
A general caveat is that the two perspectives on performance are, of course, 
not entirely separable; If prices fall and quality remains the same, then the 
profitability of landlords would fall as well. Or the other way round, if land-
lords perform worse with regard to their social mission, we could assume that 
consumer satisfaction decreases as well (see Figure 5.1). However, for reasons 
of simplicity they are treated separately in this study. 
 5.3  The possible effects of competition in the 
mixed rental markets of Coventry and Breda
As outlined in the introduction to this chapter, the main aim of this section 
is to give the reader an idea of the landlord-level and market-level effects of 
competition by discussing the different performance aspects in the context 
of rental housing in Coventry/England and Breda/the Netherlands. As such, 
this section seeks to provide some answers to the main research question: 
What are the possible outcomes of competition in mixed rental markets with 
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regard to the performance of the various rental housing providers, on the 
one hand, and the benefits for consumers of rental housing and regulating 
authorities, on the other hand? Since, this study does not employ a system-
atic testing of the effects of competition, but rather uses a more descriptive 
and qualitative approach, the following statements should be considered as a 
first attempt to take a comprehensive look at the outcomes of competition in 
mixed rental markets. 
 5.3.1  Landlord-level effects 
Productivity 
For the social housing sector in England, Gibb and Maclennan (2006), as well 
as Gibb and Nygaard (2006) show that the introduction of a more pluralistic 
provision structure – that is the existence of private nonprofit housing as-
sociations, nonprofit public providers, as well as privately managed Arms-
Length Management organisations – may induce housing association man-
agers to operate more efficiently, mainly because they face hard budgets, as 
they become more dependent on private finance and a decreasing security 
of public funding. Similarly, in the Netherlands the elimination of direct ob-
ject subsidies for the management and production of social rental dwellings, 
and the introduction of the revolving fund financing system (see Chapter 2), 
has induced social housing managers to reduce the waste of resources (Prie-
mus, 2003b). These findings by other authors are supported by the interviews 
with social landlords in Coventry and Breda. Here, managers state that tight 
firm budgets and external pressures from local and national stakeholders de-
mand from them to use available resources to their most productive use in 
the sense that they have to develop and redevelop social housing estates at 
minimum costs given a required minimum quality of the dwellings them-
selves but also their management services. Most managers note that they see 
the risk to lose public support and also the support from internal superviso-
ry boards if they do not minimise the costs of development and service pro-
duction. 
These observations link to the question of how the entrance of numer-
ous profit-oriented landlords to the low-income rental sector can enforce 
these productivity pressures. On the one hand, one could speculate that the 
entrance of private developing companies could have some kind of learning 
effect for housing associations. It can be assumed that specialized developers 
have a competitive advantage above more traditional housing associations 
with regard to the expertise on building techniques and building standards, 
since their profit-oriented business models will see to a minimization build-
ing costs. If housing associations are able to mimic building practices from 
specialised developers, the attached process and product innovation mecha-
nisms are likely to increase the productivity of the developing arms of social 
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landlords as a whole. However, here it should be noted that this is a ques-
tion of the period we are looking at. Both in Coventry and Breda, as well as in 
the two countries, many housing associations have become large-scale devel-
opers of not only social housing estates but also of commercial real estate. 
Arguably, their expertise on modern production methods standards is on par 
with that of private developers, which means that the learning effect has long 
been completed. A similar thought is that social landlords in the two case 
study cities are confident that the activities in the commercial market seg-
ments can lead to experiences on how to run the social housing business 
at lower costs and giving them the knowledge to perform more successful-
ly in the market as a whole. Yet, the context from where housing associations 
are coming from should not be neglected. They were established as social 
landlords and often started as public organizations, or at least have a back-
ground as organizations relying on public funding in the last decades. There-
fore, it can be assumed that in the phase of entering commercial segments 
the knowledge on how to run a fully commercial business was relatively lit-
tle. This implies that a long-term learning process on how to achieve an opti-
mal balance between mission-related and profit-seeking rental activities, and 
thus optimize overall production modes in the rental market.
On the other hand, a maybe more evident effect of the entrance of private 
developers is that there are more genuine risks for social landlords to lose or 
not receive public subsidies.4 In the previous chapters it was described that in 
England all kinds of organizations can apply for social housing grants, while 
in practice local governments only have the choice between – and often pre-
fer – few locally operating housing associations when deciding which organ-
ization should receive public grants. This means that the incentives to deliv-
er a maximum amount of dwellings with a maximum quality for incumbent 
housing associations are relatively small. This problem becomes most appar-
ent in the Netherlands, where the failure to comply with local performance 
agreements has no significant consequences. If governments however active-
ly promoted the entrance of private sector companies by distributing direct 
and indirect public resources more equally, the productivity pressures on 
social landlords would increase. 
Abstracting from such government-induced performance improvements 
there is a general question on the productivity effects of large-scale entrance 
of private landlords in the low-income rental segment. In Chapter 2 it was 
described that small-scale landlordism in the UK has often been labelled as 
being a cottage industry. If this was true and if part-time individual landlords 
rather than professional individuals and companies entered the market, the 
efficiency enhancing effect of more competition would be questioned severe-
4 See the reference to Bennett et al. (2003) in Section 5.1.2.
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ly. A particular issue here is the role of housing allowances as the determi-
nant of the pricing decisions of private landlords. The interviews with social 
landlords in Coventry suggest that where maximum allowance payments de 
facto stipulate the rent level in the low-income sector, cost reducing manage-
ment practices are undermined, since a high level of returns is guaranteed. In 
other words, the efficiency improvements of the social housing sector might 
be mitigated by a lower efficiency in the private landlord segment, depending 
on which types of landlords enter the market. 
A final argument is that if we follow the assumption that one reaction to 
increasing competition an accelerating merger activity among housing asso-
ciations5, the remaining question is how these mergers affect the perfor-
mance of individual associations and the industry as a whole. In a recent 
paper, van Bortel et al. (2010) pick up this question and ask whether housing 
association mergers as experienced in the Netherlands and in England are 
a ‘change for the better’ with regard to service delivery, operating costs and 
housing production. Based on a literature review they conclude the increased 
scale in the association sector leads to mixed results. Large housing associ-
ations often benefit from economies of scale and economies of scope in the 
production and provision of social rental services, as well as services that 
complement these, as they are able to spread overhead to a larger housing 
stock, can operate in larger geographical areas, and can get favourable terms 
from lenders and suppliers (see also Mullins, 2006). These inherent advantag-
es mean that large landlords are able to produce relatively more homes and 
invest more in large-scale projects, such as the modernization of the hous-
ing stock to achieve a better energy efficiency. As a result, a more compet-
itive market as expressed in the existence of more and smaller suppliers – 
irrespective of whether these are nonprofit or for-profit landlords – might 
decrease the productivity of the sector as a whole. 
Profitability
The second element of landlord level-performance is the question of how 
profit levels might be influenced by competition between social and private 
landlords. In the low-income rental sector it seems that the profitability of 
housing associations is generally low and is strongly circumscribed by gov-
ernment policies. Indeed, both in England and the Netherlands there are no 
profits to be made with the provision of rental accommodation for house-
holds in need. In the English rental system, social housing rents are stipu-
lated by the rent formula (see Chapters 2 and 3), stipulating that they are on-
ly cost covering. In the Dutch case, it is more a process of self-regulation and 
5 Surely, competitive pressures are not the only reason why firms seek to merge and in a long-run perspective it 
is exactly these merger activities that lead to a less competitive market environment.
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a system of moderate rent setting and increases – which are often below the 
allowed maximum –, as well as high production cost that lead to zero, if not 
negative, profits in the provision of social housing. Under these circumstanc-
es, increasing competitive pressures can aggravate the low profitability of 
nonprofit housing associations’ operations in the low-income sector. Where 
housing associations are affected by the loss of tenants to private sector land-
lords – as can be observed in the English case – the interruption of continuous 
rent payments increases the costs of providing social housing, which in turn 
decreases financial returns in the long run. Conversely, this ties in with the 
notion of possible productivity improvements, since the prospect of financial 
losses through persistent vacancies form competitive pressures to improve 
practices on keeping tenancies stable and holding turnover rates low. 
Equally, from a private landlord’s viewpoint profitability in the low-income 
rental sector is also largely prescribed by government policies and regulation 
and whether it enables satisfying profit levels. This line of thought is gener-
ally supported by the experiences of affordable renting in England. In recent 
years, it was indeed an increasing number of private landlords that saw a 
profitable business in providing government supported low-income rental 
accommodation. The interviews with landlords indeed suggest that as long as 
housing allowances guarantee high rental yields they seek to increase their 
supply in this market segment. As soon as guaranteed incomes disappear or 
the competitive pressures from other private landlords prevail, they are pre-
pared to leave the market. In the Netherlands one can observe the reverse 
effect of government regulation. Landlords claim that government regulation 
and the unavailability of government subsidies means that the costs of pro-
viding accommodation in the regulated sector are too high to make satisfy-
ing profits. 
In the commercial, more expensive market segment, where rents are not 
regulated and market forces determine the allocation of resources, competi-
tion can arguably have a more direct effect on the profitability of all types 
of providers. Drawing on the statements of corporate investors in Breda and 
the published statements of their umbrella organisation in the Netherlands 
(IVBN, 2008) it can be noted that they regard the existence of nonprofit hous-
ing associations and their competitive strategies as a general problem for 
their own revenues in the deregulated market segment. Since housing asso-
ciations are able to impose asking rents that do not aim to maximize prof-
its and are thus considerably lower than the asking rents of for-profit land-
lords, their business model is seen as an inherent competitive advantage in 
the commercial market segment. From this viewpoint the call for abolishing 
what institutional investors consider an unlevel playing field is more of a call 
for diminishing competitive pressures in the deregulated market segment by 
keeping prices and consequently profitability levels high. This is not to say 
that institutional investors are not right when they say that government sup-
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port for the social housing activities of housing associations is leaking into 
their commercial activities (see above). Nevertheless, where the nonprofit 
business model is seen as the general problem rather than the alleged avail-
ability of government subsidies, the claim that housing associations should 
operate as profit maximisers and not as profit-oriented nonprofit organisa-
tions could be interpreted as a call for the complete abolishment of the com-
mercial activities of all social landlords. 
Social mission 
Throughout this chapter and the thesis in general it was pointed out that, 
ideally, the social mission circumscribes the activities of housing associations 
in the rental market. The question thus is how competition processes might 
affect this social mission. Generally, there is an easy case for arguing that 
there is no direct impact. More or less providers in the low-income rental seg-
ment, or a higher degree of product similarity between the services of social 
and private landlords should not have a direct effect on the social goals of the 
nonprofit providers. After all, the social mission is the very reason for their 
existence. Nevertheless, there are some unresolved issues about the effects 
of the increasing provision of more expensive commercial rental housing, as 
a reaction to increased competitive pressures and commercialization require-
ments, on the social business as a whole. 
Generally, and this holds true in both the English and the Dutch rent-
al system, the effects of housing associations’ commercial rental activities 
is a question of how these are organized and what the function of commer-
cial activities is. In other words, from a social welfare point of view the main 
question is whether stronger growth in commercial segments such as the 
construction of owner-occupied dwellings and in particular the provision of 
rental housing for households not in housing need has negative impacts on 
the main mission or task of the housing association. The empirical research 
in the previous chapters suggests some mixed findings. First of all, where 
housing associations operate in the more expensive rental market segments 
on a substantial scale (i.e. in Breda), their strategies aim at long-term profit 
making through the minimization of vacancy rates. The fact that competing 
private investors have substantially higher asking rents for similar accommo-
dation implies that short-term earnings could be increased through upward 
price adjustments; however, the focus on continuous rent streams in the long 
run means that cross-subsidization to the social renting sector can be stabi-
lized and the overall performance of the individual firm might be optimized. 
From this follows that when the market conditions are right, there can be a 
positive utility from providing commercial rental accommodation. 
However, the key question is how these activities are funded. The inter-
views with social landlords in Coventry and Breda propose that the hous-
ing associations’ reluctance to enter the commercial rental sector on a larger 
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scale mainly results from the concern that the provision of commercial rent-
ing could dry up the resources for the provision of social housing. Up until 
now, it seems that the provision of commercial rental housing has been rel-
atively successful for housing associations in Breda in the sense that reve-
nues were relatively high, which in turn allowed for high levels of cross-sub-
sidization. Yet, there are also concerns that the provision of private renting in 
the deregulated sector is becoming a second core business rather than a com-
plementary activity to the provision of social rental housing for low-income 
households. It remains to be seen how the balance between the social mis-
sion and the solely profit-oriented business segment evolves, once the lat-
ter is experiencing less flourishing times as it is doing now. Quoting a survey 
among housing association managers in the Netherlands, Priemus and Gruis 
(2011) provide some evidence that stronger budgetary constraints and wors-
ening market environments lead to cut backs in commercial housing invest-
ments. However, given the size of the sample (40 managers), this result can 
only be taken as a first indication. 
Another consequence of large-scale commercial activities is that the 
social housing activities of the housing associations might not be adequate-
ly noticed by the various stakeholders any longer; rather they might get the 
impression that social landlords mimic the business foci of profit-orient-
ed landlords. As a result, a general suspicion about the effective use of gov-
ernment subsidies and the public role of social landlords might occur. Par-
ticularly, in the Netherlands such discussions exist and have been spurred by 
what is perceived as an illegitimate use of public resources for the commer-
cial activities of housing associations (Conijn, 2005). The assessment of Brown 
(2010) that such an overtly strong commercial business orientation will “cause 
political headaches for advocates of the nonprofit sector” (p. 101), indeed 
seems to get momentum in the public discourse in the Netherlands.
With regard to the effects of competition on the social mission of nonprofit 
landlords in the low-income sector, one argument is that is that profit-orient-
ed landlords are often depicted in the housing literature as pursuing a cher-
ry-picking strategy, meaning that they seek to provide accommodation for 
the least risky households, even when they operate in the low-income sector 
(e.g. Priemus, 2003b). The entrance of a large number of profit-oriented land-
lords would thus mean that housing associations are left with an increasing-
ly residualized and more problematic customer base. However, this argument 
misses the point that ‘cherry picking’ could only be a successful strategy if 
profit-oriented landlords offered better products in this market segment. The 
housing literature does, however, not provide evidence that this is the case in 
reality; on the contrary, it is often the services of housing associations that 
tenants consider to be superior, mainly due to better maintenance stand-
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ards and tenancy stability.6 As we have seen in the previous chapter, private 
landlords do indeed seek to accommodate tenants from which they expect 
the least problems; however, this cannot be considered as a selection of ‘safe’ 
tenants because at the same time they are not actively seeking to convince 
social tenants to move to their accommodation, but rather accept (or do not 
accept) households that cannot find adequate accommodation in the social 
housing sector. 
 5.3.2  Wider market effects 
Price/quality relation
A first observation is that in the low-income market segments, where ab-
solute rent levels as well as rent increases are stipulated, as in the English 
case, or at least regulated, as in the Dutch case, more or less competition be-
tween social and private landlords does not have a direct impact on the price 
of rental housing consumption. Accordingly, a better affordability of rental 
housing services in the low-income market is not primarily subject to com-
petitive forces as such but to government decisions on how high rent levels 
should be. Theoretically, one would expect that under such conditions, com-
petition between all types of landlords would take place on quality levels, in 
the sense that only those landlords who provide the highest quality of the 
dwelling and the best quality of management/maintenance services, succeed 
in the market. This in turn would mean that quality is increased overall. How-
ever, this assumption is only valid in markets where there is more demand 
than supply, or at least a balanced relation exists. Indeed the interviews with 
private landlords in Breda and Coventry suggest that the incentive to gain a 
competitive advantage by offering relatively high quality services is relative-
ly low and one can observe quality shirking of private landlords in the low-in-
come segment as common behaviour. This is particularly the case in England, 
where housing allowance payments seem to provide landlords with a satisfy-
ing return, irrespective of how they perform as a quasi-social landlord. In the 
Netherlands, on the other hand, a low quality strategy of profit-oriented pri-
vate landlords is less obvious. It was said in the previous chapter that hous-
ing associations are increasingly pursuing a strategy in which relatively high 
quality dwellings are priced below the deregulation threshold, even though 
they could be offered in the deregulated segment. Against the background 
that the system of quality-based rent regulation makes low rent / low quali-
ty strategies for private landlords very unattractive, if not unfeasible, one can 
argue that private landlords are required to provide accommodation and rent-
6 This is a question that will be dealt with in the following chapter on tenants’ perceptions and moving inten-
tions. 
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al services that can match those of housing associations. However, given the 
higher costs of rental housing provision and production of private landlords 
– they are required to make profits and do not receive any government sub-
sidies – the number of potential entrants to the deregulated sector remains 
very low. 
A second line of thought concerns the commercial rental sector. It was said 
before that the nonprofit business model has allowed housing associations in 
Breda to enter the deregulated rental market segment with a comparably low 
rent strategy. Social landlords in Breda claim that even though their prices 
are lower, they do not shirk on quality at the same time, but apply the same 
management and service standards that are common in the social housing 
segment. As a result, their relatively lower rent levels put high pressure on 
profit-oriented corporate investors to provide high quality accommodation 
and high quality services at lower rents as well. From this we can conclude, 
that where genuine competitive processes take place – which is the case in 
the commercial private rental segment – consumer surplus in the market is 
increased. Conversely, where competitive forces are largely circumscribed by 
government decisions – i.e. in the low-income segment – the effect on aggre-
gate price and quality levels is less apparent. 
Output and consumer satisfaction
Arguably, the most obvious effect of increasing competition between so-
cial and private landlords is the increasing choice for the consumers of rent-
al housing services. In recent years, the association sector together with the 
regulators of social housing in England and the Netherlands have sought to 
introduce elements of choice in the what was a fully needs-based allocation 
system (see Chapters 2 and 3). The main idea is that introducing an element 
of choice in the allocation of social dwellings, gives tenants the possibility 
to select a dwelling that reflects their housing preferences best. This in turn 
leads to an optimal allocation of resources, since undesirable services are ne-
glected. However, it is questionable to what extent the element of choice is re-
ally effective in allocating the scarce social housing good in a more efficient 
way. It was explained in the previous chapter that in England and the Neth-
erlands the prioritisation of households in need means that it is almost im-
possible for them to move within the social housing sector and find accom-
modation that satisfies their preferences better when personal situations 
change. Here, the expansion of the provision of private profit-oriented land-
lords in the low-income sector could actually introduce an element of effec-
tive choice, since it gives dissatisfied tenants the possibility to exit the so-
cial housing sector. A necessary condition for this is, of course, that these ten-
ants are able to cover the additional rent that is to be expected when moving 
to the private rental sector, which again signifies the importance of housing 
allowance payments in making such a strategy of more choice in low-income 
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rental housing work. 
Another perspective on the topic is that in a purely choice-based allocation 
model, social rental housing would not only become the playfield of compe-
tition between providers but also between consumers, since those with the 
greatest need would not be prioritized any longer and the alternative would 
most likely be a first-come, first-serve model, putting households in need 
in an inferior position. In the Netherlands, where new rules in choice-based 
allocation have tried to strike a balance between choice and need, one could 
indeed observe that where the key objective of social housing is the provi-
sion of housing for those who cannot pay the market price, needs must be the 
dominant allocation principle (Oxley et al., 2008a).
In the commercial rental sector the research on landlord behaviour in the 
Netherlands has shown that consumer satisfaction might not be simply sat-
isfied by more output and thus a wider array of choice in the rental market. 
It is rather the output of improved or new dwellings that comes to the ben-
efit of consumers. In the interviews for this thesis, corporate investors stat-
ed that the entrance of housing associations with their relatively cheap and 
high quality housing stock has made the older parts of their housing portfo-
lios, mainly the multi-family units from the 1960s and 1970s, relatively unde-
sirable. As a result, many investors have decided to either dispose of these 
dwellings through sales and demolition or by investing in them to make them 
more desirable again. This means that in contrast to what might be expect-
ed when one looks at the number of added dwellings by housing associations, 
mixed market competition in the commercial rental sector does not neces-
sarily lead to a change in the total number of provided dwellings. Hence, it is 
rather the increasing quality than the sheer quantity that adds to the benefit 
of the consumer. 
 5.4  Quantifying the competition-performance 
relation 
Up until now, the effects of competition on the performance of mixed rent-
al markets have been explored from a merely qualitative viewpoint. In oth-
er words, rather than examining the actual effects of mixed market competi-
tion, some possible effects have been analysed. Here, a reference was made to 
findings of other housing studies on the performance of the rental sector on 
the one hand, and the findings of the empirical material on landlord conduct 
on the other hand. It can be argued that by choosing such a qualitative ap-
proach, the primary research focus was on the relation between the concept 
of conscious rivalry and the performance of the rental market as a whole, 
while the explicit references to the role of the government in shaping market 
outcomes has provided a first indication of the link running from market per-
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formance to market structure in the SCP of rental housing. Mainly due to da-
ta unavailability reasons, this study cannot provide a well-developed quanti-
tative analysis on how a more or less competitive market structure influences 
the performance of the market and individual suppliers directly. Accordingly, 
a test of the structure to performance hypothesis is not done here. Nonethe-
less, it seems meaningful to discuss how this question might be approached 
in research practice. 
It was pointed out in the introduction to this chapter that a simple way of 
analysing the competitive market-performance relation is to regress a proxy 
measure of the latter against a proxy measure of the former. In research 
practice, most studies have used a measure of profitability such as the total 
return on investment and compared this to the levels of supply concentra-
tion across different industries or across different geographic areas within 
the same industry. If one considered such an approach to be meaningful, a 
similar research design could be applied to the SCP of rental housing. Assume 
that we were interested in the effects of supply concentration on the profita-
bility levels of dominant housing associations in various local rental markets 
in one country. In line with the definition of supply concentration in Chap-
ter 3, one would need to consider two aspects: Firstly, the concentration of 
supply within the social housing industry; and secondly, the position of the 
housing associations within the whole rental market. For both items the Her-
findahl Index could be calculated, where the two items should be included 
separately in an applied statistical model. One could then look at the effects 
of the second item on a selective measure of profitability, while holding other 
structural (e.g. the overall demand pressure on the rental market) and behav-
ioural aspects (e.g. a measure of the degree of internal managerial efficiency) 
constant. 
Similarly, depending on which aspect of performance a researcher is inter-
ested in, this approach could also be used for, i.a., a measure of productivi-
ty, aggregate price levels in the whole rental market7, or even the impact of 
market concentration on the social efficiency of housing associations. Howev-
er, as simple as this sounds, there are apart from the question of data availa-
bility various problems with such a research design. 
First and foremost, one might argue that it is relatively easy to find a use-
ful indicator for measuring the economic performance of individual suppli-
ers. For instance, profits could be measured by total rates of return, while pro-
ductivity could be measured by individual vacancy rates. However, it seems 
inherently more difficult to find useful measures for assessing the social per-
formance of landlords, let alone a measure that can assess economic and 
social performance simultaneously. Indeed, Mullins et al. (2011) point out that 
7 For an example see Atterhög and Lind (2004).
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the search for such indicators is a continuous and unfinished endeavour. It 
can thus be doubted that any existing performance measure could be sim-
ply applied to such a research, but some tailor-made indicator would be nec-
essary. 
Secondly, as interesting as the question of the linear relation between 
mixed market supply concentration and specific performance levels seems 
to be, it can, of course, only partially reproduce the relation between struc-
ture and performance in the SCP of rental housing. It was argued through-
out this thesis that a perfectly competitive mixed market has different facets, 
where supply concentration is only one out of five aspects of market struc-
ture. Ideally, a quantitative model of market performance would include all 
these five aspects (supply concentration, spatial concentration within a local 
market, barriers to entry, barriers to access, and the price/quality relation) as 
independent variables; however, this would evoke further measurement prob-
lems. Both concentration measures, rent differentials, quality measure, and 
the demand/supply relation in the whole rental market are based on relative 
or absolute quantitative measures. In contrast, other aspects of market struc-
ture are qualitative by definition (e.g. policy-induced barriers to access con-
sumption and entry supply) and it seems to be inherently difficult to quantify 
them in a statistical sense. 
Thirdly, if one wanted to go as far as to assess the aggregate effect of the 
competitiveness of the rental market on an aggregate performance meas-
ure, the integration of individual quantitative indicators – assuming that this 
is possible – into one composite competitiveness indicator would be neces-
sary. However, it has been pointed out that these composites have their own 
weaknesses. Among other things, they tend to oversimplify complex relation-
ships, it is not self-evident how each underlying indicator should be evaluat-
ed and weighted, and the individual effects of single indicators on single per-
formance items cannot be reproduced and interpreted (Freudenberg, 2002). 
To conclude, in theory it does not seem to be very difficult to excogi-
tate possible ways of quantifying the structure to performance relationship, 
thereby giving a more comprehensive picture of the effects of competition in 
mixed rental markets. However, in applied research there are various unre-
solved issues about the feasibility of a comprehensive quantitative approach, 
which are mainly grounded in the design and integration of workable perfor-
mance and competition indicators. 
 5.5  Conclusions
In this chapter two key questions were explored. A first step was to give 
meaning to the term performance in the SCP of rental housing. By review-
ing the industrial organization, housing, and nonprofit literatures, the argu-
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ment was made that two different perspectives of performance need consid-
eration. On the one hand, firm-level effects are about the impact of competi-
tion between social and private landlords on the productivity and profitability 
of both types of providers, as well as its impacts on the social mission of so-
cial landlords. On the other hand, market effects of competition are defined 
as the impact of competitive processes on the price/quality relation of the 
services traded in the market and the level of consumer satisfaction, which 
is a proxy for allocative efficiency. Furthermore, the nonprofit literature pro-
posed a distinction between the possible effects of competition in the low-in-
come market segment, which is normally dominated by incumbent nonprof-
it social landlords, and the commercial rental market segment, in which non-
profit housing associations principally are new entrants. 
Utilizing the empirical findings of the previous chapter on landlord con-
duct and adding some insights from related housing research, the analyti-
cal framework of performance was then used to provide some first findings 
on the effects of competition on the performance of mixed rental markets. 
Unsurprisingly, the main finding is that depending on the specific circum-
stances competition can have positive as well as negative effects. It is bene-
ficial if competitive pressures from private landlords lead to higher produc-
tivity levels of housing associations. It was shown that in Coventry, but not 
in Breda, the competitive pressures from the low-income PRS induce social 
landlords to improve tenancy management and to keep turnover rates at a 
minimum level. Furthermore, the inclusion of a larger multiplicity of land-
lords and thus business approaches can lead to more consumer satisfaction, 
if tenants get more choices and opportunities in the market and can make 
those choices effectively. However, unfettered competition in the low-income 
rental segment can lead to the failure of housing associations, which would 
not be in the public interest if their role in the housing market exceeded the 
pure provision of rental housing in that they are major actors in community 
building and urban renewal processes – a role which would most likely not be 
adopted by for-profit private landlords. From a government’s viewpoint, effec-
tive competition could mean that competitive forces will see to a decrease 
in management slack and might result in a more efficient use of public sub-
sidies – most importantly, the mechanism of punishing bad performance 
through contract terminations or non-renewals could be identified here. The 
Dutch case is a good counterexample for this. Where local authorities do not 
have strong enforcing powers and cannot effectively penalise housing asso-
ciations’ failure to act in accordance with the local performance agreements, 
because they cannot turn to other, better providers, landlord-level perfor-
mance is likely to have suboptimal outcomes. 
In the commercial rental sector it was shown that the sheer existence of 
nonprofit housing associations in the commercial rental sector in the Neth-
erlands puts strong downward pressures on rent levels or upward pressures 
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on the quality levels of private profit-oriented investors. As a result, com-
petition between nonprofit and for-profit landlords in the commercial seg-
ment can increase social welfare overall as it comes to the direct benefit of 
the consumers. A condition that has to be met, however, is that competition 
takes place on a level playing field. The inherent cost advantage of the hous-
ing association seems to have a positive effect on the aggregate performance 
of the commercial rental industry; nonetheless, if housing associations are 
at the same time able to use public subsidies for their commercial activi-
ties, cost pressures on profit-seeking private landlords might become over-
whelming. Consequently, corporate investors and individual landlords might 
opt for exit strategies, with the result of a smaller or unchanged commercial 
rental housing stock overall, rather than trying to improve their price/qual-
ity bundles in a growing market. Finally, it was argued that increasing com-
petition in the commercial rental sector could have a negative effect on the 
social mission of the housing association sector. Succeeding in this market is 
a resource-demanding endeavour, which might divert funding from the social 
business to the commercial market segment. Some housing association in the 
Netherlands, including one case in Breda, seem to be taking this game to the 
extreme, through which they are in danger of losing sight of what their obli-
gations in the rental market actually are. 
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 6  Tenants’ willingness to 
substitute social and 
private rental services 
In the previous chapters of this thesis, the different facets of a competitive re-
lationship between social and private rented housing were explored with the 
original supply-side view of the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm in 
mind. Chapter 3 devised an analytical framework of the competitiveness of 
mixed rental housing markets and applied this framework to the case study 
cities of Coventry and Breda. In the previous two sections it was i.a. analysed 
how market structural aspects impact the actual competitive actions of so-
cial and private landlords (Chapter 4) and what the outcomes of more or less 
competitive markets might be (Chapter 5). It was shown that the degree of 
substitutability between the two rental services is a key aspect of a compet-
itive rental market and thus competitive interactions and market outcomes. 
The aim of this chapter is to add another perspective to the question of 
substitutability, because so far it has only been defined through observa-
ble product characteristics, such as absolute rent levels, quality characteris-
tics, attached property rights, regulation aspects. This does not mean, how-
ever, that this chapter seeks to refute the structural view on rental markets 
and its relevance for the relation between the two sectors. Yet, the argument 
here is that such a view needs to be conceptually broadened, since it neglects 
tenants’ willingness and ability to actually substitute social and private rental 
accommodation. Accordingly, this chapter is a deviation from the original SCP 
framework in that it gives special attention to the demand side in a market, 
where, again, the main argument is that substitutability is an endogenous 
concept, because it is not evident that social and private renting are homog-
enous products. In terms of the overall theoretical framework, in this chap-
ter the study moves to a meta-analytical level (see Figure 1.2), thereby giving 
this research on competition in mixed rental markets a more robust and far-
reaching perspective. 
If the behavioural, or better, psychological notion is added to the concept of 
substitutability, two additional aspects become relevant: Firstly, to get a bet-
ter understanding of whether the structural perspective on product similar-
ity actually matches the consumers’ perspective, tenants’ perceptions of the 
observable product characteristics should be examined. Secondly, it is not 
clear whether tenants, even if they consider social and private rental servic-
es to be substitutes, are willing and, maybe more importantly, able to con-
sume either rental service. Accordingly, two research questions will guide the 
analysis in this chapter: (1) What are tenants’ perceptions of and attitudes towards 
social and private renting?, How can these perceptions and attitudes be explained? 
and (2) How do these attitudes and perceptions, as well as personal circumstances 
influence tenants’ willingness to consume social and/or private rental services? 
Generally, substitutability is an abstract concept in the sense that it is hard-
ly imaginable that when households decide about which housing service to 
consume they will be thinking in terms of the degree of substitutability. How-
ever, much of what seems to be relevant when reconsidering the decision pro-
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cesses underlying the consumption of the two rental products relates to the 
concepts of tenure preferences and residential mobility. Where the former 
seeks to explain which factors determine a household’s decision on which 
kind of housing service they want to consume, the latter seeks to unfold the 
conditions under which a residential move takes and can take place, where 
the preferences a household holds is one defining factor of a decision to 
move. Consequently, in order to make the concept of substitutability more 
graspable and frame it in the context of decision-making in real rental mar-
kets, tenants’ tenure preferences and their intentions to move are used as 
proxy measures.
The research approach that has been chosen for this chapter is a cross-sec-
tional quantitative survey among rental households in Breda and social rent-
ers in Coventry (for information on the sampling procedures and data see 
Appendix C). A larger sample of respondents was seen as a better research 
strategy to explore and explain the perceptions of tenants on the two rent-
al sectors and their moving intentions within mixed rental markets. Howev-
er, the explanatory analysis is solely based on the survey among 825 social 
and private tenants the Dutch case study city, while a case study city com-
parison of the views and moving intentions of social renters in Coventry (162 
respondents) and Breda (519) is added in a second research step.1 According-
ly, the structure of the chapter is as follows. In the next chapter the analyti-
cal framework for the analysis of perceptions and moving intentions will be 
devised. Hereafter, Sections 6.2 and 6.3 will present the research result from 
testing this analytical framework through the survey among rental house-
holds in Breda. Section 6.4 will present the comparison between the social 
tenant samples in Coventry and Breda. The last section will present a brief 
summary of all research findings. 
 6.1  An analytical framework of tenants’ moving 
intentions in mixed rental markets
A decision to move, if it is by choice and not by force, helps households to 
meet their (changing) housing needs and preferences (Clark & Huang, 2004). 
Before a household moves it will be engaged in prolonged decision-making 
processes about, i.a., whether they should or should not move, to which kind 
of dwelling they should move, and where they should move. Generally, resi-
dential mobility can be regarded as a two-stage process, first the formation 
of an intention to move and second the accomplishment of the move, or the 
actual moving behaviour (Kley & Mulder, 2010). The pre-move thought does 
1 The reasoning for this approach is given in the beginning of Section 6.4. 
[ 149 ]
not necessarily coincide with considerations about changing the housing ten-
ure since households, due to specific circumstances in their socio-econom-
ic and/or demographic predispositions, might just seek to move to another 
neighbourhood or a bigger dwelling, but then within the same tenure form 
(Mulder, 1996). However, particularly when a decision to move overlaps with 
tenure change things start to get complicated, because each of the main three 
tenures is characterized by different attributes and functionalities, which ap-
peal to different groups of housing consumers and to the same individuals in 
different stages of their life (Di Salvo & Ermisch, 1997).2
One aspect of the formation of a moving intention thus is the decision on 
which type of housing to consume. A simplified account of the tenure choice3 
literature is the division into two main theoretical perspectives. On the one 
hand, formal economic models have focused on financial aspects of owning 
and renting, such as the relative costs of ownership versus rent payments, 
as explanatory factors of tenure preferences. The main assumption is that 
households choose the tenure that maximizes the household’s utility with-
in a given budget constraint. Demographic factors (e.g. household composi-
tion) affect tenure choice through changing socioeconomic status only and 
not through life cycle per se (Clark & Huang, 2004). On the other hand, soci-
ologists, demographers, and geographers argue that tenure preference, and 
consequently tenure choice, is not a simple investment and consumption 
decision but is linked with changes in the household situation and the hous-
ing market. Here, the importance of socioeconomic factors is recognized, but 
also demographic characteristics and trigger events occurring during the life-
course (e.g. a couple having a child) are significant factors for predicting ten-
ure choice (Andersen, 2011; Clark & Dieleman, 1996). Furthermore, this per-
spective has led to few publications that have tried to make sense of the ‘psy-
chological’ aspects, such as status and risk aversion, in these decision pro-
cesses (Ben-Shahar, 2007; Coolen & Hoekstra, 2001). 
The main reason for why the literature on tenure preferences does not pro-
vide an adequate theoretical model for this research is that it has almost 
exclusively focussed on the buying/renting cleavage (as exemplified by Ioan-
nides, 1987; Börsch-Supan & Pollakowski, 1990; Bourassa & Hoesli, 2010) and 
to a much lesser extent on choices and decision-making processes on rent-
ing socially or privately. Certainly, there is a plethora of studies that aim to 
describe the structure and functionality of social and private rental hous-
ing (Scanlon & Whitehead, 2007; Scanlon & Kochan, 2011), thereby reveal-
2 Arguably, these complications are particularly pronounced with regard to tenure change between buying and 
renting, since rental housing from a household’s viewpoint has only consumption attributes, while buying is also 
an investment decision (Haffner, 2003).
3 Tenure choice and tenure preferences are here used as synonyms.
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ing much about the roles of the two sectors and offering some implicit 
explanations of which factors might lead to the choice of private renting or 
social renting. Yet, with few exceptions (e.g. Di Salvo & Ermisch, 1997; Kemp 
& Keoghan, 2001), explicit research that tries to unfold the decision-making 
within the rental tenure is scarce. 
A second strand of the residential mobility literature, which is relevant 
here, is the cleavage between stated (tenure-) preferences and revealed (ten-
ure) preferences.4 A question that has attracted ample research is, when peo-
ple have a specific moving intention in the housing market, why is it seem-
ingly so difficult for many people to act on these intentions. Or in other 
words, why does the cleavage between moving intentions and actual mov-
ing behaviour exist? Here, it has been pointed out that real opportunities in 
the housing market and resources play a key role (Mulder & Hooimeijer, 1999). 
However, only in recent years have several studies succeeded to convincingly 
explain the existence of this cleavage through the use large-scale longitudinal 
samples and logistic regression modelling (e.g. de Groot et al., 2011a; de Groot 
et al., 2011b; Coulter et al., 2011; Kley & Mulder, 2010; Di Salvo & Ermisch, 1997; 
Kan, 1999).5
When explaining the theoretical relation between intentions and behaviour 
some of these studies refer to the reasoned action approach (RAA) of social 
psychologists Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen (2010, 1975)6, saying that behav-
4 From a methodological viewpoint the stated and revealed preference approaches have historically divided 
residential mobility studies into two camps, one where information on stated preferences is used to unfold 
households’ moving intentions in the future and one where information on revealed preferences, i.e. the cur-
rent housing situation, is used to understand actual moving behaviour in the past. Both approaches have their 
own weaknesses. The revealed preferences approach is based on the assumption that current tenure reflects the 
preferences of the household that existed when the moving decision was made in the first place. However, this 
neglects that the current dwelling might not fulfil a household’s desires and needs, and might only be occupied 
due to the lack of other opportunities. The stated preference method, on the other hand, does not necessarily 
take into account the possibilities for realizing such preferences; e.g. most households indeed have a preference 
for owner-occupied housing, but many are not able to realize this goal (de Groot et al., 2011a). As we will see, 
this study is in the tradition of the stated preference methodology.
5 The various studies put forward such explanations as unforeseen events/surprises, the strength of intentions, 
desire, and expectation, anticipated triggers of life events (e.g. new job, new education), resources and restric-
tions on a macro and micro level (income, current tenure – homeowners move less frequently, labour market 
position, household composition), local housing market opportunities (e.g. the availability of dwellings), as well 
as individual characteristics.
6 In the early stages of their work, Fishbein and Ajzen used the concept of Reasoned Action Approach, whereas in 
a later stage the model was called Theory of Planned Behavior. The main difference between the two models is that 
the latter predicts behavior that is not under volitional control of the person engaging in the behavior, which means 
that the theory of planned behavior integrates the aspects of perceived and actual control into the model (see text). 
However, in their most recent publication (2010) they extend their model with the person’s background factor (in-
cluding individual and socio-demographic criteria) and use the name ‘Reasoned Action Approach’ once again.
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ioural intention is the best predictor of actually performing the behaviour 
(see also Armitage & Conner, 2001; Sheeran, 2002; Godin & Kok, 1996). Never-
theless, what these residential mobility studies are missing is that the RAA 
model provides a holistic framework for understanding moving behaviour in 
that it allows for the integration of not only the relation between behaviour-
al intentions and actual behaviour, but – and more importantly for this study 
– it also presents a well-developed theoretical framework for understand-
ing how intentions are formed (Miller, 2011). It is this part of the theory that 
directly connects to the two research questions on the perceptions of the two 
rental housing sectors and the moving intentions between them. Even though 
it has not directly been applied as a conceptual framework to rental, it seems 
to be more suitable than the existing conceptual approaches in the residen-
tial mobility and tenure choice literature. 
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The reasoned action approach (RAA) of moving intentions in mixed rental 
markets
The main assumption of the RAA is that human social behaviour follows rea-
sonably and often spontaneously from the beliefs people possess about the 
behaviour under consideration – which would be in the case of this research 
the beliefs about renting a social or a private rental dwelling (see Figure 6.1). 
Generally speaking, beliefs are defined as the subjective probability that an 
object (renting socially, renting privately) has a certain attribute (e.g. is ex-
pensive, is secure, socially accepted, etc.). An example would be that a person 
might believe that living in a social dwelling (the object) increases the securi-
ty to stay in their dwelling on a long-term basis. Beliefs originate in a variety 
of sources, including individual traits (personality, general attitudes, values, 
past behaviour) and social backgrounds (income, age, gender, etc.). Beliefs are 
not innate to an individual, but they are formed and changed through activ-
ities in the real world. There are a large number of potentially relevant back-
ground factors, and it depends on the behaviour in question, which factors 
are relevant and which not. Relying on the cited literature on tenure prefer-
ences and mobility decisions, one can argue that the notion of moving re-
sources and restrictions in these literatures, closely relates to what is called 
background factors in the reasoned action model: age, gender, income, house-
hold composition, economic activity, current tenure, desire to buy, moving 
plans, housing satisfaction. These are all factors that have been described 
as good predictors of tenure preferences and moving behaviour (e.g. Clark & 
Huang, 2002; van Ham & Clark, 2009; de Groot et al., 2011). 
Irrespective of how beliefs are acquired, they serve to guide the decision 
to perform or not perform the behaviour in question. Three kinds of beliefs 
are distinguished. Behavioural beliefs are about the assumed positive or neg-
ative consequences of engaging in the behaviour. These outcome beliefs are 
assumed to determine the person’s general attitude towards the behaviour. 
Following Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p. 76), attitude in this study is understood 
as “a latent disposition or tendency to respond with some degree of favorable-
ness to a psychological object.” It is important to note the bipolar evaluative 
dimension of attitude, ranging from a negative through a neutral to a positive 
disposition. Also, it might not be helpful to understand attitude as the evalu-
ative response in itself, but it is more of a hypothetical disposition, which can 
be inferred from other evaluative responses (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). This sim-
ply means that individuals mainly do not think in terms of attitudes (such as 
“my attitude towards this is like that”) but intermediate constructs are pre-
sent (“I do not like this, because of that”).
People also form beliefs about whether important individuals, groups, or 
members of society would approve of their behaviour (i.e. injunctive norm) 
and whether these people engage in similar behaviour and can thus serve as 
a positive or negative example (descriptive norms). Together these normative 
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beliefs determine the perceived norms of a person to engage in the behaviour. 
In the context of rental housing a descriptive norm would mean that a tenant 
would perceive social pressure to live or not to live in a social/private rental 
accommodation, because his friends, family, and other influential people live 
in social/private rental accommodation as well. Injunctive norms, on the oth-
er hand, concern the question of whether a friend, family member, or other 
influential people would support the individual in his decision to rent social-
ly or privately. 
Finally, people hold beliefs about their personal dispositions and environ-
mental factors that facilitate or inhibit them in engaging in the behaviour. 
In their aggregate, these control beliefs form a high or low level of perceived 
behavioural control, which can be understood as a concept measuring the 
influence of such different aspects as choice, autonomy, and self-efficacy7, 
which is a person’s belief to succeed in a given situation (Bandura, 1997). The 
contention here is that the concept of perceived behavioural control incorpo-
rates resources/restrictions as well as environmental opportunities and con-
straints into the prediction of behavioural intentions, which are presented 
as important factors in the tenure preference and residential mobility liter-
atures. In the reasoned action approach in general but in our context in par-
ticular, perceived control seems to have a crucial position. It is reasonable to 
assume that if people do not think they have control over moving to either 
social or private renting, they may not form the intention to do so in the first 
place, even if they hold positive attitudes towards either rental sector and 
perceive equal societal pressure to rent a social or private rental dwelling. 
Once attitudes towards, perceived norms of and perceived control over 
engaging in certain behaviour have been formed they can lead to the forma-
tion of a behavioural intention – the readiness to perform the behaviour. The 
general rule is that the more positive attitudes, and the stronger perceived 
norms and perceived control, the more likely a person is to hold the behav-
ioural intention in question. From a statistical viewpoint, various studies have 
shown that the three determinants of intentions almost never carry similar 
statistical weights. However, Fishbein and Ajzen (2010) convincingly argue 
that this does not challange the theory as a whole, but just emphasizes that 
the relative importance of each item depends on the behaviour and popula-
tions that are analysed. 
The intentions formed in this fashion can then be used to predict whether 
a person engages in the behaviour; again, the stronger the intention the more 
likely the performance of the behaviour. There is, however, no contingent link 
between the two factors, since there might be a lack of resources (including 
7 Some authors argue that there are specific differences between the concepts of perceived behavioural control 
and self-efficacy. For an extensive discussion on this issue the reader is referred to Armitage and Conner (2001).
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skills, financial resource) or the presence of environmental constraints that 
can impede a person from acting on their intentions. This means that indi-
viduals may lack actual control over the performance of behaviour. Volition-
al (actual) control is assumed to moderate the intention-behaviour relation, 
i.e. if they have enough actual control, intention should be a good predictor of 
actual behaviour8.
Deviations from the original RAA theory 
In general, the reasoned action approach serves as a theoretical framework 
for analysing the perceptions of social and private renting – including atti-
tudes, perceived norms, and perceived control – and moving intentions of 
tenants within rental markets. Nevertheless, there are some aspects that 
should be seen as a deviation from the original model, which means that in 
the end there is no possibility to make all-encompassing conclusions on the 
validity of the RAA theory in rental housing markets. 
First and foremost, as this study relies on cross-sectional data, this chap-
ter actually focuses solely on tenure-specific moving intentions rather than 
on actual moving behaviour. This means that the study cannot exactly pre-
dict tenure-specific moving behaviour from intentions, since we lack informa-
tion on whether a move is performed, which in turn implies that the analysis 
of actual control would remain speculative. Therefore, it should be clear that 
the exclusive focus on behavioural intentions falls short of understanding the 
whole process of actual tenure change within rental housing. Nonetheless, 
given the main aim of this chapter – i.e. to achieve a better understanding of 
the conditions under which tenants are willing to substitute social and pri-
vate rental services – a lack of data on actual moves is relatively unproblem-
atic. Also, using the concept of perceived behavioural control arguably covers 
many aspects of whether a household could actually move between the two 
sectors, or more precisely whether a household can consume both rental ser-
vices.9
Secondly, intentions and behaviour relate to the process of moving with-
in the rental market, whereas beliefs relate to the notion of consuming either 
rental service (i.e. living in a social or private rental dwelling). Arguably this 
deviates from the original theory in that beliefs, perceptions, intentions and 
behaviour should measure the exact same aspect. However, it seems reason-
8 In most cases of applied research there is however a lack of information about all internal and external factors 
that might inhibit or support the effectuation of a given behaviour. In this case, perceived control can be used as 
a proxy, since often, but certainly not always a person’s perception of their control is a relatively realistic reflec-
tion of actual control (Armitage & Conner, 2001).
9 The remaining question then is how realistic perceived control is in relation to actual control. However, this 
question cannot be answered in the context of this research.
[ 155 ]
able to integrate the concepts of consumption of a rental service and the ten-
ure-specific intention to move into one framework, since measuring beliefs 
about actual moves might distort the outcomes. Moving to other accommo-
dation is normally not a goal in itself; it is rather the action that is performed 
to achieve a desired or preferred living condition (Goetgeluk, 1997). Therefore, 
moving behaviour is a synonym for tenure change, where beliefs and percep-
tions focus on the consumption aspect and thus remain on a high level of 
generality, rather than examining the specific moving event.
Thirdly, in contrast to the original model in which an individual can take a 
decision between engaging in the behaviour in question or not engaging in it, 
this study uses the RAA to analyse whether an individual intends to engage 
in one behaviour (moving to a social rental dwelling) or the other (moving to 
a private rental dwelling). This has two implications: On the one hand, dif-
ferent beliefs, attitudes, norms and control always relate to one of the two 
objects – e.g. beliefs about the quality of social rented dwellings as well as 
beliefs about the quality of PRS dwellings, which arguably adds a higher lev-
el of complexity to the research. On the other hand, it is generally not helpful 
to regard rental housing markets as closed systems, and it is, of course, true 
that many renters rather than holding a preference for rental housing would 
prefer to move to an owner-occupied dwelling in reality or do not intend to 
move at all. Equally, decisions about moving do not necessarily relate to ten-
ure choice, but they might be mainly about, i.a., preferred neighbourhoods, 
the type of dwelling. However this thesis is primarily interested in the rela-
tion between social and private renting and thus seeks to understand tenure-
specific mobility decisions and choices within the rental sector. Consequent-
ly, the research abstracts from certain complexities and thus presents a sim-
plified model of tenure-specific moving intentions.
That being said, the following three sections present the research results 
on tenants’ attitudes towards and perceptions of social and private renting 
in Breda (Section 6.2), tenants’ moving intentions within the rental market 
in Breda (Section 6.3), the descriptive comparison of social renters’ attitudes 
towards and perceptions of the two rental sectors and their tenure-specific 
moving intentions in the case study cities. The conclusions will then reflect 
on the implications of the theoretical and methodological deviations from the 
original RAA model. 
 6.2  Tenants’ perceptions of and attitudes to-
wards social and private renting in Breda 
This section deals with the first set of research questions: What are tenants’ 
perceptions of social and private renting? How can these perceptions be explained? 
For this the survey among social and private tenants in Breda is analysed. 
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Generally, the theoretical and methodological approach in this section is 
close to the original RAA model in that it seeks to describe behavioural, nor-
mative, and control beliefs – i.e. tenants’ views on the alleged attributes of so-
cial and private rental housing, and how the separate belief types together 
with an individuals’ background characteristics can predict attitudes towards, 
perceived norms of, and perceived control over social and private renting (see 
Figure 6.1). The section begins with a description of which independent and 
dependent variables were used and how they were composed. Secondly, the 
statistical approach is explained. Hereafter, the results of the survey analysis 
are presented and the some conclusive remarks on the research questions are 
given. 
 6.2.1  Dependent and independent variables 
Background factors (independent variables)
Based on the findings of the housing literature on tenure preferences and 
tenure-specific moving behaviour, the following socio-demographic and 
housing related-background factors are used as predictors in the various 
models (see top box in Figure 6.1): Age (continuous), gender (categorical dum-
my), income (three categories: below €1,850; between €1,850 and €2,650; more 
than €2,650 of net household income per month), main source of income (two 
categories: from employment; not from employment), household composi-
tion (three categories: single-person household; multi-person without chil-
dren; multi-person with children) are used as socio-demographic criteria. 
Current tenure (four categories – social tenant; private tenant renting with a 
private landlord in the deregulated sector; private tenant renting with a hous-
ing association in the deregulated sector; private tenant renting with a pri-
vate landlord in the regulated sector), experience with social renting/experi-
ence with private renting (two categories: yes; no), housing satisfaction (ordi-
nal Likert scale10 from very unsatisfied to very satisfied) are used as housing-
related background factors. Further explanations for all of these variables are 
provided in Appendix C. 
Behavioural beliefs (independent variables)
Again, behavioural beliefs are about the assumed positive or negative conse-
quences of engaging in certain behaviour, thereby determining the person’s 
general attitude towards the behaviour. Most studies that apply the reasoned 
action approach measure behavioural beliefs on seven-point graphic scales 
with endpoints such as disagree-agree, unlikely-likely or true-false (see Fran-
10 See Likert (1932). 
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cis, 2004). Which behavioural beliefs should be examined? There are sever-
al possibilities to select salient behavioural beliefs about attitudes towards a 
subject. Here, the idea is to make a reference to the observable product at-
tributes of social and private rental housing as presented in Chapter 3. Ac-
cordingly, the questionnaire asked tenants about the following attributes: 
the quality of dwellings, the quality of location, rent levels, the availability of 
dwellings, variability of the housing stock, security of tenure (including se-
curity against high rent increases), maintenance standards by landlords and 
the service of landlords. An additional belief that was not included before is 
the level of social problems in the sector.11 For each of these nine attributes a 
positively formulated proposition was given to which tenants should express 
how unlikely/likely they find the situation.12 Two examples are: 
The quality of social rental dwellings is high 
Unlikely 1         2         3         4         5         6         7      Likely
The quality of private rental dwellings is high 
Unlikely 1         2         3         4         5         6         7      Likely
Social tenants often cause social problems or disturbances
Unlikely 1         2         3         4         5         6         7      Likely
Private tenants often cause social problems or disturbances
Unlikely 1         2         3         4         5         6         7      Likely
Fishbein and Ajzen (2010) argue13 that rather than looking at only the prob-
ability of whether the belief that the object has a certain attribute, assess-
ing attitudes should include the evaluation of these attributes as well. For ex-
ample, in addition to measuring the strength of respondents’ approval to the 
proposition that a social rental dwelling is of high quality, it should have been 
asked whether tenants think that living in a dwelling with a high quality is 
good or bad for them. Additionally, other authors (e.g. van Harreveld et al., 
2000) have proposed that that some beliefs are more important than others 
for attitude. Accordingly, each attribute should be related to its importance. 
This would have required a question about the importance of quality when 
selecting a new rental dwelling. Ideally, all three aspects should be included 
in the statistical model.
11 The idea here was to include a subjective belief that can reveal the levels of discrimination shown by the re-
spondent.
12 See Appendix C (questionnaire design) for a more comprehensible overview.
13 Actually, the RAA theory contends that only when examining behavioural belief strength and the correspond-
ing outcome evaluation, we are able understand the attitudes of people towards a given object of behaviour, an 
argument that is supported by ample research on the topic (see e.g. Armitage & Conner, 2001).
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However, this study deviates from the practice of the RAA model in the way 
that respondents were not asked to evaluate the outcome of the belief, but 
only to evaluate how important each of the nine attributes is to them on a 
one to seven scale with the endpoints very unimportant (= 1) and very impor-
tant (= 7). The rationale for using importance of an attribute but not the out-
come evaluation of the same attribute in explaining attitudes had mainly 
pragmatic reasons. The questionnaire was already relatively long and com-
plex. Accordingly a choice needed to be made between the two. In the end, 
importance was chosen since it was assumed to be more informative. The 
assumption here was that if, for instance, respondents state that securi-
ty of tenure is very important for their decision of renting or not renting a 
certain dwelling, and given that the same respondent ascribe higher securi-
ty of tenure to social renting, then we can expect that this respondent has 
a more positive attitude towards social renting than private renting and all 
else being equal14 ultimately has stronger intention to move to a social rental 
dwelling. However, during the statistical examination it turned out that using 
belief strength alone led to better regression results with regard to parsimony 
and the explained variance (for similar outcomes see Gagné & Godin, 2000). 
Accordingly, the results that include the importance of attributes are not pre-
sented here. 
Attitudes towards social and private renting (dependent variable)
If one accepts the notion that attitudes have a bipolar evaluation dimen-
sion, the main challenge when measuring such attitudes is to obtain a score 
that represents a person’s position on a bipolar scale. Here, a widely used ap-
proach is the sematic differential method by Osgood et al. (1957), in which re-
spondents of a questionnaire are asked to rate the attitude object through 
different labels on several seven-point evaluative semantic differential scales. 
In this study respondents were asked to evaluate the following aspects of so-
cial and private renting on bipolar seven places scales with four as a neutral 
value. 
I find living in a social rental dwelling
bad     1         2         3         4         5         6         7      good
unpleasant   1         2         3         4         5         6         7      pleasant
disadvantageous  1         2         3         4         5         6         7      advantageous
boring     1         2         3         4         5         6         7      fun
negative    1         2         3         4         5         6         7      positive
14 The value of the beta coefficients of individual predictors in the regression models is always only valid under 
the assumption that every other predictor is held constant. This is meant when using the terms ‘all else being 
equal’ or ‘ceteris paribus’. These terms will not be used when describing all predictors in all models, but they 
should be understood as being present.
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The same design was then applied to measure a respondent’s general attitude 
towards private renting. 
The internal consistency of the five items was tested with Cronbach’s coef-
ficient alpha (Cronbach, 1951) for attitudes towards social and attitudes 
towards private renting respectively. Based on the very high coefficient alphas 
(.944 for social renting and .955 for private renting), it can be said that the five 
separate items together form reliable scales.15
 For both sectors the mean across the five items was then taken as a mea-
sure of the person’s attitudes. Due to the very high inter-item correlations, 
it was decided that cases were excluded only when all five items were miss-
ing.16 The general attitudes of a person towards private renting and social 
renting, including all five items, will be labelled as positive (the average of 
the items is above 4.0), neutral (equals 4.0) or negative (below 4.0), primari-
ly because the positive/negative dichotomy is arguably the broadest semantic 
concept of the five items. 
Normative beliefs (independent variables)
Similar to the relation between attitudes and salient behavioural beliefs, the 
RAA model assumes a positive link between salient normative beliefs and 
perceived norms (or perceived social pressure). To repeat, a distinction is 
made between injunctive norms, which are beliefs about whether important 
individuals, groups, or members of society would approve of a given behav-
iour, and descriptive norms, which determine whether these people engage 
in similar behaviour and can thus serve as a positive or negative example. 
In this study, only injunctive norms are considered, mainly because the as-
sumption that a person rents a social dwelling or a private dwelling because 
important others do so as well is not plausible. 
15 It should be mentioned that the label disadvantageous and advantageous in the private rental category devi-
ated stronger from the other labels than every other. The inter-correlation value was with 0.75 lower than the 
.85 to .95 values of the other items, where the deletion of the disadvantageous/advantageous item would have 
increased the  α  coefficient to 0.966. In non-statistical terms, respondents less often see private renting as an ad-
vantageous housing option than as, for instance, a good or positive option. Nonetheless, the approach here was 
to leave all five items in the total scale, mainly because the increase of α was only marginal. 
16 For attitudes about the social rented sector, 83 per cent of all respondents filled in all five items, while 11.8 
per cent did not supply an answer at all. Three per cent of all respondents supplied an answer for only one of 
the five items. With regard to the PRS the missing cases rate was higher (20.4 per cent), while the ‘one-item re-
sponse’ was about the same as in the social rental sector (4.6 per cent). The group that gave an answer to all five 
items was by far the largest with 71.5 per cent. To increase the reliability of this approach, Cronbach’s alpha was 
also calculated for those respondents who provided answers to all five answers only. Here, we could see that the 
alpha scores were very similar for both cases – in the PRS a difference of -.008 and in the social rented sector a 
difference of -.005.
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Moreover, injunctive normative beliefs only differ from perceived norms in 
that they define specific referent persons or groups rather than using a gener-
al social agent. Since the questionnaire did not ask for the influence of specif-
ic individuals, such as parents, siblings, friends or colleagues, on the respond-
ent’s decision-making processes, this study only applies a direct measure 
of perceived norms rather than measuring injunctive normative beliefs. As 
a result, the statistical examination of possible explanations for perceived 
norms of social and private renting do not include beliefs as independent var-
iables but only the various background factors. 
Finally, in line with the measurement of behavioural beliefs and outcome 
evaluation, Fishbein and Ajzen (2010) argue that it is equally important to 
consider an individual’s motivation to comply with the views of these groups. 
This suggests that the researcher should look at the interaction of norma-
tive belief strength and motivation to comply. Accordingly, it was tested in 
the statistical examination whether the addition of the opinions of influen-
tial others is considered as important when selecting a new dwelling. How-
ever, the addition of motivation to comply did not lead to better results with 
regard to parsimony and the explained variance and was thus omitted from 
the analysis. 
Perceived norms of social and private renting (dependent variable)
The scale variables perceived norm of social renting and perceived norm of 
private renting were constructed from the mean of the following two survey 
questions:
As a social tenant you are afflicted with a negative and discriminating reputation
Disagree 1         2         3         4         5         6         7      Agree
As a private tenant you are afflicted with a negative and discriminating reputation
Disagree 1         2         3         4         5         6         7      Agree
People who are important to me would think it is fine if I lived in a social rental 
dwelling 
Disagree 1         2         3         4         5         6         7      Agree
People who are important to me would think it is fine if I lived in a social rental 
dwelling 
Disagree 1         2         3         4         5         6         7      Agree
Again the internal consistency of the two items was investigated with Cron-
bach’s alpha. Relatively low scores in both sectors led to the decision to not 
include cases where one of the two items was missing. Furthermore, to be 
able to combine the two items in a meaningful way, the results of the first 
item were reversed. Accordingly, for both items higher numbers meant posi-
tive answers of the respondent. 
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Control beliefs (independent variables)
Control beliefs can generally be subdivided into internal and external factors, 
where the former correspond with the personal resources of the respond-
ent and the latter to the environmental opportunities. Three salient control 
beliefs are used in the models of perceived control over renting socially and 
renting privately. Firstly, the influence of landlords’ allocation policies on ten-
ants’ abilities to move to the sector is primarily an external factor, since the 
allocation system is not in the hands of tenants. However, for the social rent-
ing model internal resources play a role as well, since tenants can or cannot 
have enough waiting time to access a specific dwelling. Secondly, respond-
ents were asked whether they perceive the transaction costs that they face 
when moving to a social or private rental dwelling is seen as a barrier to 
move. Arguably this is mainly about the internal (financial) resources of the 
tenant; however the level of transaction costs is defined by suppliers and can 
thus also be seen as an environmental constraint. Finally, respondents’ per-
ception of whether they have the financial means to enter the private or so-
cial rental sector is clearly an internal resource or restriction to move to so-
cial or private renting. Interestingly, and arguably a specific trait of this re-
search is that financial resources can have different meanings in the two 
rental sectors. Where the proposition ‘my financial resources allow me rent 
privately’ (seven-places scale, disagree/agree as endpoints) clearly asks for 
ability to cover the rent, the same proposition in the social rental sector can 
also imply that the respondent’s income is possibly too high to access the so-
cial rented sector.
The RAA model stipulates that a researcher interested in control beliefs 
should measure both the belief strength of the factor as well as the power 
of the factor (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). In practice, this was done for all con-
trol beliefs, by asking the respondent, for instance, how important addition-
al costs (e.g. deposits or a letting agent fee) are when renting a new dwelling. 
However, similar to behavioural beliefs and normative beliefs, including the 
power of control beliefs did not increase the explanatory power of the mod-
el, neither as individual variables nor as an interaction term with the corre-
sponding control belief. Therefore they are not presented in the models below. 
Perceived control (dependent variable)
The distinction between perceived control and control beliefs is that the for-
mer applies a direct measure of perceived control over engaging in the behav-
iour, whereas the latter examine specific aspects of the direct control meas-
ure. Measuring perceived control should therefore aim to probe for one con-
cept that can comprise the variety of specific aspects. In the questionnaire, 
respondents were thus asked to evaluate their agreement with the following 
proposition. 
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It is easy for me to move to a social rental dwelling if I wanted to
Unlikely 1         2         3         4         5         6         7      Likely
It is easy for me to move to a private rental dwelling if I wanted to 
Unlikely 1         2         3         4         5         6         7      Likely
 6.2.2  Statistical methods 
The empirical analysis contained a descriptive part and a multivariate anal-
ysis. To answer the first research question on the differences between the 
views of tenants on social rented housing and their views on private rent-
ing, the two sectors are compared for behavioural beliefs, injunctive norma-
tive beliefs and control beliefs (see Table 6.1), as well as general attitudes, per-
ceived norms and perceived control (see Table 6.2) through a paired-samples 
t-test analysis (Sirkin, 1995). 
To be able to explain differing attitudes towards and the perceptions of the 
two rental sectors, multiple linear regression modelling (Cohen, 1968) was 
applied. For both social and private renting, attitudes were regressed on back-
ground factors and the nine behavioural beliefs (Models 1 and 2 in the next 
section; see Table 6.3). Perceived norms were regressed only on background 
factors – as explained, norms were only measured directly (Models 3 and 4 
in Table 6.4). Perceived control over social renting and private renting were 
regressed against all background factors and the three control beliefs (Mod-
els 5 and 6 in Table 6.5). This led to a total of six linear multivariate regres-
sion models. Hierarchical regression was applied in order to control for the 
separate effects of background factors and beliefs on the three independent 
variables. Step 1 included all background factors, while Step 2 added the ten-
ure-specific beliefs. This was done to be able to measure the separate effect 
of behavioural beliefs. All variables were included with the entry method. For 
most questions, tenants were provided with a ‘don’t know’ category. Given the 
complexity of the questions/propositions regarding perceptions and attitudes 
(as well as moving intentions in the next step), it is unsurprising that particu-
larly here the ‘don’t know’ category was used quite frequently. For all depend-
ent and independent variables, the ‘don’t know’ category was treated as a 
missing case in the regression models. As a result, (including logistic regres-
sion on tenure specific moving intentions – see below) N was smaller in the 
regression models than the overall sample size of 825 participants. Neverthe-
less, the relatively high number of missing cases appears to be unproblemat-
ic, since bivariate analysis of comparing respondents and missing cases on all 
relevant socio-demographic and housing-related characteristics (not shown 
here) suggests that the regression sample reflects the overall sample well. 
From the reasoned action approach the following hypotheses are derived: 
The nine behavioural beliefs about social (private) renting have a strong pos-
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itive effect on general attitudes towards social (private) renting. The way the 
propositions were put in the questionnaire means that for the three attrib-
utes rent levels, low availability, and presumptions about antisocial behav-
iour, a negative correlation coefficient is hypothesised. Furthermore it is 
hypothesized that there is a positive effect of control beliefs on perceived 
control, both in the private and in the social rented sector. Due to the word-
ing of the propositions a negative correlation coefficient is assumed for the 
allocation rules of landlords as a barrier to consuming private or social rent-
al services and the additional costs when moving to a social or private rented 
dwelling. For the various background factors no hypotheses were made, but 
an exploratory approach was used. However, it could be argued that a positive 
effect of current tenure on attitudes and perceptions seems intuitive. 
 6.2.3  Results 
Descriptive results
The following subsection presents the descriptive and multivariate results of 
tenants’ attitudes towards and perceptions of social and private renting. Ta-
ble 6.1 shows the test statistics (paired samples t-test) for the nine behaviour-
al, the two injunctive normative beliefs, and the three control beliefs. Gen-
erally, it can be seen that the attributes that tenants ascribe to the two rent-
al sector differ significantly in their strength, where the quality of social and 
private rental dwellings and the acceptance of important others of the two 
rental tenures are the exceptions. There are, however, certain aspects where 
the mean of differences is particularly high. Firstly, tenants ascribe high ab-
solute rent levels to the private rental sector and comparably low rent levels 
to social renting. Secondly, respondents expect that it takes long before they 
could get a social dwelling (i.e. low availability), where the opposite is true for 
private renting. These two items largely confirm the ascribed roles of social 
and private renting in the literature (Scanlon & Whitehead, 2008; Scanlon & 
Kochan, 2011). Thirdly, tenants expect less choice in the social than in the pri-
vate rental sector. Fourthly and interestingly, social landlords are perceived to 
have both better maintenance standards and landlord services. On the oth-
er hand, respondents expect social tenants more often to show antisocial be-
haviour and they see the quality of private renting locations as higher. The 
fact that security of tenure is perceived to be relatively high with little differ-
ences between the two tenures, most likely reflects the strong property rights 
tenants savour in both the regulated and deregulated rental market segments 
in the Netherlands (see Elsinga et al., 2009). 
Comparing normative beliefs about the two rental sectors suggests that 
stigmatization from relatives and friends, as well as wider society seems to 
be relatively weak, with a slightly more negative image of the social sector 
though. The strength of control beliefs differ substantially, particularly with 
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regard to the self-efficacy of being in a situation in which households can 
afford living in a social or a private rental dwelling. Finally, it could be said 
that there is a surprisingly small gap between the perceived effects of land-
lords’ allocation procedures on one’s own control to rent a social or private 
dwelling. We would have expected the perceived allocation barrier to be much 
stronger in social than in private renting. 
Considering that the mean of differences between the two sectors is rel-
atively small for many belief items, one might presume that the difference 
between general attitudes, perceived norms and perceived control are not 
strongly pronounced. However, as one can see in Table 6.2, this only holds 
true for perceived norms; here, respondents indeed ascribe only a slight-
ly better imago to private renting. The differences for perceived control are 
not strongly pronounced as well (mean of difference is 0.61), but overall it can 
be seen that perceived control over renting socially is positive on average, 
whereas it is slightly negative in the private rental sector. This pattern can 
also be observed for attitudes towards social and private renting. There are 
large differences between the two sectors, where general attitudes towards 
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social renting are highly positive, but slightly negative for private renting – 
it should be noted again that the dichotomous grade scale from 1.0 to 7.0 
means that 4.0 can be regarded as a cut point. 
Multivariate analysis
The following step was to analyse the influence of background factors and 
beliefs on each of the six outcome variables (attitudes towards social/private 
renting, perceived norm of social/private renting, perceived control over social/
private renting) through multiple linear regression. Tables 6.3 to 6.5 show the 
beta coefficients, the standard error and the standardized coefficients of each 
parameter, as well as the R2 – i.e. how much of the variance of the outcome 
variable is explained by the predictors – value including the improvement of 
the model when adding beliefs (ΔR2). Each model was controlled for multi-
collinearity among predictors as well as the patterns and influence of stan-
dardized residuals (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999). For attitudes towards so-
cial housing and attitudes towards private renting models, collinearity statis-
tics suggest that there is multicollinearity17 between behavioural beliefs about 
maintenance and service of landlords18. There are some outliers with regard to 
standardized residuals in the attitudes towards social housing model – 2.2 per 
cent of the cases have a Standard Residual of > 2.5, 8 outliers with a Standard 
Residual of > 3. However, Cook’s distance19 for these cases was well below 1, 
thus none of the cases had a disproportionate influence on the model. 
Attitudes 
Model 1 in Table 6.3 shows the results for attitudes towards social renting. 
Background factors alone can explain a moderate 17.1 per cent of the out-
come variable. Among all parameters, four are found to be significant. Eve-
ry other variable held constant, increasing income (as measured by income 
groups) has a negative relation with the attitudes towards social renting. 
17 Multicollinearity is a situation in which two or more variables are closely linearly related.
18 This assessment is based on high (> 50) variance decomposition proportions for both variables on the same 
eigenvalue (for an explanation see Kallaghan & Chen, 2008). The meaning of this is that the outcome of either 
one of the two variables is influenced by the other and that their influence in the model is smaller that if only one 
had been included.
19 Cook’s distance is a measure of the overall influence of a case on the model. It is suggested that a value of 
greater than 1 may be a case for concern.
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Housing satisfaction has a positive effect, which could signify that if tenants 
are satisfied with their current living situation, they are generally positive to-
wards social renting. The strongest effect on attitudes towards social rent-
ing is with current tenure. The effect is strongest for private tenants who rent 
with a private landlord in the deregulated sector, saying that all else being 
equal and when compared to social tenants, the attitude of these tenants to-
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wards social renting is 1.29 points lower. For private tenants renting with a 
housing association in the deregulated sector there is a comparable pattern, 
but the influence is less strong. There is a small negative effect for private 
tenants in the regulated sector as well; yet it is found to be not statistically 
significant. 
When adding behavioural beliefs about social renting in Step 2, the model 
can predict 32.7 per cent of the variance of the outcome variable. The effects 
of background factors get smaller, or lose their entire significance as is true 
for income. This conforms to the theory of the reasoned action model that 
there is a strong link between background factors and beliefs. Out of the nine 
behavioural beliefs only quality of social dwellings, maintenance by landlords, 
service by landlords, and antisocial behaviour of social tenants are signifi-
cant predictors of attitudes. The beta coefficients for all beliefs measures con-
firm the hypotheses of Section 6.2.2, yet they are relatively small, particular-
ly when compared with several background factors, such as income and cur-
rent tenure. 
Model 2 uses the same approach for private renting. The main difference we 
can find here is that background factors alone explain more of the variance 
in attitudes towards private renting than in social renting (+ 8.5 percentage 
points), and that the added effect of behavioural beliefs is smaller; however, 
the overall explanatory power of the two models is similar. Income, current 
tenure and housing satisfaction are significant positive predictors, confirming 
the hypothesised relationships. In comparison to Model 1, current tenure has 
an even stronger effect on the outcome variable, meaning that besides all ten-
ants in the deregulated rental sector, also being a private tenant in the regu-
lated sector has a strong positive effect when compared with the social ten-
ants reference group – their attitudes towards private renting are one point 
higher (ceteris paribus). In Step 2, single background factors lose some explan-
atory power, with the exception of high household income compared to low 
household income. However, only beliefs about the quality of private dwell-
ings (p<0.01) and assumptions about antisocial behaviour of private tenants 
(p<0.05) are significant predictors of attitudes towards private renting, where 
an increase of one unit in the strength of the belief about quality leads to an 
increase of 0.25 on the general attitude scale, and an increase of one point on 
the ‘antisocial behaviour scale’ to a decrease of 0.12 points on the attitude 
scale. 
Perceived norms
Table 6.4 shows the regression results for perceived norms. As explained 
above, only background factors were used as predictors in the model. The rea-
son is that adding the two normative beliefs to the model in a second step 
would be useless, because there is almost perfect collinearity between per-
ceived norm and normative beliefs. In general, we can see that both Model 3 
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and Model 4 explain the variance in the outcome variables only weakly, 11.4 
per cent for social renting and 5.8 per cent for private renting. 
Model 3 provides evidence that being female is found to have a positive 
impact, age a very small but significant impact, being a high-income house-
hold rather than a low-income household has a relatively large negative 
influence impact, and housing satisfaction has a moderate positive impact. 
Interestingly, having no experience with renting socially has a moderate neg-
ative effect on perceived norms of social renting. This could mean that when 
a person has previously lived in a social rental dwelling it positively contrib-
utes to decreasing stigmatization of social rental housing by important oth-
ers. The single best predictor of perceived norm of social renting is, howev-
er, being a housing association tenant in the deregulated sector. This finding 
is rather surprising, since one would expect tenants of private landlords to be 
more negative about the social rented sector. 
For perceived norms of private renting, only gender and age are significant 
predictors, with age having only a marginal effect. Given that gender has a 
positive effect on perceived norms of both social and private renting, it could 
be speculated that in comparison to male respondents, females perceive less 
social pressure on owning a dwelling, rather than renting one. For them rent-
ing either a social or a private rental dwelling might be more socially accept-
ed than for their male counterpart; or the other way round, owning a dwell-
ing is more often regarded as a status symbol amongst men, making renting a 
dwelling less desirable (see also Madigan, et al., 1990). In line with the descrip-
tive finding that there is only little difference between perceived norms of 
private renting, there is no significant effect and similar beta coefficients for 
all tenant groups. Similarly, income has no effect, meaning that the whole 
social stratum seems to accept private renting as a form of housing.
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Perceived control 
The two multivariate regression models of perceived control show the follow-
ing results (see Table 6.5). For Model 5, background factors alone explain about 
one-fourth of the outcome variable perceived control over renting socially, 
while control beliefs only add a moderately 7.0 per cent. Being a private rent-
er has a strong negative impact on perceived control over entering the social 
rental sector, ceteris paribus. There are, however, differences between the three 
subgroup of private renting: The strongest negative effect is with private ten-
ants who rent with a private landlord in the deregulated market segment and 
the weakest effect is with private tenants in the regulated segment – which 
still has a very high beta coefficient of -1.57. Equally, belonging to the higher- 
and, to a lesser extent, the middle-income group decreases perceived control. 
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This suggests that higher income groups are aware of the political mandate 
of social renting as serving primarily lower-income households. Finally, there 
is a significant positive effect of housing satisfaction on perceived control, for 
which no explanation can be given. 
When adding control beliefs in Step 2, the separate effects of single back-
ground factors get smaller – again this supports the thesis that they are medi-
ated by or are at least reflected in beliefs. Specifically household income loses 
some explanatory power for the highest income group and all of its explana-
tory power for the middle-income group. Among control beliefs, the perceived 
effect of whether a respondent thinks that his income situation allows for 
renting socially and the existence of transaction costs as a barrier to renting 
socially are found to be significant, with a stronger effect of perceived afford-
ability; however, the direction of the transaction cost effect is in opposition to 
we had expected. It is most surprising that landlords’ allocation procedures 
have no negative and significant effect on perceived control over accessing 
the social rented sector. This could mean two things: Either the respondents 
did not understand that existence of waiting is part of this allocation proce-
dure, or the respondents significantly underestimate how strongly having 
enough waiting time influences the actual access to the sector. 
For Model 6, background factors alone explain already 31.3 per cent of the 
outcome variable, while private renting specific control beliefs add anoth-
er 19.2 per cent. Increasing income and being a private tenant already have 
strong and significant effects on perceived control over private renting. Addi-
tionally being male, being a multi-person household and being older (only 
a marginal effect) have significant negative impacts. After adding control 
beliefs, it can be seen that there is a strong positive effect of the perception of 
being able to pay for private rental accommodation on general perceived con-
trol. Furthermore, there is a small negative but significant effect of the allo-
cation procedures of landlords on perceived control. Both factors are in line 
with the assumptions for the mode
 6.3  Tenants’ moving intentions in the mixed
   rental market of Breda
The second step in the application of the RAA model was then the measure-
ment of tenure-specific moving intentions of social and private tenants in 
Breda. This relates to the second research question: How do these attitudes and 
perceptions, as well as personal circumstances influence tenants’ willingness to con-
sume social and/or private rental services? Before explaining how the depend-
ent variable was constructed, explaining the statistical model itself, and pre-
senting the results of the statistical examination, two possible issues with the 
concept of tenure-specific moving intentions need some clarification first.
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Firstly, the term tenure-specific raises the questions if tenants are really 
aware of the tenure they might intend to move to and whether their notion 
of what social and private renting matches the definition of this study. In the 
previous section it was proposed that a meaningful distinction between the 
categories of current tenure is not only a dichotomization of social and pri-
vate renting, but additionally a subdivision of the private category based on 
type of landlord and net rent level should be made – which led to the con-
struction of the categorical variable of current tenure with four categories. 
Therefore, one could argue that when asking tenants about their intentions 
on which rental service to consume in the future, the distinction between the 
three private rental categories should be maintained, since tenants intentions 
to move to either sector will not only be based on the way they can access it 
– and if they can access it – but also, and probably more so, by the attributes 
that the rental service has. This would in turn mean that respondents would 
have had to be asked whether they intend to move to a social dwelling, a pri-
vate dwelling owned by a private landlord in the deregulated sector, the same 
in the regulated sector, or a private dwelling with a rent level of more than 
€652 per calendar month that is owned by a housing associations.20 Howev-
er, the proposition here is that this would not clarify the definition problem, 
but rather contrarily, would enforce it because tenants would not be confront-
ed with two hypothetical options but with four, making the analysis much 
more complex and also less reliable. Primarily for reasons of simplicity, it was 
therefore decided to treat the three private renting options as one again.21
Secondly, it should be clarified what moving intentions actually means. 
Although such concepts are often used interchangeably in social research, a 
behavioural intention is neither the same as a behavioural expectation, nor as 
a desire to perform a given behaviour. The necessity to differentiate between 
various pre-behavioural thoughts has been proposed in numerous studies 
on residential mobility (Coulter et al., 2011; Kley & Mulder, 2010; Kan, 1999) 
and other research subjects in the social science field (e.g. Miller, 2011; War-
shaw & Davis, 1985). Here, it is often argued that there is a cognitive hierar-
chy between the three concepts. Desires can simply be defined as an indi-
vidual’s preferences of engaging or not engaging in the behaviour. As such, 
20 This also holds true with regard to the propositions on tenure-specific beliefs, attitudes and perceptions in 
the questionnaire.
21 This was also clarified in the questionnaire itself, explaining to participants what constitutes a private rented 
dwelling and what a social rented dwelling several times. Literally, it was highlighted three times (in translation): 
A social rented dwelling is a dwelling with a net rent level of less than €652 per month, which is owned by a hous-
ing association. Such a dwelling is only accessible through the social housing waiting list. A private rented dwell-
ing is a dwelling that is owned by a private individual or a private company. Also, a dwelling with a net rent level 
of €652 per month that is owned by a housing association is a private rented dwelling. 
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desire reflects an individual’s wish to achieve a goal through performing the 
behaviour. In contrast, intentions involve a specific decision to pursue this 
goal. If the behavioural intention is present, the individual is usually commit-
ted to the decision and also has a plan for implementing the decision (Miller, 
2011). Expectations, on the other hand, are more of a self-prediction of future 
behaviour. Arguably, they present a more ‘realistic’ idea of whether an indi-
vidual will perform the behaviour. In contrast to intention, the construct of 
expectation presumes that individuals are capable of appraising the existence 
of additional determinants or impediments (Warshaw & Davis, 1985; Coulter 
et al., 2011). Ajzen and Fishbein (2010) note that these conceptual differenc-
es certainly exist; nonetheless, in their work they use the term intention that 
refers to the readiness to engage in the behaviour, incorporating concepts as 
willingness, desire, expectation and trying. 
 6.3.1  Dependent and independent and variables 
Tenure-specific moving intentions (dependent variable)
To do justice to the existence of different concepts of behavioural intentions, 
including desire, intention, and expectation, respondents were asked to an-
swer the following propositions in the questionnaire: 
I expect my next dwelling to be a social rental dwelling 
Very unlikely   1         2         3         4         5         6         7      very likely
I want my next dwelling to be a social rental dwelling 
Strongly disagree  1         2         3         4         5         6         7      strongly agree
I intend to move to a social rental dwelling 
Strongly disagree  1         2         3         4         5         6         7      strongly agree
I expect my next dwelling to be a private rental dwelling 
Very unlikely   1         2         3         4         5         6         7      very likely
I want my next dwelling to be a private rental dwelling 
Strongly disagree  1         2         3         4         5         6         7      strongly agree
I intend to move to a private rental dwelling 
Strongly disagree  1         2         3         4         5         6         7      strongly agree
In a first analytical step, Cronbach’s coefficient α was used to measure the de-
gree to which the items on the scales are internally consistent within each 
rental sector. In this study Cronbach’s α for social housing was .861 and for 
private renting .857. Similar to the calculation of the attitudes score, the 
mean for these three scores was calculated for what is called ‘combined mov-
ing intention’ (see Table 6.6). To increase the reliability of this approach, all 
statistical models were tested for both the combined variable and all separate 
items. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to present the results are in full, 
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but it can be said that the combination variable reflects the data in the sam-
ple better than each single individual construct. Another reason for the inte-
gration of the different pre-move thoughts is that using the three mean val-
ues leads to a more precise scale than the use of a single variable with only 
seven categories. This means that there is more possible variance in the data, 
thus more variance to explain. 
A final step was the dichotomization of the scale variable into a numerical 
variable with the outcomes ‘tenure-specific moving intention’ and ‘no tenure-
specific moving intention’.22 More precisely, on a scale from one to seven, all 
values under 4.0 were coded into ‘no intention’, whereas all values above and 
including 4.0 were coded into ‘intention exists’. This was done for both social 
and private renting, which means that we could assess the moving intention 
to social housing and the moving intention to private renting simultaneous-
ly. More precisely, using the categorical outcome variable, it is possible to ana-
lyse under which circumstances tenants move to a social rented dwelling and 
under which circumstances they are likely to move to a private rented dwell-
ing. Such a categorization also implies that, for instance, if a respondent does 
not have a moving intention to a social rented dwelling, this does not mean 
that she holds an intention to move to a private rented dwelling at the same 
time. Rather, it could be the case that the respondent prefers to stay in the 
current dwelling and cannot imagine to move in a realistic time frame, or the 
respondent might have an intention to move to an owner-occupied dwelling. 
There is thus no coercive relation between the two outcome variables.
Independent variables 
The statistical models of tenure-specific moving intentions used the same 
background factors as the linear regression models of measuring attitudes 
and perceptions in the previous section with the following exceptions: Ex-
perience with renting socially and experience renting privately were omit-
ted from the model, because with it included some predictors showed very 
high and probably unreliable values. The variable in itself was an insignificant 
and small predictor in all models. Instead two other housing-related predic-
tors were added. Firstly, desire to buy sought to account for the fact that ten-
22 Usually, the categorization of a continuous variable is problematic since information on the real distances be-
tween respondents’ answers gets lost (see Freudenberg, 2002). Nonetheless, considering the research questions 
of this research, categorizing moving intentions is necessary, as we are interested in the conditions of making a 
decision for renting socially or renting privately. Furthermore, from a statistical viewpoint the categorization of 
data is less problematic in this research, because both general intention scales are not normally distributed but 
are heavily skewed, meaning that respondents most often selected the extreme values 1 and 7. The problem that 
there is a serious underestimation in the variation of outcome between groups (respondents close to the cut-
point 4.0 are more alike than different) is thus smaller seems to be negligible.
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ants do not necessarily stay within the rental tenure when they move. It was 
constructed as a categorical variable with no desire and desire as outcome 
possibilities. Secondly, general moving intentions within the next two years 
was constructed as a categorical variable in the questionnaire, as respond-
ents were asked to express whether they ‘surely do not want to move’, ‘may-
be want to move’, ‘surely want to move’, or ‘whether they had already found 
new accommodation’. The variable was recoded into a bivariate variable with 
the latter three categories as a ‘moving plans exist’ category (the approach is 
similar to Kleinhans, 2009). Most importantly, in line with the notion that be-
liefs measures are moderated through attitudes and perceptions (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 2010), they are not used in the statistical model; rather, the three di-
rect measures general attitudes towards each sector, perceived norms of so-
cial and private renting, and perceived control over social and private renting 
were included as separate predictors.
 6.3.2  Statistical approach 
The analysis of tenure-specific moving intentions consists of two parts. 
Cross-tabulation and data exploration was applied to examine the bivariate 
relations between the outcome variable and its predictors, while logistic re-
gression was used for the multivariate analysis (Lemeshow & Hosmer, 2000)23.
Here, two models were used for each sector. Firstly, intentions were only 
regressed on background factors. At first, desire to buy was included in the 
multivariate analysis as well; however, its presence led to extremely high con-
fidence intervals for other predictors (up to 30), and it was thus decided to 
only use in the descriptive analysis. Secondly, attitude and the two percep-
tion variables were added in a second set of models in order to test for their 
23 To be able to analyse the moving intentions to either sector for the same respondent, an application of mul-
tinomial regression would have been necessary (through a combination of the two categorical variables). Such 
a model with a four-way categorical dependent variable (with the categories: moving intention to social housing 
only, moving intention to private renting only, moving intention to both, moving intention to neither) was devised 
and tested. However, the size of the sample was too small to guarantee reliable and valid results, as exemplified 
by extremely high confidence intervals for some independent variables, mostly income and current tenure. The 
separate logistic regression models for the two rental sectors should thus be considered as a second-best solu-
tion.
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influence on tenure-specific moving intentions (see Models 1 to 4 in Table 6.9, 
Section 6.3.3). 
To be able to better understand under which circumstances tenure change 
is likely, i.e. from social to private renting and from private renting to social 
renting, for a third and fourth group of statistical models (Models 5 to 8 in 
Table 6.10, Section 6.3.3) the dataset was split into social and private tenants. 
Ideally, logistic regression would have been done for all three private tenant 
groups. However, the number of the respective groups was too small to run 
reliable and valid regression models. As a second best solution, private rent-
ers were considered as one homogeneous group in these models.
The hypothesised effects of the independent variables on the likelihood to 
move to a social or a private rented dwelling are presented in Table 6.7. They 
refer to the models in which all respondents are included; yet it is assumed 
that the ‘tenure-change models’ follow these hypothesised effects as well. 
Most importantly, in line with the theoretical notions of the RAA model, the 
assumption is made that tenure-specific attitudes and perceptions have a 
positive effect on tenure-specific moving intentions in the same sector. Con-
versely, a negative link between attitudes and perceptions of one rental sector 
is supposed to increase the likelihood of having an intention to move to the 
other rental sector. 
Furthermore, national and supranational databases suggest that private 
rental housing is often the most obvious housing choice for younger house-
holds and starters, mainly because it is easily accessible (Scanlon & Kochan, 
2011). It is thus hypothesized that there is a negative relation between 
increasing age and an intention to move to the PRS. The social rented sec-
tor in the Netherlands, on the other hand, provides accommodation primari-
ly and increasingly for middle-aged and older households (Elsinga & Wassen-
berg, 2007). Hence, a positive relation between age and moving intentions can 
be hypothesized; however, such an effect might be weakened by older house-
holds’ low propensity to move at all (de Groot et al., 2011a; Kleinhans, 2009). 
Increasing income, the main source of income is employment, and being 
a private tenant rather than a social tenant is hypothesised to have a posi-
tive relation with moving intentions to private renting and a negative relation 
with an intention to move to a social rented dwelling. A positive effect of hav-
ing a general moving intention within the next two years is assumed for both 
tenure-specific moving intentions. Although tenure-specific moving inten-
tions were measured without mentioning a time frame in the questionnaire, 
it is expected that respondent who have no intention to move at all within 
the next two years are likely to end up in the no tenure-specific intention to 
move group nonetheless. Finally, a strong negative effect of desire to buy on 
the moving intentions in both rental sectors is predicted.
There are no hypotheses about the impacts of gender, household composi-
tion, and housing satisfaction. With regard to the latter, one could argue that 
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the higher the satisfaction with the current housing situation the less likely 
a person is to move at all (see Mulder & Hooimeijer, 1999); however, it could 
also be true that high housing satisfaction increases the likelihood of renting 
a dwelling in the same rental sector again once people (need to) move. 
 
 6.3.3  Results 
Descriptive results 
The following subsection presents the results of the bivariate analysis and 
subsequently the logistic regression results of tenure-specific moving inten-
tions. Figure 6.2 shows the distribution of existing tenure-specific intentions 
to move (the outcome variables) for the different samples that are used in 
the models. It can be seen that when looking at the moving intentions of all 
tenants there is a majority of people who say that they have an intention to 
move to a social rented dwelling (62 per cent) and a strong majority of people 
who say that they do not have an intention to move to a private rented dwell-
ing (77 per cent). Interestingly, we can also see that there is a only a relative-
ly small majority of private tenants with no intention move to a social rented 
dwelling, while there is an overwhelming majority of social tenants with no 
intention to move to a private rented dwelling. Finally, that most social ten-
ants intend to stay in the sector once they move, whereas private tenants are 
more inclined to move out of the sector or do not move at all. 
Table 6.8 presents the distribution of the categorical independent vari-
ables, as well as the values of the mean for all continuous variables with 
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regard to existing moving intentions to social renting and to private renting. 
With respect to intentions to move to a social rented dwelling, it shows that 
approximately 77 per cent of all respondents who are in the lowest income 
group have an intention to move to a social rented dwelling the next time 
they move. Conversely, only a fourth of all tenants in the high-income group 
have the same intention. Compared with single-person households and mul-
ti-person households with children, individuals living in other forms of multi-
person households are less often inclined to move to a social rented dwelling. 
Most interestingly, an intention to move to a social rented dwelling strongly 
differs between tenant groups. Whereas social tenants strongly seek to stay 
in the social sector, private renters living in the deregulated segment most 
often do not have such an intention. On the other hand, private tenants in 
the regulated market segment more often intend to move to a social dwell-
ing than not, and even more interestingly, they more often intend to move to 
a social dwelling than to a private rented dwelling. This is another indication 
that social renting is widely regarded as the superior alternative in the low-
er rental market segment, by both social and private tenants. Another strong 
relation seems to be between the desire to buy and the intention to move to 
(other) social rented accommodation. Those respondents who want to buy a 
dwelling in an unspecified future overwhelmingly do not seek to move to a 
social dwelling. On the contrary, those who do not have such a desire most 
often have the intention to move into the social rented sector. 
Considering intentions to move to a private rented dwelling it can be said 
that for all independent variables the number of respondents who have such 
an intention is smaller than the number of people who do not have this inten-
tion. Furthermore, compared with the social rented sector, the only variables 
that have a larger share of moving intenders to private renting are the two pri-
vate renter groups in the deregulated sector, high-income and desire to buy. 
More precisely, we can see that increasing income seems to have a positive 
effect on the intention to move to the private rented sector. Within the pri-
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vate tenant category, private tenants in the deregulated segment often intend 
such a move; yet not moving at all, buying a dwelling and moving to the social 
rented sector are more frequent. Finally, if we compare gender for both tenure-
specific moving intentions it seems that men and women are more inclined 
to move to a social rented dwelling; yet, men less often intend to do so than 
women, while they more often intend to move to a private rented dwelling.
A quick glance at the distribution of the continuous variables across the 
various outcome variables suggests that the effects of age and housing sat-
isfaction on moving intentions to the PRS are relatively small. On the other 
hand, we can see that positive attitude towards the same rental sector and a 
negative attitude towards the other sector coincide with an increasing score 
in tenure-specific intentions to move. The mean scores of perceived norms 
are almost equally distributed across the four outcome variables, with the 
exception of the relation between perceived norm of social housing and the 
moving intention to the private rented sector. Similar to the pattern of atti-
tudes and intentions, perceived control over accessing social renting/private 
renting coincides with a stronger moving intention to a social rented dwell-
ing/ a private rented dwelling.
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Logistic regression results
The logistic regression models estimating the probability of having an inten-
tion to move to a social/private rented dwelling for all respondents are report-
ed in Table 6.9.
Models 1 and 2 show the regression results for the social rented sector. A 
first finding is that, as indicated by the Nagelkerke Pseudo R2, socio-demo-
graphic and housing-related predictors alone (Model 1) can explain about 28 
per cent of the variance. Adding tenure-specific attitudes and perceptions to 
the model increases the predictive power of the model (Nagelkerke R2 = 37.8 
per cent). This provides supportive evidence for the main hypotheses that 
attitudes and perceptions do significantly influence tenure-specific moving 
intentions. 
A number of predictors included in Model 1 are found to be statistically sig-
nificant: Age has a marginal positive effect on the probability to intend to 
move to a social dwelling. The direction of this relation supports our hypoth-
esis; i.e. those older respondents are more likely to intend to move to a social 
rented dwelling. In comparison to being female, being male strongly decreas-
es the likelihood of intending to move to a social dwelling (1/0.62 = 1.6 times 
less likely, as expressed by the odds ratio). One explanation here could be that 
men, more than women, might regard owning a house or living in a more 
expensive dwelling as a status symbol and thus see particularly social rent-
ing as a less attractive housing alternative. With regard to the composition 
of households, being a multi-person household with children rather than a 
single-person household increases the likelihood of intending to entering or 
staying in the social rented sector the next time an individual moves. 
The single most influential independent variable is household income. 
The odds ratio suggests that respondents who live in a household with a net 
income of less than €1,850 per month are 5.5 times more likely to intend to 
move to a social rented dwelling as a respondent from the higher-income 
group and 2.7 times more likely than a member of the middle-income group 
to move to the social rented sector. A similar influence and also in line with 
the hypothesised effect can be observed for current tenure. Private tenants of 
all sorts are less likely than social tenants to intend to move to social dwell-
ing, with decreasing beta coefficients from private tenant renting from a pri-
vate landlord in the deregulated sector, over housing association in the dereg-
ulated sector, to private tenant in the regulated sector. The significance of 
the latter is, however, only marginal (p<0.1 rather than the widely accept-
ed p<0.05 criterion). Consistent with the hypothesised effect in Table 6.4, if a 
respondent’s main household income is from employment rather than from 
another source (i.e. pension, social benefits, student loans/grants), the proba-
bility of intending to move to a social rented dwelling decreases substantial-
ly, all else being equal. Although the beta coefficient is only marginally signif-
icant, this might suggest that social renting – even though it is designed to be 
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socially integrative in the Netherlands – is perceived as a social safety net and 
as desirable housing options in less flourishing times nonetheless (see also 
van Kempen & Priemus, 2002). The remaining predictors, i.e. general intention 
to move and housing satisfaction, are not found to have a significant impact 
on the outcome variable. 
Once attitudes and perceptions are added to the model current tenan-
cy, household composition gender and household income lose some or all of 
their predictive power. This seems logical since particularly perceived con-
trol over renting socially reflects the tenants’ perceptions of whether they can 
afford a social dwelling, etc. If we assume that these perceptions reflect their 
actual control realistically, there will be strong interdependence between 
income, current tenure and perceived control. An exception to decreasing 
beta coefficients is the increasing predictive power and the size of the beta 
coefficient of ‘main income from employment’. Out of the six variables of 
the Reasoned Action model two are found to significantly increase the likeli-
hood of a social housing moving intention. We can see that when the attitude 
towards social housing increases, the change in the odds of having such an 
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intention is 1.41. With every unit increase in the attitude towards social hous-
ing, respondents are 1.41 times more likely to intent to move to a social rent-
ed dwelling. The same holds true for the case when an individual perceives to 
have higher control over accessing the social rented sector; yet, the effect is 
somewhat less strong (odds ratio = 1.26).
Models 3 and 4 present the same approach for the intentions to move to 
a private rented dwelling. A first observation here is that when using socio-
demographic and housing-related predictors only (Model 3), fewer inde-
pendent variables are significant than is the case in Model 1 for social rent-
ing. There is a minor negative effect of age (supporting the hypothesis) and 
a strong negative effect of being in employment in comparison to having 
another main source of income. This contradicts our hypotheses. One expla-
nation could be that moving intentions to the PRS are quite pronounced 
among students (not shown here), as one of the subgroups in the ‘not from 
employment’ category. As predicted in Table 6.7, being a private tenant of all 
sorts strongly increases the likelihood of intending to move to a private rent-
ed dwelling; supporting the descriptive analysis the beta coefficient is the 
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highest for private tenants in the deregulated sector and the weakest for pri-
vate tenants in the regulated sector. Also confirming the hypotheses in Table 
6.7, there is a negative effect – which is however only marginally significant 
– of having no intention to move within the next two years, irrespective of 
which tenure is preferred. If an individual has no intention to move she is 
two times less likely to have no intention to move to a private rented dwelling 
than a respondent who has a general intention to move. Most interestingly, 
there is a strong effect of high income compared to low income, and no effect 
of middle income compared to low income. The data thus provides some evi-
dence that income is less important for having an intention to move to a pri-
vate rented dwelling than for intending to move to the social housing sector, 
which seems to be a sound assumption given that a wider array of rent levels 
is present in the private rental sector. 
Model 4 controls for the six individual RAA variables. We can see that all 
socio-demographic and housing-related variables (except for having an inten-
tion to move within the next two years) lose some or their entire explanato-
ry power. This again suggests that there is a statistically significant relation 
between these variables, particularly current tenure, on the one hand, and 
attitudes and perceptions on the other hand. With regard to the latter, sim-
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ilar to the social renting model (Model 2), the data suggests that perceived 
norms have no significant impact on tenure-specific moving intentions. Con-
versely, the model shows that positive attitudes towards private renting and 
perceived control over renting privately are good predictors of PRS-specif-
ic moving intentions, whereas higher perceived control over renting socially 
decreases the likelihood of such an outcome. 
Arguably, the main finding of comparing the four models is that attitudes 
and perceived control but not social norms play a strong role in the formation 
of tenure-specific moving intentions. The added explanatory power of these 
variables is stronger for the private renting than for the social renting model. 
For both sectors, however, the single best predictor seems to be current tenure.
 
Tenure change
As explained above, the following step was to devise models of tenure change. 
The predictors used in these models were identical to the independent vari-
ables in Models 1 to 4. Models 5 and 6 in Table 6.10 explain under which cir-
cumstances private tenants intend to move to a social rented dwelling, while 
Models 7 and 8 do the same for social renters’ moving intentions to a private 
rental dwelling. In both cases, the reference categories are thus same sector 
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tenants without an intention to move to the other sector. First of all, we can 
see that the tenure change models have almost the identical overall explan-
atory power as the models where all tenants are included. Due to different 
sample sizes the Initial -2 Log Likelihood and Chi-Square Improvement values 
are smaller, but Nagelkerke R2 is almost the same for all models. For both sets 
of models of tenure change another general finding is that when attitudes 
and perceptions are added (Models 6 and 8), socio-demographic and hous-
ing-related variables, with few exceptions, lose all of their explanatory power. 
This is most likely due to the relatively small sample sizes. After all, it is gen-
erally the case that small-n statistical models will less often produce signifi-
cant predictors than large-n samples (Royall, 1986). However, this explanation 
is only speculative and it might well be the case that for the specific sets of 
tenants in the two tenure change models the interaction between the groups 
of variables increases. 
Examining individual predictors of private tenants’ moving intention to 
the social rented sector, we can observe the following changes compared to 
the whole sample of tenants. The most important predictor of tenure change 
from private renting to social housing is increasing income; this is similar to 
the finding for the sample including all tenants, yet the effect is stronger. Pri-
vate tenants living in a higher-income household are nine times less likely 
to intend to move to a social rented dwelling than their low-income coun-
terparts – middle-income private renters are 3.6 times less likely to do so. 
In contrast to the total sample, there is evidence that being in a multi-per-
son household without children has a marginally significant positive effect 
on intentions to move to a social rented dwelling. In the whole sample it is 
households with children that intend to do so. Age has a positive effect on 
intentions, and no intentions to move has a marginally significant but strong 
effect, meaning that if private tenants do not intend to move at all they are 
very unlikely to form an intention to move to social dwelling as well. Except 
for age all variables lose their statistical significance and have smaller beta 
coefficients in Model 6; gender, on the other hand, becomes a marginally 
significant negative predictor. The best predictors in the model are, howev-
er, perceived control over accessing social renting and perceived control over 
accessing private renting. When the perceived control over accessing social 
housing increases with one unit, the odds of intending to move into the sec-
tor is 1.30 (p<0.01). Conversely, when perceived control over private renting 
increases the odds is 0.80 (p<0.1), signifying a decreasing likelihood of form-
ing a moving intention. 
Finally, social tenants are likely to intend to change their tenure to private 
renting when they are younger, are not in employment and have an intention 
to move in the next two years (Model 7). After controlling for attitudes and 
perceptions, only age (marginal with p<0.1) and having no intentions to move 
are still significant predictors. In comparison to the entire sample, social ten-
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ants’ intention to move to a private rented dwelling more strongly depends 
on their attitudes and perceptions. The single best predictor of tenure change 
accordingly is a positive attitude towards renting privately. Similarly, the 
more control social tenants perceive over accessing private renting, the more 
likely they have an intention to move there. Most interestingly, if individuals 
perceive to have increasing control over accessing the social rented sector, it 
seems that they are more likely to stay in the social rented sector, rather than 
moving to a private rented dwelling. 
 6.4  Social tenants’ perceptions and moving in-
tentions in Coventry – a descriptive analysis
The previous analysis of tenants’ attitudes towards and perceptions of so-
cial and private renting in was based on a sample of renting households in 
the Dutch case study city Breda. It was said before that given the focus on 
various aspects of the competitive relationship between social and pri-
vate rented housing, a well-developed comparative survey analysis between 
both case study cities would have required too much attention to achieve all 
goals of the thesis. More precisely, as it is generally the case in academic re-
search, this PhD faced specific time and financial constraints. Without doubt, 
it would have been interesting and prolific to compare two large-N surveys, 
which could have helped to learn more about, i.a., the effects of national reg-
ulations and policies on the moving intentions of tenants within and between 
the rental housing sectors. However, the first important prerequisite for suc-
cessful comparative survey research is that the respective samples are from 
comparative target populations (Survey Research Center, 2011). In Coventry, it 
was not possible to achieve either an optimal or a comparable sample design, 
since there was no access to the addresses of private rental households. The 
only possibility would have been to send many questionnaires to all house-
holds in neighbourhoods that are known to have relatively high shares of pri-
vate rental households (particularly Foleshill, Radford, St Michaels, Whoberley 
– see Chapter 3). However, this sampling method was considered to be very 
inefficient and financially too risky; indeed, using such an approach always 
means that there is no guarantee of receiving a sufficient number of filled in 
questionnaires, while it is certain that the costs are relatively high. 
Nonetheless, since this thesis was designed as an internationally compar-
ative housing study and particularly aims to add a new perspective to our 
thinking about rental housing system in different countries, some sort of 
compromise needed to be made. Consequently, around the same time that 
the survey in Breda was administered, the three major housing associations 
in Coventry were asked if they wanted to participate in a study on their ten-
ants’ perceptions of rental housing and their moving intentions. One of the 
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three associations (Midland Heart Housing Association) agreed to adminis-
ter such a survey and distribute and collect the questionnaire. Accordingly, 
the total social housing population was reduced from approx. 22,000 social 
tenants to about 2,000 Midland Heart renters. It was pointed out before that 
there are substantial differences between the more desirable products of tra-
ditional housing associations, such as Midland Heart, and the products of 
stock transfer associations. It should thus be kept in mind that this sample 
is not representative for the entire social housing population in Coventry, let 
alone in England.
 6.4.1  Variables and statistical methods
The variables that were used to examine perceptions and moving intentions 
of social tenants in Coventry were the same as the ones used in the Dutch 
survey. Beliefs, attitudes, perceptions, and moving intentions were measured 
as seven-point graded scales, while background factors were either measured 
as continuous (housing satisfaction/age) or categorical variables (everything 
else). Two differences exist: Firstly, the classification of income groups did not 
use the same three-way division as in the Netherlands, mainly because such 
a classification has no meaning in Coventry. Generally, £500 categories were 
used, where small group sizes for all categories of a monthly net household 
income above £1,500 were pooled into one category. Secondly, the question 
of whether a respondent receives Housing Benefit or not and its relation with 
moving intentions was added to the analysis. It was said before that housing 
allowances are designed and calculated differently in the social housing than 
in the private rental sector. It is thus interesting to see if there might be an ef-
fect of the availability of housing allowances on the attitudes towards both 
sectors and on tenure-specific moving intentions.
Originally the aim was to devise the same multivariate regression models 
of explaining attitudes, perceptions, and moving intentions of social tenants 
as it was done for all renters in Breda (see previous sections). However, the 
sample size of social renters in Coventry did not allow for such an approach 
and the study needed to be restricted to descriptive analyses. This means that 
social tenants’ beliefs on the various attributes of social and private renting, 
as well as their attitudes towards and perceptions of renting socially and pri-
vately were tested through paired-samples t-tests, while the bivariate relation 
between tenure-specific moving intentions and the independent variables was 
tested through Fisher’s exact test for categorical variables and through Pear-
son’s r for continuous variables. For the former part the results will be reported 
in comparison to social tenants’ beliefs, attitudes and perceptions in Breda.24
24 Note that there is a difference between the results in Breda shown here and the results in the similar tables 
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 6.4.2  Results 
Tenure-specific beliefs, attitudes and perceptions 
Table 6.11 reports the results for nine behavioural beliefs, two normative be-
liefs, and three control beliefs. With regard to the behavioural beliefs most of 
the outcomes are in line with what we would have expected from the struc-
tural analysis of social and private rented services in Chapter 3 of this study: 
In comparison to social renting, social tenants in Coventry ascribe higher 
rent levels, higher availability, more variability (with respect to which kind of 
dwellings are on offer), and lower security of tenure the private rented sec-
tor. Additionally, the same group believes that the maintenance standards 
and services of their housing association to be substantially better than the 
standards of private landlords (about two points on the seven-point scale). No 
significant differences exist between their views on how social and private 
tenants behave in their housing environment. Most interestingly, there are 
strong differences between the perceived quality of social and private rent-
ed dwellings, as well as significant differences between the locations of so-
cial and private renting, both of which are in favour of the social rented sec-
tor. One explanation for this could be that social tenants do not account for 
the entire spectrum of the PRS in Coventry, but mainly compare it with the 
lower end of the market. Another explanation could be the aforementioned 
selection bias in the sample, meaning that social tenants from Midland Heart 
live in better dwellings and, more importantly, better neighbourhoods than 
the average social tenant in Coventry.
Comparing these outcomes to the views of social tenants in Breda, it can 
generally be said that the differences between the two sectors follow similar 
patterns in both cities. The only exception is that the quality of location, which 
is considered to be more favourable in the social rental sector in Coventry, but 
it is the other way round in Breda. Some differences between the scores of the 
two rental sectors are more pronounced in one case than the other. Most evi-
dently, the perceived differences between security of tenure in the respective 
sectors are more pronounced in the Coventry, where the average score of pri-
vate renting is slightly negative (3.25) Equally, social tenants views on the per-
formance of private landlords is much worse in Breda, which might signify the 
perception of an existing rogue landlord class in the English case. 
Secondly, the examination of normative beliefs shows that tenants perceive 
the social rented sector to be more socially accepted than the PRS. Howev-
er, when compared with the sample in Breda, we can see that the perceived 
acceptance of both social and private renting by important others is much 
in Section 6.2. This is due to the fact that in Section 6.2 all tenants (also private tenants) were included in the 
analysis.
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lower in Coventry – however, the absolute value is positive for social renting 
(4.95 on the one to seven scale). Arguably, this reflects the prevailing public 
opinion in the UK that renting in general is a less desirable and less accepted 
form of housing than owning. 
Finally, social tenants perceive to have much less financial control over 
renting privately than over renting socially. There is a strong perception 
among all respondents that their current income situation would not allow 
them to rent a dwelling in the PRS. This seems to be unsurprising given the 
behavioural belief that private sector rents are very high on average. There is 
almost no difference with regard to their views on the impediments of land-
lords’ allocation procedures when they try to gain access to either sector. The 
results on these three items are very much in line with what was found in 
Breda, which signifies that there might be a more universal perceived afforda-
bility problem in the PRS. 
The second step in the descriptive analysis was the measurement of ten-
ure-specific attitudes, perceived norms, and perceived control (see Table 6.12). 
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A first observation is that the attitudes towards social renting are highly pos-
itive, while the opposite is true for private renting. The results are very sim-
ilar for both case study cities. On the other hand, there are significant dif-
ferences between the two cases with regard to perceived norms and control. 
Social tenants in Breda perceive social renting to be socially more accept-
ed than their peers in Coventry – both absolute values are positive though. 
However, in contrast to the Breda sample, social tenants in Coventry perceive 
more social pressure to not rent in the PRS than to not rent a social dwell-
ing. Even more surprising is the finding that there is a significant difference 
between perceived control over renting a social dwelling and renting a private 
dwelling. From the analysis of control beliefs one would have expected a sim-
ilar outcome as in Breda, i.e. a highly positive value of perceived control over 
renting socially and a negative value for the PRS. 
Tenure-specific moving intentions
Table 6.13 refers to the computation of moving intentions in Section 6.3.1 
(see Table 6.6) as it shows the different mean values for moving desires, in-
tentions, expectations and the combined moving intentions variable. Gener-
ally, the two samples show very similar results; nonetheless, we can see that 
the desire and the expectation to move to a social rented dwelling are more 
pronounced among social renters in Coventry than in Breda. In reverse, this 
means that the intention to move to a social dwelling lags behind the oth-
er two concepts of moving intentions25. Looking at the distribution of tenants 
within the tenure-specific intention to move categories, the main finding is 
that a large majority of social tenants have an intention to move to a social 
dwelling the next time they move, while only very few respondents are in-
clined to move to the PRS. Notwithstanding these reservations against a move 
to the PRS and strong inclinations to stay in the social rented sector, the da-
ta also suggest that social tenants are generally more prone to perform a ten-
ure-specific move than those in Breda. It can only be speculated that this is a 
consequence of higher levels of housing dissatisfaction, which makes people 
more prone to move at all, as well as it might be the result of an even less ac-
cessible owner-occupied housing sector in the English case, forming an impe-
25 With 0.75, Cronbach’s coefficient alpha was significantly lower than in the case of the Breda sample; however, 
alpha was still high enough to justify the statistical integration of the three concepts.
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tus to stay in the rented sector. 
Lastly, Table 6.14 presents the results of the bivariate analysis of tenure-
specific moving intentions and the predictors that were used in the statistical 
models in Section 6.3. A first remark needs to be made on the size of the sam-
ple. Even though only descriptive techniques are used here, the results should 
be interpreted carefully. Within each group there are only relatively few cases, 
with as few as 16 respondents who express a desire to buy and only 18 house-
holds that belong to the category multi-person household without children. 
This means that only marginal changes in the number of respondents who 
express an intention to move or not will lead to disproportionate changes of 
the relative number within the independent categorical variable. Notwith-
standing this caveat several moving-intention patterns can be observed. The 
focus of these descriptions is on the conditions under which a tenure change 
from social to private renting might take place. Where meaningful, the results 
of the ‘stayer’ case will be discussed as well. 
Firstly, the data suggest that male respondents are more likely to move to 
both a social and a private rented dwelling the next time they move. Second-
ly, multi-person households without children seem to be more often inclined 
to move to private rented accommodation and less often so to a social dwell-
ing. This concurs with the general role of the PRS to provide housing pri-
marily for those who are relatively mobile. Thirdly, there seems to be no link 
between increasing income (as measured by income groups) and the likeli-
hood to have an intention to move to a social rented dwelling. On the other 
hand, it appears to be surprising that increasing income coincides with a low-
er propensity to intend to move to the PRS. One would have expected it to be 
the opposite, simply because these households might consider themselves to 
be able to afford both a private and a social rented dwelling in comparison to 
the lowest income groups. Fourthly, the less satisfied people are with their 
current housing situation the more likely they seem to be to intend to move 
to the PRS rather than staying in the social housing sector. Fifthly, there is a 
positive relation between a positive attitude towards private renting and the 
intention to move to such a dwelling, and a negative relation between per-
ceived control over social housing and the latter. Similar to the findings in 
Breda, it seems that when social tenants perceive themselves to in the state 
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to remain in the social rented sector once they move, they will do so rather 
than performing a tenure change.26 The descriptive data does not propose a 
relation between the other variables and tenure-specific moving intentions, 
or they just cannot be explained here, which is the case for desire to buy and 
existing moving plans in the next two years. 
 
 6.5  Conclusion
The primary aim of this chapter was to add the consumers’ perspective to the 
idea of competition between the two rental tenures by examining the percep-
tions and intended consumption decisions of tenants in the two case study 
cities. The introduction argued that a solely structural view on the substitut-
26 These observations are supported by significant but moderate correlation coefficients. Additional analysis, 
which is not presented here, shows correlation coefficients of .483 for attitudes towards the PRS and moving in-
tentions to the PRS and -.275 for perceived social housing control and the moving intention to the PRS.
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ability of social and private renting, or more broadly their degree of homoge-
neity, is inadequate as it misses tenants’ perspectives and actions on which 
rental housing service they intend to consume and why that is so. Making the 
argument that existing research on tenure preferences and residential mobil-
ity has dealt with the relationship between the two (main) rental sectors on-
ly implicitly, the study turned to the social-psychology literature on why peo-
ple form a specific behavioural intention or not and thus proposed the rea-
soned action approach (RAA) by Fishbein and Ajzen (2010) as the theoretical 
frame of reference. More precisely, it was argued that using the RAA model al-
lows for a more holistic understanding of how and why tenants’ views on so-
cial and private renting differ (research question 1), and secondly how these 
views influence their decisions on which services they intend to consume in 
the future (research question 2). 
With regard to the former the quantitative survey analysis in Breda (Section 
6.2) proposes that the beliefs of tenants on the similarities and dissimilarities 
between social and private renting reflect the more objective structural divi-
sion of the two products, which was made in Chapter 3, very well. The sur-
vey analysis in Breda shows that that tenants seemingly have good informa-
tion on the actual disparities on what is being offered in the two rental sec-
tors and how the two products compare, i.e. they identify strong rent differ-
entials, much less availability as well as variability in the social rented sec-
tor, more social problems in the social rented sector (though not strongly pro-
nounced in absolute terms), but comparable locational and particularly dwell-
ing qualities, as well as securities of tenure. Additionally and not mentioned 
in Chapter 3, housing associations are perceived to be the better landlords. 
Both forms of renting are perceived to be socially accepted, which does, how-
ever, not mean that tenants perceive themselves in the position to consume 
both. Particularly the private rented sector, even though it is more accessible 
in terms of availability, seems to be unattainable to a large number of rental 
households in Breda. Here, the perceived affordability issue is a major point 
in explaining why that is so. The research further shows that it is less the 
direct impact of beliefs tenants hold about the two rental sectors, but more 
their personal dispositions with regard to income and above all the current 
tenure in which they live that can explain attitudes towards and perceptions 
of the two rental sectors. More precisely, the findings propose that there is an 
innate relationship between beliefs and individual background factors; how-
ever, based on the original theory we would have expected such beliefs to be a 
stronger mediating factor in the formation of attitudes and perceptions. 
Consistent with the reasoned action approach, the empirical examination 
in Breda (Section 6.3) suggests that even when socio-demographic and hous-
ing-related background factors are held constant, tenants’ intentions to move 
to a private or social rental dwelling are positively influenced by positive atti-
tudes towards and higher perceived control over renting in the same sec-
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tor. More interestingly for the general question of the willingness to substi-
tute the two rental services the research also addressed the issue of under 
which circumstances a social tenant would intend to move to private rent-
al accommodation, and vice versa. Here, it was shown that positive attitudes 
towards the other rental sector and a stronger self-efficacy of performing a 
tenure change do significantly increase the inclination to do so. It was shown 
that perceived control strongly reflects the income situation of the house-
hold, meaning that higher (lower) income is similarly a good predictor of ten-
ure change from social (private) to private (social) renting. Nevertheless, we 
also saw that the occurrence of a tenure change, or better the willingness to 
perform such an inter-tenurial move is very low in general, where particular-
ly social renters largely prefer to stay in their current tenure. Private renters, 
on the other hand, even though a majority of them seemingly intends not to 
move at all or buy their next dwelling, are in absolute terms more inclined to 
move to a social rented dwelling than to a private rented dwelling. 
To give the reader a flavour on how these results in Breda compare to the 
English case study city Coventry, a descriptive analysis on social renters’ 
views on the two rental sectors and their consumption decisions in the mixed 
rental market was added in a third step. The main findings here confirm the 
expectations that arise from a relatively strong structural divide between the 
two rental sectors as observed in Chapter 3. Most interestingly, social tenants 
in Coventry see a larger security of tenure gap, a smaller dwelling availability 
gap, and a larger dwelling variability gap between the two sectors than their 
peers in Breda. This also confirms the impression from the empirical research 
on the two rental market structures made in Chapter 3. Furthermore, social 
tenants in Coventry seem to be equally deterred by the thought of moving to 
the PRS as social tenants in Breda. The descriptive analysis suggests insecuri-
ties about whether they could meet rent payments, as well as negative expec-
tations about a lower security of tenure and the performance of private land-
lords might play a role here. Conversely, if social tenants express an inten-
tion of a tenure change, a positive attitude towards the PRS is arguably a key 
factor. This largely supports the findings on moving intentions in Breda. A 
main difference between the two case study cities is that perceived control 
over renting in the PRS seems to be no significant factor for intended tenure 
change in Coventry. Unfortunately, the research does not provide evidence on 
why that is so. 
This leads us to a general question of the sufficiency of this analysis. It was 
argued before that even though the formation of a behavioural intention is 
the best predictor of performing the behaviour – this relation is predicted by 
the RAA model and has been confirmed by ample research, also in the resi-
dential mobility literature –, various factors exist that could impede the real-
ization of an intention. Most evidently, the completion of an actual move 
is, of course, not only about the type of tenure that an individual wants to 
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live in. For instance, a situation in which an individual is inclined to move 
to the social rented sector but cannot find the desired type of accommoda-
tion is very well possible. Again, tenure preference is just one level of hous-
ing preference, and in reality the satisfaction with the type of dwelling and 
the neighbourhood might be much more important for a household than the 
tenure in itself – although there certainly is an overlap between tenure and 
the characteristics of accommodation being offered. Given that the analysis 
for this study relied on a cross-sectional survey and thus a stated-preference 
approach, it cannot be said for certain to which extent moves from one rental 
sector to the other will take place in the future. 
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 7  Summary and conclu-
sions 
In the introduction to this thesis it was argued that in the context of shifting 
provision structures of and regulatory approaches to social and private rental 
housing, the idea of competition between the two rental sectors has received 
increasing attention from both housing practitioners and researchers in re-
cent years. However, despite its intensifying usage in official reports and sci-
entific publications, the analysis of competition in mixed rental markets has 
appeared to be mainly implicit and ill-defined with regard to what it means 
in market realities, as well as business and political practices. Following this 
lack of perspicuity, the research goal of this study was twofold: (1) To devel-
op an innovative analytical framework that can give meaning to the concept 
competition in contemporary rental housing systems, and (2) To apply this 
framework in an internationally comparative setting in order to demonstrate 
the variety of competition-related behavioural processes, their structural and 
political prerequisites, their performance-related outcomes, and the interrela-
tions between these aspects. 
Based on the contention that much of our understanding of what compe-
tition means and how it could be analysed is coming from the convention-
al industrial economics literature, the study proposed the Structure-Conduct-
Performance (SCP) of rental housing as its ordering conceptual framework. 
Here, it was argued that from a supply side perspective competition has three 
basic dimensions: The competitiveness of the market environment in which 
landlords operate, the rivalrous perceptions and behaviour of the providers of 
rental housing, and the effects of competition on the performance of land-
lords themselves and on the performance of the wider rental market. In addi-
tion, the study further proposed that if one wants to fully understand com-
petition processes in mixed markets, more attention needs to be given to the 
demand side; hence the argument that a fourth dimension of competition is 
the willingness of customers to consume both rental services. 
Each of these four research foci was addressed individually in Chapters 3 to 
6. Each chapter was subdivided into two main parts: Firstly, given that main-
stream competition analysis builds on specific assumptions that do not hold 
in the context of this research, each chapter provided a theoretical discus-
sion of how the concept of competition changes when applied to mixed rent-
al markets and subsequently presented an adapted analytical framework of 
assessing structure, conduct, performance, and tenants’ consumption choices 
respectively. Secondly, these analytical frameworks were then applied to rent-
al housing in Coventry in England and Breda in the Netherlands. This com-
parative approach did not only aim to shed light on how individual concepts 
hold in practice, but even more importantly, it aimed to highlight the theo-
retical and empirical links between them.27 In the following, this conclusive 
27 As was pointed out before, this is only partially the case for the research on tenants’ consumption decision, 
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chapter summarizes the main findings on what competition in mixed mar-
kets means in rental market realities and practices. Hereafter, Section 7.2 
specifies how behavioural processes, political and regulatory frameworks, 
structural conditions, and market outcomes in competitive rental markets 
are related. Section 7.3 reflects on the research approach of the study, thereby 
addressing underlying methodological problems and the general limitations 
of the thesis. This will be connected to the question of what kind of future 
research should be conducted to perpetuate this study. Based on the argu-
ment that competition between the two rental sectors is also, if not primar-
ily, a political question, Section 7.4 deals with the policy implications of the 
research findings: What should and could governments do if they wanted to 
increase competitive interactions between the two tenures? 
 7.1  Exploring competition – the individual ele-
ments of the SCP of rental housing 
To recapitulate, in line with the two main aims the research was broken into 
four sets of research questions, each addressing a different aspect of compe-
tition between social and private rental housing. This section presents a sum-
mary of the research findings on the individual concepts, which from an em-
pirical viewpoint relate to rental housing in England and the Netherlands in 
the period of 2008 to 2011. 
 7.1.1  The competitiveness of mixed rental housing mar-
kets
Chapter 3 examined two research questions: (1) What is a competitive structure 
of mixed rental housing markets? and (2) How competitive are the rental market en-
vironments in Breda and Coventry? 
To answer the theoretical question, the study basically relied on the idea of 
a perfectly competitive market structure in the traditional SCP paradigm in 
which the degree of product differentiation, the existence of barriers to entry 
in the market, and the degree of supply concentration is assessed to evaluate 
the business environment in which firms operate (Tirole, 1988). However, giv-
en that in mixed rental markets we have to take into account the existence of 
a social housing industry and a private renting industry, both of which oper-
ate along different business principles and provide by definition differentiat-
ed goods, the notion of market structure changes. As a result, by including the 
differing regulatory, political and business approaches to social housing and 
which was primarily grounded in empirical material from Breda only.
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private renting, a concept of a ‘perfectly competitive rental market’ was pre-
sented that included five rather than three items: A highly competitive sup-
ply structure in which the number of landlords in both rental industries is 
high and their individual market shares are small; a supply structure in which 
private and social landlords provide rental dwellings in the same locations, 
which would signify the absence of spatial monopolies; the possibility for all 
types of landlords to provide social as well as private rental services without 
facing any regulatory barriers; the absence of regulatory and landlord-induced 
barriers for all types of tenants to consume either rental service; and finally, 
a high degree of homogeneity of the two rental products with regard to abso-
lute rent and quality levels, as well as their regulatory characteristics. 
Under the assumption that such a situation cannot exist in rental market 
practice, the concept was applied as a competitiveness ‘benchmark’ to the 
two local rental markets in Coventry and Breda. Using primary and second-
ary quantitative data, it was found that both local rental markets are relative-
ly uncompetitive when compared with the ‘ideal’ state of competition. In the 
English case this conclusion seemed relatively unsurprising given that the 
two rental sectors had been described in prior studies as being very dissimi-
lar. Indeed, the study could provide evidence that, with the exception of bar-
riers to entry the supply, all competitiveness items indicate a moderately to 
highly uncompetitive rental market. Specifically, the high barriers to access 
social rental housing for all renters, the high barriers for low-income house-
holds to access private renting, the dominance of either social housing or pri-
vate renting in neighbourhoods, and large rent differentials were mentioned 
here. In the case of Breda the main finding was that a more competitive mar-
ket is primarily thwarted by very high access barriers for tenants to the social 
rented sector, high barriers for private landlords to enter the social hous-
ing industry, and high absolute rent differentials. Nonetheless, mainly based 
on the finding that in comparison to the rental market in Coventry spatial 
monopolies are less developed in Breda, the conclusion was made that there 
seems to be a slightly higher degree of competitiveness in the latter case. 
 7.1.2  Competitive conduct of landlords in mixed rental 
markets 
In Chapter 4 the focus of the research shifted to the behavioural aspects of 
competition. Three key questions were asked in the first part of the chapter: (1) 
What is competitive conduct of social and private landlords in mixed rental markets? 
and (2) What are landlords’ perceptions of their competitive relationship, do they per-
ceive each other as rivals? How do these perceptions affect their strategic behaviour in 
the market? 
Rather than using an equilibrium model of firm behaviour as is common in 
mainstream neoclassical economics, the discussion of the first research ques-
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tion showed that conduct in the SCP of rental housing strongly integrates 
with the concept of conscious rivalry as presented in the business economics 
and management literature (e.g. Baum & Korn, 1996). Following this approach, 
rivalry in mixed rental markets was defined as a relational, direct, subjective, 
and reciprocal form of competition between the two landlord groups. Similar 
to the framework of a perfectly competitive rental market, this definition of 
inter-landlord rivalry was used as a yardstick for the empirical investigation 
and was seen to describe the ‘ideal’ state of competition from a behavioural 
viewpoint. 
Investigating the empirical key questions through a series of in-depth inter-
views with social and private landlords in Coventry and Breda showed that 
in both rental markets competitive forces seem to be generally limited. Argu-
ably, this conforms to the findings on the relatively uncompetitive market 
environments in the two cities. However, the research findings demonstrat-
ed that a useful distinction is between the provision of rental housing servic-
es in the low-income sector, which is arguably the primary market for non-
profit social landlords, and the commercial market segment, in which social 
landlords provide rental services along market principles. Here, it was argued 
that only in the former a pure form of competition between social and private 
rental housing could take place. The second case is more of a competitive 
setting within the private rental sector; yet, this is also relevant and worth 
examining, since the different business models and overall business goals of 
social and private landlords circumscribe strategic behaviour in this segment. 
In contrast to Coventry, the research in Breda showed that as a result of 
the growing activities of nonprofit housing associations, perceptions of rival-
ry and rivalrous interactions are relatively strong in the commercial (dereg-
ulated) rental segment. Most social and private landlords identify each oth-
er as their direct competitors and target their strategic behaviour at each oth-
er. On the other hand, in the low-income segment the relation between the 
two landlord groups in Breda can be described as conniving and coopera-
tive. Conversely, perceptions of rivalry and rivalrous interactions do exist in 
the English case. Social landlords – but not all of them – see the activities of 
private landlords in the low-income segment as a problem when they have 
experienced a loss of their own tenants to the PRS. Yet, this does not neces-
sarily result in targeted competitive strategies. Rivalrous interactions remain 
on an implicit level. Here, the main reason seems to be that social landlords 
either do not have the means for implementing such strategies or they lack 
an understanding of which competitive strategies might be useful. 
 7.1.3  Landlord and market performance 
Chapter 5 explored the third set of key questions: (1) What is the meaning of 
performance in mixed rental markets? and (2) What are the possible effects of com-
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petition between social and private landlords on the performance of mixed rental 
markets?
To be able to address the first question, the first part of Chapter 5 con-
tained a meticulous review of the industrial economics, nonprofit, and hous-
ing literatures on the meaning of performance and how these literatures have 
sought to address the question of the effects of competition. A main finding 
was that a general distinction should be made between the performance of 
the providers of rental housing themselves and the performance of the wid-
er market as experienced by the consumers. With regard to the former the 
literature suggests that it should be asked whether competition between 
social and private landlords leads to a more productive use of resources, and 
how it affects aggregate profitability levels in the two industries. From hous-
ing and nonprofit studies it was further taken that competition can also have 
an impact on the business goals of landlords in the market. Considering the 
market effects, or in other words the societal effects of competition, a review 
of the nonprofit literature on mixed market competition proposed a research 
emphasis on aggregate prices, quality levels and output levels. This is based 
on the argument that when investigating markets in which the profit-mak-
ing primacy does not prevail, analysing changing price/quality relations can 
provide a better indication of societal gains than the changes in profit lev-
els, which is often used by the traditional SCP approach. Finally, and in line 
with the research on landlord conduct, the literature review proposed that a 
useful distinction when determining competition effects is between markets 
in which social goals prevail (in our case the low-income sector) and those 
where pecuniary goals dominate (arguably, the commercial rental market). 
The applied research demonstrated that because social landlords in Cov-
entry see increasing risks of losing tenants to private landlords in the low-
income segment, they are forced to use more productive and effective ten-
ancy management to keep turnover rates at a minimum. However, produc-
tivity gains in the social rental sector do not necessarily mean that aggregate 
productive efficiency in the rental market increases as well. If relatively high 
profit levels in the low-income sector primarily attract cost inefficient part-
time landlords rather than professional landlords or even corporate inves-
tors, then the productivity gains of social landlords are outweighed. This con-
nects to a general thought about the scale of providers in the rental hous-
ing markets. Since large housing associations often benefit from scale econ-
omies they are able to invest relatively more in process and product innova-
tions. Therefore, it might be argued that more competition in the neoclassi-
cal sense of an increasing number of providers with smaller market shares 
might decrease the ability of the entire rental industry to finance process 
innovations. Furthermore, in both countries social landlords noted that they 
perceive strong pressures from stakeholders to minimise the costs of social 
housing production. It can be speculated that in a setting in which pub-
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lic grants for the development of low-income rental accommodation are dis-
tributed on productivity considerations and can be genuinely accessed by all 
types of developers/landlords, these productivity pressures will increase. 
The English case showed that a likely effect of an increasing supply of low-
income rental accommodation by private landlords is that profitability levels 
of social landlords decrease. If rent payments are designed (by governments) 
to just cover costs, longer periods of vacancies that are caused by tenants’ 
moves to the PRS mean that the returns of housing associations decrease. 
Nevertheless, for the consumers of low-income rental housing this devel-
opment seems to be beneficial, however. If the total supply in this segment 
grows because private landlords enter the market on a large scale, and if ten-
ants were willing to move to PRS accommodation, then they can experience 
increasing opportunities to act on dissatisfaction with their current housing 
situation and fulfil their housing preferences better. A main conclusion thus 
is that increasingly competitive markets are indeed likely to coincide with 
higher degrees of effective choice for consumers. 
The research in Breda showed that where social landlords compete with 
private landlords in the commercial market segment, profitability levels are 
likely to decrease as well. This is primarily due to the relatively lower pric-
es of nonprofit housing associations in this market segment. From the con-
sumer’s viewpoint increasing competition is however not only beneficial in 
that it results in lower aggregate prices; it might also lead to increasing lev-
els of aggregate quality, the reason being that a common reaction of private 
landlords – in this case corporate investors – to competitive pressures from 
nonprofit housing associations is a strategy of stock modernization. An inter-
esting finding here was that it is not only competition as such but primarily 
the nonprofit business model of social landlords that are considered to be the 
cause of decreasing profit levels of private landlords.
A last finding of the research on market performance was that competition 
might not only have beneficial outcomes but that there are also some sub-
stantial risks involved. On the one hand, if increased cost pressures lead to 
growing business risks for social landlords and might even lead to the exit 
of failing organizations, negative societal effects can occur if these associa-
tions are involved in community development and other social projects. On 
the other hand, where competitive forces lead to higher cost pressures and 
induce social landlords to focus stronger on operations in the commercial pri-
vate rental sector, the primacy of the social housing mission might be threat-
ened. Although the research did not present hard facts on such a develop-
ment, the statements from both local stakeholders and other social landlords 
indicate that at least one housing association in Breda seems to be on its way 
to a ‘for-profit in disguise’ (Malani et al., 2004). 
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 7.1.4  Consumption decisions and the willingness to sub-
stitute 
In Chapter 6, the study turned away from the overtly supply-side view on 
competition in mixed rental markets and added a new component to the SCP 
framework: tenants’ views on the similarity of the two rental services and 
their willingness to substitute these. Here, the argument was made that as 
long as tenants’ consumption decisions are neglected the competitive mar-
ket aspect of competition remains a theoretical concept with limited meaning 
in real markets. Hence, data from a quantitative survey among social and pri-
vate renters in Breda, as well as social renters in Coventry was used to answer 
the following two research questions: (1) What are tenants’ perceptions of and at-
titudes towards social and private renting, and how can these perceptions and atti-
tudes be explained? and (2) How do these attitudes and perceptions, as well as per-
sonal circumstances influence tenants’ willingness to consume social and/or private 
rental services? 
In research practice the willingness to substitute was translated as the 
moving intentions of tenants within the rental housing sector. Defining sub-
stitutability like this meant that the reasoned action approach (RAA) by Fish-
bein and Ajzen (2010) could be used as an analytical framework for describing 
and understanding tenants’ attitudes towards and perceptions of social and 
private renting and how these connect to the question of willingness to sub-
stitute (i.e. tenure-specific moving intentions). 
The data showed that the perceptions of all renters in Breda and of social 
tenants in Coventry on the similarity of the two rental services are a good 
reflection of the observable objective criteria that were measured in Chapter 
3. Renters in both case study cities tend to see strong rent differentials, a rel-
atively low accessibility to the social rental, a more variable offer in the PRS 
with regard to dwelling types, and less security of tenure in the PRS – which 
particularly holds true in the Coventry case. In Breda the perceived high sim-
ilarity locational and particularly dwelling qualities is a specific trait; yet, 
it also reflects the findings in Chapter 3. The survey analysis in Breda fur-
ther revealed that the attitudes of tenants towards social and private rent-
ing, which are generally more positive towards social renting, and the per-
ceived ability to rent in both sectors is primarily a question of the tenure 
in which these tenants are currently living in and the income of the house-
hold – the higher (lower) the income, the better the attitudes towards the PRS 
(social housing) and the higher the self-efficacy to rent in the private (social) 
sector. These attitudes and perceptions then in turn strongly influence the 
intentions to move between the two sectors. A majority of private renters 
does not express an intention to move to the social rental sector – howev-
er, lower income households in the private rented sector are more indiffer-
ent about tenure change then those PRS renters living in the deregulated sec-
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tor. The views of social renters are similar, yet their aversion against the PRS 
is much stronger than the other way around. To conclude, if we define ten-
ure-specific intentions to move as an expression of tenants’ willingness to 
substitute the two rental services, and if the latter concept is accepted as an 
important aspect of competition in mixed rental markets, then the actual 
degree of competition in Breda – and most likely also in Coventry – is relative-
ly low. Therefore, the finding in Chapter 6 largely follows the findings on the 
strength of competition in Chapter 3 on market structure and Chapter 4 on 
landlord conduct. 
 7.2  Understanding competition – the links be-
tween the elements of the SCP of rental 
housing
In the introduction of this study it was said that the study does not aim to 
test the hypothesis of the traditional SCP of a direct causal link running form 
market structure to the performance of the market. Since in such a frame-
work behaviour is merely treated as an equilibrium concept – landlords have 
but one option if they seek to maximise profits – it was argued that it seems 
to be more meaningful to explore each aspect of competition as an individu-
al concept and try to discover the links between the elements within the re-
search process. Particularly the comparative research methodology was con-
sidered to be meaningful in this ‘discovery process’. 
Based on the findings in the individual chapters some conclusions can be 
drawn on theoretical and empirical links in the SCP of rental housing. Figure 
7.1 illustrates the findings on the links between market structure, competi-
tive conduct of landlords, market outcomes, and the position of consumers in 
shaping competitive outcomes. 
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Firstly, the second empirical part in Chapter 4 examined the question of the 
possible barriers to rivalrous interactions between the two landlord groups. 
The research results showed that with the relatively broad definition of mar-
ket structure in this framework, comprising the structure of supply and 
demand, institutional elements, as well as public policy factors in mind, there 
seems to be a strong link going from structure to conduct. More specifical-
ly, all five items of market structure (product similarity, barriers to access, 
barriers to entry, supply concentration, spatial concentration) were found to 
be major barriers to competitive conduct. However, given that perceptions of 
rivalry and rivalrous actions are slightly stronger in the low-income sector in 
the English case, while they are stronger in the commercial segment in Breda, 
the following main conclusion can be made about the individual importance 
of the five items: The existence of more homogeneous products with regard 
to absolute rent and quality levels, which signifies a market domain overlap 
at the lower end of the market, lead to an increasing competitive awareness 
of social landlords about private landlords having entered their market seg-
ment. This is considered to be the cornerstone of competition between social 
and private rental housing. A second main driver is a more balanced supply/
demand relation. If landlords face genuine risks that they will have long-term 
vacancies, they are likely to behave more competitively. On the other hand, 
similar levels of regulation and access criteria are important as well, par-
ticularly from a consumer’s viewpoint; however, they seem to be of relative-
ly lower significance for landlords themselves. A particularly interesting find-
ing was that a deconcentrated market structure signifies a more competitive 
market; however, the impact on the degree of conscious rivalry is negative 
because target competitive strategies become more difficult when the rival is 
small in size. 
Secondly, if the SCP of rental housing model is approached from a more 
dynamic perspective, there surely is also a link from conduct back to market 
structure. The (competitive) strategies of landlords result in changing mar-
ket conditions for incumbent landlords and new entrants. Supply is changed 
by the business growth strategies of incumbents, which includes the merger 
behaviour of social landlords, and the actual entries of new landlords, if they 
develop new housing stock rather than buying existing dwellings. Similarly, 
product differentiation depends on the pricing and quality setting strategies 
of landlords – under the condition that they can influence these. A last exam-
ple is that investments in new dwellings as a competitive strategy improves 
the accessibility to both sectors for customers. 
Thirdly, the examination on the effects of competition has shown that 
firm level and particularly market level performance is mediated through 
the conduct of landlords in the market. However, following the finding that 
such rivalrous behaviours is largely circumscribed and in the case of Coventry 
and Breda also impeded through the structural conditions under which both 
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social land private landlords operate, there seems to be indeed (as predict-
ed by the SCP model) a coercive relation between the structure of the market 
and market outcomes. 
A fourth relationship runs from performance back to market structure. The 
discussion in Chapter 5 showed that government’s decisions on how they 
design rules and regulations in mixed rental markets are grounded in intend-
ed market outcomes. Arguably, the best example here is that a common pol-
icy strategy in England is to increase the productive use of public subsidies 
has been the cutback of barriers to enter tenders in the construction of social 
housing and allocate available subsidies on the basis of performance assess-
ments. Conversely, this primacy of policy influence in shaping market condi-
tions can be interpreted again as a testimony of an existing coercive relation 
between structure and performance. 
Lastly, there also seems to be a link from market structure through con-
sumer behaviour to market performance. The research in Chapter 6 showed 
that product differentiation, including both absolute price/quality differ-
entials and different regulatory aspects and the existing barriers to access 
either rental sector shape tenants’ attitudes towards and perceptions of the 
two rental services. In other words, the competitiveness of the market struc-
ture largely determines the consumption choices tenants can make. Given 
the long waiting lists in social housing and the nonetheless low willingness 
to substitute a social for a private rental dwelling voluntarily, we can assume 
that consumer preferences are not satisfied and market outcomes are not 
optimal. 
 7.3  Reflections on the research and directions 
for further research 
The thesis proposes that competition in mixed rental markets is a complex 
matter. It is the interplay of contingent structural conditions, behaviour-
al processes, personal and organisational goals, and last but not least large-
ly depends on local and national policy-making. It is a static state and a dy-
namic process at the same time, meaning that the degree of competition re-
lates to specific points in time and could change rather rapidly in the face 
of changing economic cycles and exogenous events, such as property slumps 
and credit crunches. Also, it concerns some segments of the rental market 
more and differently than other segments. The thesis has shown that a nec-
essary distinction is between competition social and private rental housing in 
the low-income segment and inter-tenure competition in the more expensive, 
market-based segments. More specifically, the conditions for competition in 
these segments are very diverse. Where commercial principles dominate, i.e. 
the higher-income segment, competitive forces can unfold, leading to specif-
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ic market outcomes. Where social and commercial mechanisms coexist, there 
is an inbuilt barrier to such competitive forces. In short, rather than speaking 
of competition between social and private rental housing in general, it seems 
to be useful to apply the concept of mixed market competition in the low-in-
come segment on the one hand, or middle- and higher-income segment on 
the other hand. Similarly, competition is a question of which landlord groups 
we are looking at. The study has pointed out that one necessary distinction is 
between nonprofit and for-profit organisation. But even within these general 
categories there are various types of landlords, who, due their diverging busi-
ness goals and focus, compete differently with landlords in the other rental 
sector. Particularly the distinction between corporate investors and private in-
dividuals in the Netherlands was illustrative for this argument.
Ultimately, this connects to the final argument that a clear-cut distinction 
between social and private rental housing services, as well as social and pri-
vate landlord operating in different market segments is not always possi-
ble. Therefore, it might be said that the theoretical definitions of social and 
private renting as set out in the introductory chapter are useful in thinking 
about mixed rental markets, but they should be seen as guiding principles 
rather than as absolute and inductile categories. 
With this in mind, the following sections seek to critically reflect on how 
well this study has unfolded these complexities and where it seeming-
ly falls short – most likely, Figure 7.1, does not do justice to the intricacies, 
since there is no mentioning of, i.a., the link between landlord conduct and 
consumer behaviour or the direct effect of market performance on landlord 
behaviour –, which results in a research agenda of what kind of studies could 
build on and perpetuate this thesis. 
Contribution to the literature
Generally, the study has clearly shown that the SCP of rental housing pro-
vides a useful conceptual framework for studying mixed rental markets. In 
the terminology of the research aims, it has proven itself to be able to un-
fold many complexities of the competitive relation between social and private 
renting by demonstrating the empirical validity of the theoretical links be-
tween the various aspects of competition and by giving meaning to the indi-
vidual concepts within these interdependencies. As such, the study is decid-
edly analytical, as it integrates primary and secondary data for different spa-
tial levels and ties in with various policy agendas. More precisely, the conten-
tion here is that the research presented in this thesis adds to different areas 
of the housing studies literature in the following ways.
Firstly, it contributes to the housing systems literature by giving a more 
holistic account of the competitive inter-tenurial relation than it has been 
achieved by prior studies. As was stated in the introduction, the works of 
Kemeny (1995; Kemeny et al., 2005), Haffner et al. (2009a; 2009b); Oxley et al. 
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(2010b) and Elsinga et al. (2009) merely focus on structural aspects of compe-
tition between the two rental sectors. In these works, behavioural aspects of 
competition are neglected or deduced from structural observations. This gap 
in the housing literature is partially filled by this thesis, as it provides empiri-
cal evidence on the role of market actors in filtering structural conditions and 
thereby shaping market outcomes. In other words, rather than only examin-
ing the extent of potential competition – as measured by for instance abso-
lute price/quality differentials and regulatory varieties, this study has unfold-
ed the relation between potential and actual competition – as signified by 
competitive interactions between landlords. 
Secondly, this study adds to the same literature by moving beyond the 
social housing centred approaches to analysing mixed rental markets, by hav-
ing given specific attention to the functionalities and structure of the PRS. On 
the one hand, it is shown that the choice agenda that has been discussed in 
the context of social housing in England (see e.g. Cave, 2007) does not only 
relate to the allocation of social dwellings owned by housing associations, but 
relates to the design of and policies for the private rental sector as well. The 
argument has been built that real choice in rental housing markets is only 
achieved when the provider itself becomes insignificant to the consumers of 
rental housing services. On the other hand, previous studies have treated the 
private rental sector as one coherent market. Yet, in line with Kemp’s (2011) 
assessment that there is not the private rental market, the research has 
shown that there is a de rigueur distinction between different market seg-
ments when analysing the relationship between the two rental tenures. How-
ever, being found in the research process means that this key aspect of com-
petition could not be distinguished beforehand and could thus not influence 
the country selection for the empirical investigation. In hindsight this then 
raises some concerns about the choice of the case study country selection, 
which aimed to compare what seemed two extreme cases rather than two 
cases in which competitive processes are relatively weak. 
Thirdly, the thesis provides an additional perspective on the effects of gov-
ernment interventions and regulation practices to the housing policy litera-
ture. The rhetoric in the scientific discourse on competition in housing mar-
kets has primarily focused on social housing outcomes and the behaviour of 
social landlords. Yet, it has often been neglected that minor differences in 
social housing regime designs may have (unintended) consequences for the 
rental market as a whole, and the behaviour of private landlords in specific. 
The design of the rent regulation system in the Netherlands can stand as an 
example here. The existence of a highly regulated segment, which primari-
ly aims to keep social rents at an affordable level, and a fully deregulated seg-
ment has reduced the incentives for private landlords to provide housing for 
lower income households as well. Hence, this book supports the claim that 
when researchers analyse changing social housing policies they should do so 
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with the wider rental market implications in mind. 
Fourthly, this thesis demonstrates to the internationally comparative hous-
ing literature the merits of making qualitative comparisons between local 
rental markets in different countries. Surely, comparing quantitative nation-
al-level is the sine qua non for understanding rental housing systems and 
policies in different countries. However, if one wants to understand how 
these unfold in rental market practices, adding a local-market element may 
lead to specific insights and can thus address different research questions. 
This has been shown by this thesis, in which the examination of landlord 
behaviour and consumption decisions under the same structural conditions 
could provide the holistic research that was aimed at. 
Finally, it adds a new perspective to the housing preferences and resi-
dential mobility literature in that it shows the merits of using the reasoned 
action approach to not only explain the possible discrepancy between actual 
moving behaviour and behavioural intentions, but also helps to explain where 
such moving intentions come from. 
Limitations of the study and direction for future research 
Notwithstanding these research results and their value for the housing liter-
ature, there are, of course, some unresolved issues, which suggest that more 
research is needed to draw more definite conclusions. These issues are pri-
marily methodological but also theoretical in nature. 
With regard to the former, an important issue is the generalisation of the 
research to other local rental markets in England and the Netherlands, to the 
two country cases themselves, and to other countries. As stated in the pre-
vious section there are certain gains when comparing local markets rath-
er than only the national level; yet, we are dealing with two particular rental 
markets with specific demand/supply structures and housing problems. This 
means that had two other local markets been used, different research out-
comes on the actual levels of competition would very likely have been found. 
The same holds true for the selection of countries. It was pointed out con-
tinuously that the roles and functionalities of social housing and to a certain 
extent of private renting are strongly influenced by the decisions of policy 
makers. It follows that the investigation of actual and potential levels of com-
petition would have led to different outcomes had we used other countries. 
Finally, both in the qualitative research on landlord conduct and in the quan-
titative research on consumers of rental services the number of cases was too 
small to draw meaningful conclusions for all landlords and all tenants in the 
two countries. The aim of this research, however, is not empirical generalisa-
tion in the sense of transferring the research findings to other or general pop-
ulations, but it is theoretical generalisation, which is about the “generation of 
theoretical concepts or propositions which are deemed to be of wider, or even 
universal, applications” (Ritchie & Lewis 2003, p. 264).
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Nonetheless, this is not to say that it would not have been useful or inter-
esting to replicate the research to see how the research findings hold in oth-
er case study cities and also country cases. Accordingly, one suggestion is 
that future research should seek to put the SCP of rental housing on a strong-
er empirical footing. On the one hand, this should include the comparison 
of a number of local rental markets within each country in order to be able 
to explain the influence of market structural aspects on rental market out-
comes. This is in line with the previous remarks on the links between the 
three supply side elements in the SCP of rental housing having been test-
ed qualitatively (see Section 5.4). Equally, more empirical support could be 
gained from a mixed method approach of measuring landlord’s perceptions 
of rivalry and linking them to the structure of the market. In applied research 
this could mean that a questionnaire among a representative group of social 
and private landlords assesses such perceptions and measures the effects of, 
i.a., supply concentration, market domain overlap, and price/quality differen-
tials on them. On the other hand, such a replication should include a larg-
er number of countries and therefore a larger variety of regulatory and poli-
cy approaches. The broadening of the empirical basis and the application to 
more countries could ultimately lead to a typology of competition in rental 
housing systems. 
Both a methodological and theoretical issue is with the investigation of ten-
ants’ perceived ability and willingness to substitute the two rental services as 
conducted in Chapter 6. Measuring tenure-specific moving intentions in the 
rental market presented a useful way of determining the willingness to sub-
stitute the two rental services. However, since the study made use of cross-
sectional surveys and thus followed the tradition of the stated preferences 
approach, it could only provide a limited estimate (based on the concept of 
perceived control) of whether tenants actually act on their willingness to sub-
stitute, and if not, why not. Therefore, to get a better understanding of ten-
ants’ actual moves between the two sectors, and if they move, whether these 
moves take place on voluntary decisions, or whether they are the outcomes 
of constraints to satisfy actual housing preferences, a longitudinal research 
design would be a useful addition. 
Furthermore, even though the study has relied on and made a reference 
to the concept of nonprofit business organizations, this has predominant-
ly remained on a basic level, particularly with regard to the discussion on 
the effects of competition (Chapter 5). More insight is needed on what the 
plurality of business models in the provision of rental housing services for 
households in need involves and how governments can deal with this. One 
can argue that the changes in the social housing supply structure in the last 
twenty years from public provision to the provision of private nonprofit hous-
ing associations has been a relatively mild one given that both organizations 
have the primacy of a social mission. The stronger involvement of private for-
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profit landlords in the low-income segment, or in the terminology of Gibb and 
Maclennan (2006) ‘quasi social housing’ might change the conditions of pro-
vision more drastically. More research is required on how possible negative 
effects on both incumbent nonprofit landlords and the consumers of rent-
al housing. This thought connects to existing discussions about the design 
of efficient and equitable state agent models in the public administration lit-
erature (van Slyke, 2007), which could eventually inspire new and innovative 
research on the design of rental housing systems. 
A final research recommendation is the conceptual broadening of inter-
tenure competition. Primarily due to reasons of simplicity and feasibility the 
research has largely abstracted from aspects of intra-tenure competition as 
well as the role of the owner occupied sector. The latter can have an impact in 
at least two ways.: On the one hand, policies that are directed towards own-
er-occupied housing can interfere with the rental market in unintended ways. 
For instance, if housing policy is not tenure-neutral, but is heavily skewed 
towards owner-occupied housing, the strategies of private landlords might 
change in a way that they seek to sell parts of their portfolio in times of high 
house prices rather than pursuing a strategy of maximising rent revenues. 
On the other hand, the owner-occupied sector certainly affects consumption 
decisions of sitting tenants in the housing market. It was pointed out before 
that the rental housing sector is not a closed system, but many renters aspire 
to become owner-occupiers. It would thus be interesting to see in what way 
the results of the reasoned action approach of tenure-specific moving inten-
tions would change if the owner-occupied sector was included conceptually 
and empirically. The issue of intra-tenure competition has not been neglect-
ed entirely in the research and has particularly informed the discussion on 
the possible effects of competition. However, more research is required on the 
question of how more competitive settings within each rental sector affect 
mixed market competition as a whole. Of particular interest is the question: 
If effective competition between social housing organisations alone leads to a 
more productive use of and a better allocation of resources, does the creation 
of a more competitive mixed market have an added value? 
 7.4  Policy implications 
Based on the idea that competition between the two rental sectors is primar-
ily a social and political construct some recommendations for policy mak-
ers and practitioners, who are interested in the design of competitive rental 
housing systems, can be made. 
A first question that regulators and governments should address is the 
issue of what they want to achieve with more competition between the two 
rental sectors. The SCP approach has shown that mixed market competition 
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is not a policy goal per se, but it is only one policy measure to achieve certain 
goals in the housing market, such as a more productive use of public resourc-
es and a better allocation of suitable dwellings to vulnerable households. This 
means that they should not aim to introduce, for instance, a greater plural-
ity of social housing providers as such. Rather they should – ideally – aim to 
enhance the economic and social performance of the entire rental housing 
sector and evaluate whether the inclusion of more types of providers, includ-
ing private landlords, can achieve the desired policy outcomes. 
Following this realisation, a policy debate on how much competition 
between the two rental sectors is desirable needs to develop. This study sug-
gests that there is no support for the assumption that a fully deregulat-
ed rental market, in which inter-tenure competition is the only ‘regulator’ of 
market outcomes will lead to more economic welfare and more social jus-
tice at the same time. After all, it has been argued that competition can have 
a negative impact on the social mission of nonprofit housing associations, 
where in the worst case it could lead to the complete failure of social land-
lords that have an important role in society which goes beyond the provision 
of affordable rental services. Accordingly, governments should seek to strike a 
balance between the economic gains of competition and the preservation of a 
socially just rental sector. The thesis is not able to provide an exact answer to 
what this ‘optimal balance’ should look like. Nonetheless, it seems that both 
in England and the Netherlands, including the two case study cities of Coven-
try and Breda, there is ample opportunity to stimulate mixed market compe-
tition. In both cases it seems that governments can implement various poli-
cy measures to make nonprofit housing associations behave more efficiently 
and give tenants better opportunities to fulfil their housing preferences in the 
low-income segment. On the other hand, in both countries – more so in Eng-
land than in the Netherlands – the activities of nonprofit organisations in the 
commercial renting segment could be facilitated, which can have a positive 
effect on overall rent and quality levels from the consumers’ viewpoint. Argu-
ably, a positive side-effect of this might be that the two segments come clos-
er together, which would further stimulate the integration of the entire rent-
al market. 
The remaining question then is what governments in England and the 
Netherlands – yet not only here – can do to stimulate competition. It needs 
to be made very clear that the following section should not be read as a holis-
tic approach to reforming the two respective rental housing systems and thus 
illustrate what a more market-based housing economy could look like. There 
are far more suited studies that have dealt with this task in the recent past 
– see for instance the VROM-Raad report (2007), the SER Commissie report 
(2010) and the so-called 22 Economen pamphlet (2012) for the Netherlands, 
as well as the Cave Review (2007) and the Rugg and Rhodes report (2008) for 
England. The mere objective here is to sketch different competition policy 
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options in the context of the existing housing systems, under the condition 
that the more integral housing market reform would not be pursued. 
Which regulations and policies can stimulate competition?
A first policy option is grounded in the thesis’ finding that the primacy of 
a more competitive mixed rental market and thus more rivalrous interac-
tions is the market domain overlap of social and private landlords. As a re-
sult, governments could seek to reduce the barriers to entry for private land-
lords to enter the low-income rental sector. More specifically, in the Nether-
lands, the government could consider the design of a subsidisation and taxa-
tion policy that treats both social and private landlords equally, thereby cre-
ating a level playing field. This means that in the social housing sector com-
monly available subsidised building land and government guarantees should 
be expanded to the PRS. Equally, existing tax disadvantages for housing as-
sociations should be abolished. However, equalising the conditions of provid-
ing low-income rental housing for all types of landlords is arguably not suffi-
cient to guarantee the entry of private landlords on a larger scale. In a market 
environment in which the production of new dwellings in relation to earning 
possibilities is extremely costly, the Dutch government might need to recon-
sider the introduction of building grants that are genuinely accessible – which 
is also an issue in the English case – for all types of landlords. This would 
probably relax the tight supply/demand relation in most local rental markets 
through higher building production rates, which in turn would increase the 
scope for competition in general. Such a policy strategy would require the im-
plementation of new measures for punishing bad performance and rewarding 
good performance through the application of performance assessments and 
effective contract management by local authorities. This connects to the idea 
that the existing system of performance agreements between local authori-
ties and housing associations, which could be seen as a form of local com-
mand economy, could be reoriented towards a more competitive system that 
includes profit-oriented organizations as well. Another strategy to increase 
the supply of private landlords in the low-income sector in both England and 
the Netherlands would be to facilitate the sale of dwellings owned by housing 
associations to private companies or individuals, rather than stipulating that 
they have to be offered to sitting tenants and other housing associations first.
Secondly, policy makers could generally think about increasing the homo-
geneity of private and social rental services from a regulation viewpoint. This 
would comprise rent regulation as well as property rights. Accordingly, in the 
Netherlands one could think about the introduction of a universal, yet mod-
erate rent regulation system that does not distinguish between inexpensive 
and expensive dwellings that follows a politically defined and quality stipu-
lated valuation system. If all landlords faced the same kind of rent regula-
tions and if it were equally difficult (easy) to end a tenancy, the incentives for 
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landlords to operate solely in the more expensive segment would be limited. 
A unification of the rent setting regime could include the abolishment of the 
inflation-following rent increase policy, and could, for instance, be replaced 
by a local reference system, which would better reflect the popularity of areas 
within local housing markets. Conversely, politicians in England could change 
the system of rent setting in a way that gives landlords more freedom in their 
rent setting and thus react to competitive pressures from private landlords. 
From this viewpoint, the changes by the current coalition government in the 
UK to set more social housing rents to a level of 80 per cent of the market 
rent of comparable private dwellings in comparable locations (see Harding, 
2011) is not necessarily a step towards more freedom, but at least it introduc-
es a higher interdependence between rent setting in the two sectors. In both 
countries it would be true that from a tenant’s viewpoint the introduction of 
more similar regulation (be it through stricter regulation in the PRS or less 
regulation in the social housing sector) would probably lead to an enhanced 
willingness to substitute both rental services. However, as the research 
showed, the more negative attitudes towards the PRS are highly entrenched 
in tenants’ thinking about the housing market. Hence, a convergence of reg-
ulatory approaches could only be a partial solution to this problem. Possibly, 
the cooperation of PRS landlords with local authorities, in for instance man-
datory registration schemes, would give tenants a stronger feeling of security 
and could possibly improve the image of the PRS. 
A last point is that the regulator should retain merger approval in the social 
housing sector and should apply this strictly on the ground of consumer pro-
tection and competition. It was argued before that housing associations often 
engage in merger activities under increasing competitive pressures, which 
in the long run decreases competitive forces in the rental market. It seems 
that, so far, inquiries into merger requests have only taken place under con-
siderations of the financial stability of the associations sector and the invest-
ment potentials of individual associations, whereas the negative implications 
for the performance of the wider rental market through a lower number of 
suppliers have been neglected. The contention here is that merger approval 
should incorporate both financial as well as competition implications, which 
in practice could be achieved through the collaboration between the institu-
tions of financial supervision and independent antitrust enforcement. 
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  Samenvatting
  Concurrentie tussen de sociale 
en de particuliere sector op de 
huurwoningmarkt
  Christian Lennartz
1 Doelstelling en onderzoeksvragen
Met deze studie wordt beoogd een bijdrage te leveren aan het inzicht in de 
complexe en veranderende verhouding tussen de sociale en de particuliere 
sector op de huidige huurwoningmarkt. In het kader van verschuivende aan-
bodstructuren en toezichtbenaderingen voor de beide huursectoren is er toe-
nemende aandacht voor de notie van concurrentie tussen deze twee, zowel 
vanuit de huisvestingspraktijk als vanuit de academische wereld. Ondanks in-
tensiever gebruik van de term concurrentie in officiële rapporten en weten-
schappelijke publicaties lijkt de analyse ervan echter voornamelijk impliciet 
te worden uitgevoerd en slecht te zijn gedefinieerd wat betreft de betekenis 
voor de realiteit van de markt of de zakelijke en politieke praktijk. Naar aan-
leiding van dit gebrek aan helderheid is het specifieke doel van deze studie 
tweeledig: (1) het ontwikkelen van een innovatief analytisch kader waarmee 
betekenis kan worden gegeven aan het begrip concurrentie in hedendaagse 
huurwoningmarkten, en (2) het toepassen van dit kader in een internationa-
le vergelijkende studie om de variëteit aan concurrentiegerelateerde gedrags-
processen, structurele en politieke voorwaarden en prestatiegebonden uit-
komsten te laten zien, alsmede de onderlinge samenhangen tussen deze as-
pecten.
Op basis van de stelling dat concurrentie in de allereerste plaats een alge-
meen economisch concept is, wordt in de studie de SCP-matrix (‘Structu-
re-Conduct-Performance’: structuur-gedrag-prestatie) van de huurwoning-
markt als conceptueel model voorgesteld. Betoogd wordt dat concurrentie op 
gemengde huurwoningmarkten – d.w.z. een zienswijze op de huurwoning-
markt die de sociale en particuliere huursectoren als geheel begrijpt – vanuit 
het perspectief van de aanbodzijde drie dimensies heeft: de concurrentie van 
de marktomgeving waarin verhuurders actief zijn, de percepties en gedragin-
gen van rivaliserende aanbieders van huurwoningen, en de effecten van con-
currentie op de prestaties van de verhuurders zelf en die van de huurmarkt 
in bredere zin. Vanuit theoretisch oogpunt gaat de studie echter verder dan 
de klassieke aanname dat de marktomgeving exogeen is, terwijl gedragin-
gen en dus prestaties structureel afhankelijke variabelen zijn. Er is voor een 
meer holistische en exploratieve benadering gekozen door alle drie elemen-
ten expliciet te maken en hun onderlinge verbanden in een tweede stap te 
behandelen. Bovendien wordt betoogd dat voor een volledig inzicht in der-
gelijke concurrentieprocessen een uitgebreide bespreking van de relevan-
te aspecten van de vraagzijde noodzakelijk is. Daarom wordt voorgesteld een 
vierde dimensie aan de SCP-matrix toe te voegen, namelijk of huurders zowel 




Deze vier dimensies van de SCP-matrix komen afzonderlijk aan de orde in de 
hoofdstukken 3 tot en met 6, die elk bestaan uit twee hoofdonderdelen. Aan-
gezien de gangbare analyse van concurrentie uitgaat van specifieke aanna-
mes die geen stand houden in de context van dit onderzoek, bevat elk hoofd-
stuk eerst een theoretische verhandeling over de wijze waarop het begrip 
concurrentie verandert wanneer het wordt toegepast op een huurwoning-
markt met aanbieders van sociale en particuliere huurwoningen. Vervolgens 
worden deze analytische kaders toegepast op de huurwoningmarkt in Coven-
try (Engeland) en Breda (Nederland). De analyse in de verschillende hoofd-
stukken wordt uitgevoerd aan de hand van de volgende onderzoeksvragen:
1. Wat is een competitieve structuur van gemengde huurwoningmarkten?
2. Hoe competitief zijn de gemengde huurwoningmarkten in Coventry en Breda?
3. Wat is concurrentiegedrag van sociale en particuliere verhuurders op gemengde 
huurwoningmarkten?
4. Welke percepties hebben sociale en particuliere verhuurders van hun relatie? Zien 
zij elkaar als rivalen op de huurwoningmarkt? Hoe beïnvloeden deze percepties hun 
strategisch gedrag op de markt?
5. Wat zijn mogelijke versterkende en belemmerende factoren voor rivaliserende inter-
acties tussen de beide groepen verhuurders?
6. Wat is de betekenis van prestaties op gemengde huurwoningmarkten?
7. Wat zijn de mogelijke effecten van concurrentie tussen sociale en particuliere ver-
huurders op huurwoningmarkten?
8. Welke percepties hebben de huurders van sociale en particuliere verhuur? Hoe zijn 
deze percepties te verklaren?
9. Hoe beïnvloeden deze percepties, naast structurele voorwaarden en persoonlijke 
omstandigheden, de bereidheid van huurders om gebruik te maken van sociale en/
of particuliere verhuur?
2 Methodologie
Vergelijkend huisvestingsonderzoek speelt een centrale rol in de algemene 
onderzoeksbenadering van het proefschrift. Hier overstijgt de vergelijking tus-
sen twee steden (Breda en Coventry) in twee landen (Nederland en Engeland) 
echter het idee dat de omstandigheden, processen en effecten van concurren-
tie tussen de casestudy’s verschillen. Derhalve wordt er wordt holistisch in-
gegaan op een klein aantal empirische gevallen om een beter beeld te krij-
gen van de causale processen en omstandigheden die kunnen leiden tot over-
eenkomsten en verschillen tussen de huurrelaties in deze landen. Bovendien 
is de focus gelegd op twee gemeenten in plaats van op het nationaal niveau, 
omdat huurwoningmarkten in de eerste plaats lokale entiteiten zijn. Zo wordt 
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het herkennen van de relaties tussen het gedrag van de verhuurders en huur-
ders, de omgeving waarin zij besluiten nemen en de effecten van die beslui-
ten, vereenvoudigd.
Elke onderzoeksvraag in de afzonderlijke hoofdstukken wordt beant-
woord met behulp van verschillende datasets en informatiebronnen. Dit 
betekent dat voor de analyse van structurele marktaspecten (hoofdstuk 3) 
en de bespreking van de effecten van concurrentie (hoofdstuk 5) voorname-
lijk gebruik wordt gemaakt van secundaire nationale en lokale statistische 
bronnen, aangevuld met informatie uit kwalitatieve interviews met spelers 
op de lokale woningmarkt. Voor de analyse van de belangrijkste vragen over 
verhuurdersgedrag in hoofdstuk 4 is niet gebruikgemaakt van een kwantita-
tief onderzoek met een grote n-waarde, maar zijn tijdens de empirische stu-
die met een geüniformeerde themalijst de visies en percepties van 36 soci-
ale en particuliere verhuurders onderzocht tijdens 30 semi¬gestructureerde 
diepte-interviews. Om de visies van huurders op sociale en particuliere ver-
huur na te gaan, alsmede hun bereidheid om de ene vorm in te ruilen voor 
de andere, is hoofdstuk 6 opgezet als kwantitatief onderzoek. De empirische 
gegevens voor dit hoofdstuk zijn verzameld via een enquête per post/internet 
onder 825 huurders van sociale en particuliere huurwoningen in Breda en een 
enquête per post onder 168 huurders van sociale huurwoningen in Coventry. 
Voor de analyse van het enquêtemateriaal zijn verschillende lineaire en logis-
tische regressiemodellen toegepast.
3 Uitkomsten en conclusies
Het concurrentievermogen van gemengde huurwoningmarkten
In de theoretische discussie van hoofdstuk 3 wordt betoogd dat wanneer uit-
eenlopende regelgevende, politieke en zakelijke benaderingen van sociale 
huisvesting en particuliere verhuur in aanmerking worden genomen, het con-
cept van een ‘volmaakt concurrerende huurwoningmarkt’ [perfectly competi-
tive mixed rental market] kan worden gehanteerd om een analyse te maken 
van de structurele voorwaarden waaronder verhuurders woningverhuurdien-
sten aanbieden en huurders deze diensten afnemen. Vijf elementen zijn in dit 
verband beslissend: (1) een aanbodstructuur waarin het aantal verhuurders in 
beide sectoren groot is en hun individuele marktaandelen klein zijn; (2) een 
aanbodstructuur waarin particuliere en sociale verhuurders huurwoningen 
aanbieden op dezelfde locaties en er derhalve geen sprake is van ruimtelijke 
monopolies; (3) de mogelijkheid voor alle typen verhuurders om zowel sociale 
als particuliere verhuur aan te bieden zonder uitgebreide belemmeringen in 
de regelgeving; (4) de afwezigheid voor alle typen huurders van regelgevende 
of door verhuurders opgeworpen belemmeringen om gebruik te maken van 
een van beide verhuurvormen; en tot slot (5) een hoge mate van homogeniteit 
van de twee verhuurvormen wat betreft het huur- en kwaliteitspeil en de re-
gelgeving.
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Toepassing van dit theoretische model laat zien dat beide lokale casestu-
dy’s betrekkelijk weinig concurrentie kennen. In Coventry wijst het onderzoek 
uit dat met uitzondering van de toetredingsbelemmeringen aan de aanbod-
zijde alle concurrentieaspecten op een matig tot zeer concurrentiearme ver-
huurmarkt wijzen. Meer specifiek zijn het: (1) de grote belemmeringen die 
alle typen huurders beletten om toe te treden tot de sociale huursector; (2) 
de grote belemmeringen voor huishoudens met lage inkomens om toe te tre-
den tot de particuliere huursector; (3) de dominantie van sociale huisvesting 
of particuliere verhuur in bepaalde buurten; en (4) de grote huurverschillen, 
die bijdragen tot deze bevinding. In Breda wordt een markt met meer concur-
rentie vooral belemmerd door grote beperkingen voor huurders om toe te tre-
den tot de sociale huursector (vooral lange wachtlijsten), grote belemmerin-
gen voor particuliere verhuurders om toe te treden tot het huursegment voor 
lagere inkomensgroepen en andere kwetsbare huishoudens, en de grote abso-
lute huurverschillen. Toch is de voornaamste conclusie van de vergelijkende 
casestudy – voornamelijk gebaseerd op de bevinding dat ruimtelijke monopo-
lies in Breda minder sterk ontwikkeld zijn – dat er in het Nederlandse geval 
een iets hogere mate van concurrentie bestaat.
Percepties van rivaliteit en rivaliserend gedrag
In hoofdstuk 4 worden de gedragsaspecten van de concurrentie tussen de 
sociale en particuliere huursector geanalyseerd en daarmee de verhuur-
ders centraal gesteld. Vanuit theoretisch oogpunt wordt niet het in de gang-
bare neoklassieke economie toegepaste evenwichts-georiënteerde gedrags-
model gehanteerd, maar is het gedrag in de SCP-matrix voor de huurwoning-
markt sterk geïntegreerd in het concept van de ‘bewuste rivaliteit’ [couscous 
rivaal] uit de bedrijfseconomische en managementliteratuur. In deze benade-
ring wordt rivaliteit op gemengde huurwoningmarkten gedefinieerd als een 
relationele, directe, subjectieve en wederkerige vorm van concurrentie tussen 
individuen en organisaties in de twee verhuurdersgroepen. Net als het kader 
voor een volmaakt concurrerende huurmarkt wordt deze definitie van rivali-
teit tussen verhuurders gebruikt als maatstaf voor het empirische onderzoek; 
zij wordt beschouwd als beschrijving van een ‘ideale’ concurrentiestaat vanuit 
gedragsoogpunt.
De diepte-interviews met sociale en particuliere verhuurders in Coven-
try en Breda laten zien dat op beide huurwoningmarkten het concurrentie-
gedrag tamelijk zwak ontwikkeld is. Dit sluit aan bij de bevindingen over de 
betrekkelijk concurrentiearme marktomgeving in de twee steden. Er kan ech-
ter wel een onderscheid worden gemaakt tussen het aanbod van huurwoning-
diensten in het lage inkomenssegment, onbetwistbaar de voornaamste markt 
voor sociale verhuurders zonder winstoogmerk, en het commerciële markt-
segment, waar zowel sociale als particuliere verhuurders hun diensten aan-
bieden volgens de principes van de markt (en daarmee een specifieke vorm 
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van concurrentie binnen de particuliere huursector vormen).
In tegenstelling tot Coventry toont het onderzoek in Breda aan dat als 
gevolg van de toenemende activiteiten van woningcorporaties, de percepties 
van rivaliteit en rivaliserende interacties relatief sterk zijn bij alle typen ver-
huurders in de commerciële (vrije) huursector. De meeste sociale en parti-
culiere verhuurders wijzen elkaar als hun directe concurrenten aan en rich-
ten hun strategisch gedrag op elkaar. Bovendien kan de relatie tussen de twee 
verhuurdersgroepen in Breda in het segment lage inkomens worden beschre-
ven als welwillend en soms zelfs coöperatief, terwijl percepties van rivaliteit 
en rivaliserende interacties in het Engelse geval wel bestaan. Hier beschou-
wen verschillende sociale verhuurders de activiteiten van particuliere ver-
huurders in de markt voor het lage inkomenssegment als een probleem wan-
neer zij huurders hebben zien verhuizen naar de particuliere huurmarkt. Toch 
leidt dit niet altijd tot gerichte concurrentiestrategieën. Rivaliserende interac-
ties blijven op een impliciet niveau, waarvoor de belangrijkste reden lijkt te 
zijn dat sociale verhuurders ofwel niet over de middelen beschikken om der-
gelijke strategieën uit te voeren, ofwel het inzicht ontberen om te beoordelen 
welke concurrentiestrategieën succesvol zouden kunnen zijn.
Effecten van concurrentie op gemengde huurwoningmarkten
In hoofdstuk 5 worden de gevolgen besproken die concurrentie op de ge-
mengde markt voor de prestaties van de huurwoningsector heeft. De belang-
rijkste theoretische stelling is dat prestaties bij de beoordeling van de effecten 
van concurrentie twee dingen kunnen impliceren. Enerzijds hebben de gevol-
gen van concurrentie betrekking op de prestaties van de sociale en particu-
liere aanbieders van huurwoningen, waaronder zulke uiteenlopende aspec-
ten als het productieve gebruik van middelen, de totale winstgevendheid in 
de beide sectoren en het effect van concurrentie op hun sociale en commer-
ciële doelen. Anderzijds hebben de volgen van concurrentie bettrekking op de 
bredere woningmarkt in termen van veranderingen van de totale prijs-, kwali-
teits- en productieniveaus.
Uit het empirische onderzoek in Engeland blijkt dat wanneer sociale ver-
huurders het risico lopen huurders in het lage inkomenssegment te verlie-
zen aan particuliere verhuurders en daardoor veel mutaties en stijgende kos-
ten (en dus dalende inkomsten) ervaren, zij gedwongen zijn een productiever 
en effectiever beleid te voeren. Productiviteitsstijging in de sociale huursec-
tor betekent echter niet noodzakelijkerwijs dat de totale productieve effici-
ency van de huurmarkt in het algemeen omhoog gaat. Als bevredigende pro-
fijtniveaus in het lage inkomenssegment voornamelijk relatief kostenineffi-
ciënte parttimeverhuurders in plaats van efficiënte professionele particuliere 
verhuurders aantrekken, zou de productiviteitspositief in de sociale huursec-
tor wellicht worden verloren. Vanuit het oogpunt van consumenten met lage 
inkomens lijkt toenemende concurrentie aan de onderkant van de markt in 
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één opzicht gunstig: als het totale aanbod in dit segment toeneemt door een 
stijgend particulier aanbod, en als huurders bereid zijn te verhuizen naar par-
ticulier verhuurde woningen, kunnen zij hun eventuele ontevredenheid over 
hun huisvesting bij een woningcorporatie daarmee uiten.
Het onderzoek in Breda laat zien dat wanneer sociale verhuurders in het 
commerciële marktsegment concurreren met particuliere verhuurders, de 
winstgevendheid waarschijnlijk daalt. Deze daling wordt voornamelijk ver-
oorzaakt door de naar verhouding lagere vraagprijzen van woningcorporaties 
zonder winstoogmerk in dit marktsegment. Toch kan concurrentie ook nega-
tieve uitkomsten opleveren, want er spelen ook enkele substantiële risico’s 
mee. Als de toegenomen kostendruk tot stijgende bedrijfsrisico’s voor socia-
le verhuurders leidt, kunnen negatieve maatschappelijke effecten optreden 
wanneer deze moeten bezuinigen op gemeenschapsontwikkeling en andere 
sociale projecten. Bovendien kan daar waar concurrentiedruk tot een hoge-
re kostendruk leidt – waardoor sociale verhuurders zich sterker moeten con-
centreren op activiteiten in de commerciële particuliere huursector –, het pri-
maat van de sociale huisvestingsmissie in gevaar komen en kunnen woning-
corporaties zich een ‘vermomd winstoogmerk’ [for-profit in disguise] aanme-
ten.
Bereidheid om tussen de sociale en particuliere verhuur te verhuizen
In hoofdstuk 6 komt een specifiek aspect aan de vraagzijde van de concur-
rentie tussen sociale en particuliere woningverhuur aan de orde: de bereid-
heid van huurders om de ene vorm van verhuur in te ruilen voor de andere. 
Dit wordt in de onderzoekspraktijk vertaald in de verhuisintenties van bewo-
ners in de huursector. Op basis van de ‘reasoned action approach’ (RAA) van 
de sociaal-psychologen Martin Fishbein en Icek Ajzen worden in het empiri-
sche onderzoek twee theoretisch verweven aspecten met elkaar verbonden: 
de houding en percepties van huurders ten aanzien van sociale en particulie-
re verhuur en de daaruit voortvloeiende huurvormspecifieke verhuisintenties.
De uitkomsten van de enquête onder huurders van sociale en particulie-
re huurwoningen in Breda en huurders van sociale huurwoningen in Coven-
try laten zien dat de percepties van de huurders van de overeenkomsten tus-
sen de twee verhuurvormen een goede afspiegeling vormen van de in hoofd-
stuk 3 gemeten waarneembare objectieve criteria. Huurders in beide gemeen-
ten zien over het algemeen grote huurverschillen, een betrekkelijk geringe 
toegankelijkheid van de sociale huursector, een meer gevarieerd aanbod van 
woningtypen in de particuliere huursector en minder huurbescherming in de 
in dezelfde – wat met name geldt in het geval van Coventry. De analyse van 
de enquêteresultaten in Breda brengt verder aan het licht dat de houding van 
huurders ten aanzien van sociale en particuliere verhuur – die over het alge-
meen positiever is ten opzichte van sociale verhuur – en de gepercipieerde 
mogelijkheid om in beide sectoren te huren, primair te maken hebben met 
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het type huurwoning (sociaal of particulier) dat ze nu bewonen en het huis-
houdinkomen: hoe hoger het inkomen, hoe positiever de houding ten opzich-
te van de particuliere huursector en hoe groter de intentie om in de particu-
liere sector in plaats van de sociale huursector te huren. Verder zijn positie-
ve houdingen en percepties over de andere sector van significante invloed op 
de intenties om te verhuizen naar de andere sector. Hier moet echter gezegd 
worden dat het totaal aantal sociale en particuliere huurders die zo een 
intentie hebben laag is. Geconcludeerd kan worden dat als we huurvormspe-
cifieke verhuisintenties definiëren als een uitdrukking van de bereidheid van 
huurders om de ene huurvorm in te ruilen voor de andere, en als laatstge-
noemd concept wordt aanvaard als een belangrijk aspect van concurrentie op 
gemengde huurmarkten, dan is de werkelijke mate van concurrentie in Bre-
da – en hoogstwaarschijnlijk ook in Coventry – relatief laag. Daarom volgen 
de bevindingen in hoofdstuk 6 grotendeels de bevindingen over concurren-
tiekracht in de analyse van de marktstructuur en de analyse van het verhuur-
dersgedrag.
Verbanden tussen de vier elementen van de SCP-matrix voor de huurwoningmarkt
Op basis van de bevindingen in de afzonderlijke hoofdstukken kunnen enkele 
conclusies worden getrokken over theoretische en empirische verbanden tus-
sen de marktstructuur, het concurrentiegedrag van verhuurders, de marktre-
sultaten en de positie van consumenten bij het vormgeven van de uitkomsten 
van concurrentie (zie Figuur 1).
Ten eerste lijkt de structuur van de markt, zoals verondersteld in de SCP 
matrix, in sterke mate bepalend voor het concurrentiegedrag van verhuur-
ders. Meer specifiek blijken alle vijf punten van de marktstructuur mogelijke 
belemmeringen te zijn; sommige aspecten leggen echter meer gewicht in de 
schaal dan andere: het bestaan van meer homogene producten in termen van 
absolute huur- en kwaliteitsniveaus, die wijzen op een aanmerkelijke over-
lapping van marktdomeinen, is in dit opzicht opvallend, evenals een even-
wichtiger verhouding tussen vraag en aanbod,. Ook gelijke regelgevingsregi-
mes zijn van belang, al lijkt dit aspect meer effect te hebben op de keuzes van 
huurders dan op de concurrentiestrategieën van verhuurders.
Ten tweede suggereren de uitkomsten van het onderzoek vanuit een meer 
dynamisch perspectief een terugkoppeling tussen gedrag en marktstruc-
tuur. De (concurrentie)strategieën van verhuurders leiden tot veranderen-
de marktomstandigheden voor zowel bestaande verhuurders als nieuwe 
toetreders: het aanbod verandert door de groeistrategieën van de bestaan-
de verhuurders, terwijl de productdifferentiatie afhankelijk is van langeter-
mijn¬strategieën voor prijs- en kwaliteitstelling, zelfs in zeer gereguleerde 
markten. 
Ten derde toont de bestudering van de concurrentie-effecten aan dat pres-
taties op bedrijfsniveau, en met name op marktniveau, tot stand komen door 
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het gedrag van verhuurders op de markt. Met de constatering dat dergelijk 
rivaliserend gedrag grotendeels begrensd is, en in het geval van Coventry en 
Breda ook wordt belemmerd door de structurele omstandigheden, lijkt er ech-
ter inderdaad (zoals voorspeld in het SCP-model) een dwingende relatie te 
bestaan tussen de structuur van de markt en de uitkomsten (prestaties) van 
de markt.
Een vierde relatie wijst van de prestaties terug naar de marktstructuur, 
omdat overheidsbeslissingen over de opzet van wet- en regelgeving voor 
gemengde huurmarkten zijn gegrondvest op beoogde marktuitkomsten.
Ten slotte kan een verband tussen de marktstructuur en de marktpresta-
ties worden geconstateerd via het consumentengedrag. Productdifferentia-
tie, inclusief verschillen in absolute prijs en kwaliteit en diverse regelgeving-
saspecten, en de bestaande toegangsbelemmeringen tot een van beide huur-
sectoren, bepalen de houding van huurders ten aanzien van de twee huur-
vormen. Met andere woorden, het concurrentievermogen van de gemengde 
huurmarkt is grotendeels bepalend voor de keuzes die huurders als consu-
menten kunnen maken.
4 Toekomstig onderzoek
Hoewel met het theoretische kader een innovatieve en holistische benadering 
wordt geboden voor de bestudering van de (concurrentie)verhouding tussen 
de sociale en de particuliere huurwoningsector, waarmee we kunnen laten 
zien wat concurrentie betekent en hoe structurele omstandigheden, gedrag-
saspecten en marktuitkomsten met elkaar in verband staan, zijn er nog en-
kele onopgeloste kwesties. Eén belangrijk aspect is de veralgemenisering van 
de onderzoeksbevindingen. Deze studie betreft twee specifieke huurmark-
ten met specifieke vraag- en aanbodstructuren en huisvestingsproblemen. 
Dat betekent dat als twee andere lokale markten waren bestudeerd, er met 
betrekking tot het werkelijke concurrentieniveau hoogstwaarschijnlijk andere 
onderzoeksresultaten zouden zijn geconstateerd. Hetzelfde geldt voor de lan-
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denselectie. Er wordt in het proefschrift voortdurend op gewezen dat de rol en 
de functie van sociale huisvesting en tot op zekere hoogte ook van particulie-
re verhuur sterk worden beïnvloed door de beslissingen van beleidsmakers, 
waardoor de concurrentievoorwaarden van land tot land sterk verschillen. Bo-
vendien is het aantal gevallen, zowel in het kwalitatieve onderzoek naar ver-
huurdersgedrag als in het kwantitatieve onderzoek naar consumenten van 
verhuurdiensten, te klein om verstandige conclusies te trekken over alle ver-
huurders en alle huurders in de twee landen. Hoewel deze studie veeleer ge-
richt is op theoretische veralgemenisering dan op empirische veralgemeni-
sering, zou het toch interessant zijn om de SCP-matrix voor de huurwoning-
markt als analysetool toe te passen op meer casestudy’s van steden en ande-
re landen. Een dergelijke verbreding van de empirische basis zou uiteindelijk 
kunnen leiden tot een typologie van concurrentie in huurwoningmarkten.
Aan het onderzoek naar de mate waarin huurders in staat en bereid zijn 
om de ene huurvorm in te ruilen voor de andere, kleeft zowel een methodo-
logisch als een theoretisch probleem. Het meten van de huurvormspecifie-
ke verhuisintenties was afhankelijk van steekproefgegevens en kon daardoor 
slechts een beperkt antwoord opleveren op de vraag of huurders werkelijk 
hun bereidheid om over te gaan van sociale naar particuliere huur, of omge-
keerd, in daden omzetten, en zo niet, waarom niet. Voor een beter inzicht in 
de vraag of huurders daadwerkelijk overgaan van de ene naar de andere sec-
tor en of zij verhuizen op basis van vrijwillige beslissingen, zou een longitudi-
nale onderzoeksopzet een nuttige aanvulling op deze studie vormen.
Verder is meer inzicht nodig in wat de pluraliteit van bedrijfsmodellen met 
en zonder winstoogmerk inhoudt voor het aanbod van huurwoningen en hoe 
overheden daarmee kunnen omgaan. Men zou kunnen aanvoeren dat de ver-
andering in de aanbodstructuur van de sociale huisvesting van openbare 
voorziening naar particuliere woningcorporaties zonder winstoogmerk een 
relatief kleine aanpassing is, gegeven het feit dat beide organisaties priori-
teit geven aan een sociale missie. Een sterkere betrokkenheid van particulie-
re verhuurders met winstoogmerk in het lage inkomenssegment zou de aan-
bodomstandigheden drastischer kunnen wijzigen. Derhalve is meer onder-
zoek nodig naar de mogelijke negatieve effecten van verandering in de aan-
bodstructuur.
Een laatste onderzoeksaanbeveling betreft de conceptuele verbreding van 
de concurrentie tussen de huurvormen. Voornamelijk om redenen van een-
voud en haalbaarheid is in het onderzoek grotendeels geabstraheerd van 
vraagstukken van concurrentie binnen de twee huurvormen en van de rol van 
de koopwoningsector in het hele concurrentieconcept. Laatstgenoemd aspect 
heeft in de eerste plaats betrekking op de consumptiebeslissingen van huis-
houdens. Huren is zeker geen gesloten systeem en het is waar dat een groot 
deel van de huurders ernaar streeft in een eigen koophuis te wonen. Daarom 
zou het interessant zijn om te zien hoe de onderzoeksresultaten veranderen 
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als de koopsector volledig in het model wordt opgenomen, zodat ook de con-
currentie tussen huur- en koopsector kan worden bestudeerd, vanuit zowel 
vraag- als aanbodperspectief. Evenzo is meer onderzoek nodig naar concur-
rentie binnen de twee huursectoren. Een bijzonder interessante vraag is in dit 
verband: als effectieve concurrentie tussen sociale huisvestingsorganisaties 
op zich al tot een productiever gebruik en een betere toewijzing van midde-
len kan leiden, heeft de totstandbrenging van een meer concurrerende markt 
(d.w.z. inclusief de particuliere huursector) dan toegevoegde waarde?
5 Beleidsimplicaties
De eerste vraag die toezichthouders en overheden moeten beantwoorden is 
wat zij willen bereiken met meer concurrentie tussen de twee huursectoren. 
In deze studie wordt betoogd dat concurrentie niet moet worden beschouwd 
als beleidsdoel op zich, maar dat concurrentie slechts een van een set ver-
schillende beleidsmaatregelen kan zijn om bepaalde doelstellingen op de wo-
ningmarkt te realiseren. Er dient daarom een beleidsdiscussie te worden ge-
voerd over de gewenste mate van concurrentie tussen beide huursectoren. 
Deze studie lijkt aan te tonen dat er geen grond is voor de aanname dat een 
volledig vrije huurmarkt waarop concurrentie tussen huurvormen de enige 
‘regulerende’ factor is, zoals de klassieke economische literatuur veronder-
stelt, tot meer economisch welzijn en sociale rechtvaardigheid leidt. Overhe-
den moeten de balans vinden tussen de economische winst van concurren-
tie en het behoud van een sociaal rechtvaardige huursector. Deze studie le-
vert geen exact antwoord op de vraag wat de ‘optimale balans’ is, en dit proef-
schrift is zeker geen afgerond programma voor een herijking van de huur-
markten in Nederland en Engeland. Toch kunnen wel enkele suggesties wor-
den gedaan voor de manier waarop de mate van concurrentie op de lokale 
huurmarkten in deze beide landen kan worden vergroot.
Ten eerste zouden overheden kunnen trachten de toetredingsbelemme-
ringen te verkleinen voor particuliere verhuurders die toegang zoeken tot de 
huursector voor lage inkomens. De Nederlandse regering zou een subsidie- 
en belastingbeleid kunnen opzetten waarin sociale en particuliere verhuur-
ders gelijk worden behandeld, zodat een gelijk speelveld in dit segment ont-
staat. Hierbij zou zij de invoering kunnen heroverwegen van bouwsubsidies 
die werkelijk toegankelijk zijn – ook een probleem in het geval van Engeland 
– voor alle typen verhuurders, en zou zij kunnen overwegen de verkoop van 
woningen van woningcorporaties aan particuliere ondernemingen of perso-
nen gemakkelijker te maken, opdat laatstgenoemden de woningen op com-
merciële basis kunnen verhuren. Ten tweede zouden overheden eveneens 
de mogelijkheden moeten verruimen om investeringen in het segment voor 
de middeninkomens aantrekkelijker te maken. Vooral in Nederland lijken de 
activiteiten van particuliere en institutionele beleggers in dit segment te zijn 
verdrongen door het overheersende sociale woningbouwsegment en in het 
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bijzonder door de voorkeursbehandeling van de koopsector in het subsidie- en 
planbeleid. Een neutraler beleid ten aanzien van kopen of huren is aantoonbaar 
noodzakelijk om een start te kunnen maken met meer concurrerende markten. 
Dit brengt ons op een derde mogelijke beleidsverandering: beleidsmakers 
zouden in het algemeen kunnen nadenken over vergroting van de gelijkheid 
van particuliere en sociale verhuur vanuit het oogpunt van regelgeving, met 
name door de convergentie van huur- en eigendomsrechten in de beide sec-
toren. Zo zou in Nederland kunnen worden gedacht aan de invoering van een 
universeel maar gematigd systeem van huurregulering dat geen onderscheid 
maakt tussen goedkope en dure woningen. Als alle verhuurders te maken zou-
den hebben met dezelfde huurregelgeving en het voor hen even moeilijk (of 
eenvoudig) zou zijn om een huurovereenkomst te beëindigen, zou voor hen de 
stimulans om uitsluitend actief te zijn in het hoge inkomenssegment waar-
schijnlijk minder worden. Omgekeerd zouden politici in Engeland het systeem 
van de huurvaststelling zodanig kunnen veranderen dat sociale verhuurders 
meer vrijheid krijgen om te reageren op de concurrentiedruk van particuliere 
verhuurders in hun huurvaststellingsbeleid. In het algemeen zal de harmonisa-
tie van regelgeving waarschijnlijk leiden tot een beter imago voor de particulie-
re huursector en zou daardoor ook de bereidheid van huurders om over te stap-
pen naar een andere huurvorm kunnen toenemen. 
Een laatste aanbeveling luidt dat het recht van goedkeuring bij fusies van 
woningcorporaties in beide landen zal moeten veranderen. De laatste jaren 
hebben in beide landen op grote schaal fusieactiviteiten onder woningcorpo-
raties plaatsgevonden, maar onderzoeken naar fusieverzoeken zijn slechts uit-
gevoerd uit overwegingen van financiële stabiliteit terwijl mogelijke negatieve 
gevolgen, zoals een grotere afstand tussen huurder en verhuurder, genegeerd 
zijn. Een verbeterde samenwerking tussen de instellingen voor financieel toe-
zicht in de corporatiesector en instellingen voor onafhankelijke handhaving 
van de antitrustregels zou dit probleem kunnen helpen oplossen en de gedach-
te van concurrentie en consumentenbescherming versterken. 
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Appendix A Case study selection 
Tables A.1 to A.4 aim to give an overview of the quantitative and qualitative 








  Qualitative interviews with social 
and private landlords
In order to be able to explore rivalrous behaviour and perceptions of rival-
ry thoroughly, the study opted for a qualitative research approach. Talking 
to landlords directly and asking them about their views on competition and 
competitors was seen as superior in comparison to a quantitative survey, be-
cause the housing literature does not provide any evidence on the rivalrous 
relationship between the two landlord groups. Hence, building hypotheses for 
a quantitative survey among landlords would have been a much more inse-
cure and probably a less effective methodological approach to exploring com-
petitive conduct in mixed rental markets. However, in order to build expla-
nations for rivalrous behaviour (i.e. research question 3) the study sticks to 
its comparative research approach: Interviewing landlords in both countries 
aimed to provide evidence on different national housing policies as well as 
barriers to rivalry. Equally, the case study city approach was retained to guar-
antee that all landlords in each country operate under identical demand and 
geographical conditions.
The main source for the analysis is a series of 30 semi-structured, in-depth 
interviews with both social and private landlords, as well as one interview 
with housing experts from the two municipal offices. To allow for an exhaus-
tive exploration of the range of possible views on the topics, the sampling 
approach was as follows: In the housing association sectors, interviews were 
done with managers and other responsible persons in different departments 
of each association, such as lettings, developments, strategy, and commer-
cial operations. In Breda participants were recruited from all three housing 
associations, while in Coventry all interview partners were recruited from the 
three largest housing associations. Smaller associations were invited to par-
ticipate in the interview series as well; however, they were not available for 
longer interview sessions, most likely because relatively spoken their total 
stock in Coventry was insignificantly small. Considering that the three largest 
associations own more than 90 per cent of the stock a non-representation of 
the smaller associations seems to be unproblematic for the analysis.
To cater for different market segments and business models in the private 
rented sector, the sampling in Coventry sought to target small-scale land-
lords and letting agents who are operating in the students market, the pro-
fessionals market, as well as in low-income housing. This was supposed to 
guarantee that landlords who do and who do not accept tenants receiving 
housing allowance could express their views. A majority of the actual inter-
viewees were recruited through and with the help of the Private Sector Hous-
ing Department of Coventry Council. This means that all participants were 
accredited landlords who fulfil certain dwelling standards prescribed by the 
local authority. In other words, so-called slumlords did not participate in the 
study, which in turn could mean that the product quality of private landlords 
is overestimated in this study. In Breda, the participant recruitment target-
ed small-scale individual landlords, institutional investors, and letting agents 
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who cater for both landlord groups. In both case study cities the sampling tar-
geted managers rather than owners, which led to a relatively high share of 
letting agents among the participants – this approach was particularly use-
ful for the institutional investor segment in Breda since nationally operating 
investors usually do not have a local management branch but outsource ten-
ancy management and tenant recruitment to specialized agencies. 
A target quota of at least ten interviews was sought for each rental sector 
in each case study city, as a compromise between the limited resources avail-
able to the study and a saturation-oriented sampling approach (see Liamput-
tong & Ezzy, 2006) In reality, 35 participants rather than 40 were interviewed 
in 30 interview sessions, each lasting between one hour and one and a half 
hours. The target was mainly missed in the private sector in Breda, where 
only seven rather than ten landlords or letting agents followed the invitation 
for an interview. This means that saturation was probably not achieved for 
the small-scale individual landlord segment; yet, there still was a wide variety 
of answers and perceptions of all types of private landlords in the Dutch case 
study city. 
In all interviews a topic guide was used which comprised similar questions 
for all kinds of landlords, while at the same time it allowed for country or 
city-specific issues (see below). The themes revolved around the main activ-
ities of landlords, their products and the tenants they cater for, their views 
on the rental market in general, their perceptions of the other rental sector 
and its landlords, notions of competition, as well as views on rental policy on 
a national and municipal level. The approach in the interviews was to speak 
about the competitive relationship between the two sectors implicitly at first, 
only to ask some direct questions about, for instance, whom landlords see as 
their direct competitors or the role of public policy in shaping or limiting a 
competitive relation. This proved to be very effective since it provided a sol-
id basis for linking implicit ideas and direct statements about rivalry between 
landlords and competition in the rental market in general. 
The computer-assisted analysis of the interviews was done with Atlas.ti 6.2. 
The interviews were transcribed in full and subsequently coded. For the actu-
al analysis of the interviews I used a mix of description, interpretation and 
grounded theory methodology (see Ritchie & Lewis, 2003), which means that 
some codes and themes were directly linked to the views of the interviewees, 
such as the description of the rental market or the landlord’s main activities, 
while the links between certain topics – e.g. why landlord A regards hous-
ing associations as a competitor or not – led to the creation of some genuine 
codes. With regard to (competitive) behaviour of setting rents or deciding on 
investments the interview approach was complemented by data on rent lev-
els and strategy papers for the housing association sector. This path was cho-
sen to increase the reliability of the interview approach. 
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Theme list – Interviews with private landlords and letting agents 
 1 . Your personal background
 a. Career as a landlord
 b. Motivations to operate as a landlord
 2 . Your properties
 a. Which market segments
 b. Type of dwellings/description of the stock
 c. Types of tenants you cater for 
 d. Where active in the city
 3 . Characterization of the rental market 
 4 . Your position in that market
 a. Comparison with social landlords and other private landlords 
/relation with other letting agents
 5 . Your view on the relation of private renting and social hous-
ing 
 a. Comparison of the products and tenants 
 b. How can the relation be described?
 c. Is there competition?
 d. If so, what is competition based on?
 e. If not, why not? 
 6 . Decision making processes 
 a. Rent setting/rent increases 
 b. Investment decision
 c. Relationship between letting agents and private landlords 
 7 . The role of the government in a competitive relationship be-
tween rental tenures
 a. Should competition be enforced?
 b. The possibilities for other landlords to enter your market
 c. Your challenges when setting up new business activities
Theme List – Interviews with housing associations
 1 . Your position within the association 
 2 . The housing association 
 a. Main activities
 b. Where active? 
 3 . Characterization of the rental market 
 4 . The position of your association in the rental market
 a. Description of your tenants and your housing services
 b. Comparison with private and other social landlords 
 5 . Your view on the relation of private renting and social hous-
ing 
 a. How can the relation be described?
 b. Is there competition?
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 c. If so, what is competition based on?
 d. If not, why not? 
 6 . Decision-making processes 
 a. Rent setting/rent increases 
 b. Investment decision
 c. Relation with letting agents/What is their influence 
 7 . Your plans to develop your housing stock
 a. Plans to operate in other market segments 
 b. Plans to provide market rental accommodation
 8 . The role of the government in a competitive relationship be-
tween rental tenures
 a. Should competition be enforced?
 b. The possibilities for other landlords to enter your market
 c. Your challenges when setting up new business activities
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Appendix C Methodology and data
  The moving intentions of tenants 
in mixed rental markets 
The sample of social and private renters in Breda 
The empirical data for this chapter were collected through a postal/internet 
survey among social and private renters in the Dutch case study city Breda. 
The field period of the survey was from October to December 2011. With the 
help of the two largest housing associations (WonenBreburg and Singleveste 
AlleeWonen), 5,000 social tenants were approached by email and were invit-
ed to fill in the questionnaire on a for this research specifically coded web-
site. Invitations for participation were sent to all households that provided 
its email address to its housing association. There was no pre-sampling of re-
spondents, but using email-addresses as the distribution channel meant that 
there was a per se exclusion of social renters who were either not willing to 
give their email address to the association or who do not have access to the 
internet at all. As a result, the sample of the social housing population in the 
survey is relatively young and most likely underestimates residential length 
of the social housing population. Because email addresses of private tenants 
were not available, 2,500 invitations were sent to a random sample of private 
renters by postal mail, including 500 private rented households that rent with 
a housing association in the deregulated sector (for an explanation see Sec-
tion 6.3.2) – current tenure as an independent variable). Private renters could 
use the web-questionnaire as well or use the hard copy that was included in 
the invitation for participation. 825 out of the 7,500 invited households re-
turned a usable questionnaire – of which 529 were filled in by social tenants 
and 296 by private tenants – leading to an overall response rate of 11 per cent, 
with 10.6 per cent in the social rented sector and 11.8 per cent in the private 
rented sector.
There are various possible reasons for not achieving a higher response rate. 
In the private rented sector, it turned out that the quality of address list that 
was used for approaching possible respondents was mediocre. On the one 
hand, many people (about 300) from the address list did not reside in the 
dwelling any more, which means that the letter of invitation was addressed 
to the wrong person. On the other hand, at least 300 out of the 2,500 private 
rental addresses turned out to be owner-occupied dwellings instead. Anoth-
er reason for the low response rate might be the complexity of the question-
naire. Social tenants were asked to express their attitudes towards private 
renting (and the other way round), while both tenant groups were also con-
fronted with some hypothetical questions about possible next steps in their 
housing career. It might be the case that the research was too abstract for 
a number of respondents, since social (private) tenants might not have any 
opinion at all about the private (social) rented sector, giving these respond-
ents the feeling that the research does not relate to them. This problem was 
anticipated beforehand, which is why the category ‘I don’t know’ was provid-
ed for all propositions on tenure-specific beliefs, perceptions, attitudes, and 
moving intentions. Notwithstanding the increasing reliability of the survey 
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by giving this option, it seems that the sample size could not be improved 
through this measure. 
Table C.1 presents a first overview of the sample and its key dependent and 
control variables.
Sample of social renters in Coventry
The empirical data for this appendix were collected between December 2011 
and January 2012. Midland Heart Housing Association sent one questionnaire 
to each of its 2,000 social housing addresses in Coventry by postal mail. No 
presampling of respondents took place. In total, 168 usable questionnaires 
were returned, leading to a very low response rate of 8.4 per cent. Similar to 
the survey in Breda, it can only be assumed that the complexity of the ques-
tionnaire might have contributed to the low response. Another reason might 
be that no reminders were sent to the participants. 
The outline of the questionnaire was identical to the one that was used in 
Coventry, meaning that it contained five main parts: The current housing sit-
uation, the housing career, moving plans and housing preferences, attitudes 
towards and perceptions of social and private renting, personal information. 
Since the target population was social tenants only several questions became 
redundant (e.g. ‘Who is your landlord?’). Generally, the English version was a 
translation of the Dutch questionnaire; however, giving attention to the spe-
cific terminology of housing and living in England, some questions needed to 
be rephrased and several answering categories needed to be adapted. To guar-
antee a high reliability of the survey, three native speakers with a background 
in housing and survey research checked a draft version of the questionnaire. 
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Explanation of background factors as independent variables for the survey 
in Breda
 ▪ Age was included as a continuous variable. 
 ▪ Gender is a categorical variable and was included as a dummy variable 
(Female = 0, Male = 1). 
 ▪ Income was constructed as a categorical variable: Lower-income households 
with a net income of below €1,850 per month, middle-income households 
with a net income of between €1,850 and €2,650 per month, and higher-
income households with a net household income of more than €2,650 per 
month. These classes were not randomly chosen but approximate the clas-
sification of social housing target groups in the Netherlands. Lower-income 
households (income group 1) in this study thus correspond to the new tar-
get group of social housing (maximum taxable of about €33,600 per year) 
(see Chapter 2). Middle-income households (maximum taxable income of 
about €41,000 per year) correspond to those households that are allegedly 
excluded from social housing consumption by the new rules of social hous-
ing allocation (see Priemus & Gruis, 2011). Income categories were estimat-
ed for 140 missing cases through the nearest neighbour method (Freuden-
berg, 2002) – comparators were household composition, source of income, 
work hours per week of respondent and partner if existent, level of educa-
tion of respondent and partner if existent, and gender. 
 ▪ Main source of household income was constructed as a categorical variable (1 
= from employment, 0 = not from employment). In the survey a distinction 
was made between four groups (from employment, from pension, from stu-
dent loans or grants, from unemployment or other social benefits). Howev-
er, to increase the reliability of the statistical examination, the latter three 
categories were merged into one ‘not from employment category’. 
 ▪ Household composition was included as a three-way categorical variable (1 = 
single household, 2 = multi-person without children, multi-person house-
hold with children = 3).
 ▪ Current tenure: To repeat, this study is based on the allocation mechanisms 
as the defining criterion of current tenure (see Chapter 1). Based on this 
definition it was fairly easy to classify social renters in the sample, since 
all tenants who rent with a housing association landlord in the regulated 
sector (< €652 net rent pcm) have accessed their current dwelling through 
the social housing allocation waiting list. In principle, all other respondents 
who provided information on who their landlord is and how much net rent 
they pay every month could be classified as private renters. In reality, how-
ever, the private rented category actually contains three groups: Firstly, ten-
ants renting a dwelling with a private landlord in the deregulated sector; 
secondly, tenants who rent with a private landlord in the regulated sector; 
and thirdly, tenants who rent with housing association in the deregulated 
sector. It would be imprecise to put these three groups together, since they 
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live under different housing conditions with regard to security of tenure, 
rent regulation, and the services they receive from their landlord. To do jus-
tice to such nuances, current tenure is not coded as a numerical variable, 
but as a categorical variable with four categories: 1 = social tenant; 2 = pri-
vate tenant renting with a private landlords in the deregulated sector; 3 = 
private tenant renting with a housing association in the deregulated sec-
tor1; 4 = private tenant renting with a private landlord in the regulated sec-
tor. 
 ▪ Experience with renting socially and experience with renting privately were con-
structed as categorical variables (No = 0/Yes = 1). Respondents were asked 
whether they had lived in a social/private rental dwelling in the last ten 
years (not earlier than 2001), irrespective of their current tenancy. A positive 
relation between existing experiences in both rental tenures with tenure-
specific attitudes and perceptions might be assumed, since tenants have 
shown the willingness to substitute the two tenure forms in the past. How-
ever, it could also be the case that this tenure change was involuntarily or 
that negative experiences were made, which could lead to a negative rela-
tion. 
 ▪ Housing satisfaction was used as continuous variable. In the questionnaire, 
tenants were asked to evaluate their satisfaction with their current dwell-
ing and their current dwelling environment (neighbourhood) on two five-
point Likert scales (Likert, 1932) with very satisfied/very unsatisfied as end-
points. Housing satisfaction was then recoded into the mean of these two 
scores.
1 Coding housing association tenants as private tenants who rent with an association in the deregulated sector 
was controlled for length of residency. Only in the last 5-10 years have housing associations in Breda begun to 
provide accommodation in the deregulated rental sector. Accordingly, if housing association tenants had rented 
their dwelling for more than five years and their monthly net rent exceeded the deregulation threshold only mar-
ginally, they were recoded into social tenants, as it is presumed that their rent level has gradually moved into the 
deregulated sector and they started their tenancy through the social housing allocation system. Recoding was 
done for 12 tenants, but it is acknowledged that there is a small margin of error in this recoding principle. 
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The questionnaire among social tenants in Coventry <tkp3>C.4 The questionnaire among social tenants in Coventry  
 
1 Current housing situation  
 
We would like to start this questionnaire with a couple of questions about your current housing 
situation.  
 
1. Yourself included, how many people do permanently live in your household?  
 1  2  3  4   5 more than 5   
 
2. How many of these are younger than 18 years?  
 0   1  2  3  more than 3   
 
3. What is the composition of your household?  
 One-person household 
 Lone parent with children living at home 
 Couple with children living at home 
 Couple, no children living at home 
 Other multi-person household 
 Other, ___________________ 
 Don’t know 
 
4. What is your position in the household? 
 Head of household (your name is in the rental contract)    
 Partner of head of household  
 Child living at home    
 Other, ___________________ 
 Don’t know 
 
5. In what type of accommodation do you live? 
 Single-family house (terraced, semi-detached, detached) 
 Multi-family building (apartment, flat, studio, maisonette)  
 Non-self-contained accommodation (kitchen and/or bathroom are shared with other households) 
 Other, ___________________ 
 Don’t know 
 
6. How many bedrooms does your accommodation have? (A studio with a joint living- and bedroom 
counts as 0 bedrooms) 
 0   1  2  3  4   more than 4  
 
7. In which period was your accommodation built?  
 Before 1900    Between 1901 and 1945  Between 1946 and 1960 
 Between 1961 and 1980  Between 1981 and 2000  After 2000  








The following two questions are about your overall satisfaction with your current housing situation 
 
8. How satisfied are you with your current dwelling?  
 Very satisfied     Mostly satisfied  
 Not satisfied, not unsatisfied   Mostly unsatisfied  
 Very unsatisfied   Don’t know  
 
9. How satisfied are you with your current residential environment/neighbourhood?  
 Very satisfied     Mostly satisfied  
 Not satisfied, not unsatisfied   Mostly unsatisfied  
 Very unsatisfied   Don’t know  
 
The following questions are about your housing costs 
10. What is the monthly rent of your current accommodation, excluding service charges and utility 
bills? 
£ ___________________ per calendar month  
 Don’t know 
 
11. What is the total monthly payment for your current accommodation? (Including service charges 
and utility bills) 
£ ___________________ per calendar month  
 Don’t know 
 
12. Do you receive Housing Benefit?  
 Yes, I receive Housing Benefit  
 No, I don’t receive Housing Benefit (continue with question 15) 
 Don’t know 
 
13. How much Housing Benefit do you receive?  
£ ___________________ per calendar month 
 Don’t know 
 
14. In which way do you receive Housing Benefit?  
 My landlord receives the Housing Benefit payment and subtracts it from the rent  
 Directly from the Council 
 Don’t know 
 
15. Do you think that the rent for your current accommodation is too low, exactly what it should be, 
or too high?  
 Too low      Too high 










16. Assume that you could move to your ideal property: How much total rent per calendar month 
(including service charges and utility bills) would you be willing to pay for it?  
£ ___________________ per calendar months  
 Don’t know 
 As much as is covered by Housing Benefit 
 
 
2 Your previous accommodation  
 
In the following we would like to ask you some questions over your housing career, i.e. your 
previous accommodation 
 
17. For how long you have been living in your current accommodation?  
 Less than 2 years  2 to 5 years  
 6 to 10 years   More than 10 years (continue with question 25)  
 
18. Was the household composition identical to your current household; i.e. the same number of 
persons and the same persons? 
 Yes (continue with question 20) 
 No  
 
19. What was the household composition of your previous accommodation?  
 One-person household 
 Lone parent with children living at home 
 Couple with children living at home 
 Couple, no children living at home 
 Other multi-person household 
 Other, ___________________ 
 Don’t know 
 
20. Was your previous accommodation rental housing or an owner-occupied dwelling? 
 Owner-occupied (continue with question 24) 
 Rental  
 
21. Who was the landlord of your previous accommodation?  
 Social landlord (housing association, local authority) 
 Private Company  
 Private person 
 Letting agent 
 Other, ___________________ 
 Don’t know 
 
22. How much of total rent (including service charges and utility bills) did you pay for your previous 
accommodation?  
£ ___________________ per calendar month (continue with question 24) 





23. Could you indicate whether the total rent of your previous accommodation was higher, lower, or 
exactly the same as in your current accommodation?  
 Higher   Lower   Exactly the same 
 
24. What were the most important reasons for your last move to a new dwelling? (Tick all that apply) 
 Due to work      Education-related reasons 
 I wanted to move in with my partner   Health-related reasons 
 I wanted to live near my parents / friends  Due to my age 
 Breaking up of my relationship    I wanted to pay less rent 
 Wanted to have better accommodation    I wanted a larger dwelling  
 Changes in the composition of the household  
 I was unsatisfied with my previous landlord 
 I wanted to have a smaller dwelling 
 I wanted to move to another neighbourhood 
 I wanted to stay but had to move out (e.g. eviction through landlord or demolition of the previous 
dwelling) 
 Other, ___________________ 
 
25. Did you ever live in private rental accommodation? 
 Yes, in the last ten years   Yes, but more than ten years ago 
 No      Don’t know 
 
 
3 Moving intentions and housing preferences  
 
The following questions are about your moving intentions or plans, as well as your housing 
preferences  
 
26. Are you planning to move to a new dwelling in the next two years? 
 No       (continue with question 27)  
 I would like to, but cannot find a new place  (continue with question 28)  
 Maybe yes      (continue with question 29) 
 Yes       (continue with question 29)  
 
27. You indicated that you are not planning to move to a new dwelling. What are the most important 
reasons for you not to move? (Tick all that apply)  
 I moved to my current accommodation recently  
 I am satisfied with my current housing situation  
 I like my current dwelling  
 I like my neighbourhood  
 The housing market is highly unstable, so I want to wait a bit longer before I move 
 Other, ___________________ 
 Don’t know 







28. You indicated that you would like to move but cannot find new accommodation? What are the 
most important reasons that you have not found a new place? (Tick all that apply) 
 I have not searched seriously enough 
 The available places were too expensive  
 Due to my income I was not able to afford the dwellings I was interested in 
 I did not like the dwellings that had been available 
 There is not enough on offer in neighbourhoods, where I would like to live  
 I was not long enough on the waiting list for social housing to be eligible for dwellings that were 
available  
 I have not seen a single dwelling that has met my expectations  
 Other, ___________________ 
 Don’t know 
 
29. When would you like to move?  
 I found a new home already   Within 6 months  
 Between 6 months and 1 year    Between 1 to 2 years 
 Although I want to move I do not have an exact plan yet 
 Don’t know 
 
30. Have you done anything specific to find new accommodation? (Tick all that apply) 
 Yes, I studied the housing offers in the newspaper, on property websites, etc.  
 Yes, I gathered some information on available dwellings at letting agents  
 Yes, I (or my partner) went to a flat viewing  
 Yes, I asked my current landlord 
 Yes, something else – please specify ___________________  
 No 
 Don’t know  
 
31. What are the most important reasons that you would like to move? (Tick all that apply) 
 Due to work       Education-related reasons 
 Move in with my partner     Due to my age 
 I want to live near my parents / friends    Health-related reasons 
 Breaking up of my relationship     
 Changes in the composition of the household 
 I want to pay less rent     
 I want to have better accommodation  
 I want to have a larger dwelling    
 I want to have a smaller dwelling 
 I want to move to another neighbourhood 
 I am unsatisfied with my current landlord 
 I want to buy a dwelling and become an owner-occupier 
 I want to stay but have to move out (e.g. eviction through landlord or demolition of the previous 
dwelling) 







32. Which sources do you normally use when you try to get information about available 
accommodation? (Tick all that apply) 
 Ads in the classified section of the newspaper     
 Showcase of letting agencies 
 On property websites such as rightmove.co.uk 
 On websites of letting agents directly  
 On websites of housing associations and websites that show their joint housing offer such as 
coventryhomefinder.com 
 At the information desk of housing associations 
 Other, ___________________ 
 I don’t do that  
 Don’t know 
 
33. Assume that you are moving to a new dwelling (not considering what your actual moving 
intentions are): Given your current financial situation, which kind of housing would you prefer? 
 Owner-occupied dwelling    Social rental dwelling  
 Private rental dwelling   Don’t know 
 
 
The next questions are about possible moving intentions (within the rental sector). Here we always 
distinguish between a social rental dwelling (dwelling from a housing association) and a private 
rental dwelling (dwelling from a private landlord). 
 
34. Could you please indicate how likely the following proposition are for you?  
(Please, make a clear cross in the box; the numbers are for your orientation: 1 = very unlikely, 7 = very 
likely) 
 
                                                        Very unlikely                         Very likely 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I expect that my next dwelling will be a social 
rental dwelling 
       
I expect that my next dwelling will be a private 
rental dwelling 
       
 
                    34b. And how strong do you agree with the following propositions?  
                                                   
                                                    Strongly disagree                                                                                 Strongly agree 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I would like my next dwelling to be a social 
rental dwelling 
       
I would like my next dwelling to be a private 
rental dwelling 
       
I intend to move to a social rental dwelling         
I intend to move to a private rental dwelling         
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The next questions are about the characteristics of rental accommodation that are important for 
your housing choices. 
 
35. Choosing a new dwelling depends on several aspects. Could you please indicate how important 
each of the following aspects is when you decide about moving to a new dwelling? 
 
                                                   Not important at all   Very 
 important 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The size of the dwelling        
The quality of the dwelling         
The total rent of the dwelling        
The maintenance of the dwelling         
The reputation of the neighbourhood        
The quality of the neighbourhood        
Additional costs when a new dwelling is rented 
(e.g. letting agent fees, deposit)  
       
  
                                                    Not important at all 
Very  
important 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
A large offer of available dwellings from which I 
can choose one  
       
Security to stay in the dwelling on a long-term 
basis  
       
The opinions of people who are important to 
me about the dwelling  
       
How soon the dwelling will be available         














35b. Is there another aspect that we have forgotten but is important for your decision on whether 




How important is this aspect? 
Not important at all                                            very important 
 No other aspect  
 
4 Opinions of social and private renting 
 
The following questions are about your opinions of and your attitudes towards renting a social 
housing dwelling and renting a private rental dwelling. We are primarily interested in your first 
impression, so it is not necessary that you have experience with renting accommodation in both 
rental sectors.  
 
36. First, we would like to get a general impression of your opinion on living in a social or a private 
rental dwelling. Could you please indicate for each row what your feeling is?  
 
I find living in a social rental dwelling:  
bad                       good   Don’t know  
annoying                     nice   Don’t know  
disadvantageous                     advantageous  Don’t know 
boring                         fun    Don’t know 
negative                            positive    Don’t know 
 
I find living in a private rental accommodation:  
bad                       good   Don’t know  
annoying                     nice   Don’t know  
disadvantageous                     advantageous  Don’t know 
boring                         fun    Don’t know 


















37. The following propositions aim to give a more detailed picture of your opinions of living in a social 
rental or private rental dwelling, or the two rental sectors as a whole. Could you please indicate how 
likely you consider each of the following statements?  
 
                                                                 Very unlikely                                   Very likely  
Don’t 
know 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
The quality of social rental dwellings is high         
The quality of private rental dwellings is high         
The quality of the residential environment of social 
rental dwellings is high  
        
The quality of the residential environment of private 
rental dwellings is high 
        
The rent level of social rental accommodation is too 
high  
        
The rent level of private rental accommodation is too 
high 
        
It takes a long time before you can get a social rental 
dwelling  
        
It takes a long time before you can get a private rental 
dwelling  
        
                                                                 Very unlikely                                  Very likely 
Don’t 
know 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
There is a large supply of available dwellings in the 
social rental sector  
        
There is a large supply of available dwellings in the 
private rental sector 
        
The security to be able to stay in a social rental 
dwelling on a long-term basis is high  
        
The security to be able to stay in a private rental 
dwelling on a long-term basis is high 
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                                                                 Very unlikely                           Very likely 
Don’t 
know 
A social rental dwelling is well-maintained by the 
landlord 
        
A private rental dwelling is well-maintained by the 
landlord 
        
Social landlords provide fast and effective repair 
services 
        
Private landlords provide fast and effective repair 
services 
        
 
38. The following statements are about the reputation of social and private rental housing. Do you 
agree with the following statements?  
 
                                                              Strongly disagree                             Strongly agree 
Don’t 
know 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Social tenants often cause problems through e.g. 
antisocial behaviour or nuisance 
        
Private tenants often cause problems through e.g. 
antisocial behaviour or nuisance 
        
As a social tenant you are confronted with a negative, 
discriminating reputation  
        
As a private tenant you are confronted with a negative, 
discriminating reputation  
        
People who are important to me are positive about 
renting a social rental accommodation  
        
People who are important to me are positive about 
renting a private rental accommodation 




39. The following statements are about how you consider your chances to rent accommodation in the 
social and private rental sector. How strong do you agree with the following statements? (Please, 
make a clear cross in the box; the numbers are for your orientation: 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly 
agree) 
 
                                                            Strongly disagree                             Strongly agree 
Don’t 
know 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
One would only rent a social rental dwelling if there 
was no other possibility 
        
One would only rent a private rental dwelling if there 
was no other possibility 
        
It is fairly easy for me to access the social rental sector          
It is fairly easy for me to access the private rental 
sector 
        
The allocation system of social landlords might lead to 
a situation in which I was not eligible to rent an 
available dwelling.  
        
The allocation system of social landlords might lead to 
a situation in which I was not eligible to rent an 
available dwelling.  
        
   
                                                            Strongly disagree                                 Strongly agree 
Don’t 
know 
A social rental dwelling suits my financial possibilities          
A private rental dwelling suits my financial possibilities         
The additional costs (e.g. transaction costs and deposit) 
of renting a new dwelling might lead to a situation 
where I could not afford a social rental dwelling.  
        
The additional costs (e.g. transaction costs and deposit) 
of renting a new dwelling might lead to a situation 
where I could not afford a social rental dwelling.  
        
 
We would like to know a bit more about a very recent development of rental housing markets in 
Coventry, and also the rest of England, namely that housing associations have begun to provide 
private rental accommodation at market rents.  
  
40. Do you think that it is a good development for the rental market in Coventry that housing 
associations offer private rental accommodation at market rents?  
 Yes      Maybe 
 No      Don’t know 
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41. Assume that you have to leave your social rental dwelling and have to move to private rental 
accommodation (for whatever reason). Would you then prefer to rent private rental accommodation 
from a private landlord (private person, private company) or from a housing association 
 I would prefer to rent from a private landlord   (continue with question 42) 
 I would prefer to rent from a housing association  (continue with question 43) 
 It doesn’t make a difference     (continue with question 44) 
 Don’t know 
 
42. Could you specify why you would prefer renting from a private landlord in this case? 
 
 Don’t know any reason  
 
43. Could you specify why you would prefer renting from a housing association in this case?
 
 Don’t know any reason 
 
 
5 Personal information 
 
Finally, we would like to learn more about your personal background. Again, this information will 
be treated confidentially and anonymously. 
 
44. Are you? 
 Male  
 Female 
 
45. What is your age?  
__________________ years 
 
46. In which ethic group do you primarily count yourself?  
 White British    White - Other   Black Caribbean  
 Black African    Indian    Pakistani 
 Bangladeshi     Chinese    Mixed 





47. What is the net monthly income of your household? (including the income of your partner; all 
social security payments, Housing Benefit, and pension payments are considered as income as well)  
£ ___________________per month   (continue with question 49) 
 I don’t want to say    (continue with question 48) 
 I’ don’t know      (continue with question 48) 
 
48. Could you indicate in which category the net monthly income of your household falls? (including 
the income of your partner; all social security payments, Housing Benefit, and pension payments are 
considered as income as well)  
 Less than £500   Between £500 and £1,000 
 Between £1,000 and £1,500  Between £1,500 and £2,000 
 Between £2000 and £2,500  More than £2,500 
 I don’t want to say   Don’t know 
 
49. What is the most important source of income for your household?  
 Income from work    Pension 
 Jobseeker’s allowance    Other Benefit  
 Other, _________________ 
 I don’t want to say   Don’t know 
 
50. How many hours per week do you work?  
 No paid work   1 to 16 hours   16 to 24 hours  
 24 to 32 hours   33 to 40 hours   more than 40 hours  
 
51. How many hours per week does your partner work? (If you are a single-person household, please 
skip this question)  
 No paid work   1 to 16 hours   16 to 24 hours  
 24 to 32 hours   33 to 40 hours   more than 40 hours  
 
52. What us the highest educational qualification you hold?   
 GCE/O level     CSE     GCSEs grades D-G   
 GCSEs grades A-C   Degree   Postgraduate Degree   




53. What is the highest education diploma of your partner?   
 GCE/O level     CSE     GCSEs grades D-G  
 GCSEs grades A-C   Degree   Postgraduate Degree  














<tkp3>C.5 The questionnaire social and private tenants in Breda  
 
1 Uw huidige woonsituatie  
 
We willen deze vragenlijst beginnen met een aantal vragen over uw huidige woonsituatie.  
 
1. Woont u in een huur- of koopwoning? 
 Koopwoning (ga stoppen met de enquête*) 
 Huurwoning  
 Anders, namelijk ___________________ (ga verder met vraag 4) 
 
*Deze vragenlijst is alleen voor huurders in Breda bedoeld. Als u uw huidige woning heeft gekocht, 
kunt u een groot deel van de vragen niet beantwoorden en zijn uw gegevens onterecht in het 
adresbestand terecht gekomen. We willen u hartelijk danken voor uw interesse in dit onderzoek.  
 
2. Van wie huurt u uw woning?  
 Sociale verhuurder (woningcorporatie, woningbouwvereniging, gemeentelijk bedrijf) 
 Belegger, pensioenfonds, verzekeringsmaatschappij  
 Particuliere persoon 
 Makelaar 
 Anders, namelijk ___________________ 
 Weet niet 
 
3. Wat is de naam van uw verhuurder?  
 WonenBreburg  Singleveste AlleeWonen   Laurentius Wonen  
 Anders, namelijk ___________________  
 Weet niet 
 Dat wil ik niet zeggen 
 
4. Uzelf meegerekend, met hoeveel personen woont u in uw woning?  
 1  2   3  4   5  meer dan 5 
 
5. Hoeveel daarvan zijn jonger dan 18 jaar?  
 0  1   2  3   meer dan 3 
 
6. Wat is de samenstelling van uw huishouden?  
 Alleenwonend 
 Echtpaar/vaste partners zonder een of meer thuiswonende kinderen 
 Echtpaar/vaste partners met een of meer thuiswonende kinderen 
 Eenoudergezin  
 Andere samenstelling, namelijk: ___________________ 
 Weet niet 
 
7. Wat is uw positie in dit huishouden? 
 Hoofdbewoner (uw naam staat in het huurcontract)           Partner van hoofdbewoner  
 Thuiswonend kind    
 Anders, namelijk ___________________ 
 Weet niet  
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8. In welk type woning woont u? 
 Eengezinswoning (rijtjeshuis, hoekwoning, twee-onder-een kap, vrijstaand huis) 
 Meergezinswoning (appartement, flat, etage, maisonnette, studio)  
 Wooneenheid met gezamenlijke keuken en/of toilet 
 Anders, namelijk ___________________ 
 Weet niet 
 
9. Hoeveel kamers heeft uw woning? (Keuken, toilet en badkamer, bergruimte niet meegerekend)  
 1  2   3  4   5   meer dan 5 
 
10. In welke periode is uw woning gebouwd?  
 Voor 1900    Tussen 1901 en 1945  Tussen 1946 en 1960 
 Tussen 1961en 1980   Tussen 1981 en 2000  Na 2000  
 Weet niet 
 
11. Heeft u uw woning ongemeubileerd of gemeubileerd gehuurd?  
 Ongemeubileerd     Gemeubileerd  
 Anders, namelijk ___________________ 
 
De volgende twee vragen gaan over de algemeen tevredenheid met uw huidige woonsituatie 
 
12. Hoe tevreden bent u met uw huidige woning?  
 Heel tevreden     Tamelijk tevreden 
 Niet tevreden, niet ontevreden    Tamelijk ontevreden  
 Heel ontevreden     Weet niet  
 
13. Hoe tevreden bent u met uw huidige woonomgeving?  
 Heel tevreden     Tamelijk tevreden 
 Niet tevreden, niet ontevreden    Tamelijk ontevreden  
 Heel ontevreden     Weet niet  
 
De volgende vragen gaan over de kosten van het wonen  
 
14. Wat is de kale huur van uw woning per maand? (Zonder rekening te houden met eventuele 
huurtoeslag; exclusief energie en servicekosten) 
€ ___________________ kale huur per maand  
Dat weet ik niet 
 
15. Wat is de totale huur van uw woning per maand? (Zonder rekening te houden met eventuele 
huurtoeslag; maar inclusief energie en servicekosten) 
€ ___________________ totale huur per maand  
 Dat weet ik niet 
 
16. Ontvangt u huurtoeslag?  
 Ja, ik ontvang huurtoeslag  
 Nee, ik ontvang geen huurtoeslag (ga verder met vraag 19) 




17. Hoeveel huurtoeslag ontvangt u per maand?  
€ ___________________ maandelijkse huurtoeslag  
 Dat weet ik niet  
 
18. Op welke manier ontvang u uw huurtoeslag?  
 De huurtoeslag wordt door de verhuurder in mindering gebracht op de huur 
 Rechtstreeks van het Rijk of de gemeente 
 Dat weet ik niet  
 
19. Vindt u dat u in uw huidige woning goedkoop, te duur of voor precies de juiste prijs woont? 
 Goedkoop     Te duur 
 Precies de juiste prijs     Weet niet 
 
20. Stel dat de kwaliteit van uw huidige woning/woonomgeving wordt verbeterd of dat u naar een 
voor u beter geschikte huurwoning verhuist. Welk bedrag bent u dan maximaal bereid om 
maandelijks aan totale huur (inclusief energie- en servicekosten) uit te geven?  
€ ___________________ totale huur per maand  
 Dat weet ik niet 
 
 
2 Uw wooncarrière  
 
In het volgende deel willen we u vragen over uw wooncarrière stellen. Daarmee bedoelen we dat 
we meer zouden willen weten over uw huidige woning en eventuele vorige woning.  
 
21. Kunt u ongeveer aangeven hoe lang u al in uw huidige woning woont?  
 Minder dan 2 jaar   2 tot en met 5 jaar  
 6 tot en met 10 jaar   Meer dan 10 jaar (ga verder met vraag 29)  
 
De volgende vragen gaan over uw vorige woning.  
 
22. Was de samenstelling van het huishouden in uw vorige woning hetzelfde als nu, d.w.z. hetzelfde 
aantal personen én dezelfde personen? 
 Ja (ga verder met vraag 24) 
 Nee  
 
23. Wat was de samenstelling van uw huishouden toen?  
Alleenwonend 
Echtpaar/vaste partners zonder een of meer thuiswonende kinderen 
Echtpaar/vaste partners met een of meer thuiswonende kinderen 
Eenoudergezin  
 Ik woonde thuis bij mijn ouders/andere familieleden  
Andere samenstelling, namelijk: ___________________ 
Weet niet 
 
24. Was uw vorige woning een huurwoning of een koopwoning?  
 Koopwoning (ga verder met vraag 28) 
 Huurwoning  
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25. Van wie huurde u uw vorige woning?  
 Sociale verhuurder (woningcorporatie, woningbouwvereniging, gemeentelijk bedrijf) 
 Belegger, pensioenfonds, verzekeringsmaatschappij  
 Particuliere persoon  
 Makelaar 
 Anders, namelijk ___________________ 
 Weet niet 
 
26. Hoeveel bedroeg de totale huur van de vorige woning per maand vlak voor de verhuizing? 
(inclusief servicekosten en energiekosten; zonder rekening te houden met huurtoeslag)  
€ ___________________ totale huur per maand  (ga verder met vraag 28) 
 Weet niet   (ga verder met vraag 27) 
 
27. Kunt u aangeven of de totale huur van de vorige woning per maand vlak voor de verhuizing hoger, 
lager of precies hetzelfde was als dat u nu betaalt?  
 Hoger   Lager   Precies hetzelfde 
 
28. Wat waren bij uw laatste verhuizing de belangrijkste reden om te gaan verhuizen? (U kunt 
meerdere mogelijkheden kiezen) 
 Vanwege mijn werk       Vanwege mijn opleiding 
 Omdat ik met mijn partner ging samenwonen   Vanwege gezinsuitbreiding 
 Ik wilde nabij mijn familie / vrienden gaan wonen  Vanwege mijn gezondheid 
 Vanwege het verbreken van mijn relatie    Vanwege mijn leeftijd  
 Ik wilde goedkoper wonen     Ik wilde een betere woning  
 Ik wilde een grotere woning     Ik wilde een kleinere woning 
 Ik wilde in een andere woonomgeving wonen 
 Ik was ontevreden met mijn verhuurder (bijv. slechte onderhoud van de woning) 
 Ik had willen blijven wonen, maar moest mijn woning uit (bijvoorbeeld omdat het huurcontract niet 
verlengd werd of door sloop van de woning) 
 Anders, namelijk ___________________ 
 
29. Uw huidige woning niet meegerekend, heeft u ooit een woning van een andere particuliere 
verhuurder (particuliere persoon, belegger/ pensioenfonds/ verzekeringsmaatschappij, makelaar) 
gehuurd?  
 Ja, in de laatste tien jaar   Ja, maar het is langer geleden dan tien jaar 
 Nee      Weet niet 
 
30. Uw huidige woning niet meegerekend, heeft u ooit een woning van een sociale verhuurder 
(woningcorporatie, woningbouwvereniging, gemeentelijk woningbedrijf) gehuurd?  
 Ja, in de laatste tien jaar   Ja, maar het is langer geleden dan tien jaar 










3 Verhuisplannen en woonwensen 
 
De volgende vragen gaan over uw toekomstige verhuisplannen en woonwensen 
 
31. Bent u van plan om binnen twee jaar naar een andere woning te verhuizen? 
 Beslist niet       (ga verder met vraag 32)  
 Misschien wel     (ga verder met vraag 34) 
 Ik zou wel willen, maar kan niets vinden  (ga verder met vraag 33) 
 Ja, beslist wel      (ga verder met vraag 34) 
 Weet niet      (ga verder met vraag 37) 
 
32. U bent niet van plan om te verhuizen. Wat zijn de belangrijkste redenen hiervoor? [u kunt 
meerdere redenen aangeven] 
 Ik ben pas kortgeleden naar mijn huidige woning verhuisd 
 Ik ben tevreden met mijn huidige woningsituatie  
 Ik ben gehecht aan mijn huidige woning  
 Ik ben gehecht aan mijn huidige woonomgeving  
 De woningmarkt zit op slot en ik wil liever afwachten voordat ik ga verhuizen 
 Andere reden, namelijk ___________________ 
 Weet niet  (ga verder met vraag 37) 
 
33. Wat zijn de belangrijkste redenen dat u nog geen woning hebt gevonden? 
[u kunt meerdere redenen aangeven] 
 Ik heb tot nu toe weinig zoekactiviteiten ondernomen  
 De woningen die ik wil, zijn te duur 
 Ik kwam vanwege mijn inkomen niet in aanmerking voor de woningen die ik wilde 
 De woningen voldoen niet aan mijn woonwensen  
 Er is geen of te weinig aanbod in de buurten waar ik wil wonen  
 Ik heb niet genoeg wachttijd opgebouwd om voor geschikte woningen in aanmerking te komen  
 Ik heb nog geen woning gezien die aan mijn eisen voldeed 
 Andere reden, namelijk ___________________ 
 Weet niet  
 
34. Op welke termijn bent u van plan om te gaan verhuizen?  
 Binnen een half jaar    Over een half jaar tot een jaar  
 Over een tot twee jaar   Ik heb nog geen vastomlijnde plannen  
 Weet niet     Ik heb al een nieuwe woning gevonden 
 
35. Heeft u het afgelopen jaar iets ondernomen om aan een andere woning 
te komen? Ook advertenties lezen telt al mee.  
(Meerdere keuzes kunnen gemaakt worden) 
 Ja, ik heb het woningaanbod in kranten, op het internet en dergelijke bestudeerd  
 Ja, ik heb me bij een makelaar laten informeren over beschikbare huurwoningen  
 Ja, ik (of mijn partner) heb een beschikbare woning bezichtigd  
 Nee 





36. Wat zijn voor u belangrijke redenen om te willen verhuizen? 
(Meerdere keuzes kunnen gemaakt worden) 
 Vanwege mijn werk       Vanwege mijn opleiding 
 Omdat ik met mijn partner wil samenwonen   Vanwege gezinsuitbreiding 
 Ik wil nabij mijn familie / vrienden gaan wonen   Vanwege mijn gezondheid 
 Vanwege het verbreken van mijn relatie    Vanwege mijn leeftijd  
 Ik wil in een andere woonomgeving wonen   Ik wil goedkoper wonen 
 Ik wil een betere woning      Ik wil een grotere woning  
 Ik ben ontevreden met mijn verhuurder    Ik wil een kleinere woning 
 Ik wil kopen in plaats van huren  
 Ik wil blijven wonen, maar moet mijn woning uit (bijvoorbeeld omdat het huurcontract niet 
verlengd wordt of vanwege sloop van de woning) 
 Anders, namelijk ___________________ 
 
37. Welke bronnen gebruikt u in het algemeen om u over beschikbare woningen te informeren? 
(Meerdere keuzes kunnen gemaakt worden) 
 Advertenties in de krant     
 Etalage van makelaarskantoren 
 Op internet-woningplatforms zoals funda.nl of pararius.nl  
 Op webpagina’s van makelaars met aanbod van huurwoningen 
 Op webpagina’s met het woningaanbod van (een) woningcorporatie(s) (bijvoorbeeld 
klikvoorwonen.nl of woonloketbreda.nl) 
 Bij de infobalies van (een) woningcorporatie(s) 
 Anders, namelijk ___________________ 
 Doe ik niet 
 Weet niet 
 
38. Kunt u hieronder de instanties aangeven waarbij u staat ingeschreven op de wachtlijst? (Meerdere 
keuzes kunnen gemaakt worden) 
 Een woningcorporatie  
 Een woningbemiddelaar voor een woning van een woningcorporatie  
 Een organisatie voor studentenhuisvesting   (ga verder met vraag 40) 
 Een organisatie voor ouderenhuisvesting   (ga verder met vraag 40) 
 Een particuliere woningbemiddelaar/makelaar  (ga verder met vraag 40) 
 Geen van deze     (ga verder met vraag 40) 
 
39. U staat op de wachtlijst bij een woningbemiddelaar of woningcorporatie ingeschreven. Hoe lang 
staat u ongeveer ingeschreven? 
 Minder dan een jaar    Tussen 1 en 3 jaar  
 Tussen 3 en 5 jaar     Meer dan 5 jaar  
 Weet niet 
 
40. Stel dat u zou gaan verhuizen(onafhankelijk van uw concrete verhuisplannen), waar gaat dan 
gezien uw huidige financiële mogelijkheden uw voorkeur naar uit? 
 Koopwoning      Sociale huurwoning  





De volgende vragen gaan over mogelijke verhuisplannen binnen de huursector. 
Hierbij wordt steeds het onderscheid gemaakt tussen een sociale huurwoning en een particuliere 
huurwoning.  
 
Een sociale huurwoning is een huurwoning die wordt verhuurd door een woningcorporatie en heeft 
een huurprijs van onder € 652 kale huur per maand; dit wordt ook een bereikbare huurwoning 
genoemd.  
 
Een particuliere huurwoning is een huurwoning die wordt verhuurd door een particuliere persoon, een 
makelaar of belegger/pensioenfonds/verzekeringsmaatschappij. 
Ook een woning van een woningcorporatie met een kale huur van hoger dan €652 per maand wordt 
als particuliere huurwoning beschouwd. 
 
41. Wilt u bij de volgende zes stellingen aangeven hoe waarschijnlijk deze mogelijkheden voor u zijn? 
(a.u.b. een duidelijk kruisje in het goede vakje, de nummers zijn maar voor de oriëntatie: 1= zeer 
onwaarschijnlijk, 7= zeer waarschijnlijk) 
 
                                                  zeer onwaarschijnlijk   zeer waarschijnlijk 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ik verwacht dat mijn volgende woning een 
sociale huurwoning is 
       
Ik verwacht dat mijn volgende woning een 
particuliere huurwoning is 
       
                   
41 b. En in hoeverre bent u het eens met de volgende stelling? 
                                                   
                                                    helemaal oneens                                                                                 helemaal eens 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ik wil dat mijn volgende woning een sociale 
huurwoning is 
       
Ik wil dat mijn volgende woning een 
particuliere huurwoning is 
       
Ik ben van plan om naar een sociale 
huurwoning te verhuizen 
       
Ik ben van plan om naar een particuliere 
huurwoning te verhuizen 




De volgende vragen gaan over verschillende kenmerken van woningen, die uw woonkeuzes kunnen 
beïnvloeden  
 
42. De keuze voor een nieuwe woning is afhankelijk van een groot aantal. Kunt u hieronder steeds 
aangeven hoe belangrijk elk van de genoemde punten voor u is bij de keuze voor een nieuwe woning? 
(a.u.b. een duidelijk kruisje in het goede vakje, de nummers zijn maar voor de oriëntatie: 1= helemaal 
niet belangrijk, 7= heel belangrijk) 
 
                                                   helemaal niet belangrijk  heel  
belangrijk 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
De grootte van de woning        
De kwaliteit van de woning         
De totale huurprijs van de woning        
Het onderhoud van de woning         
De reputatie van de buurt        
De kwaliteit van de woonomgeving        
De bijkomende kosten als een nieuwe woning 
word gehuurd (bijvoorbeeld transactiekosten 
en borg)  
       
  
                                                    helemaal niet belangrijk 
heel  
belangrijk 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Een ruim aanbod van verschillende typen 
woningen, waaruit ik uiteindelijk een woning 
mag kiezen  
       
De zekerheid om ook op lange termijn in de 
woning te kunnen blijven wonen 
       
De mening voor mij belangrijke mensen over 
de woning en woonomgeving 
       
De termijn waar binnen u een woning kunt 
krijgen 
       
Een goede en snelle dienstverlening door de 
verhuurder (bijv. als iets repareert moet 
worden)  


















Hoe belangrijk is deze?  
helemaal niet belangrijk                   heel belangrijk 
 
 
4 Meningen over de huursectoren 
 
De volgende vragen gaan over hoe u tegen de huursector aankijkt. Hierbij worden afzonderlijk 
vragen gesteld over de particuliere en sociale huursector, omdat wij graag willen weten hoe u 
tegen beiden aankijkt.  
 
Een sociale huurwoning is een huurwoning die wordt verhuurd door een woningcorporatie en heeft 
een huurprijs van onder € 652 kale huur per maand; dit wordt ook een bereikbare huurwoning 
genoemd. 
 
Een particuliere huurwoning is een huurwoning die wordt verhuurd door een particuliere persoon, een 
makelaar of belegger/pensioenfonds/verzekeringsmaatschappij. 
Ook een woning van een woningcorporatie met een kale huur van hoger dan €652 per maand wordt 
als particuliere huurwoning beschouwd. 
 
43. Eerst willen we een algemeen indruk krijgen van wat u ervan zou vinden om in een sociale of 
particuliere huurwoning te wonen. Wilt u bij de volgende vragen steeds per rij aangeven wat uw 
gevoel is?   
 
Het wonen in een sociale huurwoning van een woningcorporatie vind ik:  
slecht                      goed   Dat weet ik niet  
vervelend                    prettig   Dat weet ik niet  
nadelig                           voordelig  Dat weet ik niet 
onplezierig                       plezierig   Dat weet ik niet 
negatief                           positief    Dat weet ik niet 
 
Het wonen in een particuliere huurwoning van een belegger, particuliere persoon of makelaar vind 
ik:  
slecht                      goed   Dat weet ik niet  
vervelend                    prettig   Dat weet ik niet  
nadelig                           voordelig  Dat weet ik niet 
onplezierig                       plezierig   Dat weet ik niet 




44. De volgende stellingen gaan over uw mening ten aanzien van de sociale en particuliere 
huursector, ofwel het wonen in een sociale of particuliere huurwoning. Kunt u steeds aangeven hoe 
waarschijnlijk u onderstaande situaties vindt? (a.u.b. een duidelijk kruisje in het goede vakje, de 
nummers zijn maar voor de oriëntatie: 1= zeer onwaarschijnlijk, 7= zeer waarschijnlijk) 
 
                                                            zeer onwaarschijnlijk                         zeer waarschijnlijk 
Weet  
niet 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
De kwaliteit van sociale huurwoningen is hoog         
De kwaliteit van particuliere huurwoningen is hoog         
De kwaliteit van de woonomgeving van sociale 
huurwoningen is goed  
        
De kwaliteit van de woonomgeving van particuliere 
huurwoningen is goed 
        
De huurprijzen van sociale huurwoningen zijn in het 
algemeen hoog  
        
De huurprijzen van particuliere huurwoningen zijn in 
het algemeen hoog 
        
Het duurt lang om aan een sociale huurwoning te 
komen 
        
Het duurt lang om aan een particuliere huurwoning te 
komen 
 
        
                                                          zeer onwaarschijnlijk                         zeer waarschijnlijk 
Weet  
niet 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Er is een ruim aanbod van verschillende beschikbare 
typen woningen in de sociale huursector  
        
Er is een ruim aanbod van verschillende beschikbare 
typen woningen in de particuliere huursector  
        
De zekerheid om ook op lange termijn in een sociale 
huurwoning te kunnen blijven wonen is groot  
        
De zekerheid om ook op lange termijn in een 
particuliere huurwoning te kunnen blijven wonen is 
groot 
        
Een sociale huurwoning wordt goed onderhouden 
door de verhuurder 
        
Een particulier huurwoning wordt goed onderhouden 
door de verhuurder 
        
Sociale verhuurders bieden een goede en snelle 
dienstverlening 
        
Particuliere verhuurder bieden een goede en snelle 
dienstverlening 
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45. De volgende stellingen gaan over het imago van de sociale en particuliere huursector. Bent u het 
eens of oneens met de volgende stellingen? (a.u.b. een duidelijk kruisje in het goede vakje, de 
nummers zijn maar voor de oriëntatie: 1= helemaal oneens, 7= helemaal eens) 
 
                                                              helemaal oneens                              helemaal eens 
Weet  
niet 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Sociale huurders veroorzaken vaker problemen (bijv. 
geluidsoverlast)  
        
Particuliere huurders veroorzaken vaker problemen 
(bijv. geluidsoverlast)  
        
Als sociale huurder heb je last van een slechte, 
discriminerende reputatie  
        
Als particuliere huurder heb je last van een slechte, 
discriminerende reputatie 
        
Mensen die voor mij belangrijk zijn, vinden het prima 
als ik in een sociale huurwoning zou wonen  
        
Mensen die voor mij belangrijk zijn, vinden het prima 
als ik in een particuliere huurwoning zou wonen  
        
 
46. De volgende tien stellingen gaan over hoe u uw kansen inschat om een sociale of particuliere 
huurwoning te kunnen huren. In hoeverre bent u het eens met de volgende stellingen? (a.u.b. een 
duidelijk kruisje in het goede vakje, de nummers zijn maar voor de oriëntatie: 1= helemaal oneens, 7= 
helemaal eens) 
                                                            helemaal oneens                               helemaal eens 
Weet  
niet 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Sociaal huren doe je alleen als je niet anders kunt         


















           46b. En hoe waarschijnlijk vindt u de volgende stellingen? 
                                                           zeer onwaarschijnlijk    zeer waarschijnlijk 
Weet  
niet 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Het is makkelijk voor mij om in de sociale huursector te 
komen wonen  
        
Het is makkelijk voor mij om in de particuliere 
huursector te komen wonen  
        
De woningtoewijzing door verhuurders in de sociale 
huursector zouden ertoe kunnen leiden dat ik een 
beschikbare woning niet kan huren 
        
De woningtoewijzing door verhuurders in de 
particuliere huursector zouden ertoe kunnen leiden 
dat ik een beschikbare woning niet kan huren 
        
Een sociale huurwoning valt binnen mijn financiële 
mogelijkheden  
        
Een particuliere huurwoning valt binnen mijn 
financiële mogelijkheden  
        
De bijkomende kosten (bijvoorbeeld transactiekosten 
en borg) als je een sociale huurwoning gaat huren, 
zouden ertoe kunnen leiden dat ik de woning niet kan 
huren  
        
De bijkomende kosten (bijvoorbeeld transactiekosten 
en borg) als je een particuliere huurwoning gaat huren, 
zouden ertoe kunnen leiden dat ik de woning niet kan 
huren  
 
        
 
We zouden nu graag naar uw mening willen vragen over een vrij recentelijk ontwikkeling op de 
huurmarkt in Breda, namelijk het ontwikkelen van duurdere huurwoningen (met een kale huurprijs 
van meer dan € 652 per maand) door woningcorporaties.  
 
47. Vindt u het een goede ontwikkeling voor de woningmarkt in Breda dat woningcorporaties zijn 
begonnen met het aanbieden van duurdere huurwoningen (een kale huurprijs van meer dan € 652 
per maand)?  
 Ja      Misschien 
 Nee      Weet niet 
 
48. Stel dat u een niet-gesubsidieerde, duurdere woning (een woning met een kale huur van meer 
dan € 652 per maand) zou moeten huren. Zou het dan voor u uitmaken of de woning door een 
particuliere verhuurder of een woningcorporatie wordt verhuurd? 
 Ik zou liever van een particuliere verhuurder willen huren  (ga verder met vraag 49) 
 Ik zou liever van een woningcorporatie willen huren  (ga verder met vraag 50) 
 Het maakt geen verschil      (ga verder met vraag 51) 
 Weet niet  
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49. Kunt u een of meerdere redenen noemen waarom u liever voor een duurdere, niet 
gesubsidieerde woning van een particuliere verhuurder in plaats van een corporatiewoning zou 
kiezen? 
 
 Weet niet  
 
49b. Als u al in een duurdere, niet gesubsidieerde woning van een particuliere verhuurder in plaats 
van een corporatiewoning woont, kunt u dan een of meerdere redenen aangeven waarom u voor 
deze woning hebt gekozen? 
 
 Weet niet  
 
50. Kunt u een of meerdere redenen noemen waarom u liever een duurdere, niet gesubsidieerde 
woning van een woningcorporatie in plaats van een woning van een particuliere verhuurder zou 
kiezen? 
 
 Weet niet  
 
50b. Als u al in een duurdere, niet gesubsidieerde woning van een woningcorporatie in plaats van een 
woning van een particuliere verhuurder woont, kunt u dan een of meerdere redenen aangeven 
waarom u voor deze woning hebt gekozen? 
 
 Weet niet  
 
5 Persoonlijke gegevens 
 
Tot slot willen we nog een aantal persoonlijke gegevens aan u vragen. We kunnen daarmee 
bijvoorbeeld onderzoeken of er verschillen zijn tussen mannen of vrouwen bij het beantwoorden 
van de vragen, of de verschillen tussen huishoudens met een hogere inkomen en zulke met een 
lagere inkomen.  
 
51. Bent u:  









52. Wat is uw leeftijd?  
Aantal jaren  ___________________ 
 
53. Tot welke bevolkingsgroep rekent u zichzelf vooral?  
 Nederlands    Surinaams   Antilliaans/Arubaans  
 Indonesisch    Turks    Marokkaans 
 Ander ‘westers’ land   Ander ‘niet-westers’ land 
 
54. Wat is het netto maandinkomen van uw huishouden (dus inclusief het eventuele inkomen van uw 
eventuele partner)? (een uitkering, studiebeurs, pensioen, AOW en alimentatie worden ook als 
inkomen beschouwd; vakantiegeld wordt niet meegeteld)  
€ ___________________per maand  (ga verder met vraag 56) 
 Dat wil ik niet zeggen   (ga verder met vraag 55) 
 Dat weet ik niet    (ga verder met vraag 55) 
 
55. Wilt u dan de categorie aangeven waar binnen het netto maandinkomen van uw huishouden (dus 
inclusief het eventuele inkomen van uw eventuele partner) ligt? (een uitkering, studiebeurs, 
pensioen, AOW en alimentatie worden ook als inkomen beschouwd; vakantiegeld wordt niet 
meegeteld) 
 Minder dan € 1.050    tussen € 1.050 en € 1.450 
 tussen € 1.450 en € 1.850   tussen € 1.850 en € 2.250 
 tussen € 2.250 tot € € 2.650   tussen € 2.650 tot € 3.050 
 meer dan € 3.050    Dat wil ik niet zeggen 
 Dat weet ik niet  
 
56. Wat is de belangrijkste bron van inkomen van uw huishouden?  
 Inkomen uit arbeid     Pensioen/AOW 
 Studiebeurs      Overige uitkeringen  
 Anders, namelijk _________________ 
 Dat wil ik niet zeggen   Dat weet ik niet  
 
57. Hoeveel uur betaald werk verricht u per week?  
 Geen betaalde baan    1 tot 12 uur     13 tot 24 uur  
 25 tot 32 uur      33 tot 40 uur     meer dan 40 uur  
 
 
58. Hoeveel uur betaald werk verricht uw eventuele partner per week?  
(overslaan indien geen partner in het huishouden) 
 Geen betaalde baan    1 tot 12 uur     13 tot 24 uur  
 25 tot 32 uur      33 tot 40 uur     meer dan 40 uur  
 
59. Wat is uw hoogst voltooide opleiding?  
 Geen      Lagere school, basisschool 
 LBO (LTS LEAO, LHNO, etc.)   MAVO/MULO 
 HAVO     MBO 
 VWO, Atheneum, Gymnasium, HBS  HBO 
 Universitaire opleiding    Andere opleiding in het buitenland 
 Weet niet     Weigert 
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60. Wat is de hoogst voltooide opleiding van uw eventuele partner? (overslaan indien geen partner in 
het huishouden) 
 Geen      Lagere school, basisschool 
 LBO (LTS LEAO, LHNO, etc.)   MAVO/MULO 
 HAVO     MBO 
 VWO, Atheneum, Gymnasium, HBS  HBO 
 Universitaire opleiding    Andere opleiding in het buitenland 
 Weet niet     Weigert 
 
61. Heeft u nog opmerkingen die voor dit onderzoek van belang kunnen zijn?  
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In the context of shifting regulatory approaches and changing provision 
structures in many Western rental housing systems, the notion of 
competition between social and private rental housing has received 
increasing attention from practitioners and academic researchers. 
This thesis explores and theorises the concept of inter-tenure 
competition in order to advance understanding of what it means 
in local and national market realities, as well as in business and 
political practices. Results indicate that competition in mixed markets 
is a complex matter, much of which is explained by the distinctive 
properties of social and private rental services. Inter-tenure competition 
is shown to be the interplay of structural and political conditions, 
individual and organisational business goals, and the perceptions and 
strategic decisions of both providers and consumers. The results suggest 
that the degree of competition relates to specific points in time and 
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